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Senate Select Committee on 
Developmental Disabilities and Mental Health 
Wesley Chesbro, Chair 
Review of the Federal Department of Justice Investigation of 
California State Mental Health Hospitals 
State Capitol, Room 4203 
Tuesday, September 20, 2005 
SENATOR WESLEY CHESBRO: This is a hearing of the Senate Select 
Committee on Developmental Disabilities and Mental Health. 
Today we are going to be talking about the investigations in our state hospital 
system by the United States Department of Justice. In both their reviews of the 
children's and adult programs at Metropolitan State Hospital in Southern Califomia, 
as well as the more recent review in Napa State Hospital, the Department of Justice 
found significant and substantial deficiencies in virtually every aspect of patient care. 
Sadly, this is not the first time such concerns have been raised. And sadly and 
alarmingly, since the issuance of these reports, problems have continued, including 
suicides and homicide. 
Additionally, as noted in the report on Napa State Hospital, the Department of 
Justice has alleged that the state denied them access in conducting their review. This 
is an alarming accusation that needs to be addressed and is one of the purposes of 
today's hearing. 
Our goal today is to understand the issues raised in the Department of Justice 
report, of the department's response to them, what we must do to improve the quality 
of care in these facilities, and what the implications are if we don't improve the care. I 
hope we can have a frank discussion about what it will take on all of our parts to 
create the kind of safe and positive environment I know we all strive for in our state 
hospitals. And in fact, I represent the right of patients to have that type of positive 
environment. 
We have a very tight agenda, so 111 ask everyone to stay focused and on topic. I 
also want to mention, we've had some questions-or I won't say criticisms but 
concerns expressed-about why we are holding the hearing here rather than at one of 
the hospitals. I thought it was very important that we stay focused on the problems 
throughout the system and not just be focused on an individual state hospital, and so 
that's the reason why we're holding the hearing here in the capitol rather than at Napa 
or Metropolitan. 
We will begin by working through the current agenda which is available in the 
back of the room, if you haven't received a copy. We will follow that with public 
comment. If you want to present public testimony and are not on the current agenda, 
you must complete a Request to Testify form which is also available in the back of the 
room and give it to one of the sergeants, the sergeants now walking around. Oh, here. 
Here we go. The sergeants are right over here. Raise your hand, yes. 
Other members may be joining us throughout the hearing. I hope they do. All 
materials from this hearing, including your written testimony and a transcript of the 
oral testimony, will be provided to the members and be available to the public. 
With that, let me ask Steve Mayberg and John Rodriguez to come to the witness 
table, although we are beginning with a summary by Agnes Lee of the Senate Office of 
Research who will begin by going through and summarizing the allegations from the 
federal investigation. 
Ms. Lee. 
MS. AGNES LEE: Thank you. I do have a handout, which I hope you have a 
copy of, which I'll be using to walk through. 
I did want to start out with just a brief description of the authority for which the 
Department of Justice is conducting these investigations, and it's under the authority 
of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. And the act authorizes the U.S. 
Department of Justice to initiate civil actions against state or local governments for 
violations of civil rights of persons residing in certain public institutions. 
The Department of Justice takes actions to remedy systemic problems that they 
find related to what they call a pattern or practice of violations. That is to say, rather 
than addressing individual cases, they're really looking at what's going on 
systematically. The process for resolving issues is that at least 49 days before 
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initiating a civil action, they must provide the state or local government with their 
findings related to the alleged violations, their supporting facts, and their 
recommended corrective measures. Just to note, the vast majority of their 
investigations that result in violations also resulted in voluntary or court-enforced 
settlements to correct the situation. 
Just a quick overview, the recent investigations in California for our state 
mental health hospitals, at Metropolitan State Hospital, the Department of Justice 
issued their findings letters for the children's program in May of 2003, the adult 
program in February 2004, and more recently for Napa State Hospital in June 2005, 
and currently, investigations for Patton State Hospital and Atascadero State Hospital 
are in progress. 
I believe you have a copy of the Department of Justice findings letters which are 
quite detailed in the examples they use and the evidence that they cite to come up 
with their findings, and they also list some corrective measures for the State. What 
I'm going to do, because there's so many topics to cover, is just really provide a brief 
summary of just the findings that they came up with in their letters, and I'll start with 
the children's program at Metropolitan. 
The Department of Justice visited the facility in June, a couple of weeks in 
June I July of 2002, and their investigation included a review of medical and other 
records of about 70 patients, interviews with administrators and staff, speaking with 
patients, and on-site surveys. And they brought with them their own team of experts 
in child psychiatry, child psychology, psychiatric nursing, and special education. 
So let me jump into the findings in the area of psychiatry. In their findings 
letters, they say that Metropolitan fails to provide clinically justified evaluations and 
diagnoses of psychiatric disorders. They go onto to say that the number of clinically 
and justified diagnoses strongly indicates that psychiatrists deliberately make 
psychiatric diagnoses to justify the use of psychotropic medication. 
Next, Metropolitan fails to provide adequate and appropriate treatment 
planning. They say that because the hospital fails to evaluate or diagnose its patients 
adequately, that it's nearly impossible for them to come up with appropriate treatment 
plans. One of the examples they cite is that the plans didn't include any treatment 
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for, or acknowledgement of, the fact that the patients had severe traumatization and 
had multiple out-of-home placements. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Multiple-I'm sorry? 
MS. LEE: Out-of-home placements. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Out-of-home placements. 
MS. LEE: They said Metropolitan fails to identify and address cognitive and 
academic deficits. The hospital fails to prescribe clinically justified psychotropic 
medications. An example they give is that the patients were prescribed medications 
that were appropriate for adults but not for children. They also say that the hospital 
fails to appropriately assess the side effects of medications and that they fail to provide 
appropriate therapeutic environments. 
In the area of nursing care, they stated that the nursing and unit staff failed to 
identify, monitor, and report patients' symptoms and side effects of medications. The 
staff are unfamiliar with mental health diagnoses, associated symptoms, and 
appropriate treatments and interventions. The staff lacked knowledge regarding their 
patients. Staff do not meaningful participate in the treatment team process. They 
also note their observations that of many of the nursing and unit staff appeared to 
lack adequate support, training, and supervision. 
Next, in the area of psychology, they stated that the psychological evaluations 
are inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable. Active treatment interventions are too 
infrequent, are of inadequate quality, and are insufficiently documented. Metropolitan 
provides inadequate behavioral interventions. 
Then in the area of restraints and seclusions and as-needed medications, they 
found that children are exposed to excessive use of seclusion and restraints andjor 
as-needed medications. They did say that staff-their observation was that staff used 
seclusion, restraints, and medications in the absence of adequate treatment and/ or as 
punishment. 
They said Metropolitan does not provide adequate pharmacy services. They 
failed to provide necessary medical care. They do not complete systemic tracking or 
trending of infections or communicable diseases. They do not ensure timely and 
appropriate dental care, and even that their documentation for dental services are not 
complete. 
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In the area of dietary or nutrition services, they stated that the hospital does not 
implement meaningful interventions to address children's weight problems. They 
point to estimates that 80 percent of the children patients there are obese and that 
many of the medications that the children receive exacerbate their weight problems. 
The area of placement at the most integrated setting, they said that 
Metropolitan fails to actively pursue the timely discharge of children to the most 
integrated, appropriate setting that is consistent with the child's needs. They stated 
that the hospital did not have a mechanism to identify and review the patients that 
had extremely lengthy hospitalizations, that the treatment plans failed to clearly 
identify barriers to discharge to the most integrated setting, and that the actions of the 
staff where the patient needs to overcome the barriers were not included. 
In the area of special education, they found that the hospital does not provide 
specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed. They also 
noted that the hospital did not make a meaningful assessment as to whether the child, 
with the appropriate supports, could actually attend or receive some school activities 
along with non-institutionalized children. 
In the area of protection from harm, they noted that the facility had a number of 
environmental hazards, including fixtures which patients could use to commit suicide. 
They also noted that the incident management system was deficient, including 
concerns about their tracking, about tracking of incidents, the quality of those 
investigations for those incidents, and implementations of corrective actions. 
And finally, they did raise an issue regarding the patients' constitutional rights 
of free speech and due process. And this stems from the fact that state 
representatives were present in all of the Department of Justice's staff discussions 
with the patients, and they found that in this way that the state actually constrained 
the patients' civil rights. So that's the children's program. 
I'm going to move onto the adult program, and you '11 find that a lot of the areas 
are very similar. Again, they visited the facility in June/July of 2002. They looked at 
records of about 150 patients, adult patients there. And along with their team of 
experts, they also brought in consultants and incident management and quality 
assurance. 
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Again, in the treatment planning area, they found that the hospital did not 
provide a comprehensive, integrated plan for the provision of treatment addressing 
individual patient needs. Some of the examples that they gave were that the diagnoses 
listed on the treatment plan often differed from the diagnoses listed in the physician 
documentation section of the patient's chart. Treatment interventions are arbitrarily 
and indiscriminately determined and implemented. Documentation reflects that 
patients do not meaningfully participate in their treatments. Treatment teams are 
often uncoordinated, disorganized, and unstable, and that the hospital had no 
mechanism to address patients' risk factors. 
In the areas of assessments, they noted that psychiatrists routinely diagnose 
their adult patients as having psychiatric disorders without clinical justification. 
Psychological assessments and evaluations, with a few exceptions, are inaccurate, 
incomplete, and uninformative. 
Rehabilitation assessments typically fail to address a patient's rehabilitation 
needs. Most social history evaluations contained significant factual omissions, 
apparent errors, or unresolved internal inconsistencies. 
The hospital also prepares court reports for assessing patients committed due to 
a "not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity" status, which are supposed to help the court 
decide whether or not to release the patient to a lower level of care, and they found 
that the format and content of those court reports failed to provide the court with 
adequate and accurate information. 
Again, in the area of discharge planning, they said that the hospital fails to 
provide adequate, individualized discharge planning that is integrated in treatment 
decisions. For example, they said that the causes of previously failed discharges or 
reasons for the patients' admission to a psychiatric institution were seldom considered 
or addressed. 
Getting into the specific treatment services, they found that the psychiatrists 
failed to exercise adequate and appropriate medical management and appropriately 
monitored medication side effects. They said that patients were routinely prescribed 
inappropriate or unsafe medications without justification. 
Psychological services frequently are incomplete, inaccurate, and outdated. For 
example, they said that the rehabilitative and psycho-social interventions are largely 
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driven by what's available in the unit and not what's appropriate for the given patient. 
Nursing staff failed to adequately monitor, document, and report patient symptoms or 
document the administration of medications, provide a therapeutic environment, and 
participate in the treatment team process. Pharmacists do not systematically review 
patients' medication regiments. Again, the hospital fails to provide necessary medical 
care, the hospital does not take appropriate interventions to minimize the risk of 
infections, and that patients experience long delays and/ or the complete absence of 
dental treatment. 
Patients do not receive adequate physical and occupational therapy. Treatment 
plans do not address patients' weight problems. They also noted that the psychiatrists 
do not chart their patients' progress with sufficient frequency and that the substance 
of those progress notes are also deficient. 
Again, in the area of restraints and seclusions and as-needed medications, they 
found that the patients were exposed to excessive and unnecessarily restrictive 
interventions. And again, that in some cases, they were used as punishment. 
The area of protection from harm, like so much of the children's program, they 
found that the incident management system was deficient, that the quality 
improvement activities at the hospitals did try to implement were generally disjointed 
and inadequate, and, again, that the environment was not free of hazards such as 
fixtures. And they also raise the issue that the staff frequently relied on untrained 
security personnel and patient interventions. And again, similar in the children's 
program, they raised the issue of the 1st Amendment and due process rights for their 
patients. 
Finally, just wrapping up with the Napa State Hospital investigation, they 
issued their findings in June 2005. And unlike the Metropolitan investigation-I'm 
going to mention, Senator Chesbro-they did raise the issue of non-cooperation. And 
a couple of implications from that was that they did say that was a factor that they 
used in drawing their conclusions about Napa; and that because of that, this 
investigation was a little bit different from Metropolitan in that they had to rely a little 
bit more heavily on other agencies' reviews of Napa, for example, the federal Centers 
for Medicaid and Medicare Services, and also our own State Department of Health 
Services. 
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So again, going onto the findings which ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: May I ask-
MS. LEE: Yes. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: --besides relying on other departments' reviews, though, 
did they not also conduct interviews with ... 
MS. LEE: Yes. They interviewed-had interviews with professionals, advocates, 
family members, and patients. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. 
MS. LEE: So going onto the findings, which, again, were similar to the ones 
they found at Metropolitan, in the area of protection from harm, they said that staff 
often failed to intervene and to report patient-to-patient assaults. Staff do not attempt 
to prevent repeated assaults by addressing the underlying behavior of the aggressors. 
Napa fails to remedy deficiencies in its suicide-prevention practices and that it fails to 
control traffic of harmful contraband, including illegal narcotics. Patients suffer harm 
from excessive and inappropriate use of physical and chemical restraints in seclusion. 
Napa fails to keep the environment free of hazards, including fixtures that patients 
could use to commit suicide. They do know that they observe that a major factor in 
the failure to protect patients from harm was inadequate supervision. 
Going onto the treatment care, Napa does not provide adequate medical and 
nursing care, fails to provide adequate occupational and physical therapy and 
nutritional supports and services. In the area of treatment planning, again, Napa fails 
to provide adequate treatment planning. Napa fails to plan adequately to address 
patients' assaults of self-abusive behaviors. 
In the area of discharge planning, it's more like Metropolitan. They said that 
the hospital fails to place patients in the most integrated, appropriate setting 
consistent with the patients' needs in tems of any court-ordered confinements. They 
also noted in their finding letters that they had received incredible allegations that 
patients who seek to be discharged into the community placements were retaliated 
against by Napa staff. 
So that's a very quick run-through overview of the findings. Again, the letters 
do talk about some suggested, remedial measures. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. Thank you very much. 
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I have to say that these allegations are devastating and all-inclusive, in terms of 
leaving no part of the operations of these three programs-the two in Metropolitan and 
the one at Napa-untouched. It's amazing to me how all-inclusive of every aspect of 
the management-the culture, the treatment, the operations of these facilities, of these 
allegations are. Of course, also, I think, magnifies the allegations that the federal 
government says. And certainly, we're going to give the department the chance to 
provide whatever explanations you can. But to have not had them, have transparency 
and not have the doors open so that the investigation could be more clearly based on 
inspection and the examination close-up of what has taken place at Napa, at least in 
the case of Napa-no, it's not the case with the Metropolitan investigations-and so I 
think it seems like it couldn't have been worse if they had inspected. So it really raises 
the question, and one that I think has to be answered is, what possibly could have 
been served by not having access by the Department of Justice. 
I will say I'm glad to have Dr. Mayberg, the Director here today, in addition to 
the fact that I think it's-of course, it's not a legal obligation but certainly an 
important political one, that when the Legislature asks representatives of departments 
and programs to come forward, I hope it's also an indication of a recognition by 
yourself and the management of the department that these are very serious allegations 
and require a response and not just a response today because I doubt that you're 
going to stand up and say that there's no merit to all of this. So while there may be 
some explanations or some directions or responses that attempt to explain away some 
of the allegations, I also hope that there's a real willingness to examine them in an 
open way and a willingness to try to bring about real change because I have to assume 
going in that there's at least some merit and quite possibly a lot of merit and that we 
have to try to open our minds and our hearts and our eyes and figure out what we're 
going to do about it. 
So with that, let me welcome you, Dr. Mayberg, and also your Deputy, John 
Rodriguez. 
Let me say to Ms. Lee, thank you very much for your work on this. We are on a 
tight schedule, so I'm not going to ask you lots of questions about your presentation, 
but I think you've presented the outline that we're now going to go through in terms of 
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the questions that will be asked and have been asked of the department to respond to 
today, so thank you for your work. 
Dr. Mayberg. 
DR. STEPHEN MAYBERG: Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to testify 
about this complex issue and also to reiterate that we take this very seriously at the 
department. I personally take this very serious, and I think that Ms. Lee did an 
excellent job of summarizing the findings from the U.S. Department of Justice. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Are you going to be submitting written testimony today? 
DR. MAYBERG: Yes. I have mine down. And then, for your questions, we'll get 
you written testimony. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So you don't have that ready for me? 
DR. MAYBERG: I have my written testimony. It's right here. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: And you will submitting it to us? 
DR. MAYBERG: Yes, yes. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Is that the departmental response? 
DR. MA YBERG: There's two departments. Yes, there will be two responses. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So there's a further, additional response that will be 
coming to the ... 
DR. MAYBERG: Right, right. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. Ordinarily, when we hold a hearing, we ask for 
the materials to be ready at the time of the hearing so that it's available to everyone 
who's participating. 
DR. MA YBERG: Right. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So it's quite extraordinary for it not to be at this point. 
DR. MAYBERG: I think we were confused because the agenda said submitted 
by the 30th. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, we've used the same format for over 20 years, long 
before I came here. So you're now on notice that that is the format of the committee, 
is to have the written materials ready. 
DR. MAYBERG: Mine is ready, so I will submit that. 
We, as the department, are fully committed to care that is centered around the 
consumer and family member needs, and our approach needs to reflect the principles 
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of recovery and choice through use of evidence-based, outcome-driven, and 
accountable practices. Unfortunately, we found that those principles are not as 
prevalent in the hospitals as they are in the community. With-and I think you've 
seen with this approach of kind of client-centered, family-driven services-and 
certainly in our mental health services' block grant, community service, and support-
that reflects the values of the department. 
What we realize is those principles need to be consistent in all parts of our 
system, whether you're in a state hospital or whether you're in the community. And 
before the USDOJ investigation, we weren't practicing that. In 2002, when we received 
the letter, we believed that our hospitals were doing well. They were successfully 
making the transition from a civil commitment to forensic commitments. We now 
have 90 percent of the people in our system who are forensically committed, that we 
had spent much of our energy concemed about issues of patient safety, staff safety, 
and public safety and making that transition to deal with this new and challenging 
population. All of our hospitals were licensed. All of our hospitals were certified. 
Many of them had had commendations. We had people coming from all over the world 
to look at our programs. So from our point of view, we thought we were doing okay. 
So when the USDOJ wrote a letter to us and said we'd like to come and look at 
you, we were fine with that. We thought that that would give us valuable feedback 
and that it really is important to us to be transparent; and that whatever we could 
learn from their coming, we didn't feel we had anything to hide, and we actually 
thought we were doing better than the reports indicated. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So the department truly thought everything was fine. 
There wasn't feedback from anywhere that would have led you to believe that ... 
DR. MAYBERG: Not if we looked at the accreditation standards where we were 
in the 90th percentile. And then when we looked at licensing, we were doing everything 
that were national standards and that we were being recognized for that. So not that 
we couldn't have done better care, but at least we didn't have any indications at Metro 
that there was anything substantive. I mean we were having troubles making the 
adjustment. The children's program was a new program at Metro, that we moved from 
Camarillo, and we went through some kind of fits and starts, getting that started, 
getting staff on board, figuring out how to do a better program. 
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SENATOR CHESBRO: Were there indications from licensing reports or from 
PAl reports that there might be problems? 
DR. MAYBERG: There were no major cites from licensing. There were cites 
from licensing, and there was concerns from Protection and Advocacy, and certainly 
there were issues in some of our lawsuits. Emily Q. and TBS is one of those that we 
needed to move people out of our system more quickly, that we had to do a better job 
of moving these kids out, and we were aware of that. 
So when the USDOJ came to look at us, we went with them. And what we could 
see ourselves, by looking closely and objectively at our hospitals, is that a recovery 
model was not being utilized in Metropolitan, that we were relying too much on 
seclusion and restraint and/or medication to control behaviors, that we did need to 
sharpen our diagnostic skills, we needed to build in the whole concept of strengths 
and competencies, and use the whole team in terms of developing those, that we 
needed to get patients more involved in active treatment and not to stay in their rooms 
or in the dayrooms but to have much more of a mall concept or integrated-treatment 
concept, and that our treatment planning really wasn't geared to get people into their 
next step. 
So all of those statements that came from the Department of Justice comments 
about system issues were ones that headquarters, that we agree with, that there is no 
doubt that those were problems. So even though you can be licensed, even though 
you can be certified, doesn't mean that you are doing the best you can do or even what 
you should be doing to make the hospital work. 
And we realized at that time that this was not a problem that was unique to 
Metro, that we realized that that problem was endemic in our system, and that this 
culture of the way we were doing business was a culture at all the hospitals. Each of 
the hospitals are a little different but we knew that. So we began looking at the 
structure of our hospitals and how we needed to enhance care. And so we began, even 
before any of the other U.S. Department of Justice letters, to come and review us, to 
do our own reviews. And we brought in external consultants, national consultants, 
actually hired people who USDOJ hired to do the reviews for ourselves, to be proactive, 
because we assumed, if it was in one place, it was another; and that we realized we 
couldn't just fix a little bit at Metro. We needed to fix our whole system, so we began. 
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At that time, the system changed. And the USDOJ knew that. Part of what 
complicated that for us was that there was 19 months between the time they visited 
us and the time that we got the findings. And we wanted to make sure that whatever 
we embarked on that we had the collaboration and the cooperation and the 
endorsement of the U.S. Department of Justice. We didn't want to institute a whole 
system of change and have that not be consistent with what the values that USDOJ 
were saying were important. So getting that letter back from them or the findings was 
really important. But by the time that letter came, we had already begun the analysis 
of our other hospitals and began system changes. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So in response to the first Metropolitan report, you 
began a process of change at the other hospitals, including Napa? 
DR. MA YBERG: That's correct, that's correct. And we began the process of 
change at Metro before we received the findings because in our own review, we weren't 
disagreeing with those issues that I talked about. We thought those were important 
issues, and we thought we had to make those changes and make them as much a part 
of the culture as possible. And I think what's important for us to realize is those 
changes aren't easy. Those changes don't occur quickly. It take quite a bit of time 
and effort to make those changes occur. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So during the two years between the Metro, first Metro 
report and the Napa report, you did bring consultants into the hospitals, all of them? 
DR. MAYBERG: All four hospitals. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Who had worked for DOJ? 
DR. MA YBERG: That's correct. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So in terms of their, the impact to having those folks 
within the hospitals, that was not considered problematic. But when DOJ came to do 
their review, then apparently, you haven't gotten to that part yet of your testimony? 
DR. MAYBERG: Well, DOJ didn't come to do a review. I mean I think that was 
part of what confused us a little bit. We were very transparent about the fact that we 
had DOJ consultants there. We were very clear with them that we were making 
changes in all of our hospitals, that there were substantive changes, in that in our 
letters back to the DOJ, that we had stipulated that we had systemic issues that we 
wanted to work on and that we certainly wanted to get some guidance from them as to 
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what they saw as-we knew what needed to be remediated. We wanted to make sure 
that that remediation was similar to what the USDOJ wanted to do. And after the 
finding letters came out from the adult system, we began to sit down and have a series 
of negotiations with them. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: One significant difference would be that the 
consultants, even though they had been employed by DOJ, they were also consultants 
that the state hired-
DR. MAYBERG: That's correct. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: --as opposed to, you know, the more independent 
investigation that DOJ would provide. 
DR. MAYBERG: That's correct. And in that sense, Senator, consultants are 
consultants, and we figured that they aren't going to change what they say, depending 
on who pays for them, and we wanted to make sure that we got a candid view of our 
system. And I can guarantee you that it was a candid view. It was not sugar coating 
any of this. It was, I think, a very in-depth look at all of these same issues, sometimes 
building a little bit more on strength and where we can fix the system than on the 
negatives, as much as the USDOJ talks about the recovery model building on 
strength. They tend to focus on the symptoms. But that being said, we were in active 
negotiation with the USDOJ, both about remediation for what we needed to do at 
Metro but also to get a sense at the other hospitals. 
The major source of disagreement between us and where we were seen as non-
cooperative was, they had said we had denied access to them to hospitals. And that's 
just not true. We did not deny access. What we were trying to do was negotiate a 
time, a time when they could come. We didn't want them to come at the same time 
that we had JAHCO being there, and they knew that that was in October/November, 
so we have joint accreditation. And we also wanted to know what the scope of their 
review was, not that we wanted to keep them from anything. But the fact that we had 
already acknowledged that we had those programs; that when they came to 
Metropolitan as Ms. Lee talked about, it was incredibly time consuming. 
We copied over a quarter of a million pieces of paper for them, documents for 
them, and redirected ten or 12 staff, full time, to deal with this. We don't have lots of 
extra staff, and we really wanted to make sure that all of our staff were committed to 
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implementing the changes that are necessary. And so it wasn't they couldn't come. 
It's just, can we agree on a time you can come, and can we agree what it is you want 
to look at, and we'll already stipulate to some of these systemic issues. We've already 
agreed to those. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: What was the timeline from the time that they first 
indicated that they wanted to-the Department of Justice indicated-they wanted to 
come and the time that they issued the report? 
DR. MAYBERG: I think the letter was sent in February? 
John? 
MR. JOHN RODRIGUEZ: The first letter came in February of '04-no-excuse 
me-May of '03, and the second letter came in February of '04-children/ adults. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: No, for Napa. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Oh, I'm sorry. We had discussions here in Sacramento in 
March where we were actively negotiating over three days the remediation plan, I call 
it. Basically, it's the agreement we would have that will define expectations in where 
we're going and be the agreement that we're going to operate under until we get this 
resolved. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: But what about the question of when they requested 
access? 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: We've been talking about this, well, you know, since they 
came out of Metro. But where I was headed here with this is, that as late as March-
we were talking-March of this year-we were talking about when are they coming to 
the other hospitals? We were briefing them in detail about the changes that were 
going on at all four hospitals. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I assume they made a specific request to come, that 
they're referring to in the report, when they say that they were denied access, that they 
made a specific request to have access. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: And at that meeting, I specifically told them is, JAHCO is 
coming in October/November. You can come in right after that, and they also 
endorsed the changes that we've got going on. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: When did they send the official notice asking for access, 
that they were doing an investigation? 
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MR. RODRIGUEZ: That goes back to ... 
MS. LEE: That was January 2004, is when they sent the letter, their attempt to 
begin the investigation. In June 2005 is when they issued the findings letter. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So between January 2004 and the time that the report 
came out, you were unable to come to agreement with the Department of Justice 
about a time when they could have access? 
DR. MAYBERG: I think the Department of Justice was well aware that we were 
implementing system reforms during that period of time. We were in negotiation with 
them. And part of what we were talking about was -- Are we doing the right thing? 
Come and look. And when you have set out for us what the expectations or what the 
standards are that you're going to be judging us on, please come and review us on 
that. Please tell us what you're going to look for. You can come as soon as we know 
that. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: But I guess my point is, relative to other things that 
were going on, that that seems like enough time, that there would be ample 
opportunity for a visit to take place in between other things that were going on at the 
hospital there. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, actually, Senator, I mean I was the one talking to 
them on a regular basis, along with our legal people. We had a lot of stuff on our plate 
with the over-bedding, the opening of a new hospital, the JAHCO reviews. There was 
never a discussion with them that we were being uncooperative. Surely, they wanted 
to come in sooner rather than later, and we were being very consistent in that we're 
not going to prevent you from coming in, but there's some work that needs to be done 
in terms of I think all the things that you're familiar with-with over-bedding, 
preparing for JAHCO, keeping up with some of the other issues we have, and 
implementing the changes that we had going on that I was very clear with them about 
in terms of get us by JAHCO and then come on in. Since that time, of course, I've 
seen the handwriting on the wall with respect to-what they said about 
uncooperatives, despite the fact they face-to-face told me and were pleased with the 
changes they had going on, we had said come on in to Atascadero and Patton 
whenever you want, and that was in August, and I expected them to be there in 
August. Now they can't come in until November or December. 
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So I think there's two sides to every story here, and I think that the allegations 
of uncooperation when they have access, even without coming in, to patients, to family 
members, to staff members, to reports, is somewhat misleading and represent the 
tactic on their part to give some concessions in the discussions on remediation. They 
are very pleased, what they told me in March, with the changes that we have going on, 
particularly at Metro, and which we're now under way at all the other hospitals. 
Now having said that, I recognize that they're going to say whatever they want to 
say. Our doors are open. Come on in, and come to Patton and Atascadero whenever 
you want. And now they're talking about November/December. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. I'm going to want to move to the specific 
questions we submitted, but I don't know, Dr. Mayberg, if you wanted to, if you had 
some additional things you are going to include in your opening remarks before we go 
to those questions? 
DR. MAYBERG: Well, I think we're basically going to say we are committed to 
the change. We think that we have to make the system changed, that we need to build 
a system around not just medical treatment of folks. We need to do the social 
rehabilitation model; we need to focus on wellness and recovery; we have to get rid of 
the unnecessary seclusion and restraint. We need to change our medication 
practices-we have changed those-and how we monitor that. We have to have a 
better incident management system, all of the things you've heard about. Those are 
things we're committed to; those are things where we're in agreement with the USDOJ, 
that we either have done them or in the process of doing those, and that we continue 
to not dispute the majority, if there's some specifics of the finding. But the USDOJ 
report about systemic issues was a catalyst for us to change and that we do welcome 
them at any time to come in-welcome anybody at any time-to come to our hospitals. 
They're not as bad as they're portrayed, but they're certainly not as good as they could 
be. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. Thank you. 
Going to the specific questions, first of all, I appreciate it if you'd stick around 
for as long as you can, certainly throughout Mr. Rodriguez's presentation. But going 
to specific questions, I'll stipulate that you answered the first one in your presentation, 
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and let's just go to the second one regarding what, if any, of the findings by the 
Department of Justice are disputed by the Department of Mental Health. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Senator, my name is John Rodriguez, as you know, but for 
the record. 
There are a number of issues-individual, specific issues-that we would have 
problems with. But I think what you've heard here already is that we are in agreement 
in terms of the broad, systemic issues that they identified, and that's the starting point 
that we've undertaken in terms of the changes that are underway now with existing 
resources and the details of the remediation plan that we're negotiating. 
In our judgment, there's enough true in what they're saying that we're not going 
to get into fight over the things that we disagree with because the effort should be 
focused on the fixes that we need to make. If we need to go through and identify a few 
things-for example, the access to the patients we disagree with-there's individual 
issues about whether they took information to consideration by restraint and 
seclusion, information about whether an individual needed a hip replacement and we 
didn't provide it. You know, the other side of the coin is, she had complicating factors. 
I mean there's lots of those little things but not enough where I'm saying they're 
wrong. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So you're saying-! believe I hear you saying-that the 
department is in substantial agreement with the things that have been identified in 
this report as needing correction at the various hospitals? 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes. From a systemic standpoint, I do agree with that. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So disagreement, perhaps, over some details. But 
systemically, you have accepted that these are real problems. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, Senator. I'm the frontline guy. I think, as Dr. Mayberg 
indicated, relying on licensing and accreditation, the work of our medical staffs, in 
terms of policing themselves, certification, those were independent, onsite measures 
that we took as the standard against which we should be striving for. And quite 
frankly, against those standards, I thought we were doing pretty good. These surveys, 
by USDOJ, opened, I think, my eyes, Dr. Mayberg's eyes, the Executive Director's eyes, 
that systemically, we need to change in the terms of the way that we deliver services 
and the way we monitor services. 
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Would it be helpful if I dived into the ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, the thing is that you've touched on some of them 
so I'll try to help you figure out what I think hasn't been answered yet as we go along. 
I think the next question-and Dr. Mayberg, you have substantially responded 
to-but let me ask, Wouldn't the Department of Justice have an interest in 
documenting conditions at the hospitals even if they were to agree to the systemic 
remediation plan? In other words, it's not a one-time thing. It's a process. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: What I've learned is, certainly they need to know what's 
going on. We're stipulating, based on our own reviews, that these systemic problems 
exist in all the hospitals and we're moving ahead on making those changes. What we 
learned from the reports finally coming out, since we already had work going on, is 
that engaging the USDOJ evaluators on our side was the right thing to do because we 
had work already going entirely consistent with the findings and the remedial 
measures they recommended. 
What I've also learned, is when we start discussions about coming into other 
hospitals, they're prepared to forego onsite reviews if we stipulate the problems. But 
then you start getting the lawyers-with all due respect to the lawyers in the room, 
sir-you get the lawyers start talking about what the stipulation can say. They don't 
have to come in when it comes down to it. What they're looking for is stipulations 
from the State that you have these kind of systemic problems and that you're 
proceeding forward. 
Now I've gotten beaten up pretty good about the Napa lack of cooperation. They 
can say whatever they want. I disagree. But now that we're talking about Patton and 
Atascadero, we're still talking about stipulations that would prevent or result in not a 
need for on-sites at Patton and Atascadero if we stipulate that those problems exist 
there. What's going to prevent that from happening, if it happens, if it doesn't happen, 
is getting the right words down in some sort of legal document. Having said that, 
where I'm at right now, is that we're blasting ahead with the remediation plans. I'm 
assuming they're coming in to Patton and Atascadero in November and December, and 
we will be ready for those things, if that's what they feel they need to do. 
But to answer your question directly, Senator, an onsite is not necessary for 
them to do their job, and that's the substance of discussions we've been having about 
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stipulating the conditions at the other two hospitals and which we were talking about, 
by they way, for Napa when they issued the report and said we were uncooperative. 
Having said that, that's old history. Come on in. I'm not going to allow that kind of 
stuff to happen. And in the meantime, we're moving ahead. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So let's skip down to the question of the status of 
negotiations with the Department of Justice regarding the Metro findings, the Napa 
findings, and the issue of access to Patton and Atascadero. 
Where are you at with trying to reach agreement with DOJ on those items? 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: As I mentioned, at the end of March, we had a three-day 
discussion here-USDOJ and us, our respective attorneys-made substantial progress 
on the details, the programmatic details, of the remediation plan, the enhancement 
plan, the settlement agreement, all very much mean the same thing. What it basically 
talks about, is what has to happen, by when in the hospitals in order to satisfy 
USDOJ. 
We got 90 percent, 95 percent of the way there. In March, we had subsequent 
exchanges of drafts several times, had another onsite, in-person Sacramento visit at 
the end of August. Subsequent to that, we have had further phone conversations. I 
think we're very close, if not done, in terms of the programmatic components, that is, 
what's the hospitals supposed to do and how will people monitor that and what kind 
of results will we be expecting? What will you, me, and everybody else see when they 
go down to the hospitals? 
There's still a number of issues outstanding in terms of dates, although I don't 
think that's going to be a big hurdle because generally they would agree that this kind 
of change, systemic change, that we need to achieve will take anywhere from three to 
five years. Metro's farther down the line because they started first. I would think 
they're closer to three years. Atascadero has just recently begun. I think they're going 
to be taking close to five years. I don't expect that to be a disputed item. There are 
other issues still to be resolved, but I think we've made substantial progress and are 
pretty close. 
Further, I'll say again, there is no disagreement on our part about coming into 
Patton and Atascadero. I've got tentative dates set based on what I thought, when 
they wanted to come in, they said the end of November, first week of December, and 
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then skip a week, come back into the second hospital in the middle of December. 
Works for me. We're still waiting for them to tie that down. And meanwhile this issue 
of stipulation where you don't come in at all continues. But I'm not going to hold my 
breath on that. We're moving ahead preparing. And we told them they could come in, 
in August, come in, in September, if they wanted. They said they couldn't. Frankly, 
that works for us because we've got JAHCO coming in, in the middle of October, and 
therefore with us for a month, we've got to make that work too. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I appreciate you being striking an optimistic tone about 
how it's going. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: What else can you do? 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Let's assume for the moment that negotiations with the 
Department of Justice-I'm going to be moving onto the next question here. Let's 
assume that they don't reach a successful conclusion. What other steps do you think 
the Department of Justice might take to ensure corrective actions are taken to improve 
the quality of care in the hospitals, and what are the consequences of those actions? 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: What I've learned about this process is that, if agreements 
are not reached, they take you to court. Basically, they take a writ to court saying 
that we don't provide a constitutional level of care, and they probably get, attempt to 
get a court order. And I suspect we'd end up similarly to where we are right now, only 
we've gone through a bunch of court proceedings and spent a lot of money and spent a 
lot of time. I think that gets back to our own assessment of what needs to be done. 
My personal, maybe optimistic, point of view is, I don't think we're going to get there. I 
think that what you're seeing here is a commitment by California to make it happen. 
And the feedback I've gotten from them in March when we briefed them in detail on 
the actions that are going on at Metro and are underway at the other hospitals was 
very positive from the attorneys from USDOJ as well as the hired consultants that 
they bring to the table to provide programmatic and medical and clinical advice to the 
USDOJ attorneys. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So you see this potentially moving towards a voluntary 
agreement or a consent decree? 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: I do. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Which? 
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MR. RODRIGUEZ: I think it will, sir. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Can you differentiate between the two in terms of 
which ... 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I'm down here on the totem pole. And one of the 
reasons I can't tell you that the deal is cut is because I have bosses that I have to 
explain this to. I'll also tell you that I believe there's a fiscal impact that I'm working 
through inside the administration, that to make this thing happen beyond what we've 
been able to do with existing resources-and hopefully I will be able to, the governor 
would be able to present you something in the January budget along those lines. I 
guess I'm saying there's some I's to dot and T's to cross internally that I've still got to 
work through that prevents me from saying it's a done deal and being really optimistic 
and saying all done; now we've just got to make it work. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So is whether or not it's a voluntary agreement or a 
consent decree, is that something that might stand in the way of reaching an 
agreement? 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: That is an issue that we're talking about. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Now another possibility, and God help us, is that it does 
wind up in court and we go down the path that Corrections has gone in terms of 
judges overseeing. And can you respond to that possibility at all? I can characterize it 
myself but ... 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, you hit it on the nose. I'm pretty involved in the 
Coleman case from DMH's standpoint. As you know, we provide a lot of services to 
CDCR in our hospitals, and I've seen up close and personal the additional costs, the 
additional, what I consider unnecessary oversight, if you're not otherwise committed. 
You've got too many cooks in the kitchen, which sometimes slows you down. I think 
it's in our interest, and I would recommend strongly, that we avoid that unless all else 
fails. And I continue to believe, from where I'm sitting, that there's no reason why we 
couldn't get an agreement of some sort with voluntary compliance from the State of 
California to do what has to be done. My own consultants that we've hired, who also 
worked for USDOJ, have been extremely helpful in terms of defining the scope of our 
program. And again, you said I was optimistic. I guess I am, but I can't tell you much 
more than that. I think it will work out. 
22 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Now has there been any indication of a DOJ 
investigation under the False Claims Act? 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes. The CRIPA attorney, the individual that works for the 
Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons' civil rights division made a referral to the 
U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles asserting, that based on their investigation, the bills that 
we submitted to Medicare and Med-Cal from Metro during the period of time for this 
investigation couldn't be valid. I'll be real candid with you. I think that that was a 
strong-arm tactic to try to get concessions at the table. It, as far as I know, hasn't 
been done anywhere else in any other state. And I personally found it to be a bad-
faith tactic-nothing I could do about it-in light of California's cooperation. And the 
other point I made is, by the way, another arm of the federal government, the folks 
that find Metropolitan to be certified for billing purposes found that we were fully able 
to bill those programs. So we11 go through this process with the United States 
Department of Justice if that's what's necessary. But I found that to be disingenuous 
and nothing more than a negotiating tactic and completely ignores the fact that we 
were certified by another arm of the federal government for exactly that, to bill 
Medicare and Medicare, during that time. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: As a matter of tactics, though, it raises the question of 
whether you're as close and you should be as optimistic as you're saying, if they're 
threatening, waving around threats like that. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, we've had-these are audits and investigations that 
occur not infrequently. We've had billing on us before; we've gone through them. In 
fact, we've paid money back in the past. That's not a big surprise and if we find 
errors. 
My only concern is, if they have a concern with billing and Metropolitan do an 
audit, do it at any one of our facilities, but the attempt to link it up to performance 
under the Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act, I think, is unprecedented and 
just represents a tactic to try to get something from California. And I'm not prepared 
to agree that when you're otherwise licensed and accredited and certified for billing, to 
then somehow agree with them that because there's a CRIPA investigation, which has 
some good points and which we're dealing with, means that we can't bill Medi-Cal or 
Medicare. I may be a little overdramatic. But I think sometimes this is Big Brother 
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trying to just lean on states and take away more federal money, establish a precedent 
where California ruled on this, so in the future, every CRIPA investigation that doesn't 
work or isn't positive means money gets paid back by the states. It maybe a little 
overdramatic, but that's basically what I'm thinking is that they're up to. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. Let me change gears here a little bit, skipping 
back up to the question about implementing components of the remediation plan. We 
do have other lives besides politics. In my educational background, our organizational 
culture is one of the things that I have some credentials with regards to. And I know 
this organization and others I've been involved in, that organizational change is not a 
simple thing and may be in fact close to the heart of what's going on here. It's not just 
a question of who's in charge, although we are, and we do believe in accountability. 
Nonetheless, you're in charge of an organization that has history, culture, existing 
arrangements, existing traditions. 
So what are your perceptions about the ability of the organization to change, to 
implement the components of the remediation plan, and meet the changing demands 
that we do a better job? 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Thanks for asking that question. It's something that's on 
my mind all the time. I view this to be one of the biggest challenges I've ever faced in 
my state career. And you're changing the culture, not in just a small organization. 
You're changing it in four large organizations, and we're approaching 9,000 employees, 
and every one of them, from top to bottom, has to change the way that they view their 
job and what expectations are, and we need to get this done in three to five years at all 
the hospitals. I'd say, for the most part, with proper training, explanation, meetings, 
town hall meetings, we've had a fairly positive response from the staff, and that 
continues to grow. 
I'll be real candid with you. There's some resistance going on, and a number of 
people at Metro either left or retired. In some cases, I don't think that was a bad 
thing. Situations where you've been around a long time, you don't want to change the 
way we do business, you're going to sabotage the process or it's just not something 
you want to do, that's okay. It wasn't an easy thing to say when we're struggling for 
clinical staff, but I think on balance, we've turned out okay. And with the people that 
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we have hired at Metro, I find that they come in without any preconceived notions, so 
those are folks that are going to be more able to work with. 
Changing the organization long term is not going to happen because I write a 
policy. It certainly starts with defining expectations, in terms of our policies and 
special orders and me and the leaders in the hospital talking about it. But it's a 
function of train, train, train, train. 
I mean people think I'm crazy when I say that kind of stuff, but you wouldn't 
believe the amount of training that's going on right now. It's one of the things that we 
can do now without new resources because there aren't other expectations yet on us 
officially from USDOJ, so now is the time to do that. 
Secondly, involve everybody. We have, to the extent possible, crafted work 
groups that are system-wide. What I'm trying to avoid is only Metro is the hospital 
that's changing. We've got to change all the hospitals. And what I don't want to walk 
away with is four different systems. So what we've created is system-wide work 
groups in ten very specific areas, including restraint and seclusion reduction being a 
high priority with representatives from all the hospitals and leaders and coordinators 
being people who are established and know what they're doing and leaders in the 
system. They are the ones that are designing new program guides-the training 
materials, the manuals, the policies, doing the training-to the extent they can at the 
hospitals. 
There are going to be some spots. One of the things I wanted to talk about was 
the fact that we are-our organizational philosophy is the recovery model. One of the 
big challenges for management, one of our responsibilities, is to create an 
organizational structure for the staff to do what they have to do. Sure, there's a lot of 
problems here, and certainly everybody shares responsibility. But management 
shares a special responsibility for this because it's our responsibility to create an 
environment and a structure where the people who are bought buying into the process 
can have the tools, the training, the knowledge, the ability to get the job done in the 
way we expect in terms of assessments and treatment planning and discharge 
planning and reduction in restraint and seclusion, and supporting the treatment 
teams in developing special strategies to go after the hard-to-take-care-of patients 
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who, by the way, end up in restraint and seclusion, who do the assaults. But that's 
where a lot of the change we're going to see. 
The other part, though, the structure, the monitoring tools, and stuff like that, 
is not just to support the people who are supporters of this and are on board. It's to 
monitor the non-performance of people who may not be on board or who have not 
picked it up or basically saying, I don't buy into your structure and your philosophy. 
That's one of the real, one of the major changes. As I mentioned before, we had relied 
a lot on quality of care to be measured by licensing--..JACHO and the medical staff-to 
monitor themselves. And while all of those three are very important measures and 
we11 continue to rely on them, we also have to create structures that are going to 
answer the questions of -- Have all the assessments been done on each and every 
patient within the timeframes prescribed? Has the treatment planning been done by 
the whole team? Does it incorporate all the measures that we expect in terms of not 
only the psychiatrists but also the team, other members-the psychologists, the social 
workers, the rehab therapists, the nurses? 
You're going to probably hear some concerns, if you will, from psychiatrists. 
We're not in any way diminishing the importance of psychiatrists in this. But 111 tell 
you, we are raising the visibility and the importance of the other treatment. As Mrs. 
Lee indicated, a lot of what they found was that the other treatment team members' 
assessments and their contributions to diagnoses and their contributions to the 
treatment team were often not reflected in the treatment plan. That's not only a 
problem from the fact that we've got these people who got talents. But when you look 
at their specific talents in terms of the recovery model, that's the kind of stuff that can 
make the difference for success after discharge or wherever people go back, even if 
they're going back to CDC to live on the main line. You're talking about social 
rehabilitation here too. How do you live successfully after you leave the hospital? And 
it's just not a question of taking your drugs and following that discharge plan. We've 
got to give you those kind of tools. 
Going back and answering your question is, we've got some concerns. We're 
still out there. We're still battling them. It's not going to go away. But I'm committed 
to making this happen, but I've got to provide tools. And part of our remediation plan 
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accounts for that, and part of my thinking in terms of what we're going to need in the 
future, resource wide, is also embodied in that. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Unless we create a really negative feeling that people 
can't change. A couple of optimistic thing. Just let me throw out-one was, my 
legislation last year on seclusion and restraints was based on the model in 
Pennsylvania where they demonstrated that through training you could dramatically 
reduce the amount and use of seclusion and restraints, and so people can change--
that's one thing-and rise to the occasion. 
Secondly, if you remember, my bill was endorsed by the organization 
representing many of the folks who will need to be trained and adopt new practices in 
order for legislation to succeed. So, you know, I throw out that change is hard, but 
change is also possible. So I think it's important before we leave the topic to 
acknowledge that. 
DR. MAYBERG: You're absolutely right. And one of the things I think we don't 
talk about is this change isn't just the culture of the people providing the care. It's 
also changing the culture of the people who are going to receive the care. And part of 
that means educating and training and empowering our family members and our 
consumers to be able to have expectations of what the services should be like. So the 
training has to go to them just as much as it needs to go to our staff. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Let me just touch on this because it's not directly 
affected by these investigations. But it seems like, because you have a new facility or 
we have a new facility in Coalinga that there's an opportunity there to demonstrate 
some things because there's not the same amount of history and traditional ways of 
doing things. Do you want to comment on that briefly? 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes. In fact, that's exactly how it ought to happen. You 
know, I don't want to single out anybody in particular. But we need to also learn how 
to use our resources better. No big surprise to anybody here. Recruiting clinical staff 
is extremely difficult. Some of our most important staff are the most scarce. 
Psychiatrists are a good example. They're difficult to recruit. We need them; we've got 
to have them. And no way this recovery process is diminishing them in any way. But 
not only in Coalinga where, through their type of patient that they have, the SVP's 
which, as you know, is probably more of a behavioral problem than a psychiatric 
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problem, that's a natural for behavioral intervention, which is a natural for your non-
psychiatric clinical staff, not that psychiatrists don't do behavioral interventions, but 
they don't have to do it all. Save your psychiatrists, some of the highest-level stuff 
that needs to be done, particularly when you can't get enough of them, when you're 
asking a lot from all your staff, and including your psychiatrists. Raise the stature 
and give more responsibility to your psychologists, to your psychiatric nurse 
practitioners. I'm not suggesting that we put anybody at risk. But the private sector 
has shown how you can do this. It's really a question of proper use of your resources. 
They're doing it at Coalinga because we're starting fresh. 
If you want me to get into some of the remediation stuff, when you see some of 
the activities we're talking about in terms of positive behavioral support and 
behavioral consultation committees, and assessments that are specific to 
developmentally disabled or folks who in our hospitals who have developmental 
disabilities or cognitive problems, it's the psychologists that can take the lead in terms 
of looking at special interventions and making specific recommendations to the whole 
treatment team about how to deal with some of the unique problems of those 
individuals. 
And as I've come to learn, it's those individuals that we really need to retarget 
our resources to. They're the ones that are going to be at the hospital longest; they're 
most treatment resistant and often have the biggest problems with violence and which 
we respond with restraint and seclusion. It's those folks, some of the special 
measures, that this remediation plan embodies and from which, unfortunately, there's 
going to be additional costs, in my judgment. But that's a natural for some of our 
other clinical staff, Senator. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. Let me just conclude with the final question I 
had to ask you, which is, other information you believe is relevant to our 
understanding of the investigation and improve quality of care at the state hospitals 
that we may not have already plowed through. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: You gave me an opportunity on that. I got into that a little 
bit. I noticed that the recovery model places a special emphasis on helping the 
patients develop the successful living skills. And that's where the value of our other 
clinicians, the whole team working together, becomes important. And you gave me 
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that lead-in already, so thanks for that. But that continues to be one of my main 
points. 
In one of the key features of the enhancement plan, in terms of retraining of 
staff in assessment and treatment planning, providing new tools to facilitate that, 
providing monitoring structures, it really gets back to that -- is how do we as a 
management team help the folks that want to make that happen, do it, and then be 
able to prove it to you, me, and USDOJ and all my bosses? 
I think one of the things I want to take this opportunity to do is compliment 
most of the staff at the state hospitals. We're asking a lot of new stuff of them. We're 
asking them to look at things in a new way. We're asking for them to work harder, 
with not a whole lot of additional money and not any money recently. Most of them 
have risen to the challenge, and I'm proud of them. And whether I'm here or not, five 
years from now, when we're all done with this, we're going to be different hospitals in 
terms of the way we do business from the day a person enters the facility to the time 
they're discharged and every place in between. It's not that we're doing new things, 
like assessments or treatment planning. It's because we're doing it differently and 
better and we can prove it. 
The other thing is, they do this in a situation with a very dangerous group of 
folks-and I think you guys appreciate this-is the LPS patients that come from the 
counties are now 520 out of 4,700. CDC and CYA-or CDCR-want more beds from 
us. We're going to continue to give them more. Those are very difficult patients. 
These are people who otherwise would be locked up in cells with my staff that look like 
you and me, unarmed, walking around in street clothes, managing them. I'm 
extremely impressed, and you see that all the time. MDO's, IST's, NGI's all need our 
help but SVP's, too. Those folks not too long ago were in prison, and the expectation 
of no violence continues, but it's not going to be always doable. But our 
enhancements, I think, are going to work on that too. But we're going to continue to 
see violence. I don't think that's going to be eliminated, but it's something I want 
everybody to keep in mind is, it's a tough line for us to walk, is to keep our integrity in 
terms of being a hospital but not lose control of the facility to the extent that, you 
know, public safety's put at risk or the safety of other individuals or staff are put at 
risk. 
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Here in Sacramento, it looks tough. It's got to be really a lot tougher down at 
the hospitals. Forensic patients continue to grow. You know this better than others. 
You've been involved in this. We got to continue to deal with an ever-growing 
population. Thank goodness Coalinga opened and they're accepting patients. We 
can't be thinking about today. Only we need to be continuing to plan four or five years 
down the line, and I've got staff now starting to look at what do we next if the patient 
growth in forensic categories continues like it has over the last few years. 
As Coalinga's an interim answer, we've got to be ahead of the curve. And, 
Senator, you were involved from the very beginning. Coalinga took us from the day we 
were first talking about it, before it was Coalinga, till we opened seven years. So we've 
got to be working on that. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: That's my entire tenure in the Senate. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: It's a good time for state hospitals, huh? Anyway, that was 
cool. We hope you come visit it one of these days. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I think we need to wind it up for purposes of time. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. I'm done now. Thank you for the opportunity. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Let me say that I'm going to insist to written responses 
to all the questions by the end of this week, and detailed responses, please. I thank 
you for your presentation, and I assume that-
MR. RODRIGUEZ: I'll be here. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: --Mr. Rodriguez will stick around. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: I'll be here. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: And as long as you can stay here, I'd appreciate it, Dr. 
May berg. 
DR. MAYBERG: Thank you, Senator. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Sure. 
And thank you again, Ms. Lee. 
Let me ask Catherine Blakemore, Executive Director of Protection & Advocacy, 
to come forward. 
We similarly submitted some specific questions that we ask PAl to ... 
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MS. CATHERINE BLAKEMORE: We have copies of our testimony. Did you 
want us to hand it to you now, at the end? And there's a copy here, and it's missing 
Page 7 and 8, but we'll get you a corrected copy later on this aftemoon. My apologies. 
With me this aftemoon is Michele Mudgett who is the Director of our Office of 
Patients' Rights, and she's here because she has staff that are onsite at each of the 
hospitals to answer any specific questions you might have from that perspective. I 
think, as you know, we provide services to residents of the state hospitals in three 
different ways: through our regional legal offices, through our Office of Patients' 
Rights, which we have a contract with the Department of Mental Health to provide, 
and through our Peer Self-Advocacy Unit that conduct weekly self-advocacy groups at 
a number of the state hospitals; and Amy Breckenridge is on the next panel and will 
be talking more specifically about that work. 
I do thank you for the opportunity to talk with you today about our concems. I 
thought I might make some introductory remarks, if that was okay? 
The federal Department of Justice ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I should say briefly, because we're already running 
behind ... 
MS. BLAKEMORE: I will be brief; and when I'm too long, you just tell me and 
you can go to whatever questions. 
The Department of Justice confirms our experience at the state hospitals. At 
the most basic level, the hospitals far too often fail to treat and protect the residents. 
The issues identified in the reports are the same issues that we see every day when we 
are at the hospitals, and they remain, in spite of the Department of Justice findings. 
Those problems include misdiagnosis, overmedication, lack of treatment 
planning, poly-pharmacy, aversive behavioral therapy, inappropriate use of restraint 
and seclusion, no discharge planning; and for children and youth, the failure to 
educate and prepare them for life in a non-institutional setting. 
We are pleased that the Department of Mental Health has put into place a 
framework for reform, and it has positive elements. But sadly, we've seen little 
progress or change in the lives of the residents. This is particularly troubling to us 
because at some hospitals DMH has had two years to correct the problems. In our 
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experience, we have not met a single resident who could not be better treated with 
intensive, individualized services in the community. 
In addition to the questions that you have asked us to respond to, we think two 
other questions are warranted and would ask you to give consideration to those. First, 
whether the state hospital system can truly be fixed and whether recovery can fully 
occur within a state hospital setting; and second, whether it would be more prudent to 
use resources and better fulfill the mandates of state and federal law to close the state 
institutions and devote the resources to programs such as those that are being 
developed as part of the Mental Health Services Act. To ignore the notion that people 
can live in communities and to only focus instead on how we fix state hospitals, we 
think at best, only gives you half of the picture. 
However, as state hospitals continue to be part of our mental health system, we 
have several recommendations for you. First, that there be greater transparency 
about what's going on. That doesn't just mean to us that the Department of Justice is 
welcome into the hospitals when they want to visit the hospitals but that also 
information must be available to all of us who care about what happens to people who 
live in the hospitals. That means specific information about what is the department 
proposing with the Department of Justice in terms of a negotiation. Those are closed-
door meetings that none of us have access to. We know nothing about what is being 
proposed. Once there have been findings and agreements with the Department of 
Justice, reports must be provided to all of us that do work in this area so that we can 
adequately monitor the progress. There has to be increased oversight by the 
Legislature. We obviously think this is a very important first step, but it has to be 
done on an ongoing basis to make sure that there is real reform. And finally, we 
believe there has to be an increased role and presence of advocates at the state 
hospitals. 
I can continue with more specific recommendations and findings, or we can just 
go to your questions, whatever ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, you11 be submitting the specific recommendations 
and findings to the-and I hope our questions are not too far a field in terms of-
MS. BLAKEMORE: They are not. 
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SENATOR CHESBRO: --giving you the chance to touch on what your 
recommendation and findings are. 
MS. BLAKEMORE: Okay. I think one of the things that I want to just first 
start by saying, as I go into the recommendations, is that we are pleased that the 
department is focused on the wellness and recovery model. But our principal concern 
is that that policy has not been adequately or consistently implemented, and we worry 
that it's just a paper change and not a change in clinical practice. And one of the best 
ways I can point that out is giving you just some brief experiences of some of our 
clients that are there because that's really who we all care most about. 
There are three clients, beginning in February 2004 at Metro-so after the 
Department of Justice have been there, who have killed themselves while they are at 
Metropolitan; someone in 2004; in May of this year, a young woman was found 
hanging from a light fixture; and last week, we received an unconfirmed report of 
another suicide of a female resident on the same unit at Metro. Those are very 
troubling and consistent with what the Department of Justice found. 
At Napa, we worked with a patient who has a disorder of the pancreas. When 
he went to the local hospital for treatment, he was told that one of his psychiatric 
medications might be a strong factor in his disease. He asked to be removed from that 
medication. The psychiatrist ignored that information and put him back on the same 
psychiatric medication, and he was hospitalized again with additional symptoms of 
pancreas disease. Again, the medication was discontinued. Finally, and fortunately 
for our client, a staff member spoke up and the doctor was taken off of his case. 
In a third instance, a Vietnamese-speaking client on a conservatorship at 
Metropolitan was provided treatment on a treatment mall, but no one on that mall 
spoke his primary language nor were translators provided. He became very bored, not 
surprisingly, and he did not want to attend, causing his social worker to conclude that 
he wasn't ready for discharge. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Had anyone tried to speak with him-
MS. BLAKEMORE: Not while he was receiving ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: --to figure out if there was a language barrier? 
MS. BLAKEMORE: Well, that was the issue that we were involved in, and we 
certainly raised the concern that he needed to have his services provided in a language 
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that he understood. We ultimately worked with him to get him discharged. He's not 
the only client for whom that has been the experience. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: That's the difference between just going down a 
checklist or actually having a cultural change that says it's my responsibility to help 
solve a problem and that person, or persons, whoever was involved, probably didn't 
think that they were doing anything other than what was expected of them in terms of 
following procedures. But obviously there was a problem. 
MS. BLAKEMORE: Right. And it requires sometimes thinking outside the box 
to solve the problem. 
Finally, I'll just bring to your attention a young man who was admitted to Metro 
in October 2004 at age 14. His treatment plan listed his discharge criteria as 90 days 
of no assaults, no self-injuries, behaviors, no AWOL attempts. And until this criteria 
are met, there would be no discharge meetings. However, he was never referred to the 
positive behavior support team to help him dealing with the behavior. So a criteria, in 
other words, was set up that he had to meet. But the additional behavioral supports 
that is on the department's plan were never provided to him, thus really setting him 
up for failure, because, if he didn't have the support, how would he ever meet these 
kinds of discharge criteria? 
So I think these examples-and we have appended a number of other ones, of 
examples to our testimony, point out that a cultural change that needs to happen, and 
the paper planning that the department has done has not yet become a reality. And 
it's really time is wasting for many of the people that are here. 
We also wanted to point out to you the barriers that exist to our thinking to the 
reforms. There's no clear accountability for failures in treatment in care. Someone 
has to say, "This is my job; it stops with me", and has to make sure that the plans are 
implemented, and it can't just be the hospital director. It has to be at all levels in the 
state hospitals. 
We think that there's an insufficient commitment to staff training. I was 
actually struck by hearing that the department is supportive of training, which is a 
very good thing. However, one of our investigations team members has been recently 
been doing a monitoring at the state hospitals on seclusion and restraint and noted 
that the seclusion and restraint training manual that we were provided hasn't been 
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updated since 1991, so that's fairly shocking if we're emphasizing training and we're 
trying to make a cultural change about how seclusion and restraint is used. 
We also think there are a lack of people with psychiatric ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: By the way, let me indicate to you that I'm holding a 
hearing next week on the progress, or a lack of progress, on the implementation of my 
seclusion and restraints legislation of last year. 
MS. BLAKEMORE: We are certainly pleased about that and will have some 
additional information for you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So there's at least a week left before an answer to that 
question needs to be provided. 
MS. BLAKEMORE: Okay. We also think a fundamental problem is the lack of 
presence of people with psychiatric and other disabilities in leadership management, 
and line staff at state hospitals, that it's very hard to envision people with psychiatric 
disabilities in a different way, other than a person who's hostile and violent in causing 
a problem, unless you see people who have other experiences and are contributing to 
the treatment, and we would urge the hospitals to give serious consideration to 
employing people at all levels of their organization with disabilities and particularly 
psychiatric disabilities. 
We're also concemed that there exists a pervasive attitude by current staff and 
an environment that prevents residents from having a true voice about their daily 
living and their life goals. An example is that an individual is given medication in the 
rooming that might make him feel sleepy. The individual prefers to take the 
medication at night. This is seen as the resident being resistant to taking medication, 
and it's presented to the courts as proof of the resident's noncompliance as opposed to 
an opportunity to engage that individual in their own treatment and to help the 
individual learn to make decisions about their life and to have those decisions 
respected. 
I want to just identify our recommendations, recommendations conceming the 
Metropolitan's children unit. They are very serious problems at the Metropolitan 
Children's Unit. It's been a "short-lived" unit for eight years. But during the time of 
its existence, we have not seen changes at Metropolitan for the children. We've 
appended in our report a copy of the special masters' report from the Katie A. case 
35 
that summarizes his findings at Metro for the children's unit, and they are very 
troubling. We think fundamentally that the Metro Children's Unit should be closed 
within 18 months. We cannot see any reason why children who have access to EPSDT 
services, special education services, and a variety of other entitlements cannot be 
served adequately in their communities. We would also put in place an ongoing 
oversight mechanism to ensure that children who would have otherwise been placed at 
Metropolitan receive appropriate services. 
We talked briefly earlier about transparency and outcomes. We really believe 
that DMH should be required to publicly report data on its website monthly regarding 
a number of measures. They have done that for seclusion and restraint, and we think 
it is very helpful to have public accountability of that data. But we also should look at 
the numbers of deaths that have occurred at each hospital, the number of injuries 
that have occurred to patients at each hospital. We should have information about 
people's discharge, how long they have lived there. All of that creates a more 
transparent system S() that we can collectively provide oversight and monitor the 
progress the department is making and implementing the Department of Justice 
findings. 
The department has recently posted injuries to employees related to the use of 
restraint and seclusion on its website but interestingly has not reported injuries that 
occur to patients on the website, and we're puzzled by that, and we think that would 
be a fundamental change. We know of at least two deaths that occurred while people 
have been restrained since January 2004. 
Insofar as DMH assesses the pace and quality of its reform, this information 
should be reported to the Legislature on a quarterly basis and again be reported on 
the website. 
In terms of oversight, we believe that the Legislature should commission an 
independent panel of experts to assess whether patient care has improved at the state 
hospitals. Fundamentally, the thing we should care most about is how people are 
treated while they're living at state hospitals and ensure that they're getting the kinds 
of services that they need. And we think outside, independent oversight is something 
that will help move us in that direction more quickly. 
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Finally, we think there needs to be an increased role and presence of advocates 
that will allow advocates to have onsite monitoring of practices, such as the use of 
seclusion and restraint, training to staff, about patients' rights and development of 
corrective action plans following a finding regarding a patients' rights violation. Thank 
you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Let me focus in on some of the specific questions that 
we had asked you to answer. 
What barriers does the Office of Patients' Rights face in meeting the advocacy 
needs of state hospital patients, and what actions would you propose to address 
through those barriers? And you probably mentioned some of those in your list of 
recommendations. But what could we be looking to in the Legislature in terms of 
overseeing the department to try to improve or increase that? 
MS. BLAKEMORE: I think that the fundamental problem is that the number of 
complaints that are now handled by our Office of Patients' Rights has nearly doubled 
since its inception. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Is that a function of increase in complaints, or is it a 
change in the ratio between the number of people you have and the number of 
patients? 
MS. BLAKEMORE: That's a function of a number of things. One, we have 
fewer staff. Second, there are more complaints, and it has some to do with the 
changing nature of who happens to live at the state hospitals. So last year, there were 
7,000 complaints that were handled by the Office of Patients' Rights. And what 
happens when there's such a large number of complaints is that you lose your ability 
to be more proactive, to provide staff training, to do the kind of follow up that you 
would otherwise would do, because there's very specific statutory timelines around 
investigating those complaints. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So 1s that problem pretty consistent throughout the 
system, or it greater at some hospitals than at others? 
MS. BLAKEMORE: I'll let Michelle respond, but I believe it to be consistent 
throughout the hospitals. 
MS. MICHELE MUDGETT: That's correct. It is throughout the four state 
hospitals. 
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SENATOR CHESBRO: With regards to the relationship with the Department of 
Mental Health, are there firewall protections between the department, as a contracting 
agent, and PAI, as the contractor, sufficient to ensure that OPR is independent in 
carrying out your duties? 
MS. BLAKEMORE: There are. Yes. There are certainly firewalls between 
Protection & Advocacy and OPR. I think that both ensures that OPR remains 
independent. I think it also addresses the department's concern that OPR might 
provide PAI with information that would then lead to litigation. So I think the firewall 
kind of cuts that other way as well, but we are very diligent in honoring that firewall. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, I certainly never noticed PAI to be shy or unwilling 
to step forward in a critical way. 
MS. BLAKEMORE: That's true. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I mean that's a compliment. 
MS. BLAKEMORE: Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: What outcomes would you look for following 
implementation of a remediation plan? And I guess more importantly, in terms of 
accountability, how can those outcomes best be measured? 
MS. BLAKEMORE: I think some of the things that I referred to in my testimony 
is that measuring the outcomes means we all first have to have agreement on what the 
outcomes are. I think the department has started well with sort of identifying more of 
a recovery-based model. But the specifics of what's going to be required by the 
Department of Justice should be shared in part with everyone who is part of this 
larger system before all the I's are dotted and the T's are crossed. 
It also requires, I believe, that as part of the oversight and accountability, that 
everyone have access to the data about how the reforms are going. You can't simply 
look at the data behind closed doors and trust that we're all going to believe that 
there's the kinds of reforms that are needed. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So you're referring to the proposed settlement in terms 
of what ought to be transparent and available? 
MS. BLAKEMORE: I certainly think that that's a piece of it. I think there's two 
things going on. There's both the settlement that the department has talked about 
today of entering into, and I think there needs to be much more transparency around 
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that. In addition, the department has put into place a number of reforms, and that's 
good that they're doing that. But we get very little data, nor is data published 
anywhere from the department, about how well they're implementing the reforms that 
they already put in place. So what we have is our individual experiences from our 
clients that suggests that those reforms are really not happening at a client level. If 
there's other data that suggests otherwise, an accountable system would say, Let us 
show you the data about the kinds of progress that we are being made, both on an 
individual and on a more systemic basis. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Is Dr. Mayberg still here, available to respond to this 
comment? Maybe Mr. Rodriguez, I can ask you to come forward, the issue being 
measurable outcomes and how we can assure that there's feedback mechanisms to 
know that we're, in fact, making the progress that we would hope would be made. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, that is part of the remediation plan which I presume is 
public after it's agreed to by everybody. And certainly, I think there is some-people 
should be reassured that USDOJ is half of the equation here with the state. But 
significant monitoring activities, reports, information, the support at a systemic level, 
and an individual patient level that we're achieving, what we're supposed to be 
achieving, obviously, those reports aren't being produced right now, sir. But those are 
the kinds of things that are going to be developed, not only as a tool for the staff but as 
a reporting mechanism-keep me informed, the executive directors informed, USDOJ 
informed. And to the extent we're talking generic information as opposed to patient 
specific information with names and stuff like that, I presume that that's the kind of 
stuff that we're going to be talking about, what kind of information is the Legislature 
going to want, what others want to see what's going on, thinking that that would be a 
discussion we would be having with you and others in the coming months. I figure, 
after we get the remediation plan done, then it's -- So how do you tease out 
information that would be useful to outsiders and in some sort of readable, summary-
level way and made available either reports to the Legislature or on the web page or 
upon request? I haven't quite gotten down the road to defining all that and what it's 
going to be. But I can see it coming. And certainly, we're not going have a big 
objection as to providing otherwise public information. 
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SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, of course, feedback mechanisms demonstrate to 
the Department of Justice what progress is being made are very important, I think, for 
the sake of their clients, their advocates, and certainly the Legislature, having those 
mechanisms be accessible and available as well too because obviously we're holding 
this hearing and have the Legislature through the budget process and the Select 
Committee process and the policy committee process have a responsibility to make 
sure that in fact the department is not only adhering to legal requirements but also 
improving the system for the patients. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: I don't have a lot of specificity yet, but I know it's something 
we11 be working with you all on. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Working with is the critical term. So we'd like very 
much,· along with PAI, to be at the table with you monitoring, finding out what those 
mechanisms are going to be, and then using them to monitor how the progress is 
being made. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: I give Catherine everything she wants. 
MS. BLAKEMORE: I will remember that. It's now on record. Thank you so 
much. (Laughter) 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: I thought I said I already had. I didn't say in the future. 
MS. BLAKEMORE: __ continuing. 
MR. RODRIGUEZ: Oh, good. I'm glad you acknowledge that. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I think we nailed it. Okay. Well, I appreciate your 
testimony, and we're going to proceed with the agenda. 
MS. BLAKEMORE: Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you. (Applause) 
I have Kathryn Trevino of the California Network of Mental Health Clients and 
Amy Breckenridge of Peer Self-Advocacy program for Protection & Advocacy. I11 ask 
you both to come forward and to point out, it's so easy to think of this system as, and 
the stories we hear-the suicides, the assaults, the other things-as mere numbers. 
These are human beings with illness and who are our responsibility. And I think it's 
the Network motto, Nothing about us without us. So I think your participation here 
today is very, very important. 
So Ms. Trevino, you want to-is it Trevino or Trevino? 
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MS. KATHRYN TREVINO: It's either way. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. My sister-in-law's name 1s Trevino. She 
sensitized me to the question. Thank you for being here. 
MS. TREVINO: I'd like to read what I wrote, my testimony for you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Yes. Please. 
MS. TREVINO: As a member of the Napa State Hospital Advisory Board, I work 
to represent the client voice. I believe that I bring a unique perspective with a master's 
level of education, nearly four years of direct practice which included a year as Quality 
Improvement Committee member with Sacramento County, over eight years as the 
administrator of the California Network of Mental Health Clients, and nearly four years 
as a resident of a state hospital under the care of the California State Department of 
Mental Health. 
As a member of the board, I have been attending client council meetings since 
March 2004 to learn the needs of hospital residents. Since I do not have the complete 
information, I do not know if the Justice Department is reflective of what I know. 
However, I want to testify to the problems that I've experienced. 
As a member of the Napa State Hospital Advisory Board, information provided 
by the Administration is that the practice of restraint and seclusion are significantly 
down. As an attendee of the client council, some issues brought up are reflective of 
the report. For instance, council members have pointed out the oxymoron between 
the hospital administration boasting of implementing the recovery model when 
hospital staff humiliate and dehumanize them with hostile behaviors. Council 
members have consistently informed hospital administration about the staff on the T-
11 ward-antagonizing, threatening, and punishing clients. 
The administration's first response was that abusive staff provides lessons for 
hospital clients on dealing with people like this on the outside. The second response 
to justify this behavior was to ask members to see it like a family. Some are good and 
some are not. 
At the last council meeting, members were told that it will take a year for the 
hospital to train staff, to stop the abuse, with 15 more lesson-modules to go. In 
response, one member said, I could be dead by then. I had written to the 
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administration to adopt a zero tolerance for staff abusing clients, yet I have not heard 
back from the administration and the complaints continue. 
At another council meeting, an elderly woman burst out in tears saying she 
could no longer bear seeing men shackled to chairs in the hallway with bags on their 
heads. When I asked the hospital director about this, his response was that it was not 
a bag. I was told that it was a spit guard to cover the mouth. I saw the apparatus the 
other week, and it was a bag, that I would be humiliated with. 
As the administrator to the California Network of Mental Health clients, I often 
receive calls from hospital clients and family members. The major complaints I receive 
from family members is overmedication of their loved one and lack of response from 
hospital administration to their concerns. I attended a meeting with a family member, 
the client's psychiatrist, and other hospital administration. This psychiatrist was 
obnoxious in non-verbal responses to the family member, yet no one in the meeting 
would stop her abusive behavior. When I became so distracted with the doctor's 
behavior, I was compelled to point out that her demeanor was particularly 
uncomfortable for me. The doctor stopped crossing her arms, throwing her head back, 
and rolling her eyes. She took herself off the client's case, and the other staff 
addressed the issues being brought up by the family member. 
The major complaint I receive from hospital clients is their need for advocacy 
and their fear of being discharged without a plan. As I see it, the state hospital has 
not changed in over 30 years, with a primary focus to observe predicted control, the 
behavior of hospital clients. On an unannounced visit to a ward, what I saw was 
strikingly familiar. There were many men standing idle against the wall of long 
hallways with a locked-nurse station between them. 
The hospital infrastructure needs to change from the basic facilities to the 
methods of treatment. The entrenched medical model of observed (?) clashes 
fundamentally with the social rehabilitation model which is a vital part of the recovery 
model to choose, get, and keep. 
I was 19 years old in February 1971 when a state hospital staff person dropped 
me off on the corner of 16th and J Streets in Sacramento. There were no community 
mental health supports available. I was de-institutionalized and left on the street with 
no means or inkling on how to survive. With the passage of the Mental Health 
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Services Act, there is a promise of comprehensive, holistic community mental health 
services. Although it is too late for me, there is a whole new group of state hospital 
clients that need to prepare for the new mental health community system. We cannot 
leave the people at the state hospital behind. The transformation occurring in the 
communities needs to occur in the state hospitals. This transformation can be 
expedited by bringing consumer groups that practice the recovery model inside the 
hospital to train residents and staff. 
Finally, again, there needs to be a zero tolerance for staff abuse of clients. And 
there is a need for more advocates at the hospital. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. I thank you very much for your testimony. It's 
much appreciated. 
Next, I'd like to call on Amy Breckenridge who's (applause), as I indicated, with 
Protection & Advocacy, Peer Self-Advocacy Program. 
MS. AMY BRECKENRIDGE: Thank you, Senator Chesbro, for allowing me to 
testify today. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Can you pull the mike a little bit closer? Yes. That 
would help. 
MS. BRECKENRIDGE: The Peer and Self-Advocacy Unit is a group of former 
mental health clients who facilitate self-help and self-advocacy groups inside locked 
facilities and in the communities. The groups teach people about their rights 
encourage people to strategize together, and provide an atmosphere of safety and trust 
inside a facility where clients are able to talk freely and strategize how to cope with the 
problems they encounter. 
In thinking about your question of recovery, recovery is defined in the American 
College Dictionary as retuming ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I was hoping somebody would give a definition of 
recovery. 
MS. BRECKENRIDGE: ... as retuming to a normal condition or regaining a 
normal state. Some examples: I've had pneumonia, but now I've recovered. I gambled 
every day, but now I don't do that. I was feeling depressed, but I'm feeling better now. 
I overspent on my credit cards. I felt terrible about the effects of the debt on my family 
and ashamed of myself, but I'm over it. I've recovered. 
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Recovery, I believe, is an inner process, and it's not a model that can be 
imposed from the outside. Recovery can be encouraged, however, through 
understanding and compassionate attitude and an acknowledgement of a person's 
changing condition and a process that supports that change and discussion with that 
individual about what has helped the change and what doesn't. 
I'd like you to consider the following. You are in a hospital. You are told by 
your treatment staff, I don't care what you do. You're never going to get out of here. 
And even if you do, you're not going to make it. You'll never succeed. If you don't come 
into my office right now, I'm going to shoot you so full of medication that you're going to 
crawl down the hallway. You yelled at your roommate, even though he stole from you. 
That just shows that you're not ready for discharge. 
I often think that Napa residents have to become monks or saints before they're 
considered for discharge. When an individual comes to Napa on a forensic 
commitment, they lose their individuality immediately. They're given khaki clothing, 
and they're all considered in the same lot-dangerous, mentally ill, and criminal. 
A former Napa forensic client told me when she was there that the staff had 
little understanding of mental illness and did not believe that she would ever be 
anything other than sick, incoherent, immobilized on large doses of medication, and 
non-communicative. The staff members, she said, were surprised when she recovered. 
They were surprised when she explained she had always been a good person, a 
devoted wife, good employee, and, yet, one day, she started feeling strange and really 
couldn't explain what was happening to her. Her community physician had no answer 
for her; and finally, she ended up at Napa. Now she's out and she works in the 
community and is leading a very successful life. 
It is, however, a lot harder to get out of the state hospitals now than it was when 
she was there. When a person is committed as an NGI, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, that commitment can be extended indefinitely. There's not enough space in 
the conditional release program, and people spend years working their way from unit, 
one unit to another, to eventually get to an open unit. Residents say that they have to 
keep jumping through hoops, repeating programs, or else there are not programs 
specific to what the courts are requiring for them to be discharged. 
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To me, people seem to have reached a significant level of recovery. They are 
articulate, able to be honest with themselves. They deeply desire to be back in the 
community, making a life for themselves, and hope to grow in that life. They want to 
be able to work, be with their families, see a play, enjoy life. But as the years dribble 
away, people do begin to lose hope. They worry that the hospital stay will count 
against them in the community, and they begin to believe that they11 never get out. 
As Kathy mentioned, it is difficult to talk to your psychiatrist or your social 
worker when you know that any statement can and will be held against you. It can't 
be considered therapeutic when you are afraid of the individuals that are providing 
you with treatment, where every act and thought is looked at for its potential for 
dangerousness. It is difficult to talk to a doctor or to a nurse about your symptoms 
when they tell you that the symptoms are all in your head. It's difficult to watch your 
(?) appear who's vomited in front of the nurse's station and then who is told then to go 
back to bed and who dies a few hours later. It is difficult to trust a system that 
withholds the knowledge of a medical condition that you have for a few years, when it 
is too late to get effective treatment for that condition. 
And lastly, it is horrifying to have spent a year m the conditional release 
program, feeling that you have been successful, you've worked, you're getting ready to 
go to court, you're hoping to be released. A couple of weeks before your trial, you're 
given a new medication inexplicably. You feel foggy, you feel uncertain, not yourself. 
The court decides you need to be hospitalized again because you're not stable on your 
medication. You feel victimized, you feel that a crime has been committed against you, 
and you start seeking legal remedies because the system that says its helping is 
actually harming you. 
If you want to institute a recovery model, I think you need to institute a change 
of culture among the staff. I would call it a staff recovery model. (Laughter) And I 
know it's humorous in a way, but I think that the medical model has existed in mental 
health treatment for many years with psychiatrists at the top of the totem pole. This 
model has proved ineffective in most settings. Even good staff members have found it 
difficult to advocate for their clients, their voices also going unheard, because the 
pronouncements of the doctors topped the list, and sometimes residents say -- clients 
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say -- that they only see their psychiatrist for maybe five minutes at a time 1n a 
hallway and don't receive individualized attention. 
I think you need a professional staff that truly understands symptoms of mental 
illness but also can weigh the individual character along with the illness. You need a 
staff that can be real, be encouraging, supportive, and give hope about your chances 
for living a full life. I heard recently from one client that the staff members on his 
unit are actively discouraged from talking to them, to him, to the patients. You need a 
staff that fosters independence and self-responsibility. You need to model more of the 
behavior you want to see from your clients, and you also need to foster more of a 
collaboration among staff and clients that can begin to break down the "us-and-them" 
mentality that exists on both sides of the current equation. 
I'd say, yes, many clients concur with the Department of Justice report. Many 
clients have written to the Department of Justice because one of the department's 
functions is to protect the civil rights of institutionalized persons. The cries for help 
within the institution have gone unheard. And when you can't get help from the 
helpers, you feel like you have nowhere to go. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. I thank you very much for your testimony. 
(Applause) 
We will call the next panel up, and I'm going to take a two-minute chairman's 
break while June Forbes, the current support group, Ann Williams, who's a parent, 
and Karen Henry of National Alliance for the Mentally Ill come forward. 
Thank you for being here. It's good to see you. 
MS. KAREN HENRY: Good afternoon. My name is Karen Henry. I'm from 
NAMI California representing its more than 70 affiliates, more than 16,000 members, 
and which consists of consumers as well as family members. As an attorney, I chair a 
Government Affairs Committee, as an individual, as bipolar, I chair our Consumer 
Participation Committee. 
Anyone who read that report would have to read it three times to make sure 
you're actually seeing what your eyes are seeing. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: That's exactly the feeling I had as I read through it. 
MS. HENRY: I almost did it once again today but I stopped. We have a large 
number of -- many members that -- are among the sickest of those of mental illness, 
46 
which means that some of them are in these state hospitals, and their family members 
have to go through the distress and that staying up all night because you don't know 
whether the child's even safe. 
No patient should be subjected to this. No family member should be subjected 
to having to have their child be in that condition. We all can agree that corrective 
measures have to be taken. But we probably disagree on some of the measures it will 
take to do that. When we look at it-and I realize the prior speakers went through a 
series of specific measures, suggestions, issues as far as what they thought caused the 
problem-but I'm going to look at it more generically from the standpoint of two 
things. 
It's going to take money. It's going to take lots of money. And part of the reason 
it's going to take money is because we don't have sufficient staff. If we don't have 
sufficient staff, some of the other requirements are difficult to meet. So when we look 
at it, we say, okay. If we're really serious about correcting the situation with these 
hospitals and providing the kind of care that people are entitled to, then we have got to 
look at the appropriations issue and the governor rather than additional legislation. 
And to give an example on that is restraint, seclusion and restraint that you 
passed last year, which is a great step forward. But it's difficult sometimes to 
implement things that can be implemented if you don't even have enough staff on the 
unit to know what's happening. So primarily, number one, there's got to be money. 
I went down-well, actually just looked on the internet. And part of the staffing 
problem is an inability to recruit. Now if you look at salary for an RN at Kaiser, brand 
new RN can be there, versus Napa, their vacancies, versus Napa, there's more than 
$28,000-a-year difference in those salaries, on top of which in the private sector, they 
get 10 percent (?), 50 percent, so on. I represented hospitals about 25 years, so some 
of this stuff is coming back to me. But there's a major problem there. How do you 
recruit registered nurses of the quality we need with that kind of a difference? 
Psychiatrists. Somebody mentioned to me that they thought you made more in 
Corrections than you made at Napa. I looked at it, and it's true-about $8,000-a-year 
difference. And in Corrections, you at least have correctional officers who are able to 
ensure the safety, not only the staff but of other individuals. And we don't really have 
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that at Napa and its pretty when we read that report that safety and security of 
patients; it's just a very bad situation. 
Unless we do get adequate staffing, when we talk about treatment teams, that 
assumes you've got people to put together a treatment team who have the capacity to 
not only develop the plan but to implement the plan. And there are major-by which 
nursing plans are implemented-excuse me-if the plan fails, it can be measured as to 
whether or not it's effective or not effective. We do that for other medical conditions, 
and they've specifically put forward not only the plan but who's going to do what 
portion of the plan. And that plan is under the supervision of the physician, even 
though he or she doesn't provide most of the care. But that needs to happen, and you 
have to have staff to do it. 
A lot of mandatory overtime is going on here. So you're staff -- maybe full time. 
And then they're expected to pull a 12-hour shift on top of that or to work a seventh 
day, and those are circumstances that are difficult to function in anyway. But to not 
be able to have the sufficiency so we don't put the burden on every staff member. 
Training is what somebody else mentioned, I put down here. To read that and 
to think that any staff member would allow that to go on and not report it and not do 
something about it, there is a problem here. Part of its training, part of it's going 
through the policies and procedures that they're supposed to follow. But part of it is 
that very-close-to-intentional action is going on. So in addition to the money for the 
staff, we believe we also have to have enforcement of existing laws and regulations. 
We've got the stuff there in seclusion and restraints; we've got it there in terms of 
quality of care in(?), to JAHCO, Medicare, and so on, but they're not being followed. 
If a person is being overmedicated, a registered nurse, physician, and so on 
would be able to observe that if that's going on. But even when it's observed, there's 
nothing happening. There's no follow up to that person. When you find a patient that 
was left in the bed in their own increment, somebody had to observe them being found 
there. Well, why didn't that somebody follow up with correction and disciplinary 
action on that individual? Because it's not just a question of everything, as far as the 
physician's staff. It's also a question, as I said, of the policies and procedures that you 
have now. 
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When I hear somebody say, as was said-Mr. Rodriguez-but you have to 
change the culture. Well, if you just try to use training to change the culture and you 
don't actually enforce the expectations and requirements of staff, you will not have 
accomplished what needs to be done. We've got to be just straightforward about it. 
This is the way it's going to be; these are the expectations. And if you don't want to 
follow them, then bing, bing, bing-this is what's going to happen-so we don't have 
the kind of staff taking care of people. 
The last thing I want to say is, the recovery model, there is no way that 
somebody cannot be committed to that because that's the way people start to move 
along the road and eventually get clear at the top, or three-quarters to the top, but in a 
situation in which they feel comfortable and if they're accomplishing something. But I 
don't see how, without the staff, and without the commitment and expectations, we're 
going to get very far, other than on paper. We can have policies; we're committed to it, 
and we've got these treating malls, and we've got all this stuff going. But what is the 
measurable outcome? The measurable outcome, how many of these patients are able 
to move beyond the facility, have discharge planning, have some social skills and 
programs started while in the facility so that they can go out and move into another 
setting and feel comfortable with it? 
Thank you for your time and for putting together the hearing on this issue. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I appreciate your comments. Thanks for being here. 
Let me next turn to June Forbes who's with the Napa Hospital Parent Support 
Group. Thank you for being here. 
MS. JUNE FORBES: My name is June Forbes. My son has been a patient at 
Napa State Hospital for over a year. And although this isn't part of what I planned to 
say to you today, comments have been made about the dangerousness of patients at 
the state hospital, and I just feel compelled to respond to them to remind you that in 
many, many cases, the people that we assumed to be dangerous, just because they 
think that a hospital is no different from the criminal justice system, are not. And in 
many cases, they are the very same people who once came to the hospital through the 
LPS system because, where they were committed, because of their utter helplessness 
in the outside world. They're back now, accused or convicted of crimes but often 
because the community failed to help them in time because they made mistakes they 
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would not have made with more timely, more intensive community care, and they just 
felt the stigma against those dangerous patients, different patients than we used to 
have, was overwhelming and not really justified. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I appreciate your comments. 
MS. FORBES: Thank you. 
My son has been a patient at Napa State Hospital for over a year, and I attend a 
monthly support group for patients' families there, and we know that terrible things do 
happen at the hospital, and there are real problems there, as there are problems at 
any institution that has been starved of operating money for decades, if not for a 
century. The violence and abuses do happen. Seclusion and restraints are still used, 
and we grieve about them. 
But we also conclude from our monthly meetings with senior and frontline staff 
that more cultural change is needed. The senior administrators and many of the staff 
at all levels are doing their utmost to follow best practices in care giving. A lot of them 
understand what works and what doesn't and what would constitute best practices in 
a humane, public mental health system and their challenge is to improve, despite a 
very serious staff shortage at the hospital. 
That's why we take California Director of Mental Health, Steve Mayberg's point, 
when he says, "We ... thought we were being cooperative ... [but] these interview and site 
investigations are very time-consuming, and we thought that limited resources really 
should be spent on patient care and changing our system ... " 
I dread that people who do direct-patient care will spend even more time on 
paperwork because of this investigation and have less to spend with our family 
members. 
New patients' families bring up the evidence of the staff shortage at our 
meetings every single month. The hospital assures us that we're valued members of 
our families' treatment teams. But even when we have important information for 
them, the doctors and nurses and social workers don't have time to take our phone 
calls or to call us back when we leave messages. 
And when the patients we know have questions and concerns, they're told to tell 
your treatment team, tell your social worker. But our relatives tell us, "I can't talk to 
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them. They're too busy. Treatment team meetings are intimidating. I can't remember 
what I want to say then". 
Patients we know have gone months without seemg a psychologist because 
there isn't one available. The psych techs and the nurses we depend on to guide our 
relatives and keep them safe are either exhausted from working overtime, or they're 
temporary employees-the temps who float from unit to unit, not assigned to one place 
long enough to develop good judgment about individual patients there or current 
circumstances there. 
The patients we know who have improved, who are progressing through the 
required steps towards discharge, are stymied and held back because there isn't 
enough staff to operate a unit at the level they're required to succeed at next, and the 
patients we know need things to do, too. 
Classes about the criminal justice system and group therapy for anger 
management and the like are all really well and good, but the attractive activities the 
hospital is justly proud of-the art and the music and the sports and the education 
and the work-are only available to the very few patients whose brain function has 
improved enough to permit minimal supervision-the very few who are on the 
experimental, new model of mall treatment, and they are not available to any one 
patient for more than a few hours on weekdays, and . not even then during the 
quarterly (?) weeks when no patient activities are scheduled, and the rest of the 
weekdays and every evening and weekend are empty without anything to distract the 
people we love from the mischief and even the violence that inevitably spring from 
broken brains crowded together in idleness and captivity. 
These conditions exist because the hospital is understaffed. And I know I'm 
talking money, and Califomia doesn't have money, but Califomia has an obligation to 
the helpless people in its charge, too. We're understaffed, and the staff we have are 
undertrained. And we're understaffed for two reasons. 
First, the hospital's salary and incentive structure fails to attract and retain 
enough good people. People leave for better pay in places with a lower cost of living 
than the Napa Valley, and their positions stand vacant for months. And the people 
who stay are working forced overtime and double shifts. And competent, dedicated, 
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seasoned people refuse promotions to supervisory positions where they're desperately 
needed because unit supervisors make less money for more responsibility. 
Second, the hospital hasn't authorized enough staff to provide adequate 
coverage, something that vacancy rates doesn't show. Caseloads are too large. The 
overtime required to provide coverage at this staffing level burns people out. Coverage 
for employees' sick and vacation and training time is totally inadequate. Week day, 
day shifts-when the doctors and the social workers are on the job are only 45 of the 
168 hours in a week-the nights, the weekends, the holidays, the quarterly tip weeks, 
the majority of the time people spend in the hospital-are when we're most likely to 
see unseasoned staff in charge of unstabilized patients. 
And even when the doctors and social workers are on the job, they have less 
and less time to spend with the patients, people who need attention, because the staff 
is kept so busy filling out forms for reviews and audits and this latest federal 
investigation, as well as recognizing and implement -- reorganizing to implement --
successive new models of care that advocates demand. And the staff is under-trained 
for two reasons: Coverage is so thin, that people can't be relieved from patient care to 
go attend a training session. Turnover is so high, that seasoned staff has little 
opportunity to train new people by mentoring them, so we need your help. 
We need you to authorize the budget it will take and to write whatever enabling 
legislation it will take to accomplish four things. First, just to identify and correct the 
little environmental hazards to people's safety, like the unsafe grab bars and the door 
closures and the window bars. And second, procure the technologies we need, like the 
computers and the drug detection machines and the drug-sniffing dogs. And third, 
develop an adequate staff training system that will increase coverage so that staff can 
be relieved of patient care long enough to go get trained so that when a performance 
review should uncover that somebody doesn't belong here, we dare let that position be 
vacant so we can replace them, to allow for seeking out some cutting edge treatment 
techniques and hiring consultants to teach them to the hospital staff. And finally and 
most important, rationalize the hospitals' employee compensation system so that it 
will attract and retain good people. 
The California Department of Personnel Administration and the State Personnel 
Board must be authorized to create a package of salaries and benefits and creative 
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incentives and negotiate their implementation with all five employee unions. Cultural 
change isn't going to happen until we have people, trained people, good people, and 
that's what will get them here. 
We need to develop incentives to deliver more licensed staff to the hospital, 
incentives like paying off their student loans, increasing the number of stipends we 
pay to community college trainees and licensing programs. We need to contract with 
the people who get those breaks, to stay and work at the hospital for sometime. We 
need to authorize adequate staffing. We need more psychiatrists, more psychologists, 
more social workers, more licensed nursing staff; we need more supervisors; we need 
hospital police. We need hospital police who are sensitivity trained and know that the 
way to approach us effectively is not as cop. And we need them to be trained and 
motivated ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: You do that very well. 
MS. FORBES: Well, thank you. My dad was one. We need them to be trained 
and motivated to use best practices and deliver best practices sensitively. Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you. (Applause) This actually goes for all of our 
witnesses, but I particularly want to ask you if you'll give us a copy of your written 
testimony for the record. I appreciate it. 
MS. FORBES: I will. Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So next I'd like to call on Ann Williams, who's a parent. 
Welcome. 
MS. ANN WILLIAMS: Thank you. Hello. My name is Ann Williams, and I am 
the mother of __ who has been in the mental health system over half of his life. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Can you move the mike a little closer so everyone can 
hear you? Thank you. 
MS. WILLIAMS: Over half of his life. He is being drugged(?). One doctor, who 
had his license suspended for sexual and drug or alcohol abuse before being hired by 
Napa State Hospital, told my son, in response to __ 's request, to be taken off a 
certain medication because it was making him feel weak, "I have the right to put you 
on any goddamn medication I want." His words, not mine. 
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When confronted with this, the doctor denied it. My son has been diagnosed 
with hyperthyroidism, dyskinesia, and Parkinsonism and has become suicidal and 
assaultive, all caused by the drugs. 
After graduating from high school, __ went off to Marine boot camp where he 
was discharged as emotionally immature, not mentally ill. On returning home, his 
feelings of failure caused him to become despondent, and subsequently, he fell into a 
depression. But much worse than that, he fell into the snare of the mental health 
system. 
I have tried to become __ 's conservator and get him released from Napa State 
Hospital on several occasions, only to find him over-drugged when he arrived at the 
courthouse, preventing him from making a sound statement in support of his case. 
See a similar instance on page 18, last paragraph, of the DOJ's report into Napa State 
Hospital. 
Yes. I am very angry at what the mental health system has done to my son and 
many other people's loved ones, and I believe the mental health system should be held 
accountable for the damage inflicted upon them. The DOJ have completed their 
investigations into Metropolitan and Napa State Hospitals, and their reports are, as 
you know, unfavorable, which is no surprise to myself and many others. I have no 
doubt that DOJ will find much the same throughout the California mental health 
system. I believe Napa State Hospital is no worse than any of the other facilities my 
son has been in, and that is not meant to be a compliment, because believe you me, it 
could not get much worse, as confirmed within the DOJ's report. 
The present system is not working, and nobody is more aware of that fact than 
the patients themselves. After reading the Department of Justice's investigation report 
into Napa State Hospital, it seems to me that the staff are completely oblivious to their 
instructions, which _ is no surprise to me, because they have such unrewarding jobs 
to perform. 
Senator Chesbro, in your letter to me, dated September 6, 2005; you asked if I 
have any recommendations relative to improved quality of care for individuals residing 
at a state hospital. The answer to that question is a resounding yes. 
I recommend, as I did here on March 22, 2004, an alternative treatment plan to 
give our loved ones hope and their dignity back -- a plan without labels for which there 
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is no scientific proof, which is the reason why many diagnoses are given by many 
different psychiatrists to one patient-- a plan without so many unnecessary convenient 
and costly psychotropic drugs which have serious physical and emotional side effects, 
including suicidal and assaultive behavior-- a plan with vocational training, college 
courses, farming, and animal husbandry, whichever suits the individual's abilities to 
prepare them for their release, get back into society, as is done in the prisons-- a plan 
with faith-based programs, such as Chuck Colson's -prison ministry, which, I might 
add, is very successful. Why, I ask, are these programs not in the California mental 
health system? I also believe that patients should exercise regularly and be 
encouraged to help others rather than focus on themselves. 
I truly believe that such a plan would be very cost effective and so successful, 
benefiting many patients, and that is my dream. It would seem to many, that my son 
is past being helped. But I am a woman of faith in God and believe with all my heart 
that the end of my son's story will be a good one, and I would like to add three 
profound statements found in toxic psychiatry. 
"A gigantic asylum is a gigantic evil. And figuratively speaking, a manufactory 
of chronic insanity." John Aldridge, 1859. 
"Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be 
the most oppressive." C.S. Lewis, 1970. 
"I am still more frightened by the fearless power in the eyes of my fellow 
psychiatrists than by the powerless fear in the eyes of their patients." R.D. Lang, 
1985. 
Thank you, Senator. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, thank you very much for your testimony. 
(Applause) 
And let me repeat what I said earlier for all the witnesses. I appreciate a written 
copy of your testimony, if you could make it available to us. Thank you. 
MS. WILLIAMS: And I would also like to give you Jeff Griffin, from CCHR, this 
manual. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Provide it to the sergeants, and they will make sure I get 
it. Thank you. 
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Next, let me invite Barry Chaitin who's the Chair of the Department of 
Psychiatry, UC Irvine, representing California Psychiatric Association, and Dr. Charles 
Faltz, Director of Professional Affairs for the California Psychological Association. 
Welcome. I assume you're Barry Chaitin. 
DR. BARRY CHAITIN: Right. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. Great to have you here. Go ahead and present. 
DR. CHAITIN: Well, good afternoon. My name is Barry Chaitin. I'm professor 
and co-chair of the Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior at the UC Irvine 
Medical School. And in that capacity, I'm also Chief of Psychiatry at the UCI Medical 
Center, also past president of the California Psychiatric Association. 
I'm here today to testify on behalf of 3,500-member psychiatric physicians but 
in particular on behalf of our members who work in the state hospitals. 
I want to address some quality-of-care concerns we have, some of which have 
been addressed by reports of the United States Department of Justice and some which 
have not. It's hard to know how to proceed after some of the riveting testimony we've 
just had. It's been very powerful. 
Ms. Lee, in her introductory comments, has really set the table for some of the 
problems that we're facing. And I'm not here to pile on. We've sort of, at many levels, 
have articulated what the problems are. We're going to be, try to be constructive and 
somewhat mercifully brief. And with Ms. Forbes' marvelous testimony, I think I'll be 
able to cut out at least one or two paragraphs because I think she covered, she 
covered the field very, very well, particularly around the staffing issues. 
The state hospitals have a very difficult task. They've always had a very difficult 
task in our society. They've frequently have had to take care of very ill patients with 
very diminished resources. Unfortunately, the view from afar from 25,000 feet and 
somewhat closer from some of our members, is that our state hospitals are really 
approaching meltdown in the way they're actually operating and delivering care. If we 
look back at recent history, we were investigated by the Department of Justice in 
1990. We had a consent decree dismissed in 1995, and here we are again. 
Our hospitals are grossly understaffed, they are unsafe to patients and staff 
alike, and they are not efficiently or effectively organized and managed, so the 
dedicated, committed, and motivated staff can deliver the highest quality of care 
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possible. This is largely the view of our members working in the state, inside the state 
hospitals. 
I just want to highlight a few issues which we believe are crucial, necessary, but 
not completely sufficient to tuming around the sad state of affairs. And as a physician 
and psychiatrist, one of the things I'm going to talk about is the issue of psychiatric 
leadership in the state hospitals. 
The DOJ report, and excerpts have been read from it, contain a number of 
references similar to the following: Adequate assessment of a mental health patient 
for treatment and planning purposes requires input from various disciplines under the 
active direction and guidance of the treating psychiatrist. The DOJ Metropolitan, first 
letter, also stated that treatment plans and planning do not reflect interdisciplinary 
provision of services in large part because no one person is accountable. No one 
person is identified to coordinate treatment. And no one is required by the facility to 
assume authority for overall care of the patient. Federal law also requires that 
physicians must direct, plan, and certify inpatient treatment for patients covered by 
Medicaid and Medicare which include many patients in the Califomia-operated state 
hospital. 
So our current situation represents a real disconnect in the face of the quality 
care which we would hope to offer. There are good models that exist which encourage 
multi-disciplinary teamwork and psychiatric rehabilitation which could promote the 
appropriate use of psychiatric leadership, yet none are seemingly used by the 
Department of Mental Health and the state hospitals, and there seems to be a general 
lack-that this exemplifies a lack of support for psychiatric leadership. 
If psychiatrists, the most comprehensively trained treatment professionals in 
state hospitals, are to truly live up to their obligations to their patients, to the law, and 
to the dictates of the Department of Justice, the state must provide support for 
psychiatric leadership. Despite manifold wamings from the Department of Justice, 
the state spends no resources whatsoever, that we're aware of, to ensure that 
treatment teams operate with the leadership of psychiatrists and the support of 
hospital administration, that they operate smoothly, congruently, and collaboratively. 
It's one thing to talk about changing behavior, but a lot of resources and energy has to 
be put into assuring that that takes place. 
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Establishing clear policy supporting psychiatric leadership is a necessary, but 
not sufficient condition, to meet this requirement. It is also necessary to provide 
leadership training for clinicians at all levels within the hospital. Since well over 90 
percent of patients in state hospitals currently receive psychiatric medications and 75 
percent of patients in state hospitals receive medications for physical conditions, the 
idea that non-physicians can become attending clinicians with patients with the most 
complex, life-threatening illnesses leads to further confusion with respect to the 
delivery of services and increases staff conflict and leads to less-than-optimal 
outcomes. 
We also have a two-year bill, AB 1720, by Assemblyman Dymally, the basic 
intent of which is to ask DMH to follow the current law of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code, Sections 4305 and 4308, which require all disciplines to report to one clinical 
director. The consequences of this lack of conformity to state law are a ruinous 
fragmentation of lines of authority. This dysfunctional structure underlies and results 
in disconnects between disciplines, between hospital administrators, and supervisory 
staffs, between supervisory staff and clinical staff, and makes it a virtual certainty that 
quality of care will never improve. 
As I thought about my testimony today, I thought, that if we were talking about 
a cancer hospital, I would not have to make these comments that I just made. No one 
who is basically being treated for a life-threatening illness would basically want 
anyone else but the most well-trained oncologist to be in charge of their care, not to 
say that their rehabilitation could not be assisted by others along the way, but 
someone has to be responsible for the treatment that's delivered to the patient. 
In my own institution, we have a very diverse treatment staff that includes 
nurses, social workers, case managers, occupational therapists, medical students, 
psychiatric residents, pharmacy students, and our team meetings are actually a thing 
to behold. But at the end of the day, we have to come out with a plan that we all agree 
on. And when there's a bad outcome, I know whose phone number to call and ask to 
explain what happened. And that's absolutely necessary that there be that level of 
accountability. 
In reference to treatment options, one response by the DMH to the DOJ report is 
to implement reforms at each hospital, some of which employ the recovery model. The 
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recovery philosophy is a very attractive philosophy and is quite clearly defined, yet the 
model itself is difficult to implement consistently with the heterogeneous populations 
in the state hospital system. It is worth noting that recovery is a community-based 
model of services. By the time that patients arrive at state hospitals, they have 
usually failed multiple community interventions. Patients in the state hospital present 
a number of psychiatric, medical, behavioral, and legal issues which creates 
implementations, problems for the most ill patients in the state. However, there are 
some deficiencies that need to be corrected before the potential of the recovery model 
can be realized, and we suggest the following: 
• A strategic plan for the state hospitals is not currently apparent and needs to 
become apparent and be made clear to everyone what the plan is for the 
changing the state hospital environment. 
• The DMH treatment mall concept model needs clarification. The recovery model 
may not be appropriate for all populations. 
• Psychiatrists report that their expertise has not been solicited in the 
development and implementation of new programs at the state hospital. It's 
very much a top-down system of receiving orders from on high, and these 
discussions have not involved staff at all levels in the hospital. 
• Clinical programs should adhere to evidence-based practices. We are not clear 
that they are being utilized. 
• Benchmarking and adoption of best practices are necessary processes which 
must be developed. We have to see what else is being going on in the world and 
who's doing better than we are and model what they're doing. It is also worth 
noting that to implement treatment reform and reach staffing levels for not only 
psychiatrists but a number of disciplines will be necessary. This inevitably will 
lead to higher expenditures by the state but also much-needed improvements in 
the quality if patient care. 
I think that Ms. Forbes did a marvelous job of talking about some of the staffing 
deficits and the tremendous overtime that nurses are putting in, and I'm not going to 
repeat that. I think they we're really right on. 
Our conclusions are that adequate staffing the development of improved patient 
care policies, combined with effective training and continuing education in both 
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clinical subject matter and management are necessary to substantially reduce the 
number of suicides and assaults and bad clinical outcomes in our state hospital. 
I appreciate the opportunity of talking to you today and appreciate your holding 
these very important hearings. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you for being here, Doctor -- appreciate your 
participation. 
And let me tum now to Dr. Faltz who's the Director of Professional Affairs for 
the California Psychological Association. 
DR. CHARLES FALTZ: Thank you, Senator. 
Because of some of the testimony here, I wanted to say something about the 
particular perspective that I have because of my professional background, which is 
relevant. 
My background is at the local level. For a good part of my career, I was chief of 
Forensic Mental Health Services in San Mateo County. And the relevance of that is 
that most of the population now in the state hospital are Penal Code patients. And my 
service received from the streets -- mentally ill people who had gotten in trouble with 
the law. We treated them on an inpatient basis, more often in the jail for an extended 
period of time before they were sent to the state hospitals, and I was also responsible 
for the local conditional release program, and so my staff would visit on a regular 
basis, the state hospitals, and the patients that we were going to be receiving, but they 
also were able to know what the programs were in the state hospital. And just as 
what's been discussed all day today, there was very little happening in the state 
hospitals which would prepare the people who were in the state hospitals for what 
they were going to have to be doing when they return to the community. 
I also will, further along, want to say something about the money question 
because that is a very important question, and there's been a variety of views that's 
been expressed today. 
Before I do that, though, I want to comment on the Legislature because it hasn't 
been mentioned. The State Legislature in this State has an outstanding record in 
seeking to make the changes. This is not something that's new. It's been going on for 
a long time, and this particular Select Committee, under the leadership of Senator 
Chesbro, but also your predecessors, there have a very strong record of a very patient, 
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focused concern about quality treatment in the state hospitals, and there have been 
innumerable examples of legislation that has been passed that then is sent over for 
the Department of Mental Health and the Department of Corrections to implement. So 
we know a lot about the concern that this Legislature has and its efforts in order to 
make changes. And I think we're going to have to continue to rely on the Legislature 
because, if today has proved anything that I think many of us sitting in this audience 
have been dismayed at what has been said today and that the department apparently 
thought everything was fine, and they didn't know until the Department of Justice told 
them that everything was not fine, and it was to their great surprise. 
I think the Department of Justice needs to be commended. We would not be 
sitting here understanding that there is a very serious problem if it hadn't been for the 
Department of Justice telling us and defining what these problems are. 
We are greatly concerned, however, that it takes an outside agency in order to 
be able to tell us that there are all of these problems, and I think that we need to pay 
attention to that, that I don't think that we can depend upon the Department of 
Mental Health to tell us how things are going; that over the years, as we've discussed 
the changes, that the feedback that we have gotten, the feedback that many legislators 
who have written for information, the department has responded in much the same 
way, almost the same words, that we heard today that we are making progress, we 
know there's problems, but we are well on our way to resolving these problems, and 
with just a little more time, that the problems will be resolved. 
Well, I don't think that's going to happen, everything else being equal. The 
history has been that the problems are not resolved. Whenever confronted with 
problems, the department indicates, well, the reason there's a problems is, there aren't 
enough resources, specifically, and most often, that there aren't enough psychiatrists 
and we aren't paying them enough. 
Now I want to rely on my background at the local level. Prop. 13 happened, and 
that was a wakeup call for all of us at the local level. We had to make dramatic 
changes that we were forced to make, that no one wanted to make, and we all thought 
that we were-and we were-very busy doing the best we could, and where in the 
world were we going to make changes? Well, it turned out that we didn't know what 
was happening in our programs for, in large part, and so we had to figure out what 
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was happening in our program, and we had to define what was most important-what 
were the most important services-and they were face-to-face services. We weren't 
monitoring what people were doing. And it tumed out that there was relatively little 
time going into actually providing face-to-face services. 
We don't have enough time to go on today. But for example, we found-and we 
didn't know it-that we were paying seven times more for a medication visit in our 
program than what was existing in the community at that time. So everyone was very 
busy, but they weren't busy doing the kind of, providing the kind of service that all of 
us valued most highly, and I think that that says something about-the state hospital 
system was not confronted with Prop. 13 in the same way. And in spite of budget 
shortages, every year the budget increases and increases because they come to you 
and ask for more increases, but I don't think the department knows it has no 
information system that most of us can tell that will provide us with the kind of 
information to tell us what is really happening and who is providing what services and 
how are people spending their time. 
At the same time that shortages of services are being decried, entrenched 
interests in the state hospitals are preventing certain staff members from providing 
services. As you know, psychologists are being prevented from delivering the services 
that they're qualified and that the patients need, and so are nurse practitioners being 
blocked from providing the services. I think the reasons for that-we've spent an 
awful lot of time talking about, but we'll be talking more about that in other ways. 
Through the 1990s, the State Legislature was taking a lot of steps through bills 
because it recognized that changes in the kind of programs that existed in state 
hospitals were needed, and the bills that were passed at that time directing the 
Department of Mental Health to make changes, to emphasize the kind of services, for 
example, that psychologist delivered important services that the patients were not 
getting. 
Today, those laws have not been implemented. That is discouraging because, in 
the recovery model, that psychologists have a lot to offer, that teaching people skills 
about how to survive and thrive in the community are something that psychologists, 
that's what we're trained to do. 
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The Department of Justice has noted that the recovery model of care should be 
provided by the Department of Mental Health. In the early 1990s, psychologists and 
the Department of Health, on their own initiative, hired a specialist in the recovery 
model to train the psychologists. They did this on their own. They were never able to 
convert that information that that training that they had into practice in the state 
hospitals because of.-there was not an interest-there was not a support for delivering 
those kinds of services. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I'm going to need to ask you to summarize. 
DR. FALTZ: I will. 
In conclusion, today, I do want to leave with members of the Committee, the 
American Psychological Association has a new document about best practices in 
recovery, and it is divided into sections that, if we looked at the agenda of today's 
meeting, that it goes right down the list. And this is the most up-to-date kind of 
formulation of exactly what is needed in the state hospitals, and we thank you, 
Senator, for having these hearings and for your persistence. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, thank you both very much. I would like to say 
that the ongoing conflict or disagreement about the relative, respective roles of the 
psychiatric profession and psychological profession are a part of.-I don't want to over-
emphasize the amount, the degree, which is true, but are a part of the difficulty we 
have in getting a cultural change where everybody is on board towards trying to 
remake and rebuild the way things are done at the state hospitals. And I don't think 
that the two professions are mutually exclusive or are somehow inherently in conflict. 
I think that both have significant roles to play. But one of the things that I think 
should be addressed-and I encourage both professions to attempt to address, is 
trying to reach a detente so that we can all be on the same team in trying to address 
the kinds of criticisms that we have faced. 
I think psychiatrists and psychologists both have very significant roles to play. 
That has to be acknowledged, and the two professions need to try to figure out how to 
coexist in the same treatment system. 
So that being said, thank you both very much. 
And let me ask the next panel to come forward. We have Ken Murch of the 
Association of Psychiatric Technicians; Kimberly Cowart, RN, Napa State Hospital; 
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Christopher Dunn, RN, Atascadero State Hospital, representing the California State 
Council of Service Employees; as well as Dr. Michael Lisiak, Chief of Psychiatry at 
Atascadero State Hospital representing the Union of American Physicians and 
Dentists. 
Before I open it up to your testimony, let me say, we still have the public 
comment portion of the agenda to come, and I always tend to do this. I want to hear 
everybody, as much as they have to say. We get later in the hearing, and the pressure 
tends to build. But I would encourage you all to be as brief as you can in order to 
make sure we have enough time to hear the public testimony as well. 
That being said, let me begin with Ken Murch. 
MR. KEN MURCH: Yes. Thank you. 
My name is Ken Murch and I represent the California Association of Psych 
Techs. We have about 2,400 licensed psychiatric technicians working in the 
Department of Mental Health. We jokingly call ourselves the Rodney Dangerfields of 
nursing because we don't get much respect, but we're working on it. 
First of all, I want to comment on a couple of the DOJ reports. I will say the 
many things that was in the reports, there is an attempt, from our point of view, to 
correct them. And I really take a little issue with some of the allegations that was 
contained in the Napa report where there was some allegations of abuse against 
patients, and I thought the report didn't really fully investigate these allegations; and 
unfortunately, though, they were included in the report. 
I want everyone to know, that from our perspective, the union that represents 
state hospitals, I can assure, Senator, that they do have a good system in place, and 
they have to investigate any kind of complaints that a patient may have against staff. 
My experience is that management does have a system in place, and they do act on 
these allegations. With that being said, from our organization's perspective, we 
advocate zero tolerance to our members of any kind of abuse or mistreatment of 
patients. We're there to help them, and we want anyone that would mistreat patients 
to be disciplined and disciplined severely. 
As far as the state hospital patients are concerned, there have been many 
improvements in recent years as a result of legislation such as your restraint bill, 
court decisions, regulations, and some departmental policies. For example, there's an 
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amount of time that patients that are in restraints have been greatly reduced. I was in 
a meeting a few weeks ago where it's down at that particular facility by 70 percent. 
Medications have been reduced. And I believe that patients have more freedom in the 
hospitals, and our organization is really endorsing the recovery mall concept. We 
think it's good to get them off the units and in some kind of vocational training. 
But these improvements have come at a great cost to our members and other 
direct-care staff. The average state hospital patient is more difficult than they were in 
the past. And I agree with Ms. Forbes that they're not all dangerous. There's degrees 
based upon what hospital. But it's a dangerous climate, and it's a part of our jobs to 
protect those patients from patients that may be dangerous. 
These days, state hospitals are treating very few mentally ill folks, and most of 
them are coming through the court system, and dealing with these forensic patients 
are difficult. They come into the system with a prison culture. We have areas now 
where we have gang cultures within the mental health framework, what we must 
address every day. 
In addition, many patients are more difficult to work with because of the 
cutbacks and the use of medication. You cut back meds, patients sometimes react 
differently. Also, there's very recent court decisions that give patients the right to 
refuse meds, so that puts the staff in a difficult position. 
There's a greater pressure to reduce the use of restraints and seclusion, even in 
legitimate situations where a patient is out of control. And this can put patients and 
staff at risk of serious injury. All these changes that are coming about loads a great 
amount of stress and responsibility on the staff. You can have as many programs as 
you have. But if you don't have the ground troops to implement them, they're not 
going anywhere and there's going to be problems. 
And to make things worse, there's a shortage of licensed psychiatric technicians 
and other licensed staff. The Napa report talked about the lack of untrained staff that 
they observed at Napa State Hospital. Well, 40 percent of the people that are assigned 
to the level-of-care duties at Napa State Hospital are unlicensed and might become a 
shock to a lot of you. These are people that have CNA certificates, they're there on a 
temporary, limited term, and many of them are waiting to get trained to become 
licensed staff if the opportunity is there for them. 
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So our staff are spread too thin to cover many of the shortages, although 
management likes to call a lot of this overtime that's being done, and that's how we're 
getting these programs implemented, by the staff working overtime. In reality, 
voluntary overtime and mandatory overtime is the same. 
There's times, that in order to meet the treatment programs and meet staffing 
minimums, that we will have overtime in excess of 2,500 shifts a month at some of 
these hospitals. This is causing our staff to be burnt out, and it gives them a difficult 
time in dealing with family problems, and there's health problems, and it's having an 
effect on staff morale. And also, the quality and effectiveness of the care that they're 
providing is eroded by this excessive overtime. 
No one can argue, that if the hospitals had enough direct-care staff, many of the 
situations reported in the DOJ reports would have been prevented. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I hate to do this, but I'm going to have to ask you to 
summarize. We do have your written testimony and appreciate very much all your 
points. 
MR. MURCH: Can I make a summation? Twenty-two years ago, a judge made 
a statement about the state hospitals. It was in regard with a lawsuit, relative staffing 
level. The judge says working without enough staff has the potential to demoralize the 
level of nursing care staff, contribute to a high turnover rate, increase worker 
compensation outlays, result in the deterioration of patient care, and interfere with 
programs or effective programming. That was a judge's observation 22 years ago, and 
those conditions still exist today as we speak. Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you very much for your testimony. 
And next let me call on Kimberly Cowart, a registered nurse at Napa State 
Hospital. 
MS. KIMBERLY COWART: A lot of what I'm going to say is going to echo what 
was previously said by the other speakers, so it will be short and I understand ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Appreciate it very much. 
MS. COWART: As you said, my name is Kimberly Cowart, and I'm a registered 
nurse at Napa State Hospital. I have been for the past six years. 
Let me start out by saying, that as a registered nurse, my primary 
responsibility, under the California Nursing Practice Act, is to ensure the safety, 
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comfort, and protection of the clients that I serve. I will also say that because I found 
that the Department of Mental Health often seems to forget there are laws defining my 
responsibility as a registered nurse. 
When the Department of Justice reported the findings of their investigation at 
both Metropolitan and Napa State Hospital, they provided the minimum remedial 
measures that they believed were warranted to correct deficiencies contributing to 
conditions that violated the federal rights of individuals residing in these facilities. In 
both reports, the Department of Justice recommended that the state immediately 
implement a variety of remedial measures. 
The phrase used repeatedly in the reports was that the state should implement 
the many remedial measures consistent with generally accepted standards of care. 
The accepted standards of care for the registered nurse in mental health is to have a 
patient caseload of anywhere from 11 to 21 patients, which in nursing, that's a lot; 
enforce policies and procedures that do not take into the account the changing needs 
of mental health and the increasing amounts of paperwork that has led to increased 
assaults, illegal drug use, and poor patient care. 
Just as Dr. Mayberg stated, the department relied too much on chemical and 
physical restraints. The department also relies too much on mandatory overtime to 
cover staffing shortages. Often, when the staff, including myself, are mandated, we're 
very tired. We don't react to situations as quickly. And that puts not only ourselves 
in jeopardy but the clients we serve. 
There is clearly a shortage of registered nurses in Califomia, and the state 
boasts some of the highest vacancy rates as an employer of registered nurses. I 
believe that the shortage of the registered nurses have contributed to the deficiencies 
in client care in our mental hospitals. Mandatory overtime is at a crisis level and 
needs to be addressed immediately for the protection of the clients we serve. 
I would like to ask the Department of Mental Health why am I, my coworkers, 
and the individuals we serve constantly paying the price for the department's inability 
to attract and retain qualified nursing staff? I would also like to ask, Why do we have 
to spend more time doing paperwork than actual patient care? So much time is spent 
playing catch up, being audited, instead of talking to our patients and helping them to 
integrate back into society. 
67 
Someone asked me on the way over here why do I work in mental health. And 
the only thing I could say to him is because I care, and I do care. (Applause) I have 
no greater satisfaction than to see a client being discharged and integrated back into 
society. 
And in closing, if the department truly wants to improve the conditions, staffing, 
and care it provides, it should not only listen and nod but act upon the concems of 
the clients, their families, and the staff that is ultimately responsible for the care that 
we provide. 
Thank you for letting me provide this testimony. (Applause) 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you very much, Ms. Cowart. Appreciate it. 
Mr. Dunn. Is there a Christopher Dunn? No? 
DR. MICHAEL LISIAK: Mike Lisiak. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: What's that? 
DR. LISIAK: Mike Lisiak. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Mike Lisiak. And you're with the Council of Service 
Employees? 
DR. LISIAK: No. I'm with UAPD. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Oh, well, then I'm not calling on you yet. There's not 
another person up here representing SEIU? If not, okay. Then I am calling on you 
now. 
DR. LISIAK: My name is Mike Lisiak. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I have to apologize. 
DR. LISIAK: That's okay. My name is Mike Lisiak. I'm the Vice-President of 
UAPD, the Union of American Physicians and Dentists. I'm also the Chief of Staff at 
Atascadero State Hospital. I want to thank you, Senator Chesbro, for your time in this 
most complex and important matter. 
I also brought with me Chris Heh, who's the Chief of Staff at Metro because I 
think he can put some light on the issue about how things are going at Metro. I 
believe that they're not going as well as they have been presented. 
I'm going to be brief because I think the Califomia Psychological Association 
very elegantly presented the picture consistent with UAPD and the medical staff, but I 
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just wanted to highlight a few things, currently the shortage. The nurses and the 
physicians are being essentially burnt out. I mean it is unbelievable what I see. 
At ASH, we have two RNs who are essentially covering 150 patients consistently 
to the point where I don't know how these two nurses continually do their job and they 
should be applauded. At ASH right now, we only have 24 psychiatrists delivering 
treatment for over 1,300 patients. I, myself, have the following ratio: I have 80 
patients; I have 50 MDOs, mentally disorder offenders; and I have 30 2684 prisoners 
from Corrections. And of those 80 patients, I'm supposed to deliver care at a ratio of 
that was established by the DOJ of about 1:20, 1:25. On top of that, I'm also the 
Chief of Staff, which is a full-time position. I'm essentially covering four positions. It's 
impossible for one person to do this. I try my best. 
The recovery model, although good in philosophy, the methodology is highly 
flawed for a forensic population. Contraband, as you '11 hear from Metro, is being 
passed at an all-time high because of the free flow of the population. Also safety, 
which I think the correctional officers have something to say, with this kind of model, 
again, is suspect. I think the model has good components but needs to be presented 
to a forensic population very carefully. 
This goes to my next point. Planning. I think the planning of this massive 
operation was poor. There's no strategic plan. Both the union and medical staffs have 
asked for the strategic plan, the master plan, so we can know what was going on, and 
help enlighten ourselves what the goals are so we could join in on this adventure. And 
we were told by the consultants that no strategic plan-and the department-that not 
strategic plan exists. I think that speaks to why things are breaking apart at this 
time. At this time, Atascadero State Hospital is in the worse shape it's been since I've 
been there for 14 years. We are essentially falling apart. Morale's in the basement 
and staff is leaving in droves. 
Implementation is at an ad hoc basis. People are confused. We really don't 
seem to have much direction. The consultant today has been paid almost a million 
dollars in two years, and I have to ask, as a taxpayer, are we getting our money's 
worth out of this consultant? I believe, with this complex of a plan, a team is needed. 
You need an eclectic approach, consisting of physicians, nurses, administrators, and 
69 
psychologists, and other disciplines in the consultation team and good communication 
with the staff. 
Right now, I would say the medical staff who used to work very well with the 
Department of Mental Health is more at odds than ever. We're currently being, the 
medical staffs, are being marginalized. We have little to no input into the new model. 
The psychiatrists feel we're losing control of these patients' care, and there's being 
special orders written, Special Order 129 essentially has in it that administrators 
essentially can tell the surgeon how to cut and the physician how to treat. And when 
administrators are going to tell the clinicians how to do their business, I think we're 
running into dangerous ground, and I think we need to revisit exactly how we're 
approaching this supposed improvement in patient care. 
I'd like to hand it over to Dr. Chris Heh at this time so he can give you a little 
briefing of what's going on at Metro. Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. Brief because we're getting to the public input 
section, and we hadn't listed you as a member of the panel, although we did ask all 
the organizations to submit representatives. So welcome. 
DR. CHRISTOPHER Heh: Thank you, Senator. 
My name is Dr. Christopher Heh. I am the President and Chief of Staff at 
Metropolitan Hospital. I basically represent the psychologists and psychiatrists who 
are treating our patients at Metropolitan State Hospital. 
DOJ came in 2002; and since DOJ has arrived, we've tried to institute changes, 
and everyone at Metropolitan State Hospital has worked very hard to institute the 
recovery model, all right? If you look at our data, restraints and seclusions are 
dropped. If you look at our data, you can see very clearly that poly-pharmacy is 
better. We don't medicate the patients as much. Okay. You can see that our 
documentation has drastically improved. Things have improved on paper. 
However, things have improved on paper, but does that translate over? Are the 
patients getting better? That's the bottom line. Okay. Are the patients actually 
getting better? On paper, seclusion and restraints are down; documentation is 
excellent; we have 17 -page treatment plans; we have a 58-page nursing plan we fill 
out; we spend four to five hours in a treatment teaming conference planning 
treatment. Are patients actually getting better with all this? 
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Okay. I think that's a basic question we need to ask ourselves at this point and 
juncture. And the reason is, to be frank, our last-well, we've had recently three 
suicides at Metropolitan State Hospital within the past 18 months. Since the hype of 
the institution of this recovery plan, our last death at Metropolitan State Hospital was 
in 1997. So I ask you, if this recovery plan is working, why have we had more deaths? 
Why have we had more suicides? 
All right. And so if it's working, if on paper it looks good and we're doing fine, 
we're doing better, why have we had these deaths? Again, that's a good question. All 
right. I have my hypotheses as to why. Some of them had been alluded to here. One 
of them is the enormous amount of paperwork. People are spending more time with 
the chart than with the patient. I hear this complaint on a daily basis, all right? 
They're filling out paperwork, spending hours treatment planning, planning treatment, 
less actually rendering treatment, all right? And this onerous task, it's interfering, I 
believe, with the quality of care at our hospital, all right? 
And the next question is somewhat alluded to, Are these experimental treatment 
malls, as someone said here? And they are truly experimental. We're experimenting 
with patients. If you look at the literature, the recovery model, okay, and where it's 
utilized, and where it's best utilized, is at outpatient settings, all right? There's very 
little literature to show its proven efficacy in controlled trials for it to be effective in a 
chronically psychotic, hospitalized, state hospital patient. 
So what are we doing? We're experimenting with our patients here with 
unproven treatments, and we've had three patients die recently. Okay. I would say 
we need to revisit, relook at the plan very carefully. If this is really what-is this the 
correct direction we're going? 
As a physician, I care; nurses care. We care about our patients, all right? 
Irrespective of what the data shows, all right, we have an increased mortality rate, and 
I don't like that. None of us like that, all right? And so all we're asking is, to take a 
close look, a very close look, at what's occurring, all right, not to rush in things. I 
think the Department of Mental Health, they have a lot of pressure on them, okay, to 
make changes, a lot of pressure. DOJ is on their back. 
Well, you know something? They're putting a lot of pressure on us. Let me give 
you a case in point, ifi may. 
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SENATOR CHESBRO: I'm going to have to--
DR. HEH: Okay. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: --to wind up. I will encourage you, though, because it's 
obvious that you have a lot to say, to write us, to write something to the committee to 
give us as many specifics in terms of what and how you think, we can approach these 
problems successfully. 
DR. HEH: Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: So I do appreciate your participation. Thank you and I 
thank the entire panel. 
DR. HEH: Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: We're going to go to the public-testimony portion. And 
I'm going to take the, from my ability-to-read-handwriting standpoint, the toughest 
one first. I'll start out by saying this person's from Mill Valley. Maybe that will help. 
I believe its Esperanza, or did I read it right? Okay. I'm going to ask each of the 
members of the public to testify to give us a minute of testimony each, please. 
Yes, ma'am. Come on forward because we have quite a few, and I want to make 
sure we have time for everybody. 
MS. EUIZATIA: Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: What is your name? I'm sorry. 
MS. EUIZATIA: My name is Euizatia. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Say it one more time? 
MS. EUIZATIA: Euizatia. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Euizatia. 
MS. EUIZATIA: I live in Mill Valley. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Could you spell it for us? I'm sorry. 
MS. EUIZATIA: E-u-i-z-a-t-i-a. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MS. EUIZATIA: I am here with three other mothers. Together, we have 
acquired 107 years of bearing witness to the sorry and cruel state of treatment to our 
children, mine since 14, against my permission. He's now 43 and very ill. I'm 
probably going to outlive him. And other people's children, I'm very familiar with the 
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destruction. I'm here to support the Citizen's Commission on Human Rights' solution 
to these problems. Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you very much for your testimony. 
Next, I'm going to call on Pamela Nance. 
MS. PAMELA NANCE: Hello. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Hi. 
MS. NANCE: I'm Pamela Nance. I have a son who is in Napa State Hospital for 
three and a half years. 
Mr. Chesbro, I came to your office a year-and-a-half ago with complaints, and 
the man who was your assistant met with me and a friend of mine who said that there 
had never been any complaints from Napa State Hospital. I found that very hard to 
believe. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, it's not true, that there have never been any 
complaints about Napa Hospital, so I can't imagine he told you that, but it's certainly 
not my experience or any of my staffs experience. 
MS. NANCE: Well, I wish I had written down his name. I have it at home. 
Anywho, while my son was at Napa State Hospital, he never received his GED; 
his levels; to program out; was overmedicated. He had his nose broken while leaving 
the cafeteria because they don't have enough staffing, had four-and-a-half-hour 
surgery on his nose, contracted Hepatitis-C, had his first seizure, wasn't seen by a 
neurologist for two weeks, asked to be put in a side room three times because he knew 
he was deteriorating. No one took him seriously enough. He assaulted someone for 
the very first time in his life and took the person's keys who was a worker there at the 
facility, tried to get out the back door. 
Now he's considered high risk. So now he's transferred to Atascadero State 
Hospital. Well, I just wonder who is at fault. Now my son is considered high risk. 
But other than that, it's been a gift in disguise. My son now is programming out, and 
he's only been there eight months. He's doing fabulous. And I'm thankful for that. I 
find that a lot of parents are fearful of speaking out for their loved ones that are still 
incarcerated for retaliation. I do not understand why there is not metal detectors for 
staffing. We have to be checked as parents before we go visit our loved ones. Why 
shouldn't staff have metal detectors for drugs or whatever other things go on? 
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My son has been offered heroin, methamphetamines, pot. There's no excuse for 
it. He's there to get well, and I'm fearful for his life. And he already has an impulse-
control problem. That's why he's where he's at. And I thought a hospital was is a 
place to get well, and I don't understand why they allow smoking. I almost lost him to 
pneumonia last April. And he goes back to Atascadero for ten cigarette breaks a day. 
I mean don't they something better to do with their time? Thank you, sir. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, thank you very much for your testimony. 
(Applause) 
Next, let me ask for Brian B. 
MR. BRIAN B.: Yes. I've had a couple of-I'm with the California Network of 
Mental Health Plans. I have a couple of friends-well, I had a girlfriend who was in 
Camarillo State Hospital. She's been in IMDs. I don't know where she is now because 
her mother died who I was contacting her with, and this was an ex-girlfriend. I sent a 
letter in care of the Public Guardians Office. But I saw Camarillo, and I saw basically 
that nothing's happened with her, as long as I kept tabs on her. She's been, I think, 
out for a few months and then-so the state hospitals aren't doing much. Camarillo 
didn't do much at all for her. 
I did research a Penal Code person who was sent to Patton. She was a street 
person. She was sent there largely because she was declared incompetent to stand 
trial because she did not think the Santa Barbara County Public Defenders Office was 
doing an adequate job, and she requested private counsel. I think under right of 
counsel that includes, at least theoretically, the right to a counsel of your choice, and 
that's something that-she spent more time in Patton than she did in the county jail 
for an assault, felony assault charge. 
I visited people in Napa when I was in Santa Barbara day treatment for a year. 
They use-they were sending people back to Camarillo on the slightest-the state 
hospitals-well, at least they were much overused in the early '80s. But I've seen the 
IMDs are not that much better, from what I have seen of them. Some of them are 
better, but larger because they are small and because they have-and because they're 
largely private sector, I know. But the question is, what's going on there to get people 
ready to live on the outside? 
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I've seen a good friend of mine, the late Charles McCoy. He was a professor of 
Christian Ethics at Pacific School of Religion, did tell me about the internship program 
he had in the early '60s in Napa. He told me pretty much the chaplains were pretty 
much powerless to do much of anything, that if anybody had spoke up. I'm just 
wondering if the chaplain-this is one of the reasons why I felt the chaplaincy have to 
answer to their religious denominations, and I'm very strongly opposed to clergy under 
any circumstances being on the state payroll because they cannot serve two masters. 
I think, from what I've seen of them-I was in Metro for just six hours because that 
was where they sent the 5150 cases, at least, used to, from out of Long Beach. This 
was in '77. It was six hours. But being there for even that time created a stigma. 
Are 5150 cases still sent to Metro State Hospital? I'm just wondering because it 
does not seem like an appropriate place for evaluations at all. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I don't believe that that's the case. 
MR. BRACHNY: It was the case back in 1977, and I think there has to be a-
from what I have seen, I know one person in the Cal Network said they should have 
burned, they should bum down Napa. But because ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I think there's a few other people in the audience who 
probably would ... 
MR. BRACHNY: But what I'm saying ... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I am going to need to ask you to summarize and wrap 
up because ... 
MR. BRACHNY: This is just my stream of consciousness, observations. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: I appreciate it. I appreciate your stream of 
consciousness. Thank you. I'm going to ask for Marilyn Gill next. And I'm going to 
start giving the next name so that somebody can come on up and be ready to testify so 
that we cannot spend more time waiting for folks to walk up. Gary Sargent is next. 
Go ahead. 
MS. MARILYN GILL: Thank you, Senator Chesbro. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. Then Jeff Griffen is next then. 
MS. GILL: Thank you. I'm here as a mother of a son who is in Atascadero 
State Hospital, as an MDO, and his physician said at the time that he was transferred 
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over to that particular unit, that he was into that status, that he was not exactly a 
criminal type. And I also told him that it was because of the medications that he had 
been on that he was there. And I asked him not to over drug him, and he immediately 
said, we do what we do here, etcetera. We do what we do. We can give as many 
drugs as we like, and then we see what happens. 
So anyway, that having been said, we wanted to find out exactly, because I 
cannot see my son at this time, and we wanted to find out what we can do to get our 
son home, and I really possibly (can) save the state $125,000-plus a year if we could 
have our son home. I cannot see him; I cannot speak to him; I cannot write him 
because of this MDO and parole, no contact. 
He did much better at home. I could not understand why he could not be with 
us, as his family, and this is a problem, I guess, that I wanted to just say that there is 
recovery and he was certainly doing better at home. No one would listen to me. No 
one has given me that opportunity to speak. I have to be silent when I go to these 
meetings because I am told basically that my philosophy, my viewpoint, is not 
acceptable. 
I've worked with the Citizens Commission on Human Rights. I actually have 
found validation with Citizens Commission on Human Rights. They've put together 
this manual which I think will describe recovery, and recovery is possible. It can be 
achieved. And I just wanted to definitely say that the attitude of a lot of the workers is 
such that we think that they think that our children cannot get better, and that is a 
very big detriment to recovery, and that's what I basically-thank you for doing this. I 
appreciate it. Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you for your comments and for being here. 
Jeff Griffen is next and then followed by Blair Romer. 
MR. JEFF GRIFFEN: I thank the sergeants for the extra time. 
My name is Jeff Griffen. I'm the Executive Director of the Citizens Commission 
on Human Rights for the Western United States. 
A few comments on what has been said up until now before I quickly cover this. 
I do agree with Dr. Mayberg. It is management's responsibility that this not occur, 
that it should not have occurred. He is quoted in the newspaper in Los Angeles as 
saying that he has been aware of this systemic problem and has been trying for 12 
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years to clean it up and change it. I think it's time to change the head. The CEO of 
any corporation of the United States would not have lasted that long with this type of 
systemic problem. 
He talks about the transparency, that they wanted to be transparent, yet they 
would not allow patients at Metropolitan to talk to the Department of Justice. Last 
August, a letter was received by Bill Sergent from Graziani at Napa. Bill had requested 
of the Department of Mental Health, Why is the Department of Justice not there? Dr. 
Mayberg sent that to Mr. Graziani to complete the answer. 
In that letter, he stated: 
"We have asked the Department of Justice not to come in until we have put in 
the remedial actions at our other hospitals." 
This is tantamount to saying; we are just as bad as Metropolitan. 
These are basic things that have occurred that I have seen, I have read, and I 
have documented in my office. The fact that we need dog-sniffing-the drugs at the 
facilities-is a pretty stark indictment. 
In this particular document that you have in your hands, in 1982, there was, by 
the Senate, a bill, 929, which became Chapter 208 of the statutes of 1982. Senate Bill 
929 set up a study that was carried out by two doctors. They looked at 529 mental 
health patients in the State of California, some at Napa, most of them across Northern 
California. The findings of that were published later as a result of Chapter 376 of the 
Statutes of 1988. That set up for Dr. Koran at Stanford to prepare a manual, and the 
fact of this particular set of papers that I've given to you is that document that was 
prepared for the Legislature. You've already spent the money to get this. 
It actually gives the data necessary to initiate the first steps to start changing 
what's going on in our facilities and start upgrading. They talk about the recovery 
module. I agree the mall program isn't working. It doesn't work because it doesn't 
address the proper issues. I'm very familiar with it at both Patton and at Metropolitan. 
But this will begin steps in the right direction toward handling our mental health 
problems in not only our state hospitals but all of our facilities. 
Dr. Koran has delivered this to you. I don't know where it is so I'm getting it to 
you, and I have copies for the rest of your committee. Thank you for your time. 
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SENATOR CHESBRO: I appreciate your sharing with us, and thank you for 
your testimony. (Applause) 
So next is Blair Romer-- Dr. Blair Romer, M.D., followed by Robin Broadman, 
M.D. 
Dr. Romer. 
DR. BLAIR ROMER: Yes. Thank you very much, Senator. I really appreciate 
the opportunity to be here today. I'm chair of the California Psychiatric Association of 
State Facility, Doctors Taskforce. I'm going to be really brief. 
I believe, and my organization believes, that there's a nearly total and undesired 
disconnect between administration and clinical staff. We believe that the nursing 
shortages and mandatory and voluntary overtime problem is huge, quite possibly the 
largest problem that we have in the state hospitals, because those are the folks who 
are with the patients 24/7. They're exhausted. Clearly, you know it affects their 
ability to deliver top, quality care on a consistent basis. I think they are idealistic and 
do absolutely the best they can. 
Somebody alluded to the fact that there are quite a number of quality staff. 
That was June Forbes earlier. Many of the staff at the state hospitals are quite 
idealistic. It's a very difficult setting in which to work, and many of the staff see it as a 
calling and are staying on despite very difficult circumstances. Far more transparency 
is needed with administration. The remediation plan needs to involve clinical 
disciplines, also needs to involve protection and advocacy and other groups that wish 
to participate. That has not occurred up to this point. 
Finally, you mentioned about a detente between psychology and psychiatry. 
That's absolutely necessary. The patients in the state hospitals are tertiary-care types 
of patients with very difficult, complex, psychiatric, and medical problems, and we 
believe the administration needs to be clear that psychiatric physicians need to be the 
attending doctors and also be trained to be effective leaders so that they can then 
utilize all the other disciplines in a positive, multi-disciplinary way to achieve positive 
outcomes. Thank you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you, Doctor. 
Next, we have Dr. Robin Broadman followed by Felicia McCarty. 
DR. ROBIN BROADMAN: Hi. Thank you for having me. Can you hear me? 
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I'm Dr. Robin Broadman. I'm a psychiatrist at Napa State Hospital. I am the 
past Chief of Staff at Napa State Hospital. I am board certified in general psychiatry 
and also in forensic psychiatry, and I've been at Napa State Hospital for five years. 
First of all, I want to just point out that we all share the same concern whenever 
there is allegation of abuse of patients at the hospital. Someone-! can't remember 
which speaker-suggested that anyone who is identified as abusing a patient ought to 
be disciplined. I think they ought to be fired and have criminal charges filed against 
them. So I want to be clear that the majority of the staff at the hospital are caring, 
hard-working, highly trained, and highly-skilled individuals that only want the very 
best for our patients. 
I became a psychiatrist in order to treat, to educate, to provide tools for 
recovery, and to advocate for my patients, and I believe that I do all those things at the 
hospital, and I believe that my patients would agree with that. And many of them tell 
me so to my face. 
I want to touch on a few points. I'm speaking somewhat extemporaneously 
because I came late to the process, and I didn't write anything down except for notes 
while people were speaking. So forgive me if I repeat what some people have said. 
First of all, I want to mention discharge planning. There is some confusion, I 
think, about the difference between patients that are civilly committed and patients 
that are judicially committed. Patients that are judicially committed absolutely need 
to receive the kind of treatment that will prepare them for success in the community. 
But ultimately, their discharge depends on the courts, and it depends on the 
community being ready to receive them. We can only do so much at the hospital. I 
just want to make that clear for many people who may not understand that. 
In addition, the problems that we have with violence have not been emphasized 
enough. We do understand that not everybody is dangerous. We also understand 
that many individuals that come to our hospital, unfortunately, are either unable or 
unwilling to refrain from assaulting on others, and that includes both staff and other 
patients. And this leads me to my most important point, I think, which is that the 
clinicians at our hospital-and I would like to say that that includes psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social workers, we have therapists, psychiatric technicians, and 
nurses-have all worked together to provide input to our administration and to the 
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Department of Mental Health which has in large part been ignored. We have been very 
specific about what problems we face in terms of being assaulted, in terms of trying to 
protect our most vulnerable, mentally ill patients from predators who are also at our 
hospital who may or may not belong there. But that, again, is a judicial issue. 
But we have suggested many, very reasonable solutions to our administration, 
including a more visible hospital police presence, some way to keep the dangerous 
drugs out of our facility, which is still a big problem. We cannot provide treatment 
under any model-recovery, medical, what have you-unless we have a safe and 
effective treatment environment. Safe and effective means people are not getting 
beaten up when they come to work; vulnerable patients are not getting beaten up 
when they leave their bedrooms or, even worse, in their bedrooms at night; and people 
are not being offered heroin every five minutes. 
I think, that if the administration were to genuinely respect the clinicians that 
they've hired based on the clinician's experience, training, education, that they could 
come up with some workable solutions to these problems, but it's not happening. 
Thank you for listening. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you very much for being here for your testimony. 
And our final person who's requested to testify is Felicia McCarty. 
MS. FELICIA McCARTY: I wasn't prepared for this, but I can send you a 
written one, but I will send one to you. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: And all of the folks who haven't submitted it to us are 
welcome to write to the Committee, so I appreciate that. 
MS. McCARTY: Thank you. My name is Felicia McCarty. I've been in this 
business for a long time because my son has been in this system a long time, over 25 
years, between ASH, Patton, and Camarillo. 
Before he got into this system and was given various drugs, drugs, drugs, there 
was never an assault. He was never guilty of assaulting another human being. But I 
can tell you that he's been assaulted within the system many number of times, and 
there have been altercations. Many of them have been because of self-protection in 
which some of the staff at times have witnessed an assault against him, written him 
up, and given him a 30-day suspension of ground privileges. There have been so 
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many imbalanced acts toward him and toward others, not just my son-toward 
others-that speaks not of genuine care and concern. 
Right now, sir, he's in court waiting to go back to ascertain whether or not-
then return to sanity. Well, let me tell you that he was never insane in the first place, 
and that's the pity of it all, is exactly what happens to individuals when our laws allow 
an attorney of record, a public defender, to make a plea of insanity for a client That is 
a law that should be changed. 
Another law that must be changed is the insanity plea itself because I am here 
to tell you-I'm here tell you-about the pain and suffering that this woman that 
you're looking at has endured as a single mother and have seen all of the subterfuges 
that go on within these so-called hospitals-the lies, the distortion. Let it be known 
that it was Patton's personnel that went to Metro to train Metro personnel in the area 
of caring with the first 100 patients that were sent there, transferred, many of them 
against their will, never being told that they could appeal the transfer, never being told 
anything about their rights. Just dumped into there, dumped into Metro, many of 
them over-drugged, given drugs as much as the law allows them. That's a lot of drugs, 
that's a lot of poly-pharmacy. 
And, Senator Chesbro, I have the medical records to back up every word I'm 
saying. So when we think, Oh, it's all about a culture change, tell me, what is there 
cultural about compassion, care, concern, you know, and on the part of the treatment 
team, really caring about their patients, really wanting them to move forward? My son 
has become "toy boy" at Patton. He finally got the courage to go back to court and to 
fight for his release. And I'm going to be right there with him, with plenty of 
ammunition. This time, the public defenders will look at my records, or I will go to the 
grand jury. This has got to stop. This kind of thing has got to stop. People who get 
adjudicated in that fashion and then get dropped through the cracks such as he and 
others like him is a shame in the State of California. 
Now let me tell you something else, Senator Chesbro. You're looking at a 
woman who had Metropolitan's care over 50 years ago. It may be a new dispensation 
right now, you know, with our community-type things, if that's what you want to call 
them, community mental health, but it's the same dispensation that existed 50 years 
ago when I went briefly through the system and since that time had been stigmatized 
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over and over again in medical records by the very physicians and caregivers that have 
cared for my son. 
And let me tell you further, I cared enough about this, about justice, about 
reasonability, that I served in the California Senior Legislature, and we don't get paid 
there, okay? It came out of my pockets-limited income-to serve the people in this 
state, many of whom get put into, literally get it put into such bondage, as exists 
within our state hospitals-nursing homes drugged up, literally killed, okay? 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Okay. 
MS. McCARTY: This is why I am here, and I will put it in writing. Actually, I 
write much better than I... 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Well, you're quite articulate in person, so you make your 
points very well. 
MS. McCARTY: I'm 73. For the last 30 years, I've been fighting this battle, and 
I will not stop. I will not stop until either these walls are torn down completely and 
starting all over again in a way that truly serves those who deserve decent treatment. 
SENATOR CHESBRO: Thank you very much. (Applause) 
I'd like to thank everyone who participated today, especially those who don't get 
paid to be here, who have traveled long distances to express obviously; strongly-held 
concerns from their life experiences and their loved ones' life experiences. 
We'll look forward to working with clients, with family members, with the 
department, with advocates to develop strategies to improve the quality of care, and 
I'm going to continue to engage in every way I can to try to make sure that there's 
accountability and a spotlight shown on the ways that the hospitals and other mental 
health care, community mental health care, are managed, as well as developmental 
disabilities, which is the other half of this committee's responsibility. 
We are having a hearing next week in Los Angeles at the California State 
Building on September 28 in the afternoon, same hours; although, if you go this long 
in Los Angeles, you know you're really in trouble because you're stuck in the traffic. 
But it's going to be specifically on the use of seclusion and restraints which many of 
you probably know is the topic of the legislation which I authored last year and is the 
law now, and we're going to be asking various, knowledgeable parties to tell us how 
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things are going with implementation of that legislation. So thank you again. 
(Applause) 
---oOo---
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SECTION 3 
Department of Mental Health 
Written Testimony 
Responses to the 
Senate Select Committee on Developmental Disabilities and Mental Health 
September 20, 2005- Senator Wesley Chesbro, Chair 
This document responds to questions raised by Senator Chesbro in a September 1 
letter to Director, Dr. Stephen Mayberg in regards to the United States Department of 
Justice (USDOJ) investigation of California state mental hospitals. While the 
Department of Mental Health (DMH) takes issue with certain specific conclusions of the 
USDOJ's investigation, the department agrees with the overall findings of the 
investigation. Further, the Department of Mental Health is fully committed to continuing 
the process of system-wide change that will bring its hospitals in line with the USDOJ's 
recommendations. The following pages present the specific questions asked by 
Senator Chesbro, as well as DMH's response to those questions. DMH is committed to 
improving conditions at the state's mental hospitals. 
Please describe the issues raised by the U.S. Department of Justice investigation 
of Metropolitan State Hospital and Napa State Hospital. What, if any, USDOJ 
findings are disputed by the State Department of Mental Health? 
As presented in its Findings Letters, USDOJ raised a number of concerns about the 
state mental hospital system and about conditions at specific hospitals. While DMH 
agrees with USDOJ's overall conclusions regarding the state hospital system, DMH 
does contest several specific characterizations and conclusions. USDOJ's 
conclusions are presented below, followed by DMH's response to each of those 
conclusions in cases where we disagree: 
• USDOJ Finding #1: Diagnoses and assessments are often untimely, 
incomplete, and do not reflect the input f~om all members of the treatment 
team. 
• USDOJ Finding #2: Treatment plans are not individualized and monitored 
and do not build on patients' strengths nor always reflect their input, do not 
integrate assessments performed by all clinical disciplines, and are often not 
modified because of lack of progress. 
• USDOJ Finding #3: Treatment services often do not reflect the integrated 
participation of the various clinical disciplines, are not well monitored, and 
sometimes reflect poor medical management. 
• USDOJ Finding #4: Seclusion and restraint are used excessively when less 
restrictive alternatives may be available. Numerous instances of seclusion 
and restraint were not included in the data Metropolitan provided to USDOJ. 
DMH Response: DMH has reviewed the data submitted and confirmed 
that information regarding all of the cited cases were contained in the 
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database supplied to USDOJ. It is not clear why USDOJ claims DMH 
underreported instances of seclusion and restraint. 
• USDOJ Finding #5: Behavioral plans are inadequate for patients with 
serious behavioral problems. 
• USDOJ Finding #6: Medication management is often inadequate and 
patients are often prescribed medications without documented justification. 
• USDOJ Finding #7: Documentation is often inadequate with progress 
charting and other developments not performed with sufficient frequency. 
• USDOJ Finding #8: Incident management and performance improvement 
systems are inadequate to insure that problems are always promptly 
identified, investigated and corrected throughout the facility. 
• USDOJ Finding #9: Environmental issues that could cause patient harm are 
not systematically assessed, prioritized and resolved. 
• USDOJ Finding #10: Metropolitan completes no tracking or trending of 
infections or communicable diseases, putting patients at increased risk. 
DMH Response: It is standard practice at Metropolitan to track and trend 
incidence of infections and communicable diseases. When analyses 
reveal potential problems, we take corrective action. 
• USDOJ Finding #11: In 2003, a patient at Napa was forced to wait at least 
seven months for surgical repair of a broken hip. 
DMH Response: DMH consulted with outside medical professionals in 
2003 and twice in 2004. In every instance, the medical professionals 
determined that, because of the patient's preexisting heart condition, hip 
replacement surgery would have endangered the patient's life, so DMH 
had no choice but to forego surgery for this patient. 
According to the USDOJ, State officials declined to cooperate with federal 
investigators and repeatedly refused to allow investigators access to Napa, 
Patton, and Atascadero State Hospitals. Please respond to these allegations. If 
accurate, what was the rationale for such non-cooperation? What are the 
immediate and potential future and/or on-going repercussions of such non-
cooperation? 
DMH welcomes the USDOJ to visit the state hospitals and we have confirmed dates 
with them for visiting Atascadero State Hospital from November 28 to December 2 
and Patton State Hospital from December 12 to 16. We respectfully disagree with 
the USDOJ term "non-cooperation" and stress that we wanted an opportunity to 
address as many of the issue identified in the Metropolitan investigation as we could 
before their visits. We took the USDOJ findings very seriously and agreed early in 
this process that state hospital changes were needed. We never denied USDOJ 
access to the state mental hospitals and were actively negotiating USDOJ visits that 
would not coincide with intensive site visits by accrediting entities. However, 
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communication was disrupted and complicated by the unexpected death of our 
attorney on this case. 
In any case, DMH is committed to continue working cooperatively with USDOJ. In a 
recent letter, USDOJ indicated that it was "pleased" with DMH's progress towards 
resolution of the issues raised by its investigation. 
Describe the remedial measures proposed by the USDOJ for the Metropolitan 
child and adolescent programs, the Metropolitan adult programs, and the Napa 
programs. Describe what, if any, remediation plan components have been 
implemented, are being implemented, or planned to be implemented at 
Metropolitan and Napa. Describe the timelines associated with the 
implementation of remediation plans. 
DMH has been negotiating with the USDOJ since March 2005 on specific terms of the 
remediation plan. The remediation plan will define expectations, performance 
standards and dates that must be met in order for California's state hospitals to be 
found in compliance with CRIPA, the agreement to be terminated, and the complaint 
filed by USDOJ to be dismissed. 
The state hospitals have begun making improvements within existing resources. 
USDOJ recognizes that major reforms cannot be completed overnight. In the proposed 
negotiated agreement, dates have yet to be specified, but all parties have agreed that 
we are looking at a 3- to 5-year timeline in which to achieve full compliance. 
The following bullets include general features of the proposed remediation plan, as well 
as an update of DMH's response to each feature of the plan. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #1: The Recovery philosophy of care 
and the psychiatric rehabilitation model of service delivery will be used. 
DMH Response to Date: DMH is promoting a major "culture shift" in adopting 
the Recovery Model of mental health, in which the role of the hospitals is to 
assist individuals in reaching their goals of recovery of effective functioning in the 
community through individualized treatment, empowerment and self-
determination. DMH is doing this by incorporating Town Hall meetings, training 
at all staff levels, and inclusion of patients on committees to develop components 
such as By Choice incentive programs, Positive Behavior Supports, Psychosocial 
Rehabilitation Malls, Therapeutic Milieu interventions, and restraint reduction. 
DMH established a statewide structure of work groups over a year ago to 
develop comprehensive manuals covering every aspect of the remediation plan. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #2: Improved ratios of clinical staff to 
patient caseload. 
DMH Response to Date: Hospitals have formed some of the core enduring 
treatment teams. 
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• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #3: New expectations in the frequency 
and thoroughness of Treatment Planning Conferences (TPCs) for individual 
patients. 
DMH Response to Date: A new person-centered treatment planning system 
(Wellness and Recovery Plan) has been developed and requires input from all 
disciplines. This system is being implemented at one hospital (Metropolitan), and 
is being gradually introduced at the other three (Patton, Napa, and Atascadero). 
The department is also in the early stages of developing an automated system 
for recording and working with this data. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #4: Interventions to reach patient 
objectives must occur appropriately throughout the individual's day, with a 
minimum of 20 hours of active treatment per week. 
DMH Response to Date: This is the current objective at all state hospitals, 
which has been achieved at Metropolitan. DMH will continue to train staff to 
provide evidence-based treatment in order to meet this goal. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #5: The service plans must be revised, 
as appropriate, to ensure that planning is based on the individual's progress, or 
lack thereof. 
DMH Response to Date: Metropolitan is meeting this standard and is striving to 
increase the overall quality of the service plans to meet its own high standards. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #6: There must be a comprehensive and 
ongoing system of integrated assessments that will guide all aspects of care and 
treatment. 
DMH Response to Date: A comprehensive set of required clinical assessments, 
quarterly assessments, quality of life measures, etc. has been identified by a 
statewide workgroup made up of personnel from the various hospitals 
representing a wide range of clinical disciplines. These assessments are being 
phased in at each of the hospitals. These assessments require the purchase of 
new testing instruments, staff training, reallocation of staff, and monitoring of 
quality. 
USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #7: Assessments must include a 
Positive Behavior Support plan (PBS) which is an overall strategy to promote and 
encourage wellness and recovery that is individualized and relies on positive 
incentives and encouragement. 
DMH Response to Date: State hospitals have put PBS teams in place, though 
no hospital yet has a complete team because of the difficulty in hiring 
appropriately trained staff. However, current resources have been utilized to the 
fullest extent possible and two teams have begun providing behavioral services 
at each of the hospitals. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #8: DMH must aggressively identify and 
treat the growing numbers of patients who are obese and at risk of developing 
diabetes. 
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DMH Response to Date: A "trigger system" is in place at Metropolitan to identify 
patients with high body mass indexes (25 and above) and provide dietary, 
exercise, and other management and support plans to ameliorate obesity and 
related diabetes. A statewide work group is finalizing a trigger system to be 
employed in all hospitals that will meet this standard. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #9: Nursing services must complete 
competency-based training on diagnosis, medications and side effects, and on 
how to complete the Medication and Treatment Record, including medication 
variances. 
DMH Response to Date: Extensive training of staff has been initiated at each of 
the hospitals and will continue. The training staff at each hospital recognizes that 
this will be a long-term effort. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #1 0: Pharmacy services must conduct 
reviews of each individual medication regimen and make recommendations to 
the physician about possible interactions and side effects, and document where 
such recommendations were not followed. 
DMH Response to Date: Pharmacy services currently review all new 
prescriptions and changes to prescriptions as required by JCAHO. Formal 
protocols to guide the level of detail in these reviews are currently in 
development on a statewide basis. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #11: Investigations of patient abuse and 
other serious incidents must begin immediately and reports must be completed 
timely. 
DMH Response to Date: Currently, all such incidents are thoroughly 
investigated with the goal of prompt completion. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #12: A "trigger system" must specify 
conditions indicating risk to patient well-being and set in motion urgent, 
individualized interventions that will be monitored until the risk is corrected. 
DMH Response to Date: The Daily Trigger Monitoring and Feedback System is 
being developed at each of the hospitals. Metropolitan has a rudimentary system 
in place but the other hospitals have yet to begin implementing this system. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #13: A By-Choice incentive plan will be 
implemented that gives redeemable points for participation in group activities to 
engage patients earlier in the treatment process. 
DMH Response to Date: The By-Choice incentive program has been fully 
implemented at Metropolitan and partially at Patton. The other two hospitals are 
working on their implementation plans. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #14: Each facility must have at least one 
developmental and cognitive abilities team that has demonstrated competence in 
assessing and treating persons with cognitive challenges. 
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DMH Response to Date: All but one of the members of the Developmental and 
Cognitive Abilities team at Metropolitan have been appointed out of redirected 
positions. The other hospitals have yet to develop this team. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #15: Policies concerning seclusion and 
restraint and "PRN" and stat medications must be revised and monitored. Use of 
prone restraints, prone containment and prone transportation will be expressly 
prohibited. 
DMH Response to Date: Methods for reducing use of seclusion and restraint 
have been implemented, including extensive staff training within existing 
resources. DMH will continue to track use of seclusion and restraint. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #16: Potential environmental hazards to 
patients must be identified on an ongoing basis and remedied as soon as 
possible. 
DMH Response to Date: Each DMH hospital has a list of environmental 
concerns, which it will address through upgrades or replacement. A new 
environmental assessment instrument has been developed and implemented. 
• USDOJ Proposed Remedial Measure #17: Extensive levels of monitoring, 
automation, data gathering, and reporting to ensure that virtually every aspect of 
every patient's care, from entry until exit from a state hospital, is tracked and can 
be summarized. 
DMH Response to Date: Extensive monitoring systems are in the early stages 
of development that will track literally millions of individual data elements for 
program monitoring, evaluation, and auditing purposes. 
How do these plans and timelines reflect corrective actions proposed by the 
USDOJ? What steps will USDOJ likely take or require ensuring compliance? 
• The proposed negotiated remediation plan is designed with the 3- 5-year 
timeframe for full compliance in mind. 
• The USDOJ will require extensive monitoring, reporting, and audits to ensure 
compliance. 
What are the barriers to implementing components of the remediation plan? 
There are four main barriers: 
• The first barrier is the major culture shift necessary to bring DMH staff at all 
levels around to a new way of thinking and doing business. However, DMH 
can make this cultural shift and do so successfully. Staff who have been 
trained and have tried out the Recovery Model have been enthusiastic about 
it. 
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• The second barrier is limited resources. We now are evaluating the need for 
additional resources. 
• The third barrier is recruitment of qualified and well-trained staff in the years 
to come. DMH must compete in some disciplines, such as nursing, with all 
other private and public sector employers for a very limited number of good 
candidates. We continue to seek innovative ways of recruiting and attracting 
good staff to our organization. 
• A fourth barrier is that we have changed the populations of our hospitals 
dramatically and now have 90% forensically committed patients. There has 
been increased attention on public safety, and balancing staff and patient 
safety with treatment. 
What role does the Recovery Model play in the remediation plan? Describe the 
Recovery Model. What are the barriers to implementing the Recovery Model in 
state hospitals? 
Under the Recovery Model, the hospital's role is to assist individuals reaching their 
goals of recovery of effective functioning in the community through individualized 
treatment, empowerment and self-determination. The model holds that treatment 
planning should be based on enhancing an individual's strengths and quality of life, 
rather than on treating an individual's "sickness," symptoms and problems. 
Treatment is delivered to meet individuals' needs for recovery in a variety of settings, 
including the living units, psychosocial rehabilitation malls and the broader hospital 
community, rather than solely in the living units. There must be a broad array of 
interventions available to all individuals, and interventions are matched to an 
individual's status in terms of readiness for change. Incentive programs are used to 
help motivate individuals to make positive changes in their lives. The Recovery 
Model is central to the proposed remediation plan. 
What outcomes are anticipated following implementation of the remediation 
plan? How will these outcomes be measured? How do these outcomes relate to 
the USDOJ expectation for compliance? When will measurable outcomes be 
apparent? 
We anticipate further reductions in the use of seclusion and restraint, patient 
assaults, and patient suicides; speedier resolution of investigations of abuse; shorter 
lengths of stay in state hospitals; improved physical health and dietary planning; 
positive consumer evaluations; and substantial clinical improvements to the mental 
health of our clients. Many of these outcomes are already being measured by such 
mechanisms as the ORYX system, the mechanisms put in place pursuant to SB 
130, Chesbro (Chapter 750, Statutes of 2003), and the Admissions Discharge 
Transfer computer system maintained in Sacramento. Additional monitoring 
systems are being developed and will be put in place. 
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What is the status of negotiations with the USDOJ regarding the Metropolitan 
findings, the Napa findings, and the issue of access to Patton and Atascadero 
State Hospitals? 
DMH met with USDOJ most recently on August 30, 2005. There is much agreement 
on the program aspects of the settlement. However, some technical issues remain 
to be resolved. USDOJ has confirmed on-site inspections at Atascadero and at 
Patton from November 22 to December 2 and December 12 to 16, respectively. 
Should negotiations with USDOJ not reach a successful conclusion, what other 
steps might the USDOJ take to ensure corrective actions are taken to improve the 
quality of care at state hospitals? What are the potential consequences of further 
USDOJ actions for the State? 
If negotiations fail, the result would likely be years of costly litigation. We do not 
believe this is a likely result, based on the tentative agreements we have alreapy 
reached with USDOJ, as well as on California's commitment to the Recovery Model 
and the changes in the hospitals that are already underway. 
Please describe any other reviews that have occurred (i.e., accreditation, 
licensing) at each of the state hospitals over the same period as the USDOJ 
investigations. How have these review findings compared to the findings of the 
USDOJ? Describe any other review or investigations currently underway or 
anticipated to occur in the next year. In addition to the CRIPA investigations, is 
the USDOJ conducting any other investigations into state mental health 
facilities? 
Other accreditation and licensing reviews at the state hospitals during 2004 and 
2005 included: 
• Annual re-licensure surveys for Acute Psychiatric and Intermediate Care 
Facilities 
• Skilled Nursing Facility Annual Re-Certification Survey 
• JCAHO review of a natural but unexpected patient death 
• Intermediate Care Facility Annual Re-Certification 
• Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments accreditation survey of the 
Laboratory and Pathology program 
• Skilled Nursing Facility Fire Life Safety Survey. 
Deficiencies identified in these reviews were generally minor and quickly corrected. 
In none of the above reviews did a hospital lose accreditation or licensure. 
However, in addition to the regular licensing and accreditation activities listed above, 
JCAHO, CMS and DHS have conducted periodic, unscheduled visits and surveys at 
all of the state hospitals in response to complaint allegations and serious incidents 
related to medication irregularities, treatment concerns, suicides, patient-on-patient 
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homicides and staff-on-patient, hands-on incidents. In some cases the hospitals 
have been found to be at fault, with findings consistent with some of those identified 
by the USDOJ, resulting in citations and deficiency notices. 
This fall, JCAHO will conduct on-site reviews of our state hospitals as part of the 
reaccreditation process. 
The USDOJ has also indicated that it intends to begin a review of Metropolitan's bills 
to the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Due to the CRIPA investigation findings, 
the USDOJ alleges that there may be some question as to the validity of the 
hospitals' claims for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. However, the hospitals 
continue to maintain all necessary licenses and accreditations, and DMH believes 
the claims for reimbursement are valid. 
Please provide any other information you believe is relevant to our understanding 
of the USDOJ investigations and improved quality of care at our state hospitals. 
• Because the Recovery Model places special emphasis on helping patients 
develop successful living skills, clinicians of every discipline must be involved in 
each patient's recovery. Although we believe psychiatrists are as important 
within this model as in previous service provision models, other disciplines 
including psychology, social work, rehabilitation therapy, and nurses will share a 
larger role in shaping and delivering treatment than they did previously. 
• We are committed to the principles of the Recovery Model, to an open and 
accountable mental health system, and to full compliance with all reasonable 
elements of the agreement we are negotiating with USDOJ. 
• Mental health services are dependent on human factors. It is essential to have a 
well-trained, fully staffed, supported, accountable workforce to be the effective, 
respected hospitals we desire. 
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SECTION 4 
Organizational 
Written Testimony 
September 21, 2005 
The Honorable Wesley Chesbro 
California State Senate 
P.O. Box 942848 
Sacramento, CA 94248-0001 
Dear Senator Chesbro: 
ADMINISTRATION 
1 00 Howe Avenue, Suite 185N, Sacramento, CA 95825 
Telephone: (916) 488-9955 Fax: (916) 488-2635 
www.pai-ca.org 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify at your September 20, 2005 hearing 
regarding the Review of the Department of Justice Investigation of California State 
Mental Health Hospitals. A copy of our testimony is included. 
I and other P AI staff look forward to working with you to both increase access to 
community services and supports and the quality of services at state institutions. 
Sincerely, 
t~~ 
Catherine Blakemore 
Executive Director 
c: Peggy Collins, Consultant 
"Advancing the human and legal rights of people with disabilities." 
ADMINISTRATION 
1 00 Howe Avenue, Suite 185N, Sacramento, CA 95825 
Telephone: (916) 488-9955 Fax: (916) 488-2635 
www.pai-ca.org 
Testimony of Catherine Blakemore 
Protection & Advocacy, Inc. 
Senate Subcommittee on Developmental Disabilities and Mental Health 
Review of the Federal Department of Justice Investigation of 
California State Mental Health Hospitals 
September 20, 2005 
Thank you for the opportunity to address your committee today regarding our 
experience with the quality of patient care and treatment at California's State 
Mental Health Hospitals. 
The Federal Department of Justice Investigation confirms our experience at the 
state hospitals. At the most basic level, the state hospitals far too frequently fail to 
treat and protect their residents. There is not a single issue identified in the reports 
that P AI staff has not observed first-hand. The reports confirm the wide-spread 
and systemic nature of the problems: misdiagnosis, over-medication, lack of 
treatment planning, poly-pharmacy, aversive behavioral therapy, inappropriate or 
excessive use of restraint and seclusion, no discharge planning, failure to identify 
or address developmental disabilities and to notify or coordinate with the regional 
centers, failure to identify and treat organic or neurological conditions such as 
Huntington's disease or traumatic brain injuries. For children and youth, this 
extends to a failure to educate and prepare them for life in a non-institutionalized 
setting. 
Although the Department of Mental Health has put into place a framework for 
reform and we believe that this framework has many positive elements, we have 
seen little real progress or change in the lives of the residents. This is particularly 
troubling because at some hospitals, DMH has had two years to correct these 
problems. In our experience, we have not met a single resident who could not be 
better treated with intensive, individualized services in the community. 
"Advancing the human and legal rights of people with disabilities." 
We think this committee must ask some additional and different questions. We 
question: 
1) Whether the state hospital system can truly be fixed, and whether 
recovery can fully occur within the state hospital setting 
2) Whether it would not be a more prudent use of resources and better fulfill 
the mandates of state and federal law to close the state institutions and 
devote the resources to programs such as those being developed as part of 
the Mental Health Services Act. 
Given the existence of community mental health entitlements for children under 
special education and EPSDT, there is no reason that any child should be placed at 
a state hospital, and for that reason, recommend the closure of the children's unit at 
Metropolitan. We also believe that with the addition of Mental Health Services 
Act (Proposition 63) funding, all residents committed to state institutions under 
conservatorship proceedings could be served in the community and that the proper 
role of this committee is to direct DMH and the counties to develop discharge 
plans for each hospital resident. Finally, we think closer legislative scrutiny needs 
to be paid to individuals on "forensic commitments" including the barriers these 
individuals face in being discharged from state hospitals. 
Insofar as the state hospitals continue to be part of our mental health system, 
however, we have several recommendations concerning how care and treatment 
can be improved. Most principally, we believe that there needs to be greater 
transparency about what is going on within the state hospitals-in other words, 
additional public data reporting, posting of expert audits, reviews and corrective 
action plans developed to comply with the Department of Justice investigation; 
increased oversight by the legislature and independent entities such as the Mental 
Health Planning Council; and an increased role and presence of advocates at the 
state hospitals. We outline our specific recommendations in greater detail at the 
end of this written testimony. 
PAl's Experience with the Remediation Plan Implementation at Metropolitan 
and Napa State Hospitals 
Inadequate and Inconsistent Implementation of the Remediation Plan 
In general, the remediation plan developed by the Department of Mental Health is 
a great improvement compared to what previously existed at the state hospitals. 
The wellness and recovery model, which focuses on the individual's strengths, is 
certainly a positive development. PAl's principal concern is that these policies 
have not been adequately or consistently implemented, but instead represent a 
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paper change only, not a change in clinical practice. As a result, these new policies 
have not resulted in demonstrable improvement in the lives of the patients. Our 
concerns are best illustrated by the work we have done since the time of the DOJ 
report: 
In February 2004, Chris (42 years old) was found by his roommate hanging 
by a scarf tied around his neck from a metal bar across the window. In May 
of this year, Marla, an 18 year old resident, was found hanging from a light 
fixture in her room. Neither survived. Both had a history of depression 
and/or self-injurious behavior. Last week, PAl received an unconfirmed 
report of another suicide of a female resident on Marla's unit. In their 
report, the DOl noted environmental hazards on the adult units which pose 
risks of serious injury, illness and death. 
John is a patient with a disorder of the pancreas. When taken to a local 
hospital for treatment, he was told that one of his psychiatric medications 
may be a strong factor in the disease. When John returned to Napa, the 
psychiatrist ignored the evidence and the client was put back on the same 
psychiatric medication. The client was hospitalized with additional 
symptoms of the pancreas disease and again, the psychiatric medication was 
discontinued. Finally, and fortunately for John, a staff member spoke up 
and the doctor was taken off his case. 
Anthony is Vietnamese American, on a conservatorship, and no longer a 
resident at Metropolitan. During his stay at Metropolitan, none of the 
treatment mall groups he attended were presented or translated in his 
primary language, Vietnamese. Anthony became very bored by the groups 
and did not want to attend, causing his social worker to conclude that he 
wasn't ready for discharge. Nevertheless, Anthony's conservator arranged 
for his discharge and placement in a less restrictive setting, with no help 
from Anthony's treatment team. 
Mark was admitted to Metropolitan in October 2004 at age 14. His 
treatment plan listed his discharge criteria as: 90 days of no assaults, no self 
injurious behaviors, no AWOL attempts, and that until this criteria are met, 
there will be no discharge meeting. He was never referred to the positive 
behavior support team to help him deal with behaviors that were preventing 
him from reaching discharge criteria until 6 months after his admission 
because he was not considered "stabilized on his medications. " At the same 
time, Mark's records show that he was assessed in the Borderline 
Intellectual Functioning range and was experiencing large scale 
fluctuations in his prescribed medications, suggesting a constant 
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undermining of Mark's ability to achieve consistency in controlling the 
behaviors on which his hopes of discharge were pinned. 
Mary J. is on a conservatorship and has been at Metropolitan for the past 
nine years. Since her admission to Metropolitan, she has repeatedly been 
sent to the local hospital emergency room for self injurious behavior, 
including swallowing batteries, pens and cutting herself. It took several 
months of advocacy by PAl to get Mary a positive behavior assessment and 
plan. Despite her severe behavior, no-one from Mary's treatment team ever 
referred her to Metropolitan's specialized positive behavior support team 
for an assessment. After years of placing the blame on Mary for her 
behavior, her treatment team is only now slowly attempting to implement the 
ideas proposed by the positive behavior support team. Unfortunately, the 
treatment team has been unable to make any provisions for a critical fact 
raised in Mary's behavior assessment: Mary's living unit is a great source 
of stress that sets off her challenging behavior. Until and unless Mary has 
real opportunities off the grounds of Metropolitan, she will likely be trapped 
in a cycle that prevents her from ever being considered ready for discharge. 
Barriers to Reform 
Although true reform can take time, some barriers must be addressed from the 
outset in order to increase the ability for reform to occur. 
The principal barriers that PAl identifies with regard to reform at the state 
hospitals: 
• No clear accountability for failures in treatment and care. There are 
no consequences for the failures at the state hospitals. There should 
be a system of accountability and incentives. 
• Insufficient commitment to staff training. If staff are not properly or 
fully trained or do not have the necessary qualifications to carry out 
the components of the remediation plan, no reform can occur. Simply 
hiring more people to do things as they've always been done will not 
result in improvement. 
• Lack of "real life" examples of people with psychiatric disabilities 
who are participatory members of the community to serve as role 
models for both residents and staff. Currently, an "us" versus "them" 
ethos permeates the state hospitals. Staff will never be able to 
envision and embrace recovery unless they are exposed to mental 
health clients who are in leadership positions. 
• Attitude by current staff and an environment that prevents residents 
from having a true voice about their daily living or life goals. On the 
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units, residents are expected to follow direction without questions. 
Questioning a staff member's direction or asking about alternatives is 
considered resistant and obstructive, which can often be followed by a 
punitive measure by staff. As an example, an individual is given 
medication in the morning that makes him feel sleepy. The individual 
prefers to take the medication at night. This is seen as being resistant 
to taking medication and is presented to the courts as proof of the 
resident's non-compliance. 
P AI's Recommendations For Improving Treatment and Patient Care, 
Including Suggested Outcomes to Measure: 
Specific Recommendations for Metropolitan's Children's Unit: 
The problems at Metropolitan's Children's Unit are serious, well documented and 
pervasive throughout its relatively short eight year history. Not only have we seen 
poor outcomes for the youth who were once patients at Metropolitan's Children's 
Unit and hearing how they now feel scarred and traumatized as survivors rather 
than as recovered patients, but we have witnessed Metropolitan's continued failure 
to correct many serious problems despite prescriptive remedial measures from 
multiple inquiries and investigations at the federal, county and state level citing 
Metropolitan for deficiencies. 
In response to the inadequacy of special education services in the surrounding 
community, in 2005 PAl caused the California Department of Education to initiate 
its own investigation into Metropolitan's perpetuation of a segregated educational 
environment on the basis that its practices violate state and federal law. The results 
of this investigation have recently been released (attached as Exhibit B), but even 
if all educational deficiencies are remedied, it has little effect on the inadequate 
programming, therapeutic interventions and supervision, nor will it change the 
pervasive collective attitude of Metropolitan staff and administrators that 
criminally prosecuting children with disabilities is an acceptable form of behavior 
management. 
Therefore our current recommendation remains identical to that of P AI' s testimony 
before the California Assembly Subcommittee on Mental Health in 2003: 
1. Metropolitan's Children's Unit should be closed within 18 months using a 
process which incorporates advance planning, direct oversight by and 
accountability to the Legislature or an independent citizens' commission or 
other body and reliance on outside expertise in individualized community-
based services; and 
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2. Put in place an on-going oversight mechanism to ensure that children who 
would have otherwise been placed at Metropolitan receive appropriate 
service. 
Transparency and Outcomes: 
DMH should be required to publicly report data on its website on a monthly basis 
regarding a number of measures. DMH currently reports its data on the use of 
restraint and seclusion. It should also report the number of deaths, injuries and 
escapes or unauthorized absences. DMH should also report data on admission and 
discharge, information on where the patient is discharged to (for example, locked 
IMDs, board and care facilities, jails, prison, etc)., and any data on readmission. 
DMH has recently posted injuries to employees related to the use of restraint and 
seclusion but not injuries or deaths of residents to the use of restraint and seclusion, 
as required. Since January 2004, PAl is aware of deaths of two state hospital 
residents related to the use of restraints or seclusion, neither of which were 
reported by DMH to P AI within statutory time limits. 
Insofar as DMH assesses the pace and quality of its reforms, this information 
should be reported to the Legislature on a quarterly basis. This reporting should 
include any expert or consultants' reports. 
Oversight: The Legislature should commission, or order the California Mental 
Health Planning Council to commission, a panel of experts to assess whether 
patient care has improved at the state hospitals. These experts would review 
patient charts and meet with patients and staff to assess such factors as: How is the 
patient doing? Is there a long term plan for him or her? If the plan is not working, 
why not, and are there any ideas to change the plan? The expert would assess 
everyone who works or interacts with the particular patient-can she or he identify 
what's needed? 
Advocacy: There should be an increased role and presence of advocates to include 
on-site monitoring of practices such as the use of restraint and seclusion, training 
to staff about patients' rights, and development of corrective action plans following 
a finding of a patients' rights violation. With the increased number of patients in 
the state hospitals and increased numbers of complaints, the complaint process has 
currently become the focus of the program, making it reactive instead of proactive. 
Increased advocacy presence would allow increased monitoring and training within 
each facility on a regular basis. 
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Synopses of Ongoing PAl Cases 
Below, we list case synopses of ongoing patient problems. The facts from 
these synopses apply to the period since the reforms have been in place. 
Names have been changed to protect privacy: 
Metropolitan State Hospital 
In February 2004, Chris (42 years old) was found by his roommate hanging 
by a scarf tied around his neck from a metal bar across the window. In May 
of this year, Marla, an 18 year old resident, was found hanging from a light 
fixture in her room. Neither survived. Both had a history of depression 
and/or self-injurious behavior. Last week, PAl received an unconfirmed 
report of another suicide of a female resident on Marla's unit. In their 
report, the DOl noted environmental hazards on the adult units which pose 
risks of serious injury, illness and death. 
Mary J. is on a conservatorship and has been at Metropolitan for the past 
nine years. Since her admission to Metropolitan, she has repeatedly been 
sent to the local hospital emergency room for self injurious behavior, 
including swallowing batteries, pens and cutting herself It took several 
months of advocacy by PAl to get Mary a positive behavior assessment and 
plan. Despite her severe behavior, no-one from Mary's treatment team ever 
referred her to Metropolitan's specialized positive behavior support team 
for an assessment. After years of placing the blame on Mary for her 
behavior, her treatment team is only now slowly attempting to implement the 
ideas proposed by the positive behavior support team. Unfortunately, the 
treatment team has been unable to make any provisions for a critical fact 
raised in Mary's behavior assessment: Mary's living unit is a great source 
of stress that sets off her challenging behavior. Until and unless Mary has 
real opportunities off the grounds of Metropolitan, she will likely be trapped 
in a cycle that prevents her from ever being considered ready for discharge. 
Randy C. is on a conservatorship and has been at Metropolitan for several 
years. Randy has a traumatic brain injury which causes him to engage in 
challenging, sometimes assaultive behavior. Randy's treatment team never 
referred him to the positive behavior support team for an assessment or 
plan. Instead, Randy was kept in continual seclusion. Two locked seclusion 
rooms were devoted to Randy because the one that he occupied would 
become extremely filthy because of his feces and urine; Randy would need to 
be transferred to the other seclusion room while his regular room was being 
cleaned out. 
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Todd has Huntington's disease. His conservator and the conservatorship 
court do not believe that Metropolitan is the correct placement for him. 
However, Metropolitan staff have impeded with any efforts for his 
discharge, principally by highlighting all his negative behaviors. A court 
appointed psychologist reviewing Todd observed that the man he was 
interviewing did not at all correspond to the man described in very 
pejorative terms throughout the records, but instead appeared to have 
greater strengths and potential for discharge. 
Anthony is Vietnamese American, on a conservatorship, and no longer a 
resident at Metropolitan. During his stay at Metropolitan, none of the 
treatment mall groups he attended were presented or translated in his 
primary language, Vietnamese. Anthony became very bored by the groups 
and did not want to attend, causing his social worker to conclude that he 
wasn't ready for discharge. Nevertheless, Anthony's conservator arranged 
for his discharge and placement in a less restrictive setting, with no help 
from Anthony's treatment team. 
Metropolitan Children and Youth Unit 
Criminalization of Behaviors 
Metropolitan has a longstanding history of using the juvenile justice 
system as a means of dealing with patients who, despite their 
documented behaviors, do not receive adequate behavioral 
intervention while admitted. This problem was further noted in the 
DOJ Reports and in the Katie A. v. Diana Bonta federal class action 
lawsuit's Fourth Expert Panel Report, attached as Exhibit A. 
In June 2004, 16 year-old Matt, a Metropolitan patient since 2001, 
was arrested for assaulting a substitute teacher at the special 
education school, resulting in his detention in Juvenile Hall. An 
independent evaluation of Matt in Juvenile Hall after the incident 
found: "The current charges ... stem from an incident at Metropolitan 
where remarks made by a substitute teacher led to a confrontation. He 
was charged with assault with a deadly weapon (pencil) and making 
terrorist threats. I am dismayed that an agency that exists solely to 
serve persons with mental and cognitive disabilities would so quickly 
resort to legal intervention in such an incident especially when it was 
caused and aggravated by the remarks and behavior of a staff 
member ... the behavioral outburst was a predictable result of the 
disability ... and therefore not subject to standard disciplinary 
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measures. " Matt is now a ward of the Juvenile court and remains 
largely without treatment at Juvenile Hall. 
Inadequate Discharge Planning Efforts: 
P AI has observed that discharge planning for minors is inadequate by 
Metropolitan staff. Minor patients approach their 18th birthdays with 
nothing done to prepare them for reentry into their communities. The 
failure of Metropolitan to prepare minors for transition to less 
restrictive settings is pervasive from inadequate provision of special 
education services, a failure to identify specialty community-based 
mental health services such as therapeutical behavioral services, and a 
failure to refer patients for eligibility for other important support 
systems such as the regional center. Upon their 18th birthdays, they are 
abruptly pushed out to IMDs or other restrictive placements where 
available, otherwise rolled over into one of Metropolitan's adult units. 
Eddie entered Metropolitan at age 16 as a voluntary parent placement 
funded by the school district as a special education placement. 
Metropolitan initiated LPS conservatorship proceedings and mother 
successfully fought to be appointed his LPS conservator. She 
repeatedly pressured the hospital to help her son be discharged to her 
care with community mental health services. Metropolitan told the 
conservator that her son was ready for discharge for over one year, 
but refused to discharge him without approval of the probation 
department which they failed to make contact with, and mother 
unilaterally had to get juvenile court case dismissed before discharge 
was approved with only 6 months until his 18th birthday. Had his 
mother not intervened, Eddie would have remained at Metropolitan 
until dismissal of the juvenile court case. 
Jed was at Metropolitan for 6 months in 2003 where he met 
Metropolitan's own difficult discharge criteria months before his 18th 
birthday. Metropolitan made no efforts to discharge him prior to his 
18th birthday, and no specialty mental health treatments such as 
therapeutic behavioral services were ever considered as a way of 
securing Jed's safety outside of Metropolitan in less restrictive 
community settings. Jed was ultimately discharged to an /MD. 
Unrealistic Discharge Criteria: 
Metropolitan has in the past used and continues to use discharge 
criteria that are based on a level-points system. Good behavior earns 
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points and the accumulation of points lowers a patient's level to the 
point at which a patient is only then considered ready for discharge. 
However, even after reaching this level, the treatment team typically 
favors only highly structured placements upon discharge. For many 
children, discharge goals written into their treatment plans are set at a 
level that many children may never meet, especially given the poor 
behavioral supports, poor supervision, and general lack of therapeutic 
programmmg. 
Mark was admitted to Metropolitan in October 2004 at age 14. His 
treatment plan listed his discharge criteria as: 90 days of no assaults, 
no self injurious behaviors, no AWOL attempts, and that until these 
criteria are met, there will be no discharge meeting. In the month 
before his discharge, the discharge criteria had been lowered to 45 
days without negative behaviors, suggesting that the initial90 day 
criteria was unrealistic. He was never referred to the positive 
behavior support team to help him deal with behaviors that were 
preventing him from reaching discharge criteria until 6 months after 
his admission because he was not considered "stabilized on his 
medications." At the same time, Mark's records show that he was 
assessed in the Borderline Intellectual Functioning range and was 
experiencing large scale fluctuations in his prescribed medications, 
suggesting a constant undermining of Mark's ability to achieve 
consistency in controlling the behaviors on which his hopes of 
discharge were pinned. 
Inadequate Special Education Services: 
Metropolitan's educational obligations derive from a combination of 
both federal and state law. Specifically, Cal. Welfare and Institutions 
Code §4011.5 states: "In counties where State Department of Mental 
Health hospitals are located, the state hospitals shall ensure that 
appropriate special education and related services, pursuant to Chapter 
8 of Part 30 of the Education Code, are provided [to] eligible 
individuals with exceptional needs residing in state hospitals." 
Included in these statutory mandates are the duty to identify and 
assess pupils eligible for special education services, and the duty to 
provide a continuum of educational services in environments that 
include settings outside of the hospital boundaries. Cal. Ed. Code 
§56857.5 
Jed was hospitalized for 8 months at Metropolitan and entered with 
an Individualized Education Program. He was placed at 
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Metropolitan's segregated on-grounds school for the entire eight 
months, despite meeting discharge criteria for several months before 
he was discharged to an !MD on his 18th birthday. Jed was never 
offered opportunities to be educated with his nondisabled peers nor 
was he offered off grounds extracurricular activities or classes in a 
general education environment with appropriate behavioral and 
instructional supports. 
Inadequate Programming/Interventions and Supervision: 
The DOJ report notes at many points that treatment interventions at 
Metropolitan were not appropriate or therapeutic. These problems are 
ongoing. Children are largely left alone to harm themselves or 
victimize others. Quiet time between meals and programming limited 
to fifty minute sessions of anger management, bike repair or softball 
offer patients little toward their recovery and ample opportunity to 
provoke and victimize one another. Residents report to P AI that they 
live in a culture of violence and fear. 
Stanley, age 14, lived in fear for his safety while at Metropolitan, 
using his care packages from his grandmother to payoff other kids to 
protect him. He often had bruises from physical assaults. At the same 
time, Stanley was lead to believe that if he victimized other patients 
smaller or less sophisticated, he would not be the target of such abuse 
himself. In the pecking order hierarchy that developed, Stanley felt 
justified, with the assistance of three other boys, in forcibly 
sodomizing another child with a lower cognitive developmental level. 
Napa State Hospital 
In late December 2004, Robert was found by his roommate hanging 
from a bed sheet. Robert had a history of depression and previous 
suicide attempts. Less than thirty minutes before his suicide, Robert's 
family notified NSH staff that he seemed distraught during their phone 
call with him minutes earlier. They requested staff provide him with 
additional supervision and support. 
In the early morning hours in March of this year, Nick was found 
hanging in a bathroom stall from shoelaces secured to a metal grill in 
the ceiling. He had been noted missing during the previous bed check. 
It was hospital policy to lock the bathrooms at night to better 
supervise the residents. Staff were aware that residents knew how to 
unlock the bathroom door using a card. Nick hung himself with 
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shoelaces from his ankle braces which staff had neglected to secure 
when he went to bed, as is facility policy. Nick had a history of 
depression and previous suicide attempts. 
John is a patient with a disorder of the pancreas. When taken to a 
local hospital for treatment, he was told that one of his psychiatric 
medications may be a strong factor in the disease. When John 
returned to Napa, the psychiatrist ignored the evidence and the client 
was put back on the same psychiatric medication. The client was 
hospitalized with additional symptoms of the pancreas disease and 
again, the psychiatric medication was discontinued. Finally, and 
fortunately for John, a staff member spoke up and the doctor was 
taken off his case. 
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To: Senator Wesley Chesbro, Chair 
Senate Select Committee on Developmental Disabilities and Mental Health 
From: Union of American Physicians and Dentists ("UAPD") 
Re: Oversight Hearing on Review of the Federal Department of Justice ("DOJ") Investigation 
of California State Mental Health Hospitals 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
The Union of American Physicians and Dentists ("UAPD") submits this 
memorandum in response to the gracious invitation of Senator Chesbro to comment on the issues 
raised by the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") investigation of mental hospitals operated by 
the Department of Mental Health of the State of California ("DMH"). Our goal is to improve 
patient care and to address the DOl's concerns. The UAPD has over 3,000 physician members, 
many of whom provide medical and psychiatric services to the patients hospitalized for the 
treatment of mental illness in California's State Hospitals. Hence, the UAPD is in a unique 
position to provide knowledgeable information on the subjects being investigated by your 
Committee. 
The UAPD believes that the State of California must make a renewed 
commitment to the treatment of the mentally ill who are under its care. This requires taking 
immediate steps to correct the chronic lack of physicians, including psychiatrists, and other 
medical staff, at the State Hospitals and immediate cessation of apparent efforts by DMH which 
would deprive the most seriously ill patients of effective medical and psychiatric treatment. In 
particular, the UAPD is concerned that DMH is acting to remove treatment decisions from the 
State Hospital physicians who are personally responsible for the patients as attending physicians. 
These misguided DMH policies have come under scathing criticism by the DOJ and appear to 
violate both federal law (Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act- CRIP A) and California 
state law regarding medical staff self-governance (California Business & Professions Code § 
2282.5). 
II. THE DOJ'S INVESTIGATION CRITICIZES DMH FOR F AlLURE TO HAVE 
PSYCHIATRISTS IN CHARGE OF TREATMENT. 
The DOl's position is that the team leader for each patient hospitalized for the 
treatment of mental illness in a California State Hospital must be a clinical professional legally 
CHESBRO TESTIMONY.wps 
authorized and professionally responsible for all aspects of the patient's care. According to the 
DOJ, failure to meet this requirement is a violation ofCRJPA. By definition, such a team leader 
must be a physician, preferably a psychiatrist. This is because virtually all patients in California 
State Hospitals who are hospitalized for the treatment of mental illness are receiving medication, 
which only a physician may prescribe and evaluate. A high proportion of those patients also 
suffer from non-psychiatric medical illnesses requiring the attention of a physician, such as 
psychiatrist. An expression of the DOJ position is found in the federal regulations governing 
Medicare which provide at 42 Code ofFederal Regulations§ 424.10(a): 
"§424.1 0 Purpose and scope. 
"(a) Purpose. The physician has a major role in 
determining utilization of health services furnished by providers. 
The physician decides upon admissions, orders tests, drugs, and 
treatments, and determines the length of stay." 
Given the federal policy requiring physician direction of the treatment of patients, 
including the hospitalized mentally ill, it should come as no surprise that the DOJ criticizes 
DMH's care of the hospitalized mentally ill based on a perceived failure by DMH to have 
psychiatrists acting as the attending physicians for hospitalized patients. 
DOJ's February 19, 2004letter to Governor Schwarzenegger regarding care at 
Metropolitan State Hospital states(p. 16): psychiatrists must "direct their treatment teams 
adequately, which is an essential requirement of a mental health facility"; (p. 14) "federal law ... 
requires that treatment teams, with the leadership of psychiatrists" provide care and; (p. 7) 
"[a]dequate assessment of a mental health patient for treatment planning purposes requires input 
from various disciplines, under the active direction and guidance of the treating psychiatrist, who 
is responsible for assuring that relevant patient information is obtained and considered"; the 
DOJ's May 13, 2003 letter to Governor Gray Davis states (p. 8): " ... no one is accountable or 
responsible for coordinating patients' overall treatment. ... "; (p. 30) "There are numerous 
instances in which Metropolitan [State Hospital] fails to provide necessary medical care to the 
children and adolescents" in the hospital. 
III. CALIFORNIA LAW REQUIRES THAT TREATMENT PROTOCOLS MUST BE 
DEVELOPED BY THE MEDICAL STAFF OF THE STATE HOSPITALS. 
California law is consistent with the requirements which the DOJ is seeking to 
impose on California State Hospitals. California Business & Professions Code §2282.5 requires 
recognition of the "right of self-governance" of the medical staff at each hospital in California, 
including each California State Hospital. The medical staff at each hospital is responsible to 
establish "medical staff bylaws, rules, or regulations, clinical criteria, and standards to oversee 
and manage quality assurance, utilization review, and other medical staff activities including, but 
not limited to, ... review and analysis of patient medical records." (Business & Professions 
Code §2282.5, subd. (a)(2).) This means that the medical staff has primary responsibility for 
directing the medical care of patients in the State Hospitals. 
It is important to note that the DOJ's criticisms ofDMH for its management of the 
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State Hospitals focuses upon the failure of DMH to provide for physician leadership of the 
diagnosis and care rendered in the hospitals. This criticism reinforces policies found in 
California law. 
IV. UAPD IS CONCERNED THAT POLICIES OF DMH ARE PERPETUATING 
THOSE ASPECTS OF CARE CRITICIZED BY THE DOJ. 
UAPD is extremely concerned that DMH policies are perpetuating its actions 
which have been criticized by the DOJ. For example, DMH has proposed a special order 
governing the treatment protocols for patients hospitalized in its State Hospitals. That proposed 
special order, Special Order No. 129, removes responsibility for patient care from the attending 
psychiatrist who is assigned to provide and to direct the care of the patient. For example, the 
proposed Special Order, at section VI.B., provides that a committee- the Behavior Consultation 
Committee ("BCC") - is empowered to make recommendations regarding patient care which the 
attending physician cannot ignore and must follow. This direction by the BCC, which has not 
personally diagnosed the patient, not only is an invitation to malpractice, but violates the federal 
law and the state law described above. Nevertheless, draft Special Order No. 129 states that the 
BCC's "recommendations will be routinely followed" by the treatment team. This violates the 
DOJ requirement that a psychiatrist must be in charge of treatment, because it removes treatment 
responsibility from the attending psychiatrist to a committee, the BCC, which does not have 
personal contact with the patient. Furthermore, the Special Order is being adopted without any 
input from the medical staffs at any of the State Hospitals, and thereby violates the legal 
requirement of medical staff self-governance enshrined in California Business & Professions 
Code §2282.5. 
There is evidence that DMH's ongoing efforts to respond to DOJ's criticisms and 
to develop programs, like the one suggested by Special Order No. 129, have been delegated to 
Norbhay Singh, Ph.D., an outside consultant who is not licensed to practice in California and 
who lacks the medical training to design such programs. A Public Records Act request to DMH 
has disclosed that Dr. Singh has been paid in excess of $900,00 by DMH for his consulting 
services regarding CRIP A and program design. Such expenditures by DMH detract from patient 
care, divert precious resources, and undermine efforts to correct DOJ' s concerns. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
The UAPD thanks you for the opportunity to present its views to your Oversight 
Hearing. We hope that your Committee will take action to correct the deficiencies identified by 
the DOJ and to encourage DMH to aggressively recruit psychiatrists so that it may meet the 
requirement ofhaving adequate psychiatric direction of patient care as demanded by the DOJ. 
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Testimony of Ken Murch, CAPT Consultant 
before the 
Senate Select Committee on Developmental Disabilities and Mental Health 
September 20, 2005 
Subject: Review of the Federal Department of Justice 
Investigation of California State Mental Health Hospitals 
My name is Ken Murch, and I am representing the California Association of Psychiatric 
Technicians. Among the 7,000 state employees we represent, approximately 2,400 are 
direct care staff in the five state hospitals, including Coalinga which opened a few days 
ago. 
First of all, it's very important to realize that many deficiencies in the DOJ reports on 
Metropolitan and Napa state hospitals have been corrected or are in the process of 
being corrected. In addition, many of the allegations by patients against Napa State 
Hospital staff were not fully investigated, but were unfortunately included in the DOJ 
report as if they were fact. 
From the perspective of a union that represents hospital employees, I can assure you 
that the Department of Mental Health has a solid procedure in place for patients to 
lodge complaints against staff. DMH management will investigate every complaint and, 
if the facts support the allegation, DMH is not at all hesitant to take against the affected 
staff member. 
As far as state hospital patients are concerned, there have been many improvements in 
recent years as a result of court orders, legislation, regulations and departmental 
policies. For example, the amount of time that patients are in seclusion or restraints 
has been reduced dramatically, as has the use of anti-psychotic medications. Patients 
have more freedom to roam the hospitals, and they aren't locked in their rooms at 
night. 
But these improvements have come with a great cost to our members and other direct 
care staff. The average state hospital patient is much more difficult and dangerous to 
work with than in the past. 
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These days, the state hospitals are treating very few mentally ill people who are 
committed under the civil court system. Instead, nearly all patients are seriously 
mentally ill offenders from the criminal justice system, either committed by the criminal 
courts or transferred directly from state prisons. Dealing with these so called "forensic" 
patients is very difficult, challenging and often dangerous work. 
In addition, many patients are more difficult to work with because of cutbacks in the use 
of anti-psychotic medication, including court decisions giving patients the right to refuse 
meds. Also, there is great pressure to reduce the use of restraint or seclusion -- even in 
legitimate situations when a patient is out of control -- and this can put patients and staff 
at risk of serious injury. All of this loads a great amount of stress and new responsibility 
onto the staff. 
To make things worse, there is a major shortage of licensed Psychiatric Technicians 
and other licensed nursing staff. To put it bluntly, our staff are spread way too thin. To 
cover that shortage, Psychiatric Technicians and other nursing staff have been working 
horrendous amounts of overtime for the past few years. 
Although management likes to call a lot of this overtime voluntary, in reality it's the 
same as mandatory overtime. Because if someone doesn't volunteer, that person or 
someone else is ordered to work it. In the past, most hospitals had minimal amounts of 
overtime. But these days we regularly see in excess of 2,500 overtime shifts per month 
at various hospitals. 
With stressed-out, burned-out staff working double shifts with increasingly difficult, 
assaultive patients, it takes a terrible toll on the employees' health, families and morale 
-- and also on the quality and effectiveness of the care they provide. I don't think 
anyone would argue that if the hospitals had enough direct care staff, many of the 
situations reported by the DOJ would have been prevented. 
Here's something a Sacramento Superior Court judge said in dealing with a state 
hospital staffing lawsuit. "Employees responsible for patient care have dangerous and 
demanding jobs and staff shortages may increase the risk of assault and injury to both 
staff and patients." The judge said working without enough staff "has the potential to 
demoralize the level of care nursing staff, contribute to a high turnover rates, increase 
workers compensation outlays, result in the deterioration of patient care and interfere 
with effective programming." 
It was more than 22 years ago that the judge made that statement, and unfortunately it 
remains a valid comment on today's state hospital system. We say it's long overdue for 
the Legislature and administration to take positive steps to eliminate the root cause of 
the problems reported by the DOJ. And one vital step is providing DMH with enough 
licensed Psychiatric Technicians to provide care and treatment that is safe to both 
patients and staff. 
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And this brings me to a final critical point. Over the years, our union and DMH have 
worked hard to recruit enough licensed Psych Techs to properly staff the hospitals. But 
a continuing problem is there are simply not enough Psych Techs available to come 
work for the state. 
So there is a huge need for our community colleges and other schools to train many 
more Psych Techs so they can get licensed. We're told that in the state hospital 
system alone, there is now a need for 1,000 licensed Psych Techs. And in the next five 
years, estimates are that as many as 3,000 more will be needed by DMH, 
Developmental Services and Corrections and Rehabilitation. 
In closing, the Legislature, administration and schools have done a great job focusing 
on ways to alleviate the shortage of Registered Nurses and Licensed Vocational 
Nurses. It's time now to focus the same priority effort on California's other major group 
of licensed nurses, the Psychiatric Technicians who have been called the backbone of 
the state hospital system. Thank you. 
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Oakland Peer/Self-Advocacy Unit 
433 Hegenberger Road, Suite220, Oakland, CA 94612 
Telephone: (510) 430-8033 Fax: (510) 430-8246 
Toll Free: (800) 776-5746 
The Peer/Self Advocacy Unit is a group of former mental health clients who 
facilitate groups in locked psychiatric facilities and in the community to teach 
people about their rights, provide an atmosphere of safety, trust and empowerment 
and teach skills which will enable people to advocate successfully for themselves 
or as a group. 
I facilitate four self advocacy groups at Napa State Hospital-three are with 
residents on forensic commitments and one is with people on civil commitments. 
Group members discuss problems and strategize solutions. Many residents at the 
Napa State Hospital seek legal recourses to problems because they believe they are 
being treated unfairly within the system. 
The Napa Self Advocacy group members largely concur with the Department of 
Justice's report. Their chief complaint has been that negative staff attitudes are 
at the core of what is wrong with every aspect of their care. . 
A recent incident illustrates this point. A client has been experiencing a disorder of 
the pancreas. When taken to a local hospital for treatment, he is told that one of his 
psychiatric medications may be a strong factor in the disease. When the client 
returns to Napa, the psychiatrist ignores the evidence and the client is put back on 
the same psychiatric medication. The client is hospitalized with additional 
symptoms of the pancreas disease and again, the psychiatric medication is 
discontinued. Finally, and fortunately for this client, another staff member spoke 
up and the doctor was taken off his case. However, this is just one of many 
complaints of medical abuse and neglect. 
Another instance of lack of respect was reported by a client on an LPS 
commitment. He told the group that he had asked a staff member who was 
handling some trash if she could wash her hands before handing out their 
medications. The staff member retaliated against this client by not allowing him 
the opportunity to attend the unit dance that weekend. The client filed a Patients 
Rights complaint; however, the damage was done. This denial of rights is typical 
'Working in partnership with people with disabilities - to protect, advocate for and advance their 
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of a pattern of undermining individual's self esteem and creates a feeling of 
powerlessness and sometimes, understandable rage. 
I cite these incidents as indicative of the overall staff culture within Mental Health 
Institutions. Where a medical model prevails, individual clients are seen as sick or 
incompetent. Coupled with the forensic system, with its heaviest emphasis on 
diminishing "dangerousness" it is not easy for staff to contemplate a culture 
change which includes looking for and building on an individual's strengths and 
looking for character shifts that indicate a diminished capacity for being 
dangerous. 
A recovery model builds on a person's strengths 
Psychiatrist Mark Raggins, from Long Beach California writes that a recovery is 
based on hope, empowerment, self responsibility and finding a meaningful niche in 
life. In a model rehabilitation program where he works, the top down medical 
model is done away with. Staff and residents interact collaboratively with a 
personal treatment plan based on the individual's goals. Everyone's input is 
respected. 
In most mental health institutions, a top -down power model has existed for a long 
time, making innovation and change difficult. 
Suggestions for improving residents care and life in an institution 
(These suggestions came directly from Self/Advocacy group members at Napa 
State Hospital in September, 2005) 
1. Close the State hospitals and open smaller treatment facilities where people 
could be known as individuals. 
2. Look at the whole person; stop criminalizing every infraction or small 
mistake. 
3. Decrease the length of stay in the state institutions; get people back to the 
community sooner. 
4. Ask staff members to speak in the language of the clients; provide adequate 
translators for clients with Limited English proficiency. 
5. Make a tape-recording of treatment team conferences, so that there will be 
clarity about what happens in those conferences. A voice recording would 
allow clients to review their treatment team's comments and would also 
provide accurate evidence in a court hearing should questions arise. 
6. Hire more Patients Rights Advocates and increase monitoring of treatment 
conditions. 
7. Have psychiatrists and doctors meet individually with residents on a more 
regular basis. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Amy Breckenridge 
Senior Peer/Self Advocacy Coordinator 
Protection and Advocacy, Inc. 
CALIFORNIA 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 
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TESTIMONY 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES AND MENTAL 
HEALTH 
SENATOR CHESBRO, CHAIR 
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2005 
INTRODUCTION: I am Dr. Charles Paltz and I am here on behalf of the California 
Psychological Association. CPA has a major, ongoing commitment to upgrading the 
quality of care provided to people in the State Hospitals. In my own professional career, 
for many years I was the Chief of San Mateo County's Forensic Mental Health Service. I 
was responsible for a large multidisciplinary group of physicians, psychologists, social 
workers, nurses and psychiatric technicians that provided both inpatient and outpatient 
care to mentally ill people who were in the criminal justice system. That is the primary 
population of people who are currently in State Hospitals. We sent our patients to the state 
hospitals and we received them when they returned to the community. When state hospital 
patients returned to the community, a team under my direction provided the Conditional 
Release Program for those patients as they adjusted to the community. 
SUBJECT: Review of the Federal Department of Justice Investigation of 
State Mental Health Hospitals. 
California 
• The California Psychological Association is aware of the longstanding bi-partisan 
legislative commitment to providing quality care to people in California's State 
Mental Hospitals. 
• Senator Chesbro and the Select Committee have played a leading role in trying to 
assure that people in the state hospitals are treated in a compassionate and safe 
environment. 
• CPA believes that the U.S. Department of Justice has provided an important public 
service in exposing and reporting on tragic lapses in the treatment of people who are 
committed to the state hospitals. 
Affiliated with California Chapters and the American Psychological Association 
• CPA has great concern that it took an outside agency to identify these problems 
which suggests a major breakdown of accountability has occurred within DMH. 
• CPA has great concern that whenever confronted with problems in the state 
hospitals, the Department responds that it can only provide the additional, needed 
services if it hires more, higher paid psychiatrists. 
• In fact, at the same time it is claimed more services are needed, it is extensively 
documented that DMH and state hospital psychiatrists have been blocking 
additional, needed services to patients by psychologists and nurse practitioners. 
• The State Legislature can take great credit for its early recognition in the 1990s that 
existing care in state hospitals was inadequate when it directed the state hospitals to 
start offering care as described by Sec. 1316.5 ofthe California Health and Safety 
Code. With the assistance of the legislature and the State Department of Health 
Services, CPA has been trying to move the Department of Mental Health to 
implement the law for nearly a decade. 
• The Department of Justice has determined that the Recovery Model of care must be 
provided by the DMH to improve the quality of care in the state hospitals for the 
mentally ill. 
• On its own initiative, DMH psychologists began training themselves in the 
Recovery Model in the early 1990s when the American Psychological Association 
identified it as an improved model of care based on advances in our understanding 
of serious mental illnesses. 
• CPA is pleased to provide the Select Committee with copies ofthe May, 2005, 
edition of the American Psychological Association's publication which describes an 
advanced Recovery Model and the latest best practices that will lead to improved 
outcomes for people with serious mental illnesses. 
### 
The California Psychological Association is a non-profit professional organization of 
nearly 4,000 members practicing in the state of California. California's psychologists 
currently work in state hospitals, private practice, government agencies, university and 
research settings, schools, community clinics, and businesses. 
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SECTION 5 
Public Testimony 
... 
Marilyn Gill 
4117 Palm Tree Ct. 
La Mesa,' CA 91941 
Senator Wesley Chesbro 
P.O. Box 942848 
Sacramento, CA 94248-0001 
Dear Senator Chesbro, 
October 3, 2005 
This letter is in response to your request for written testimony given at the recent 
Senate Hearing on the facilities caring for the Developmentally and Mentally Disabled 
folks who live there. Thank you for this opportunity to submit my personal story which I 
briefly spoke about at the Hearing. 
This is extremely painful to write about because recently even more people have 
become involved in this saga to their detriment as well as our son's. When I arrived 
home from Sacramento I had a call from one of the patients on my son's ward. Since 
there is a NO CONTACT Order in place I cannot call my son directly and have to rely on 
staff who call infrequently or other patients who can only leave a Collect Call name on 
my answering machine with no details. This is a huge disadvantage to both my son, 
S 2 1 and me because he is used to contacting me for his basic needs such as canteen 
money, batteries etc. 
There was an incident this week (due to the NO CONTACT) which was 
precipitated by 7 f, &· not having enough batteries for his walkman. He took batteries 
for his walkman from another patient. Please let me explain why batteries are so 
important. Day after day, week after week, month ......... patients who have been 
affected by overdrugging as my son has been get to do little but languish on their ward. 
As you will see in Dr. Bucke's story, that I have attached, patients are sometimes not 
ready for all the ''Treatment Programs" that the Team decides are "best" FOR 
EVERYONE. In case, he was doing much better when he first went to 
Atascadero last November. He was more able to communicate and interact with staff and 
peers. That was because he had been home with us for 3 weeks and was on his Equilib 
Nutrient Regimen along with lots ofTLC from his family and others. This Program 
enables one to eliminate the labels of Schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder, Tourettes, Autism 
and many other labels which could stem from real medical problems that have not been 
properly diagnosed and addressed as CCHR' s White Paper along with many other 
Scientific Papers verifiy. 
I have attached some information from the Nutrition Institute of America. It is 
known that drugs, even those prescribed, leach nutrients from one's body leaving it 
vulnerable to disease including manifestations of mental disorders and odd behaviors. It 
is now known that Zyprexa (which e t 1 was on) causes Diabetes, Risperdal (which 
is on) causes heart disorders, Clozaril causes Agranulocitosis - a life threatening 
1 
blood disease. His present doctor (who put him in restraints for not wanting to talk to 
him) wanted to put I j 1 3 on Clozaril as well. 
Based on this information I know that you can see how a person could have a lot 
of difficulty in the institutions which you are now learning are not running as well as they 
might. This is my son's situation. I want to be able to help make it work better than it is 
presently. I need your help. He is sometimes able to cope and often not. Hence, the 
insatiable need to "zone out" in order to maintain one's own emotional/mental 
equilibrium in the midst of daily institutional chaos. The walkman provides a link to all 
that was normal before the RETRAUMATIZATION of in and out of prison/hospital/jail 
etc (Systemically Caused Recidivism). 
This scenario would not be occurring had been 
honorable and NOT PUT 2 p back on extremely high doses of Depakote, against 
family wishes, which was the cause of his original MASSNE WITHDRAWAL that 
ended up in the ACCIDENT with me. If the hospital had allowed us to provide M f' Q 
with his Equilib Nutrient Program at our own expense or if objecting to this, some similar 
form of nutrient supplement, 1 f 1 would most likely be faring much better at this time 
(I have documentation to prove this). Other family members have also implored Hospital 
Administrators and Medical Professionals to allow their loved ones to receive Remedial 
Nutritional Supplements to help assuage the intense painful, adverse effects such 
as.Akathesia, Tardive Dykinesia etc. and ill health created by some of the Standard 
Forced Treatments such as psychotropics/neuroleptics/SSRI's. In fact, one caregiver 
removed these vitamins/nutrients from a patient's diet with the admonishment, "you look 
too healthy, you don't need them any more." 
So, you see, Senator Chesbro, if my son were doing really well he wouldn't be 
snagging other people's batteries or listening to his walkman incessantly. He would be 
doing what he did at home. He began to help me with little things like the dishes. He 
asked to go out for a drive/walk. He talked about getting a job and a car- all the things 
that he has missed for so long now. He was just a kid when I brought him to the psychs 
via the school he attended. We had such great insurance. It cost $30,000 for the first 
hospitalization (at age twelve and halt) in Alvarado Parkway Institute for Adolescents 
(which closed w/in 2 years because of mismanagement) where I f 1 &was restrained 
and held in seclusion for laughing at something his eight-year old roommate said to 
staff. I, along with countless other loved ones began this journey into Madness without 
the slightest understanding of where it would lead. 
Returning to this tale of unfortunate circumstances, the patient who attacked my 
son because he took his batteries is now being Forced Drugged (he was not previously on 
any medication to my knowledge and was not a bother to either staff or peers). Due to 
my son's immediate need for batteries (they don't have access to electrical outlets) and 
his not being able to meet these needs through communication with me -this man now 
has had a year added to his sentence and is on debilitating psychotropics and I have no 
knowledge of how this is going to affect m.y son. I feel very badly about this. It has 
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affected more t~an just the two people involved. Even the patients are upset at this 
outcome. 
This NO CONTACT is a violation of so-called System Values upholding Family 
Preservation. Mine is not the only situation where this kind of keeping-loved-ones-away 
-from-each other attitude prevails. It pervades the entire System. It is contrary to 
Recovery. It is detrimental to Society. It has no benefit to those involved who do not 
want it. I should be allowed contact with my ONLY SON who contrary to what parole 
and the psychs say DOES WANT TO COMMUNICATE WITH ME. He refuses visits 
out of fear ofhis Freedom being taken from him forever which he has been warned will 
happen if he Contacts me, his mother! He has been warned repeatedly that this could 
happen. Were I he, in his position, I would comply as well. 
Regrettably, we have a situation that from the outset was contrived for the benefit 
of everyone but our son and tills family. I am told that it is a public safetf issue. Well, 
FOR THREE MONTHS AND THREE WEEKS,-.WAS AT HOME WITH 
TIDS FAMILY AND IN THE COMMUNITY AND THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS. 
Why is this not taken into account? Why am I not allowed to VISIT my son in the ' 
hospital, in a heavily locked room, with two ARMED GUARDS and many more nearby? 
Why can I not call, write or send things to my son whose wellbeing is of great concern to 
me and my family? Why is psychiatry going along with Parole on issues of 
RECOVERY?. This is ANTITHETICAL. (Psychiatry promises wellness, freedom, help 
and normality and provides exactly the opposite). This liason with the Prison Industry 
has poisoned whatever semblance of sanity one could possibly hope for as evidenced by 
my son's and others' records. 
Speaking of records, we asked for these through an attorney after was 
Recertified for the MDO Program in Spring of2004. Miraculously, he suddenly 
Recovered and was no longer eligible for the MDO Program. His prescribed drugs 
were suddenly changed and eliminated along with this NEW DIAGNOSIS which 
indicated that he "wouldn't do well in a new social situation." So what did the 
ASH/Parole/CDC do? They "dumped him into Parole's lap" who stuck him about a mile 
away from home in a half-way house. I told the social worker to tell the doctor that this 
would not work for I f' a. I was right. He left the group home after one hour and no 
one knew where he was nor would his Parole Officer, call me back. They let 
him go and once again he was in withdrawal from 2000 mg of Depakote and 
Risperdal that had increased and decreased more than once in a 
month's time. I have pictures to show how toxic f t 1 was. I even have a video of 
how well 6 ; a was doing before the SWAT-like Team picked him up(June 2004) 
from our home at gunpoint. 
What I do know to be true, is that we are willing and able to take I f 1 home or 
even to live with family out of the country. We were never given the opportunity to 
really discuss options because we were prevented from seeing&S 1 1 when he was 
returned to Donovan Prison for my Parole Violation. The psychs at the prison decided he 
was off limits to us and his Lawyer. 
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We had a hospital for him to go to near San Diego. I had the letter of acceptance 
but I 7 3321 said that she checked with this hospital in Alpine and that 8 J ' was 
not eligible. 
Suffice it to say, the situation remains convoluted, an impossible construct that 
offers NO OPTIONS and much discussion on pseudo topics of Release and Recovery 
which can't materialize because of the collaboration between Law Enforcement and 
Medicine/Psychiatry keeping the patients and family members in LIMBO. 
My entire family and I are reaching out to anyone who can help change this now 
too-terribly-long (forensic) ordeal which continues to cost the State of California dearly 
as well as my son's health and the emotional well-being of this entire family who has 
been unnecessarily fragmented by the dictums of these Collaborating Official Agencies 
that seem to lack any understanding and empathy toward Conciliatory Measures which 
would lead to Family Recovery and Reunification. 
Respectfully Yours, 
Marilyn Gill 
Cc: Governor Arnold Schwarzennegger 
Thelton E. Henderson, US Magistrate 
Bill Lockyer, Office of Attorney General 
Jackie Cuncannon, US Dept. of Justice 
Jeff Griffm, CCHR 
David Oaks, MindFreedom USA 
Jeff Lustman, Esquire 
Jim Gottstein, Esquire 
Undisclosed Recipients. 
Enclosures.(~) 
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4117 Palm Tree Ct. 
La Mesa, CA 91941 
... 
March 25, 2005 
Ms Christine Moore 
Department of Corrections 
Region 11 Headquarters 
1515 Clay Street, lOth Floor 
Oakland, CA 94612 
Re: -----~~~-· 
Dear Ms Moore, 
Thank you for your letter dated February 23, 2005, in which you stated all the reasons 
that you feel our son should not be with me or with his family. Still, my family and I are 
requesting that Parole lift the NO CONTACT and NO VISIT ORDER in place now. 
Indeed, so many of the letters I receive from Institutions seem perfunctory and yours did 
not. Thank you for that. On the other hand, much of the information that is in our son's 
file was done in a perfunctory manner and some of it is actually inaccurate; The 
statements taken by the officer at the scene of the accident in June 2000 were incorrect. 
She has me confused with Ms Mendeville. Since I was unconscious I was unable to say 
much. Ms Mendeville was receiving medical treatment at the time and was not as 
coherent a witness as she might have been. She subsequently passed away due to her 
illness. 
Ms Moore, what happened was an accident which was exacerbated by withdrawal 
from psychiatric drugs •. I was never permitted to speak in court because when I went to 
mention this I was quickly sllenced by I jl b Public Defender, IE 1 Perhaps 
he knew something about the judge's mores that I did not know and was fearful that 
things would go worse for • 2 ' 
q 1 has been damaged by all the excessive drugging to counteract a drug problem 
which 0 £ ' 3 started to handle himself by taking responsibility for his own Recovery in 
Washington in January, 2000. This was blatantly thwarted by his Social Worker and 
Probation. By the beginning of2000 the withdrawal was starting again. Often this is 
what gets the label of"mental illness getting worse." The high profile cases and the 
parents who have testified before the FDA attest to this very fact. Hence, more BLACK 
BOX WARNINGS on drugs such as the ·one Sl t Q was prescribed in his teens -
SerentiL 
In the time that I £ ' has been incarcerated I have been learning about Recovery and 
how it is achieved. Many Psychiatric Survivors were informed they would always be 
'mentally ill' but actually recovered outside of the present mental health system with 
Alternative Therapies. I belong to MindFreedom which started thirty years ago and is 
recognized by the U.N. I work with Citizens' Commission on Human Rights and 
Criminon. I have been Certified by Narconon to do Narconon- The First Step. I am 
better trained and informed on what is specifically needed and wanted in Stephen's case. 
I also know better now how to help him heal from the trauma that he has created and 
endured. 
d j I 31 s files abound with discrepancies. We did not refute these because we, his 
family, have been waiting for the many Release Dates that never materialized. Mental 
health awaits the incarcerated (Mentally Disordered Offender) who are on medication or 
perhaps withdrawing from same and experiencing behaviors that only being on and 
coming off a prescription drug or combination thereof can produce. Isn't it sad that what 
can·be perceived by a layperson is so hard for some professionals to see? Medications 
and withdrawal can create an iatrogenic illness. Hence, much of the "mental illness" 
that professionals see in their clients is actually caused by the "cure." 
I am very concerned with our son's health and well-being which has been seriously 
compromised in the State's care. I ain angry that we were told that S t ' was to be 
released at the end of November 2004 and when we went to discuss Alpine Center as an 
option my husband and I were told by II 7 9 · 1 an that I p had, once 
again, been procured by Atascadero because of his 'mental condition.' · 
How fine and dandy it is for Donovan and Atascadero who have a "contract" with each 
other. Where does Family Preservation come into play? You mentioned that we did not 
do our part to get someone in to evaluateS 3 ' 5 for Alpine. Do you know how difficult 
it is to see a person in prison withdrawing from 2000 mg ofDepakote (which the 
prison doctor said they didn't use at Donovan because they don't think it's good)? That's 
great for them but not for our son who did not do well on it or coming off it unless he 
followed the Harvard Study Equllib Nutrient Protocol which we had been doing prior 
to sentencing in June 2001 when Stephen was at home with me without incident for , 
three months and when he was with us for the three weeks prior to the arrival of the 
SWAT-like Team at our door this past June, 2004. 
Ms Moore, if you are a mother then you will understand my plight. I did not know how 
the Systems worked until we had fumbled through each one. By that time it was too late 
' for our; son, ~ho has definitely been impaired by over-drugging and cold turkey 
withdrawing trom all drugs. to be easily extricated from this mess. 
In our visit with and -we were told we would have to speak to-
g 7 L b at Atascadero. When I calleJ I JJ 2 @ he told me that he was unable to 
help and that and Ei 7 I were the ones to talk to. 
Now you tell me, once again, that it is whom I must consult for redress in 
this matter of lifting the No Contact Order so that we, his family, can help Stephen 
SUCCEED at getting off Parole so that he can be one of the ten percent who are not "set 
up" for failure. These words came from Judge Exarhos' lips when he stated to our 
lawyers that "ninety percent of parolees are set up." 
Parole claims to work with us and ta1k with us. They claim to be "nice guys" but they 
don't want to be bothered with 0 £' Well, we do and we are. That is why I will 
continue to work to get him home so that he can be with other members of our family 
. because we now know what works and what was getting8? 1 1 healthy. Surely, you 
are not against this. You ta1k about safety but where is the safety in disintegrating 
families by overburdening them and their loved ones with rules and regulations they can 
neithet'understand nor easily follow without the assistance of those "in the know" such as 
the Parole Officer? Without good Notice and without a viable Plan our son was 
"dumped" per PO into their laps by Atascadero. Ultimately the communities you purport 
to protect fall apart as well. 
I could send you articles about prison conditions and excessive parole violations but I am 
sure you know what the Little Hoover Commission's report had to say about these things. 
So, when is the day coming that something different is to be done? When is the day 
coming that kids who are bright and on the wrong track get a real helping hand not 
handcuffs, solitary confinement, labels and prescribed drugs due to poor conditions as a 
way to "correct" their behavior? ' 
What happened between j and me was an ACCIDENT. I trippecfover hiS foot 
and his reactions were too slow/confused from Toxicity and Spontaneous Withdrawal 
from psychotropics to let go of me. I, being heavier thanQ f' a, fell to a cement floor 
with my son on top of me. My head hit the cement. I was unconscious due to the fall 
not because hit my head on the floor (not wall as report states). His actions after 
that were because of the withdrawal and not because of any intent to harm me. He didn't 
know what he was doing. He doesn't even remember what happened. He needed to 
DETOX. He did that in jail and that is why with the Harvard Study Eqyilib Nutrients he 
did so well with me at home for three months prior to sentencing in June. 2001. He was 
still recovering- he had Autistic-like symptoms but his demeanor was gentle and civll as 
it was before all the drugs. · 
I 2 ' subsequently bad "no signs of mental illness" per the Psych Eval in jail in 
June 2001 but BECAUSE OF HISTORY from Washington State he was prescribed 
20 mg. of Zmrexa immediately (which he took because he was so cooperative 
because of the Equilib Nutrient Program he'd been on for three months). This is in 
keeping with TMAP-TX Medical Algorithm Plan that has been implemented 
across the country in all Institutions and is now seriously in question for FRAUD in 
the Federal Court. 
~. 
I apologize for the length of this letter but it is hard to compile sixteen years into a few 
pages. My request of you, Ms Moore, is that you see what is actually happening here. 
As his parents we had to learn the.Systems. ByJbe time we learned, the damage was 
done. Then we figured out what to do about the damage and were beginning to have 
some success butt ' 's history trapped him. It was so extensive and the lack of 
real help so pervasive that W I got permanently caught up in a very serious 
business in the form of Social Services and Government Entities whose goal is to 
procure clients .... 
If Parole were inclined to work with families, as II 1 2 indicated to me, then he 
would have called me back, we would have met to discuss 1 { 's release with all its 
variables and we would have worked something out together. I am not an unreasonable 
person. This did not happen. Meeting with us after the fact did not help S 1 ' 1 . 
We want our son back with us. Please lift the No Contact Order against me which 
prohibits me from visiting f I even in the hospital. It seems that Parole is 
punishing me as well because I wanted to make sure my son was safe and not 
wandering the streets in a Depakote/Risperdol withdrawal stupor. No one listened to 
me. I said that I 1, IL would not do well with strangers (this is noted by• I · 
before Atascadero released I 1 I 1 suddenly after we requested his medical 
records). He will fall prey to those who are more street-wise than he and ifl tell that to 
someone who is not jaded by the criminality of society they will understand me. I am not 
trying to pamper our son- I am trying to help him heal That means that he needs some 
care at the outset that only family would be inclined to give. Why wouldn't Parole 
want to help us with this? It would save the State a great deal of money- over $125,000 
a vear. 
Thank you, Ms Moore, for your time and consideration of this matter. I am pleading with 
you as a mother, to please help me by lifting the No Contact and not setting I 1 5 
up again by putting him through the rigorous job of adhering to all the rules of 
Parole/Mental Health while physically/mentally impaired without assistance from those 
who love him most, his family. We are fully prepared to work with Parole if Parole will 
only allow us to do so by considering our input as much as they consider what has been 
incorrectly written in I f3 's file. - . 
Respectfully yours, 
Marilyn Gill and Family 
cc: Mr. Rodriguez 
September 20, 2005 - State Capitol Building -Room 4203 
Hello, my name is Ann Williams, and I am the mother oN••••• who has been in the Mental 
Health System over half of his life; 12 years of which have been at Napa State Hospital. He just 
turned 40 and looks like an old man. He is being drugged into a premature death. One doctor, who 
had his license suspended for sexual and drug or alcohol abuse before being hired by Napa State 
Hospital, told my son in response to._s request to be taken of a certain medication because it 
was making him feel weak "I have the right to put you on any GOD DAMN medication I 
want". When confronted with this, the doctor denied it. My son has been diagnosed ~ith 
a.n-;1 ~ l'..u~ o/~ 
hypothyroidism, diskenesia and parkinsonism; all caused by the drugs. After graduating from High 
/1 
School Curt went off to Marine Boot Camp, where he was discharged as emotionally immature; not 
"mentally ill'! On returning home his feelings of failure caused him to become despondent and 
subsequently he fell into a depression, but much worse than that, he fell into the "Snare" of the 
Mental Health System. I have tried to become I Js conservator and get him released from Napa 
State Hospital on several occasions only to find him over drugged when he arrived at the court house 
preventing him from making a sound statement in support of his case. (See similar instance on page 
18, last paragraph of the DOJ' s Report into Napa State Hospital). 
Yes, I am very angry at what the Mental Health System has done to my son and many .other 
people's loved ones, too, and I believe the Mental Health System should be held accountable for the 
damage inflicted upon them. The Department of Justice have completed their investigations into 
Metropolitan and Napa State Hospitals and their reports are unfavorable, which is no surprise to 
myself and many others. I have no doubt the Department of Justice will fmd much the same 
throughout the California Mental Health System. I believe Napa State Hospital is no worse than any of 
the other facilities my son has been in, and that is not meant to be a compliment, because believe you 
me, it could not get much worse as confirmed within the DOJ' s Report. The present System is not 
working and nobody is more aware of that fact than the "patients" themselves. After reading the 
Department of Justice's Investigation Report into Napa State Hospital it seems to me that the staff are 
completely oblivious to their instructions, which again is no surprise to me, because they have such 
unrewarding jobs to perform. 
Senator Chesbro, in your letter to me dated September 6, 2005, you asked ifl have any 
recommendations relative to improved quality of care for individuals residing at a state hospital. The 
answer to that question is a resounding YES! I recommend, as I did here on March 22, 2004, an 
alternative treatment plan to give our loved ones hope and their dignity back. A plan without labels, 
,. 
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for which there~ no scientific proof, which is the reason why many diagnoses are given by many 
different psychiatrists to one patient. A plan without so many unnecessary, convenient and costly 
psychotropic drugs, which have serious physical and emotional side effects, including suicidal and 
assaultive behavior. A plan with nutrients to replace/augment the psychotropic drugs for their physical 
and mental health. A plan with vocational training, college courses, farming and animal husbandry, 
whichever suits the individual's abilities to prepare them for their release back into society, as is done 
in the prisons. A plan with faith based programs, such as Chuck Colson's Prison Ministry, which I 
might add is very successful. Why, I ask, are these programs not in the California Mental Health 
System? I also believe that "patients" should exercise regularly and be encouraged to help others 
rather than focus on themselves. 
I truly believe that such a plan would be very cost effective and so successful benefitting many 
patients, and that is my dream. It would seem to many that my son is past being helped, but I am a 
woman of faith in God and believe with all my heart that the end of my son's story will be a good one. 
Thank you 
Ann P. Williams 
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INTROOUCTION 
The State of Cahtornia currently operates four State hospitals with a fifth to 
come on lineshortly. The four currently in operation are Metropolitan State Hospital in 
Norwalk, Patton State Hospital in Highland. Atascadero State Hospital in San Luis 
Obispo and Napa State Hospital in Napa. 
The fiscal year budget for the operation of these four institutions in the fiscal 
year 2002-03 was $141,000.00 per patient. The total number of patients housed in these 
institutions currently is 4,712. This is a total cost of$584,392,000.00 per year, 
extrapolating with no annual increase in 2003-04, 2004-05 or 2005-06. 
The aforementioned monies from the State coffers do not include almost 
$100,000,000 billed to the various counties ofthe State that have placed patients in these 
facilities as reported in 2001. That figure has certainly risen over the past four years, 
making our expenditures in the range of% of a billion dollars or more per year. 
The amount of land being used for these facilities totals over 1,192 acres, 162 
for Metropolitan, 140 for Patton, 700 for Atascadero, and 190 for Napa. It is estimated 
that the real estate value of this property could easily run in the multiple billions. 
Ostensibly, these facilities are operated to handle the "insane" and "criminally 
insane" under the auspices of the California Department of Mental Health. Referrals to 
these facilities come from the California Court system, whether civilly or criminally 
committed. 
These facilities do not handle anyone on a voluntary basis, and as a result of 
the commitment process, are essentially prison compounds, with sally ports for entering 
the facilities by vehicular traffic. Metropolitan does have one area that visitors can enter 
without going through a police inspection. (The people housed in this area are not 
criminally incarcerated, but civilly incarcerated and kept behind high fences with razor 
wire at the top.) 
Results 
What are we, the citizens, getting for our "investmenC of almost a billion dollars 
tax dollars each year? 
The United States Department of Justice, Civil rights Division, Special Litigation 
Section, announced in late June of2002. that it was investigating possible civil rights 
abuses at Metropolitan State Hospital. The Los Angeles Times reported in an article 
dated July 3, 2002, "The U. S. Department of Justice is investigating possible civil rights 
abuses at Metropolitan State Hospital in Norwalk, a sprawling facility that for years has 
been the subject of complaints about excessive use of restraints and drugs to control child 
and adult mental patients." (Italics added.) (See attached newspaper article for full story 
in appendix D) 
In May of 2003, the US DOJ sent a letter of fmdings and recommendations to 
then Governor Gray Davis and the California Department of Mental Health regarding the 
children's program at Metropolitan. (See Appendix A) 
In February of2004, the US DOJ sent a letter of findings and recommendations to 
Governor Schwarzenegger and the California DMH regarding the adult programs at 
Metropolitan. (See Appendix B) 
Also attached are newspaper articles that reflect that "business as usual" is still 
the norm at Metropolitan. (See Appendi.'< D) 
In January of2004, the US DOJ armounced an investigation into alleged civil 
rights abuses in Napa State Hospital. In June of2005, the US DOJ sent a letter of 
findings and recommendations to Governor Schwarzenegger and the California DMH 
regarding their investigation ofNapa State Hospital. (See Appendix C) 
In the same letter of findings of June 27, 2005, the DOJ made it public that it is 
also investigating Patton State Hospital and Atascadero State Hospital. It can be 
expected that the findings will be similar, if not worse, to those as found at Metropolitan 
and Napa. 
In addition to the drain of tax dollars to support this reported abuse. how many 
law suits will these US DOJ fmdings fuel? And at what cost to the already strained fiscal 
scene in California government? 
Summary 
In addition to the aforementioned costs, how many of the patients released by our 
State institutions are released back into society as productive, tax-paying citizens? How 
many are released into the Condition Release Program (CONREP) which is continuing 
their drain on the tax dollars via the Department of Mental Health? 
All ofthe patients in the forensic units, if they do get released, are released into 
CONREP as their first taste of outside life. These patients are then kept under close 
scrutiny by CONREP personnel in group homes scattered throughout the State, another 
cost. If they don't violate their conditional release over a period of as much as several 
years, then they might get back into society's mainstream and possibly go to work and 
pay taxes. 
Many end up as homeless on the streets of our cities at still yet another cost to 
taxpayers, because ofthe inability of the Department of Mental Health to properly treat 
and rehabilitate these people. 
Where is the positive return to taxpayers for the investment of billions of tax 
dollars, Federal, State and local? There doesn't appear to be one and the conclusion can 
be dravvn that our State Hospital system is a total failure and costing us way too much for 
nothing in return. 
If you look at the Department of Justice findings and recommendations you will 
find that it states that at Metropolitan State Hospital, "These deficiencies subject patients 
to treatment that: (a) prolongs their psychiatric distress ... (d) needlessly extends their 
institutionalization." (see page 7, Appendix B) 
It is costing the State $386 a day per patient. This comes to a potential waste of 
$1,814,200 each day when one considers that every patient has been detained longer than 
necessary. 
RESULTS OF "TREATMENT" 
United States Department of Justice Findings 
In June and July of 2002, the US Department of Justice began an investigation 
into possible wrongdoings at Metropolitan State Hospital. This investigation came as a 
result of the activity of a State agency, Patient Advocacy, Inc. Patient Advocacy, Inc. 
had uncovered what it deemed to be gross violations of patients' civil rights as 
guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States. 
The findings of the DOJ investigation of Metropolitan State Hospital were 
published in two separate letters sent to then Governor Gray Davis. The first, published 
in June of2003, was a scathing report of the fmdings in Metropolitan's children section. 
(See Appendix A) The second, published in March of2004, was a scathing report of the 
fmdings in Metropolitan's adult section. (See Appendix B) 
In July of2005, the DOJ published its findings from an investigation ofNapa 
State Hospital. This report was also a scathing report of conditions at Napa, but even 
more so, a scathing statement of the systemic problems in our State Department of 
Mental Health. (See Appendix C) 
Metropolitan Children Section 
The findings of the investigation of Metropolitan's children section found that the 
"psychiatric supports and services substantially depart from generally accepted 
professional standards of care and expose children and adolescents there to a significant 
risk of harm and to actual harm." (Italics added.) The report continued to elaborate on 
the substandard care by listing the many failures of the psychiatric support and services: 
1. "fails to provide clinically justified evaluations and diagnoses of psychiatric 
disorders: 
2. "fails to provide adequate and appropriate treatment planning; 
3. "fails to identify and address cognitive and academic deficits; 
4. "fails to prescribe clinically justified psychotropic mediations; 
5. "tails to assess appropriately the side effects of medications: 
6. "fails to provide an appropriate therapeutic environment." (See Appendix A. pg 3) 
The report further found that the "nursing services substantially depart from 
generally accepted professional standards of care and treatment and expose the children 
and adolescents there to a significant risk ofharm and actual harm." (Italics added.) The 
report then enumerated the failures of nursing and unit staff: 
I. "failure to identify, monitor and report patient's symptoms and side effects of 
medications; 
2. "unfamiliarity with mental health diagnoses, associated symptoms, and appropriate 
treatments and interventions; 
3. "ineffective participation in the treatment team process." (See Appendix A, pg 13-
4.) 
The case of A.M. is an example Citizens Commission on Human Rights found 
that substantiated the above findings by the DOJ. (Initials are applied to protect the 
identity of the minor patient.) A.M. is a teenager incarcerated at Metropolitan and her 
history of "treatment" is that of a plethora of drugs, a virtual cocktail of psychotropic and 
neuroleptic toxins. When her mother is allowed a home visit from her, A.M. has become 
an unmanageable young person that even her mother doesn't want to try to handle. The 
incarceration and effects of the psychiatric drugs have made her far worse than she ever 
was before entering Metro. 
As reported in the media, a little over two years after the DOJ findings were 
relea~ed on the children section of Metropolitan, five teens escaped from the compound 
and were not found after several weeks of searching. The logical assumption is that they 
have added to the homeless numbers on our streets in Los Angeles County. 
Metropolitan Adult Section 
The findings of the investigation of Metropolitan's adult section found that the 
treatment planning "substantially departs from generally accepted professional standards 
of care." (Italics added) The report stated that, "Metropolitan's treatment planning 
format does not recognize that adequate treatment planning is dependent upon a logical 
sequence: (Italics added.) 
1. "first and foremost, the formulation of an accurate diagnosis; 
2. "subsequently, the utilization of the diagnosis to identity the fundamental problems 
that are caused by the diagnosed illness: 
3. "the development of specific, measurable goals that are designed to ameliorate 
problems and promote functional independence; 
4. "interventions that will guide staff as they work towards those goals; 
5. "finally, ongoing assessment and, as warranted, revision of the plan." (See 
Appendix B, pg 3) 
The discharge planning process of Metropolitan's adult patients was found to fall 
well short of the normal standards of care. '"Consequently, patients are subjected to 
unnecessari(v extended hospitalizations, poor transitions, and a high likelihood of 
readmission, all ofwhich result in harm." (Italics added) (See Appendix B, pg 14.) 
It was documented that the psychiatrists at Metropolitan "failed to plan adequate 
and appropriate treatments" among other failings. "The resulted harm to the patients 
takes many forms, among them. inadequate and counterproductive treatment. serious 
physiological and other side effects from inappropriate and unnecessary medications and 
excessively long hospitalizations." (Italics added) (See Appendix B. pg 16-17.) 
Since the findings of the DOJ were released in February 2004, there have been 
five known unusual deaths of patients in the facility at Metropolitan. The first of these 
deaths was that of A.C., a patient whose family was trying to get him released to a less 
restrictive environment the week of the death. He apparently went to staff with a request 
for help as he was feeling depressed that morning and he was not properly attended to 
and hung himself on the ward. 
Another death occurred in June of 2005 and was that of an 18-year-old young 
woman, B.D., who had recently transferred from the children section of Metropolitan to 
the adult section. B.D. hung herself in the ward and was transferred to a local hospital 
and put on life support and lived on life support for six days before succumbing. She also 
had a history of being prescribed numerous psychotropic drugs. 
Still another death was that of a patient who had attempted suicide several times 
before succeeding in her actions. E.G. died in September 2005, at the same local hospital 
as BD, after being on life support for a few days. E.G, had set herself on fire twice 
before this year and had spent time in LAC USC hospital for burn treatment. 
Another patient, F.H., had joined E.G. in the previous two attempts at suicide by 
burning. E.G. had received massive dosages of neuroleptic and psychotropic drugs in the 
past 18 months. Her situation had been steadily deteriorating durin!; this time. She had 
been driven totally insane from the plethora of drugs administered in the guise of 
"treatment" at Metropolitan. She also had reported numerous attacks by other patients 
and staff, attacks which the staff have attempted to pooh-pooh and write off as self-
inflicted harm rather than brutality by staff and patients. Pictures exist of her lying on the 
asphalt beside a Metropolitan police automobile late at night in an unconscious state after 
being returned from the local hospital following an examination after one of the beatings 
she received. 
Reports of unsanitary conditions at Metropolitan have been consistently coming 
in to the Citizens Commission on Human Rights Los Angeles (CCHR) over the past year. 
These indicate that what the DOJ reported as smells of urine in the facility when they 
inspected in 2002 have not been corrected. Reports have come in on several occasions of 
no hot water available for days on end for bathing. Drinking fountains with the smell of 
urine are commonplace reports even now. 
Napa State Hospital 
The DOJ findings of their investigation ofNapa State hospital were prefaced with 
scathing statements of the California Department of Mental Health's attempt to block any 
attempt to enter the facility for an on-site look. In spite of the "stonewalling" by CDMH, 
the DOJ continued with its stated purpose of investigating Napa. 
The Department credited two government agencies, (one Federal and one State,) 
"professionals, advocates, family members of patients, and patients themselves" with 
granting of interviews or providing documentation of CRIP A violations. The letter to the 
State stated, "In doing so, we found evidence of significant and wide-ranging deficiencies 
in Napa's provision of care to its patients." (Italics added.) (See Appendix C, pg 2.) 
In telling the story of one death by suicide at Napa the DOJ stated that the 
incident "is emblematic of the systemic deficiencies" they discovered at Napa. This 
carne after the "dismissal of the consent decree in 1995" that was the culmination to an 
earlier US DOJ investigation into wrongdoings at the facility. (See Appendix C. pg 3.) 
The findings of the DOJ were numerous, "Information from multiple, creditable 
sources leads us to conclude that Napa fails to protect patients from harm and abuse." 
DOJ stated, "The harm suffered by Napa's patients is multifaceted, including: 
I. "physical injury by assault; 
2. "death by suicide due to inadequate suicide precautions; 
3. "excessive and inappropriate use of physical and chemical restraints and seclusion; 
4. "inadequate, ineffective, and counterproductive treatment; 
5. "exposure to unnecessary environmental hazards." (See Appendix C, pg 4.) 
The DOJ found that illegal drugs were available to patients as a result of the 
facility not following policy. "We have determined that patients have access to illegal 
drugs, including marijuana and cocaine, while residing at Napa." These illegal drugs are 
provided to the patients by staff in exchange for cash or sex, according to the DOJ. (See 
Appendix C, pg 7.) 
In the past year there have been several deaths reported to the DOJ by CCHR and 
verified by DOJ as deaths that should have been prevented. Their stories can be found in 
the DOJ fmdings letter. 
A patient has been reported for committing lewd sex acts on other patients within 
the facility. This report occurred this year and states that a woman patient is going after 
other women on the ward. The data indicates that staff is not protecting other women 
patients from this activity. 
A psychiatrist who was charged in the California court system of making a death 
threat to a former patient and recording the threat on the former patient's answering 
machine in the late 1990s was allowed by the Medical Board to work under probation for 
ten years. Napa hired this psychiatrist and he was discovered to be committing 
substandard care. He was asked to surrender his license earlier this year, but the fact 
remains that Napa paid him to work at the facility. 
The foregoing is only a part of the fmdings at the two State Hospitals with 
completed investigations thus far. In the report on Napa the DOJ stated that it is 
investigating the other two facilities, Patton and Atascadero. The expected result of these 
investigations can be reasonably assumed to be quite similar to the results of the previous 
investigations into Metropolitan and Napa. 
As an example of wh; this can be expected, two patients murdered one of their 
roommates on night of the 6 of September this year. The day before the murders, at 
Patton, a patient attacked another patient without any apparent provocation and caused a 
large amount of blood to be scattered over the scene. These are two examples of staff not 
protecting patients from harm at Patton. 
Additionally, a psychiatrist who is a convicted felon and who spent time in 
Federal Prison in California in the late 1990s, has been discovered to be currently 
licensed by the Medical Board and employed at Patton. This psychiatrist hac; the 
nickname from patients of"Dr. Death". This psychiatrist was forcibly removed from a 
ward just a couple of weeks ago by the Hospital Police. He had verbally attacked and 
was attempting to provoke a patient. After being removed from the ward, he returned 
later and wrote a prescription for extra drugs for the patient and ordered that the patient 
be put in restraints. Fortunately the staff on duty caught this and went above this 
psychiatrist's head to get the prescription changed and the restraint order cancelled. 
Metropolitan and at least one other State Hospital have instituted a "Mall 
Program" that is being touted as a solution to their prcolems. This program lets patients 
supposedly choose their '"treatment" activities to attend. Patients report it has not worked 
to rehabilitate them or prepare them to return to the outside world, but is just a 
continuance of the "treatment" being used prior to the DOJ entering the facility. Patients 
are so disillusioned with the '"treatment" at "mall" that they are refusing to attend. At 
Patton, when a patient refuses to attend he or she is placed in the "refusal room," a room 
formerly used for group meetings. When a patient tries to stay in bed and not attend, the 
staff physically remove the person from their bed and ifthe person resists, they then put 
in the seclusion room in 5-point restraints. Often this is in conjunction with a shot of a 
neuroleptic drug. The Mall program appears to be the only change in what is being done 
at Metropolitan as the patient abuse, deaths, and unsanitary conditions still exist and the 
deaths appear to have increased. 
Bill Silvas, who is retiring as director of Metropolitan at the end of Sept 2005, 
made the statement to Assemblyman Bermudez and the Director of CCHR LA when they 
visited together in late spring of 2004 after a patient's death, "But we have lots of 
[suicide] attempts." This was made after telling the visitors that this death in March was 
the first in 1 0 years. That being the case, matters are much worse than in 2002 when the 
DOJ first investigated as there have been five unusual deaths in the past 18 months. 
Dave Grazziani, Director ofNapa, (in responding to a CCHR investigator's 
request as to why the State was not allowing DOJ to enter Napa in its investigation,) 
wrote a statement that was tantamount to admitting that all of the State Hospitals are 
guilty of the same substandard care as Metropolitan. He said that the State was asking 
the DOJ to wait until all of the hospitals could put in the remedial actions required of 
Metropolitan. 
Enforced Drugging - Dangerous Consequences 
Jack Henry Abbott wrote in his book, In the Belly of the Beast, the following 
graphic words: "These drugs ... attack from so deep inside you, you cannot locate the 
source of the pain... The muscles of your jawbone go berserk, so that you bite the inside 
of your mouth and your jaw locks and the pain throbs. For hours every day this will 
occur. Your spinal column stiffens so that you can hardly move your head or your neck 
and sometimes your back bends like a bow and you cannot stand up ... You ache with 
restlessness, so you feel you have to walk, to pace ... in such wretched anxiety you are 
overwhelmed, because you cannot get relief." (The Real Crisis In Mental Health. A 
Report, Conclusions and Recommendations, by Rohit Adi, M.D., Mary Jo Pagel, M.D., 
Anthony P. Urbanek, M. D., Julian Whitaker, M. D., published - 2003, pg 32.) 
Whenever a "mental patient" commits an act of senseless violence, psychiatrists 
invariably blame the tragedy on the person's failure to continue his meds. Such incidents 
are used to justify mandated community treatment and involuntary commitment laws. 
However, statistics and facts show it is the psychiatric drugs themselves- including the 
newest neuroleptics or antipsychotics - that can create the very violence or mental 
incompetence they are prescribed to treat. (Ibid.) 
A 1985 investigation into a commonly prescribed tranquilizer, as reported in the 
American Journal of Psychiatry, found that 58% of the treated patients experienced 
serious "discontrol", i.e., violence and loss of control, compared to only 8% who were 
given a placebo. Episodes included "deep neck cuts," "arm and head banging," "threw 
chair at child," and "jumped in front of car." The patient who threw a chair at her child 
had no history of physical violence toward the child. The patient who cut her neck had 
no previous episodes of self-mutilation. (Ibid.) 
A 1990 study determined that 50% of all fights in a psychiatric ward were linked 
to neuroleptic drugs which induced a side etiect called akathesia. Patients in this study 
described that they experienced "violent urges to assault anyone near." (Ibid.) 
The FDA has now required of 10 ofthe major psychiatric drugs manufactured and 
sold in the United States that a "black box label" be used to warn people of the potential 
deadly side effects that may occur in users. These side effects include violent feelings as 
well as suicidal ideation. (See Appendix D.) 
This could well be the cause of the violent actions of patients on patients and 
patients on staff. A handling for some of this is given in the Handling section of this 
paper that follows. 
Media Response to DOJ Reports 
The response of the media to the findings of US DOJ investigations of the two 
hospitals so far reported is not favorable to the State of California. The State of 
California was portrayed as the black hat in a battle with the United States Department of 
Justice in many of the published articles about the fmdings on Napa 
Examples abound and several are attached to this document. (See Appendix D.) 
1. Los Angeles Times article of27 July 2005, "Hospital for Mentally Ill is 
Criticized." 
2. San Francisco Chronicle article of28 July 2005, "Mental Hospital Probe 
Shows Major Problems, Officials Accused of Stalling Napa Inquiry.'' 
3. AP Wire Service posting of28 July 2005, ""DOJ: Deficiencies Widespread at 
State Mental Hospital in Napa." 
4. Los Angeles Times article of 31 July 2005, "State Faults US Report on 2 
Mental Hospitals." 
5. Los Angeles Times article of3 August 2005, "Officials Bicker as Mentally Ill 
Wither." 
6. Los Angeles Times article of 10 August 2005, "Vacancies At Mental Hospitals 
a Disaster." 
That the investigations did not change the scene at Metropolitan and the other 
State Hospitals is evident in the media reports that are attached. (See Appendix D) 
7. Los Angeles Times article of 3 March 2004, "Patient Hangs Himself at Mental 
Hospital." 
8. Los Angeles Times article of 6 June 2005, "Troubles Continue at State Mental 
Hospital in Norwalk." 
9. Los Angeles Times article of9 September 2005, "Patients Held in Patton 
Death." 
The seventh article above was published only a week after the findings into adult 
section investigation of Metropolitan by DOJ were issued and almost a year after the 
children section findings were published. This is indicative of no change after almost a 
year of opportunity to put in proper corrective actions. 
The eighth article above tells of not only a suicide death at Metropolitan but the 
escape of five teens from the children section. Again, almost two years after the first 
published findings by the US DOJ. 
The ninth article listed above tells of another suicide attempt at Metropolitan. The 
patient died a few days after the article was printed. This is a couple of years after the 
first investigation findings were released. 
In one of the August articles written by Steve Lopez, he quotes the Director of the 
California Mental Health Department as saying that the Director has been aware of the 
"systemic problems" at the state Hospitals and has been "trying to clean them up" for 
over 10 years. An executive who admits to such ineptitude should probably be replaced 
by someone with the capabilities of making these facilities a true rehabilitative haven for 
our troubled people, not a tax drain on the taxpayers. 
Summary of Costs 
Based on the US DOJ fmdings that have been published to date, it would be safe 
to say that as a minimum the average incarceration at our four facilities is at least six 
months too long. In many instances it is years too long. 
Extrapolating from these data, it is costing the taxpayers of the State of California 
at least $331,091,500.00 more than we should have to expend to house and not 
rehabilitate our patients in the State hospital system. This is a very conservative estimate 
of our costs. This does include the projected loss of tax monies that would have been 
derived from a large producing group of people rehabilitated and earning money rather 
than taking money from the system. 
Suggested Handling or Solution 
Past Legislative Actions 
In the 1980s, the California legislature set up Chapter 208 of the Statutes of 1982. 
This was called the California Medical Evaluation Study and was carried out in 1983 and 
1984. The study was authorized by SB 929. The study was performed on 529 patients in 
the mental health system of California and reported in detail to the California Legislature 
as well as several scientific publications. The study team performed complete medical 
evaluations on these patients. 
In 1988, pursuant to Chapter 376 of the Statutes of 1988, (which was set up by 
Assembly Bill 1877,) a manual was prepared for the California Department ofMental 
Health and local mental health programs. This manual was the result ofthe work of Dr. 
Lorin Koran. MD, of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Stanford 
University Medical Center. This manual, Medical Evaluation Field Manual, was 
published in 1991. (See Appendix E.) 
Since that time it has collected dust, apparently on the shelves at the California 
Department of Mental Health, or in a file cabinet in some obscure office location. It has 
not been implemented for certain. 
Results of the Funded Study 
To quote Dr. Koran, "The most important findings ofthat study are: 
1. "Nearly two out of five patients had an active, important physical disease. 
2. "The mental health system had failed to detect these diseases in nearly half of the 
affected patiel!::S. 
3. "Of all of the patients examined, one in six had a physical disease that was related 
to his or her mental disorder, either causing or exacerbating that disorder. 
4. "The mental health system had failed to detect one in six physical diseases that 
were causing a patient's mental disorder. 
5. "The mental health system had failed to detect more than half of the physical 
diseases that were exacerbating a patient's mental disorder." (See page 3 of 
attached Medical Evaluation Field Manual in Appendix E.) 
The result of the above findings led Dr. Koran to produce the Medical Evaluation 
Field Manuel. In the acknowledgments to the manual he expresses appreciation to the 
two co-investigators ofthe SB 929 Study of 1983-4, Drs. Harold C. Sax and Keith I. 
Marton. In the introduction section of the manual Dr. Koran refers to the fact that many 
studies of this nature have been conducted in mental health settings. These studies 
reported that anywhere from 15% to 93% of mentally ill patients had a concomitant, 
active, important physical disease. 
Dr. Koran stated in the introduction to the manual, "These findings underscore the 
need to improve screening for physical disease among patients in California's public 
mental health system." He further pointed out that current methods of screening of 
patients is very limited and often don't detect important physical diseases and are not cost 
effective. 
Dr. Koran developed an algorithm, (a set of step-by-step instructions for solving a 
problem,) that uses a limited set of items from a patient's medical history, a blood 
pressure measurement and selected laboratory tests to detect physical disease. The use of 
this algorithm detected more physical diseases than the mental health programs had 
detected in the study patients. (See Appendix E, pg 4, 12-13.) 
This algorithm can be pertormed by staff in any mental health setting after "'very 
limited training." It can be done at a lower cost per diagnosed case than current 
screening tests. 
Summary 
Extrapolating costs of current "treatment" in our state facilities as done above, 
and adding the savings of treating a physical malady and thus restoring the mental health 
of a patient without extensive incarceration in a State hospital, the savings to taxpayers 
could reach into the billions of dollars over several years. 
Imagine having almost 40% of our patients healed and back out into the work 
force in a matter of weeks or maybe months instead of years. This would be a cost 
savings of at least $264,873,200.00 per year. This would be in addition to the $331 + 
million already pointed out. 
With the reports from the United States Department of Justice proving the abuse 
and substandard care in general, it is only a matter of time until some sharp thinking 
attorneys decide to take more money from our depleted coffers in the form of provable 
malfeasance on the part of state psychiatrists and facilities thus creating a large class 
action lawsuit that will gamer still more hundreds of millions of our stretched tax dollars. 
This is not fanciful conjecture but a probable reality. 
The State of California is already under threat of a federal lawsuit for violation of 
CRIP A laws in these four State Hospitals. This can be averted by an immediate drastic 
change is the administration and care of patients in these facilities. This is but a start at 
much needed reform. 
Proposed Laws to Implement a Handling 
For State Hospitals 
Add the following to Division 7. Mental Institutions, Chapter 2. State Hospitals 
for the Mentally Disordered, Article 2. Admissions. Section 7225: 
(a) All patients admitted to a state hospital shall, within 48 hours, be screened 
per the Medical Evaluation Field Manual compiled pursuant to Chapter 376 of the 
Statutes of 1988 and presented to the California Department of Mental Health in 
1991. This screening shall consist of the use of the algorithm given in this manual. 
(b) The forms as prepared in this manual shall be incorporated into this 
algorithmic use without change. These forms are as follows: SB 929 Standard 
Medical History Form comprised of 134 questions, Medical History Checklist, 
and SB 929 Physical Examination Record. 
(c) In addition to the forms used in (b) above, a urine sample and blood 
specimen shall be taken upon admission. The urine shall have three dipstick tests, for 
glucose, blood and protein. The blood specimen shall have a panel of tests that 
consist of: a hemacrit, white blood cell count, serum aspartate aminotransferase, 
serum alanine aminotransferase, serum albumin, serum calcium, serum sodium, 
serum potassium, serum cholesterol, serum triglycerides, serum T4, serum free T4 
and serum vitamin B12. 
(d) Those patients found to have a concomitant, active physical disease shall 
be treated for the physical disease before any psychiatric treatment or drugs may be 
administered, with the exception of any patient on a prescription drug before entering 
shall be continued without change on the current drug, until the physical element is 
determined and if found to exist, is handled. Upon full recovery ofthe physical 
disease, the person is to be released forthwith, or if a criminal institutionalization was 
ordered by the court, to be returned to the committing authority for placement in the 
proper jail or prison facility per their criminal conviction. 
(e) Violation ofthis section shall constitute a fine cf$5000.00 on the 
offending facility for the first offense and probation of six months for the violating 
physician by the California Medical Board; a second offense shall carry a fme of 
$25,000,00 on the offending facility and a suspension of license ofthe offending 
physician for a period of one year; a third offense shall carry a fine of $50,000.00 on 
the offending facility, revocation of license of the offending physician, and removal 
from post of the Director of the facility. 
For Licensed 5150 Facilities 
Add to Division 5. Community Mental Health Services, Part 1. Chapter2. Article 
1. Section 5151 the following: 
(To be added as the last sentence to paragraph 2 of this section) Such assessment 
shall be as follows: 
(a) All patients prior to admitting are to be screened per the Medical 
Evaluation Field Manual compiled pursuant to Chapter 376 of the Statutes of 1988 
and presented to the California Department of Mental Health in 1991. This screening 
shall consist of the use of the algorithm given in this manual. 
(b) The fomts as prepared in this manual shall be incorporated into this 
algorithmic use without change. These forms are as follows: SB 929 Standard 
Medical History Form comprised of 134 questions, Medical History Checklist, and 
SB 929 Physical Examination Record and are found on pages 35-43 of the 
Medical Evaluation Field Manual. 
(c) In addition to the forms used in (b) above, a urine sample and blood 
specimen shall be taken during screening. The urine shall have three dipstick tests, 
for glucose, blood and protein. The blood specimen shall have a panel of tests that 
consist of: a hemacrit, white blood cell count, serum aspartate aminotransferase, 
serum alanine aminotransferase, serum albumin, serum calcium, serum sodium, 
serum potassium, serum cholesterol, serum triglycerides, serum T4, serum free T4 
and serum vitamin B12. 
(d) Those patients found to have a concomitant, active physical disease shall 
be treated for the physical disease before any psychiatric treatment or drugs may be 
administered. Upon full recovery of the physical disease, the person is to be released 
forthwith. Violation of this section shall constitute a fine of $5000.00 on the 
offending facility for the first offense and probation of six months for the violating 
physician by the California Medical Board; a second offense shall carry a fine of 
$25,000,00 on the offending facility and a suspension oflicense of the offending 
physician for a period of one year; a third offense shall carry a fine of$50,000.00 on 
the offending facility plus revocation of licensure as a 5150 facility, and revocation of 
license of the offending physician. 
June Forbes 
Comments 
Select Committee on Developmental Disabilities and J\.fental Health 
State Senator Wesley Chesbro, Chair 
September 20, 2005 
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My name is June Forbes. My son has been a patient at Napa State Hospital for over a year, and 
attend a monthly support group for patients' families there. 
We know that terrible things do happen at the hospital. There are real problems there, as there 
are problems at any institution that has been starved of operating money for decades, if not for a 
century. Violence and abuses do happen. Seclusion and restraints are still used. And we grieve 
about them. 
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We also conclude, from our monthly meetings with senior and front-line staff, that senior 
administrators and many of the staff at all levels are doing their utmost to follow best practices in 
caregiving. They understand what works and what doesn't, what would constitute best practices 
in a humane, sustainable public mental health system. The challenge is to improve despite a 
serious staff shortage at the hospital. 
Thafs why we take Califomia Director of Mental Health Dr. Steve Mayberg's point when he 
says "We ... thought that we were being cooperative ... we have absolutely nothing to hide ... we're 
working to have the best patient care possible .... [but] these interviews and site 
investigations ... are very time-consuming and expensive, and we thought that limited resources 
really should be spent on patient care and changing our system, rather than litigation .. *' 
Patients' families bring up the evidence of the staff shortage at our meetings every month. 
• The hospital assures us that we're valued members of our families' treatment teams, but, 
even when we have important information for them, the doctors and nurses and social 
workers don't have time to take our phone calls or answer the messages we leave them. 
• ""'hen the patients we knmv have questions and concems, they're told to "tell your 
treatment team, or tell your social worker". But our relatives tell us, "I can't talk to them, 
they're too busy." 
• Patients we know have gone months without seeing a psychologist. 
• The psychiatric teclmicians and nurses we depend on to guide our relatives and keep 
them safe are either exhausted from working overtime, or they're temporary employees---
temps who float from unit to unit, not assigned to one place long enough to develop good 
judgment about individual patients or current circumstances. 
• Patients we know who have improved, who are progressing through the required steps 
toward discharge, are stymied and held back because there isn't enough staff to operate a 
unit at the level they're required to succeed at next. 
• The patients we know need things to do. 
Classes about the criminal justice system, group therapy for anger management and the 
like are well and good, but the attractive activities the hospital is justly proud of--- art 
and music, sports and education and work--- are only available to the few patients whose 
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brain function has improved enough to pem1it minimal supervision. And they're only 
available to any one patient for a few hours on week days, and not even then during 
quarterly "tip weeks", when no patient activities are scheduled. 
The rest of the weekdays, and every evening and weekend, are empty, without anything 
to distract the people we love from the mischief and even violence that inevitably spring 
from broken brains crowded together in idleness and captivity. 
These conditions exist because the hospital is understaffed, and the staff we have is under-
trained. If s understaffed for two reasons. 
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First, the hospital's salary and incentive structure, fails to attract and retain enough good people. 
People leave for better pay in places with a lower cost of living than the Napa valley. Their 
positions remain unfilled for months. Those who stay are working forced overtime, double shifts. 
Competent, dedicated, seasoned people refuse promotions to supervisory positions where they're 
desperately needed, because unit supervisors make less money for taking more responsibility. 
Second, the hospital isn't authorized enough staff to provide adequate coverage. Caseloads are 
too large. The overtime required to provide coverage at this staffing level bums people out. 
Coverage for employee sick and vacation leave and for training time is inadequate. Weekday, 
day shifts, when doctors and social workers are on the job, are only 45 of the hours in 168-hour 
weeks. The nights, the weekends the holidays, the quarterly "tip weeks" ---the majority of the 
time patients spend in the hospital---are when we're most likely to see unseasoned staff in charge 
of un-stabilized patients. 
Even when doctors and social workers are on the job, they have less and less time to spend with 
the patients who need attention, because they're kept so busy filling out forms for 
reviews, audits and this latest federal investigation, as well as reorganizing to implement the 
successive new models of care advocates demand. 
The staff is under-trained for two reasons. Coverage is so thin that people can't be relieved from 
patient care to attend training sessions. Turnover is so high that seasoned staff has little 
opportunity to train new people by mentoring them. 
So, We need your help. 
Please, authorize the budget it will take and \vTite whatever enabling legislation it \Viii take to 
accomplish four things. 
First, identify and correct environmental hazards to patients' safety---like unsafe grab bars, door 
closures and window bars. 
Second, procure needed technologies---like computers) drug detection machines and drug 
sniffing dogs. 
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Third, develop an adequate staff training system that will 
• Increase coverage so that staff can be relieved of patient care long enough to 
participate in regular trainings. 
• Allow for seeking out cutting-edge treatment techniques and hiring consultants to 
teach them to hospital staff. 
Finally, and most important, rationalize the hospital's employee compensation system so that it 
will attract and retain good people. The California Department of Personnel Administration and 
the State Personnel Board must be authorized to create a package of salaries, benefits and 
creative incentives and negotiate their implementation with all five employee unions (CAPT, 
ASCME, UAPD, CAUSE, SEIU). 
• Develop incentives to deliver more licensed staff to the hospital---incentives like 
paying off their student loans and increasing the number of stipends we pay to 
trainees in community college programs, and we need to contract with people who 
receive such incentives to stay and work at the hospital for some time. 
• Authorize adequate staffing. We need more psychiatrists, psychologists, social 
workers, licens~ nursing staff (psychiatric teclwicians and RN' s) supervisors and 
hospital policerand we need them to be trained and motivated to use best practices, 
and deliver them sensitively. 
Than.!( you. 
4 
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SECTION 6 
Senate Office of Research 
Summary 
Hearing on the Review of the Federal Department 
of Justice Investigation of California State 
Mental Health Hospitals 
Presentation by the Senate Office of Research 
September 20, 2005 
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) 
• CRIPA authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) to initiate civil 
actions against state or local governments for violations of civil rights of 
individuals residing in certain public institutions 
• USDOJ takes actions to remedy systemic problems related to a "pattern or 
practice" of violations 
CRIPA Process for Resolving Issues 
• At least forty-nine days before initiating a civil action, USDOJ must provide 
the state j local government with: 
... Findings related to alleged violations 
... Supporting facts 
... Recommended corrective measures 
• Vast majority of CRIPA investigations that find violations .result in voluntary 
or court-enforced settlements to correct the situation 
Recent USDOJ CRIPA Investigations of California State Mental Health 
Hospitals 
• Metropolitan State Hospital 
... Children's Program: Findings letter issued May 13, 2003 
... Adult Program: Findings letter issued February 19, 2004 
• Napa State Hospital 
... Findings letter issued June 27, 2005 
• Patton State Hospital 
... In progress 
• Atascadero State Hospital 
... In progress 
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Metropolitan State Hospital (MSH) Investigation: 
Children's Program 
• USDOJ visited MSH between June 24 and July 8, 2002 
• USDOJ investigation included: 
~ Review of medical and other records of about seventy patients 
~ Interviews with administrators and staff 
~ Speaking with patients 
~ On-site surveys 
• USDOJ brought in a team of experts in the following areas: 
~ Child psychiatry 
~ Child psychology 
~ Psychiatric nursing 
~ Special education 
MSH Findings: Children's Program 
(per USDOJ letter dated May 13, 2003) 
• Psychiatry 
~ MSH fails to provide clinically justified evaluations and diagnoses of 
psychiatric disorders 
~ MSH fails to provide adequate and appropriate treatment planning 
~ MSH fails to identify and address cognitive and academic deficits 
~ MSH fails to prescribe clinically justified psychotropic medications 
~ MSH fails to appropriately assess the side effects of medications 
~ MSH fails to provide an appropriate therapeutic environment 
• Nursing 
~ Nursing and unit staff fail to identify, monitor, and report patients' 
symptoms and side effects of medications 
~ Nursing and unit staff are unfamiliar with mental health diagnoses, 
associated symptoms, and appropriate treatments and interventions 
~ Nursing and unit staff lack knowledge regarding their patients 
~ Nursing and unit staff do not meaningfully participate in the treatment 
team process 
• Psychology 
~ Psychological evaluations are inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable 
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~ Active treatment interventions are too infrequent, are of inadequate 
quality, and are insufficiently documented 
~ MSH provides inadequate behavioral interventions 
• Use of Restraints, Seclusion, and "As-Needed" Medications 
~ Children are exposed to excessive use of seclusion, restraints, and/ or 
"as-needed" medications 
• Pharmacy 
~ MSH does not provide adequate pharmacy services 
• General Medical Care 
~ MSH fails to provide necessary medical care 
• Infection Control 
~ MSH does not complete systemic tracking or trending of infections or 
communicable diseases 
• Dental Services 
~ MSH does not ensure timely and appropriate dental care 
~ MSH does not provide complete documentation of services provided 
• Dietary 
~ MSH does not implement meaningful interventions to address children's 
weight problems 
• Placement in the Most Integrated Setting 
~ MSH fails to actively pursue the timely discharge of children to the most 
integrated, appropriate setting that is consistent with the child's needs 
• Special Education 
MSH does not provide specialized instruction and related services which 
are individually designed 
• Protection from Harm 
MSH has environmental hazards, including fixtures that patients could 
use to commit suicide 
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~ Incident management system is deficient 
• First Amendment and Due Process 
~ State constrained patients' constitutional rights to free speech and due 
process by denying patients the right to speak confidentially to staff from 
USDOJ 
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Metropolitan State Hospital (MSH) Investigation: 
Adult Program 
• USDOJ visited MSH between June 24 and July 8, 2002 
• USDOJ investigation included: 
~ Review of medical and other records of about 150 patients 
~ Interviews with administrators and staff 
~ Speaking with patients 
~ On-site surveys 
• USDOJ brought in a team of experts in the following areas: 
~ Psychiatry 
~ Psychology 
~ Psychiatric nursing 
~ Incident management 
~ Quality assurance 
MSH Findings: Adult Program 
(per USDOJ letter dated February 19, 2004) 
• Integrated Treatment Planning 
~ MSH does not provide a comprehensive, integrated plan for the provision 
of treatment addressing individual patient needs 
• Assessments 
~ Psychiatrists routinely diagnose their adult patients as having 
psychiatric disorders without clinical justification 
~ Psychological assessments and evaluations, with few exceptions, are 
inaccurate, incomplete, and uninformative 
~ Rehabilitation assessments typically fail to address patients' 
rehabilitation needs 
~ Most social history evaluations contained significant factual omissions, 
apparent errors, or unresolved internal inconsistencies 
• Discharge Planning and Placement in the Most Integrated Setting 
~ MSH fails to provide adequate, individualized discharge planning that is 
integrated in treatment decisions 
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• Specific Treatment Services 
... Psychiatrists fail to exercise adequate and appropriate medical 
management and appropriately monitor medication side effects 
... Psychological services frequently are incomplete, inaccurate, and 
outdated 
... Nursing staff fail to adequately monitor, document, and report patients' 
symptoms; document the administration of medications; provide a 
therapeutic environment; and participate in the treatment team process 
... Pharmacists do not systematically review patients' medication regimens 
... MSH fails to provide necessary medical care 
... MSH does not take appropriate interventions to minimize the risk of 
infections 
... Patients experience long delays in, or the complete absence of, dental 
treatment 
... Patients do not receive adequate physical and occupational therapy 
... Treatment plans do not address patients' weight problems 
• Documentation of Patient Progress 
... Psychiatrists do not chart their patients' progress with sufficient 
frequency 
... Substance of psychiatrists' progress notes are deficient 
• Use of Restraints, Seclusion, and "As-Needed" Medications 
... MSH exposes patients to excessive and unnecessarily restrictive 
interventions 
... MSH uses seclusion, restraints, and "as-needed" medications in the 
absence of adequate treatment and, in some instances, as punishment 
• Protection from Harm 
... MSH incident management system is deficient 
... Quality improvement activities were generally disjointed and inadequate 
... MSH fails to keep environment free of hazards, such as fixtures that 
patients could use to commit suicide 
... Treatment staff frequently rely on untrained security personnel in patient 
interventions 
• First Amendment and Due Process 
... State constrained patients' constitutional rights to free speech and due 
process by denying patients the right to speak confidentially to staff from 
USDOJ 
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Napa State Hospital (NSH) Investigation 
• In January 2004, USDOJ notified the state regarding its intent to 
investigate NSH 
• In its June 27, 2005, findings letter, USDOJ indicated that state officials 
declined to cooperate with the investigation and refused USDOJ access to 
NSH 
• USDOJ investigation included: 
... Review of on-site surveys conducted by the federal Centers for Medicaid 
and Medicare Services and the state Department of Health Services 
... Interviews with professionals, advocates, family members, and patients 
NSH Findings 
(per USDOJ letter dated June 27, 2005) 
• Protection from Harm 
... Staff often fail to intervene and/ or report patient-to-patient assaults; 
staff do not attempt to prevent repeated assaults by addressing the 
underlying behavior of the aggressors 
... NSH fails to remedy deficiencies in its suicide prevention practices 
... NSH fails to control traffic of harmful contraband, including illegal 
narcotics 
... Patients suffer harm from excessive and inappropriate use of physical 
and chemical restraints and seclusion 
... NSH fails to keep environment free of hazards, including fixtures that 
patients could use to commit suicide 
• Medical, Nursing, and Psychiatric Care 
... NSH does not provide adequate medical and nursing care 
... NSH fails to provide adequate occupational and physical therapy and 
nutritional supports and services 
• Psychology and Treatment Planning 
... NSH fails to provide adequate treatment planning 
... NSH fails to plan adequately to address patients' assaultive and self-
abusive behaviors 
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• Discharge Planning and Placement in the Most Integrated Setting 
.. NSH fails to place patients in the most integrated, appropriate setting 
consistent with the patient's needs and the terms of any court-ordered 
confinement 
Prepared by Agnes Lee 
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SECTION 7 
Report on Metropolitan 
State Hospital, May 13, 2003 
Report on Department of 
Mental Health Response, 
July 24, 2003 
The Honorable Gray Davis 
Governor of California 
State Capitol Building 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
May 13, 2003 
Re: Metropolitan State Hospital, Norwalk, California 
Dear Governor Davis: 
On March 21, 2002, we notified you that we were 
investigating conditions at Metropolitan State Hospital 
("Metropolitan"}, in Norwalk, California, pursuant to the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"}, 42 u.s.c. 
§ 1997. During the weeks of June 24 and July 8, 2002, we visited 
the facility. Our first tour, "Metropolitan I," focused on the 
care and treatment provided to the facility's child and 
adolescent patients, all of whom are in Metropolitan's Program 1. 
Our second tour, "Metropolitan II," addressed the care and 
treatment provided to the facility's adult patients. At exit 
interviews conducted at the end of each facility visit, we 
verbally conveyed our preliminary findings to counsel and 
facility officials. Consistent with the requirements of CRIPA, 
we are now writing to apprise you of our findings regarding the 
child and adolescent patients. We will transmit our findings 
regarding the facility's adult patients when our Metropolitan II 
investigation is complete. 
As a threshold matter, we wish to express our appreciation 
for the cooperation and assistance provided to us by the 
administrators and staff of Metropolitan. In particular, 
facility personnel cooperated fully with our document requests. 
We hope to continue to work with the State of California and 
officials at Metropolitan in a cooperative manner. 
We conducted our. investigation by reviewing medical and 
other records relating to tbe care· and treatment o~. approximately 
70 patients; interviewing administrators and staff; speaking with 
patients; and conducting on-site surveys of the facility. We 
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were assisted in this exercise by expert consultants in the 
fields of child psychiatry, child psychology, psychiatric 
nursing, and special education. 
At the time of our June 2002 visit, Metropolitan had a 
census of approximately 825 patients. Program 1, the hospital's 
Child and Adolescent Program, had a census of approximately 100 
patients. These patients, who range in ages from 11 to 17, 
suffer from serious mental health disorders and histories of 
severe traumatization. Many also have significant cognitive or 
academic impairments and/or health-related concerns. The 
majority also had an average of 10 to 12 failed out-of-home 
placements prior to their placement at Metropolitan. In many 
respects, these children and adolescents are the most 
psychiatrically and emotionally disturbed in the State's system 
of care. Because Metropolitan is the only public mental health 
institution for this population in the State, these children and 
adolescents are referred to Metropolitan by counties throughout 
the State of California. 
Residents of state-operated facilities have a right to live 
in reasonable safety and to receive adequate health care, along 
with habilitation to ensure their safety and freedom from 
unreasonable restraint, prevent regression and facilitate their 
ability to exercise their liberty interests. See Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Similar protections are accorded by 
federal statute. See, ~~ Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396; 42 C.F.R. Part 483 (Medicaid Program 
Provisions). The State also is obliged to provide services in 
the most integrated setting appropriate to individual residents' 
needs. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 
42 U.S.C. § 12132 et ~.; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (d); see Olmstead 
v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
It was apparent that many Metropolitan staff are highly 
dedicated individuals who are genuinely concerned for the well-
being of the persons in their care. Generally speaking, it 
appeared that staff promptly intervened to prevent or minimize 
injury after patients became physically aggressive. Further, 
Metropolitan repeatedly has demonstrated its proficiency in 
complying with many procedural aspects of care. Also, the 
facility commendably has initiated mechanisms to address some 
problematic aspects of its care, such as the use of restraints 
and seclusion. Nevertheless, there are significant and wide-
ranging deficiencies in patient care provided at Metropolitan. 
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Our Child and Adolescent Program findings, the facts supporting 
them, and the minimum remedial steps that we believe are 
necessary are set forth below. 
I. PSYCHIATRY 
Program l's psychiatric supports and services substantially 
depart from generally accepted professional standards of care and 
expose the children and adolescents there to a significant risk 
of harm and to actual harm. Specifically, Metropolitan fails to 
provide clinically justified evaluations and diagnoses of 
psychiatric disorders; fails to provide adequate and appropriate 
treatment planning; fails to identify and address cognitive and 
academic deficits; fails to prescribe clinically justified 
psychotropic medications; fails to assess appropriately the side 
effects of medications; and fails to provide an appropriate 
therapeutic environment. The harm to these children and 
adolescents takes many forms, among them, inadequate, ineffective 
and counterproductive treatment, exposure to inappropriate and 
unnecessary medications posing serious physiological and other 
side effects, and excessively long hospitalizations, which 
compound psychiatric distress. 
A. Psychiatric Evaluation and Diagnosis 
Each individual's psychiatric evaluation and diagnoses 
should be justified in a generally accepted professional manner. 
Specifically, there should be a close relationship amongst a 
patient's diagnoses, identified problems in the treatment plan, 
daily clinical descriptions by staff, and the medications 
administered. Program 1 does not meet these minimum standards of 
care. Psychiatric evaluations and diagnoses are woefully 
inadequate. Psychiatrists chronically diagnose patients with 
psychiatric disorders without any clinical justification or any 
documentation of signs or symptoms required for such diagnoses. 
The number of clinically unjustified diagnoses strongly indicates 
that psychiatrists deliberately make psychiatric diagnoses to 
justify the use of psychotropic medication. Indeed, multiple 
psychiatrists indicated to us that they have assigned psychiatric 
diagnoses for this reason. 
Not only do psychiatrists diagnose patients with disorders 
for which there is little or no clinical justification, they also 
routinely fail to diagnose patients with disorders for which 
patients do exhibit signs or symptoms. For example, abandonment 
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issues and past trauma are nearly universal problems for the 
patients in Program 1. However, psychiatrists frequently ignore 
these disorders in diagnosing patients. Consequently, these 
disorders often are not identified as a focus of treatment. Such 
missed diagnoses are a grave deficiency, because without proper 
evaluation and diagnosis, it is virtually impossible for patients 
to receive adequate treatment. Moreover, improper diagnosis and 
treatment affect opportunities for patients to be placed in the 
most integrated setting appropriate to meet their needs. 
The evaluations are also incomplete in that they routinely 
fail to include information about the patients' medication 
histories, medications at time of admission, recommended 
medication regimens to be utilized for treatment, or general 
medical diagnoses. This information is crucial in guiding 
treatment. In particular, existing medical problems should be a 
significant determinant when choosing a psychotropic medication 
regimen so as to avoid interactions and exacerbations of 
individuals' mental health or medical disorders. 
There were many examples of these diagnostic problems. For 
instance, one patient, D.S., 1 was placed upon admission on 
numerous medications, none of which corresponded with his 
diagnoses. Two other patients, B.S. and N.C., were diagnosed 
with Bipolar Disorder and Bipolar Disorder II Depressed with 
Psychotic Features, respectively. Both were prescribed 
medications appropriate to treat acute mania. Neither patient, 
however, had any documentation in their evaluation to support 
these diagnoses, nor did they have identified problems in their 
treatment plans consistent with these diagnoses. Moreover, 
N.C.'s symptoms were more consistent with post-traumatic stress 
disorder than the Bipolar diagnosis. E.Z.'s evaluation 
contained no information about the dosages of previously 
prescribed medications, how those medications affected his 
symptoms, or his current medication regimen. Further, Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) was not listed as an Axis I 
diagnosis to be ruled out despite the fact that E.Z. had a past 
diagnosis of ADHD and the evaluation stated that more information 
was required to confirm this diagnosis. The medical diagnosis of 
1In this letter, to protect patients' privacy, we identify 
patients by initials other than their own. We will separately 
transmit to the State a schedule cross referencing the initials 
with patient names. 
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asthma noted in his evaluation was also not listed under the Axis 
III diagnoses. Similarly, the psychiatrist for another patient, 
U.C., failed to assess the possibility of Traumatic Brain Injury 
or to diagnose her with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, despite 
her history of head trauma, prenatal exposure to drugs, sexual 
abuse, and neglect, including an incident resulting in her being 
seriously burned. Her evaluation also failed to list her past 
medication history or medications at the time of admission. 
Separately, Metropolitan's procedure calls for a preliminary 
psychiatric evaluation on the day of admission to Program 1 and a 
second evaluation once the patient is admitted to a specific 
unit. For several patients, including E.Z., B.P., L.M., X.N., 
C.H., Bc.O., J.U., B.H., and N.T., the information contained in 
the initial evaluation either was not included in, or conflicted 
with, the information contained in the second evaluation. This 
is of particular concern given that the evaluations were 
conducted within one or two days of each other. Contrary to 
generally accepted professional standards, there was no 
indication that the physicians who conducted these evaluations 
communicated about their significantly different findings. 
B. Treatment Planning 
According to generally accepted professional standards of 
care, treatment plans should be individualized and should, at a 
mlnlmum: (a) identify patients' diagnoses and symptoms; 
(b) provide interventions to address each diagnosed psychiatric 
disorder and the associated symptoms; (c) include medication 
plans; (d) provide interventions and treatments to address 
deficits in cognitive, academic and adaptive functioning, and 
address any other significant treatment or medical needs; 
(e) provide for monitoring of treatment efficacy; (f) provide for 
monitoring of medication side effects; (g) include plans to 
educate patients about their medications and other treatment 
interventions; and (h) identify the barriers to placement in the 
most integrated appropriate setting and the specific steps to 
overcome such barriers. Metropolitan's treatment plans often 
fail to include this information and are not updated on a timely 
basis. More fundamentally, because Metropolitan fails to 
evaluate or diagnose adequately its patients, it is nearly 
impossible for it to develop appropriate treatment plans. 
1. Diagnoses and Symptoms 
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It is a serious concern that many patients have psychiatric 
disorder diagnoses although their treatment plans did not 
identify any problems related to psychosis. Only one of two 
conclusions results from these practices: either the diagnoses 
are appropriate and treatment teams therefore fail to identify 
the symptoms of patients' most serious psychiatric disorders, or 
patients are not experiencing symptoms of psychiatric disorder 
diagnoses and thus the assigned diagnoses are unjustified. 
Neither possibility is clinically acceptable. 
2. Interventions 
We found that nearly every Program 1 treatment plan lists 
the same generic interventions. Treatment plans should be 
tailored to meet the individualized needs of the patients, and 
should take into account factors such as the patient's 
functioning level, cognitive level, history of trauma, and 
medical conditions. None of the plans that we reviewed were 
individualized or sufficiently detailed. Generic statements such 
as "chemotherapy" or "group therapy" do not offer the level of 
detail necessary to allow teams to provide adequate treatment. 
For instance, X.N.'s treatment plan consisted of general 
interventions: "chemotherapy, individual therapy, group therapy, 
recreational therapy, IT assignment, and special educational 
programs." The interventions listed for L.M. and N.Q. contained 
similar generic statements. 
Further, none of the plans that we reviewed included any 
treatment for, or acknowledgment of, the patients' severe 
traumatization and multiple out-of-home placements. The plans 
also provided no differentiation between major psychiatric and 
behavioral problems that were the reason for a patient's 
hospitalization and relatively trivial problems not requiring 
hospitalization (such as aches and pains) . 
The use of highly restrictive interventions, including the 
use of seclusion, restraints and/or as-needed (so-called pro re 
nata or "PRN") medication, should trigger a review of the 
effectiveness of a patient's treatment plan. Metropolitan, 
however, does not routinely review treatment plans based upon 
these events, thereby exposing patients to ongoing restrictive 
interventions and ineffective treatment. 
3. Cognitive, Academic and Adaptive Functioning 
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Psychiatrists must be aware of and take into account 
patients' cognitive, adaptive and academic levels of functioning 
to make accurate evaluations and diagnoses and for treatment to 
be appropriate and effective. A patient's cognitive abilities 
will influence significantly her response to Program 1's 
expectations and the appropriateness of her treatment plans and 
criteria for discharge. Her cognitive abilities also will affect 
her understanding of the medications that she is prescribed. 
Systematically, Metropolitan fails to identify and address 
patients' cognitive, adaptive and academic deficits. Of the 
patients reviewed who had significant cognitive and/or academic 
deficits listed in their charts, none had any remediation or 
accommodation for these deficits in their treatment plans. 
Treatment teams seemed unfamiliar with the results of such 
testing, and they did not express concern that cognitive or 
academic deficits were reported to have changed from one 90-day 
evaluation to the next. In many cases, the only reason such 
testing appeared to be performed was to determine supports and 
services needed for discharge placement; in particular, to 
determine whether the patient could be transferred into 
California's system of care for mentally retarded individuals. 
The following examples are representative of Program 1's 
failure to identify and address cognitive and academic deficits. 
First, K.N.'s diagnosis changed from "Rule Out Mental 
Retardation" in November 1998, to "Moderate Mental Retardation" 
in January 2001, to "Borderline Intellectual Functioning" in 
April 2002. No member of his treatment team could explain these 
changing diagnoses to us, nor did the team include the patient's 
cognitive/academic deficits as part of his treatment plan. 
Second, B.Q. had the diagnosis of "Mild Mental Retardation by 
history" on admission. This diagnosis was changed to "Borderline 
Intellectual Functioning" on her first 90-day evaluation without 
any new cognitive testing. Cognitive testing finally was 
performed over one year after admission for the purpose of 
determining discharge placement. The results of these tests were 
not available at the time of our tour, two months after testing 
had been completed. Third, D.S. was admitted with a cognitive 
disorder diagnosis. He, however, did not have cognitive testing 
until one and a half years after admission, at which time 
discharge was being considered. The fact that the results of 
D.S.'s test were in the mildly mentally retarded range did not 
result in any change in his treatment plan. 
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Program 1's practice is to review treatment plans at 90-day 
intervals, after an initial 14-day hospitalization. This 
excessively long time period between treatment team meetings does 
not comport with generally accepted professional standards of 
care, which call for such meetings at a minimum of every 4 weeks, 
and contributes to excessively long hospitalizations. The 
infrequency of treatment team meetings exposes patients to 
heightened psychiatric distress, both from long-term 
institutionalization and from potentially deleterious treatments, 
the effects of which the treatment team is not in a position to 
timely detect and correct. 
It is also critical that patients have genuine input into 
and understand their treatment plans and their implementation. 
Although Program 1 patients generally sign their treatment plans, 
there is no evidence that they have any meaningful input into, or 
agreement with, the plans. We observed treatment teams ignore 
significant self-initiated input from patients regarding their 
treatment during treatment team meetings. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that patients are educated about or understand the 
purposes of their prescribed medication, medication side effects, 
or the length of time it takes medication to take effect. As 
explained below at Section II, nursing and unit staff do not have 
the knowledge to assist the facility's children and adolescents 
in understanding these issues. As a result, medications 
sometimes are changed without clinical justification because 
patients report that the medications are not working, although 
the prescribed medications may not have had time to work. In 
these cases, no documentation was found in the patients' charts 
to show that staff had educated the patients about the time that 
needed to elapse before results could be expected. 
Finally, treatment plans do not reflect an interdisciplinary 
provision of services. In part this is because Metropolitan has 
not identified a team member to coordinate the interdisciplinary 
treatment process. As a result, no one is accountable or 
responsible for coordinating patients' overall treatment. No one 
ensures that treatment plans are developed and reviewed as 
necessary or that the various disciplines work together to 
develop and implement one coordinated, comprehensive plan. 
Similarly, communication and coordination among treatment team 
members and between treatment teams and the school is poor or 
non-existent. Staff whom we interviewed stated that various 
disciplines communicate informally. In any event, whatever 
communication takes place is not properly documented. 
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The care provided to F.Q. illustrates several unacceptable 
aspects of Program l's psychiatric evaluations, diagnoses, 
treatment planning, and treatment implementation. During or 
subsequent to a treatment team meeting for F.Q. that we attended, 
the team: (a) focused on whether she had a diagnosis of anorexia 
nervosa, notwithstanding that, given her excess weight, this 
diagnosis was not clinically possible, and that her desire to 
lose weight was reasonable; (b) failed to discuss a number of her 
psychiatric, Axis I, diagnoses or any specific symptoms 
supporting these diagnoses; (c) could not provide clinical data 
to support her diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder; (d) failed to 
identify or discuss her apparent sedation or Parkinsonian 
appearance, acknowledging that they had not evaluated her for 
side effects of medication; (e) failed to address her numerous 
self-initiated comments regarding her problems, needs and 
interests; (f) appeared unsurprised that she did not know the 
members of her treatment team; (g) acknowledged that they had no 
plans to evaluate her cognitive or academic functioning, despite 
the diagnosis of "Rule Out Borderline Intellectual Functioning"; 
and (h) could not explain the dramatic increase in her 
medication, conceding that a decrease in dosage may be indicated. 
Regrettably, from our observations, interviews, and document 
review, F.Q.'s treatment team meeting exemplifies the deficient 
treatment generally provided in Program 1. 
c. Psychotropic Medication 
The use of psychotropic medication always should be 
justified by the clinical needs of a patient. However, as 
previously explained, Program l's use of psychotropic medication 
rarely is justified in that patients frequently are medicated 
based upon clinically unjustified diagnoses. Documentation does 
not support the types of medications being prescribed, the doses 
prescribed, or either the extended lengths of time that 
medications are prescribed in some cases or the rapid change of 
medications in others. Rather, several of the psychiatrists' 
notes give the impression that there is little or no analysis 
conducted when choosing the patients' medication regimens. 
Furthermore, many patients are routinely prescribed 
inappropriate medications. Numerous patients, such as M.D. and 
N.H., were prescribed medications that are appropriate for 
chronically mentally ill adults, not children or adolescents. 
Psychiatrists also commonly prescribed older antipsychotic 
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medications, such as Thorazine and Haldol, as part of patients' 
regular medication regimens or as medication to be used as a PRN. 
In view of the fact that these older antipsychotic medications 
have a host of serious side effects that the newer atypical 
antipsychotic medications do not have, the use of these 
medications in an adolescent population is an outdated, 
potentially harmful, medication practice. Moreover, these 
medications were prescribed for at least 21 children and 
adolescents without any documented clinical justification. It 
appears that these medications are prescribed to control 
individuals' behaviors in lieu of an appropriate medication 
regimen and/or of therapeutic treatment interventions. 
Also, although modification of medications is appropriate at 
times, Metropolitan's psychiatrists often recommend medication 
changes frequently and abruptly without any documented rationale 
for the change. This practice is unsafe, given that such changes 
can exacerbate or precipitate an individual's symptoms. 
Further, it is generally accepted that, in most instances, 
psychotropic medication should be used to treat psychosis. When 
psychotropic medication is prescribed to treat symptoms other 
than psychosis, this practice should be documented clearly with a 
specific plan for minimizing the dosage and duration of the use 
of the medication. As indicated above, more than one Program 1 
psychiatrist acknowledged prescribing psychotropic medication to 
reduce aggression and agitation rather than to treat psychosis, 
and acknowledged manufacturing diagnoses to justify this 
practice. Assigning psychiatric diagnoses to patients who do not 
meet the diagnostic criteria for such diagnoses in order to 
justify the use of psychotropic medication is an unacceptable 
medical practice. 
Psychiatrists also prescribe medication for purposes that 
have no mention in current or past literature and for which their 
use has no.known pharmacological basis. This form of so-called 
"off-label" medication usage is considered speculatively 
experimental, should be practiced ethically only under the 
supervision of an institutional review board, and requires a 
patient's and/or guardian's clear consent. Program 1 does not 
meet any of these requirements. For example, a number of 
patients are prescribed Naltrexone, a psychotropic, to treat a 
host of different behavioral problems. Metropolitan's medical 
administration appeared unaware that this was occurring. 
Although documentation reflected that the off-label usage of this 
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medication was approved by the Pharmacy and Therapeutics ("P&T") 
Committee, there is no institutional review board to provide 
oversight, there is no experimental design to monitor this 
practice, and there has been no effort to obtain patients' and/or 
guardians' informed consent. 
Despite the fact that many of the medications that are 
prescribed for Program 1's children and adolescents have 
potentially serious, and often irreversible side effects, such as 
tardive dyskinesia, Metropolitan has no standardized instrument 
in place to assess regularly these side effects. Similarly, 
treatment plans do not include plans for monitoring potential 
side effects. Without objective measures in place to identify 
medication side effects at an early stage, Program 1's children 
and adolescents are at risk of developing potentially 
irreversible complications. 
When potential side effects of psychotropic medication are 
identified, Metropolitan's response is inadequate and 
inappropriate. For instance, E.Z.'s physical examination 
indicated that he had gynecomastia (development of prominent 
breast tissue in a male), a potential side effect of one of his 
medications. There was no indication, however, that this was 
ever addressed or evaluated further. Similarly, several 
individuals suffer constipation related to psychotic medication 
use. Rather than reassess the medications for these individuals, 
clinicians rely on the chronic administration of stool softeners 
and laxatives, an unacceptable medical practice for this 
population. 
D. Therapeutic Environment 
As part of its psychiatric treatment, generally accepted 
professional standards of care dictate that Program 1 should 
provide a therapeutic environment that minimizes the deleterious 
effects of institutionalization (namely, the compounding of 
childrens' and adolescents' psychiatric problems such that their 
developmental trajectory is further compromised) and is conducive 
to the treatment of severely psychiatrically disturbed and 
traumatized children and adolescents. In providing a therapeutic 
environment, there should be a structure comprised of community 
rules, meetings, and social interactions that help patients learn 
adaptive coping skills, improve self-esteem, and develop positive 
skills ("milieu structure"). The environment in Program 1 does 
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not meet any of these goals. Rather, Program 1 is characterized 
by a great shortage of staff-initiated, positive interactions. 
We saw few positive, spontaneous, therapeutic interactions 
in which staff initiated and facilitated a patient's expression 
of feelings, connected a patient's behavior with feelings, 
employed a "teachable moment" technique, or started a meaningful, 
positive staff-to-patient or patient-to-patient exchange. Staff 
typically failed to use natural social experiences, such as 
distribution of snacks, doing chores, or engaging in recreational 
activities, to promote positive social functioning. Rather, 
staff's interactions with the individuals on the units were 
mainly reactive and/or directive in nature, and at times resulted 
in power struggles with patients, exacerbating crisis situations. 
Similarly, we observed a lack of staff-facilitated, age 
appropriate patient-to-patient interactions. Patients appeared 
bored, over-medicated, ignored and/or upset. Program 1's failure 
to provide an appropriate health-promoting environment is 
unacceptable and does not meet generally accepted professional 
standards of care. 
Program 1's milieu structure is largely based upon a Point 
and Level system. Staff appear to believe that this system 
motivates patients to the extent that simply the interaction 
between patients and the system constitutes active milieu 
therapy. We found numerous serious deficiencies with this 
system. 
The Point system is a complex process that neither patients 
nor staff are likely to understand adequately. The system does 
not allow for consistent, accurate or individualized application 
of points across residential units and/or schools. Points are 
not distributed contingent upon the occurrence of behaviors, and 
they are not distributed frequently and immediately in 
association with those behaviors. Consequently, their intended 
therapeutic effect is negated. The number of points that 
students can earn at school - ten percent of their total daily 
points - significantly undervalues the educational portion of 
their lives. Most significantly, points are not utilized in a 
therapeutic way to connect a patient's behaviors with feelings or 
to identify more effective coping strategies. 
Similarly, the Level System is very complex. Children and 
adolescents who are severely mentally ill and traumatized, many 
of whom have cognitive impairments, are highly unlikely to 
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understand it. Procedures by which patients' levels are dropped 
or raised are not defined clearly. It is virtually certain that, 
in light of their histories of abuse and trauma, many Program 1 
patients will experience the system as arbitrary and punitive, 
thereby negating any therapeutic effect. The fact that this 
system is a key component to determining patients' attainment of 
discharge criteria makes it even more troubling. 
Program 1's physical environment is also deficient. Given 
Program l's population, the physical environment should, within 
the bounds of safety, promote privacy, individuality, creativity, 
and the opportunity for recreational activities to minimize the 
effects of institutionalization and promote positive social 
behavior. However, we found problems in all of these areas. 
As a primary matter, patients' rights to privacy and 
confidentiality are breached by the public distribution of 
medication and the posting of patient-specific information on 
publically visible boards. More broadly, recreational equipment 
was limited to televisions, damaged basketball nets, and often-
violent video games. The courtyards, which appear to be used 
rarely by patients, are in disrepair and poorly equipped. 
Although the facility has a fenced playing field, not once during 
our multiple trips around facility grounds during our two five-
day visits did we see any children or adolescents on it. 
Many of Program l's problems in providing adequate 
psychiatric services are the result of a lack of leadership and 
direction by psychiatrists and senior administration. There is 
no evidence of medical staff providing leadership in treatment 
teams or during periods in which patients are experiencing acute 
psychiatric distress. Indeed, there was scant acknowledgment, at 
leadership and administrative levels, that extended 
institutionalization frequently exacerbates existing psychiatric 
problems of children and adolescents. In important respects, the 
administration's focus lies elsewherei various Metropolitan 
documents identify the facility's "clients" as, not the children 
themselves, but rather the counties from which they come. 
II. NURSING 
Program l's nursing services substantially depart from 
generally accepted professional standards of care and treatment 
and expose the children and adolescents there to a significant 
risk of harm and actual harm. These deficits derive from nursing 
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and unit staff's: (a) failure to identify, monitor and report 
patients' symptoms and side effects of medications; 
(b) unfamiliarity with mental health diagnoses, associated 
symptoms, and appropriate treatments and interventions; (c) lack 
of knowledge regarding their patients; and (d) ineffective 
participation in the treatment team process. 
Many nursing and unit staff appear to lack adequate support, 
training and supervision. Metropolitan leadership does not 
encourage Program 1 nursing and unit staff to communicate with 
other team members to solve problems proactively. As a result, 
nursing and unit staff respond to patient needs in a largely 
reactive way. This, in turn, exposes Program 1's children and 
adolescents to excessive and inappropriate uses of medication; 
seclusion, and restraints; inadequate and ineffective therapeutic 
interventions; and unnecessary institutionalization. 
A. Monitoring and Reporting of Patients' Symptoms 
Generally accepted professional practice requires that 
patients' treatment plans identify the interventions and 
strategies to be utilized by nursing and unit staff to address 
the symptoms of patients' diagnoses, the symptoms to be 
monitored, and the frequency with which the symptoms are to be 
monitored. It is essential for nursing and unit staff to 
monitor, document and report patients' symptoms for the treatment 
team to determine if the implemented interventions are adequate 
or require modification. The psychiatrists who prescribe 
medications and the psychologists and social workers who oversee 
other therapeutic interventions rely on nursing and unit staff to 
collect and report this information. Nursing and other unit 
staff are on the unit 24-hours a day, seven days a week; they can 
and should record and report this information. Program 1 nursing 
and unit staff do not properly monitor, document and report such 
information. In part, this is because Program 1's treatment 
plans generally do not identify the symptoms to be monitored or 
the frequency with which staff should monitor them. 
Metropolitan does not appear to have a system in place to 
collect and analyze such information on a regular basis or to 
utilize such information in the reassessment and treatment plan 
rev1s1on process. Without objective measures in place to 
determine the effectiveness of the interventions being used, 
Program l's patients are likely to receive inappropriate and 
ineffective treatment interventions for long periods of time, and 
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to be exposed to excessive or inappropriate uses of medications, 
seclusion, and/or restraints. 
Staff who administer medication should know what the 
medication is for, know what results it is intended to achieve 
and when, and know the symptoms of the disorder that the 
medication is supposed to address. As a general matter, the 
Program 1 nurses are unfamiliar with the purposes of the 
medication they administer, and a number of nurses we interviewed 
were unable to identify the symptoms associated with the disorder 
for which a particular medication was prescribed. This lack of 
basic clinical knowledge contributes to nursing staff's failure 
to monitor and report patients' symptoms. 
B. Monitoring of Medication Side Effects 
Generally accepted professional practice requires that 
nursing staff monitor patients for potential side effects of 
medications. However, Metropolitan nursing staff responsible for 
the day-to-day care of patients do not monitor, document or 
report evidence of side effects on a regular basis. This is in 
part because, as stated above, treatment plans do not include 
plans for monitoring potential side effec~s. Even when nursing 
staff do identify patients who are experiencing side effects, 
they do not take adequate action to notify the prescribing 
physicians and to ensure that appropriate follow-up occurs. The 
charts of a number of patients included notes indicating that 
nursing staff had witnessed side effects such as drooling, but 
they failed to report this to the prescribing physician and/or 
document the symptom on a more formal basis, such as through 
standarized instruments that measure and record medication side 
effects. 
C. Participation in Treatment Team Process 
Nursing and unit staff consistently demonstrated a lack of 
knowledge regarding the therapeutic process. Many could not 
provide essential information about the individuals on their 
units such as the level of family involvement, issues being 
pursued in therapy, symptoms of Axis I disorders, reasons for 
medication changes, or options for discharge. Without nurses' 
knowledge of this crucial information, the units cannot function 
adequately as therapeutic environments. 
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It is generally accepted professional practice for nursing 
staff, as well as other staff who provide direct support to 
patients, to participate as active members of the treatment team. 
Because these staff work on a daily basis with the children and 
adolescents of Program 1, they likely know the patients best. 
However, Program 1 nursing and unit staff do not participate 
meaningfully in the treatment team process. Generally speaking, 
Program 1 nursing and unit staff do not appear to understand 
therapeutic tools or how to implement them. Nursing staff do not 
know the children's and adolescents' histories, especially the 
family histories, which is where mental health issues often 
start. Nurses do not appear to understand their role as 
psychiatric nurses. 
This lack of knowledge and skills places nurses and other 
unit staff at a disadvantage in the team process. Without 
adequate knowledge and skills, nursing and unit staff cannot 
contribute meaningfully to the development of treatment plans and 
interventions; cannot challenge other team members to consider 
alternative diagnoses, medications or interventions when those in 
place do not appear to be correct; cannot implement interventions 
effectively; and cannot provide a therapeutic milieu. This 
ultimately results in the children and adolescents of Program 1 
receiving inadequate treatment and care. 
III. PSYCHOLOGY 
Program 1's psychological services and behavioral 
interventions substantially depart from generally accepted 
professional standards of care and expose the children and 
adolescents of Program 1 to significant risk of harm and to 
actual harm. The deficiencies include inadequate clinical 
assessments; insufficient, inappropriate active treatment; and 
inadequate behavioral interventions. The harm to these children 
and adolescents takes many forms, among them, perpetuating their 
emotional behavioral difficulties; unnecessarily extending their 
stay in a highly restrictive setting; diminishing their sense of 
self worth; subjecting them to excessive use of seclusion, 
restraints, or sedating medications; fostering despair and 
hopelessness; and, in some cases, depriving them of physical 
safety. 
A. Psychological Evaluations 
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In attempting to determine the psychological problems and 
needs of children and adolescents, it is critical that 
psychologists and direct care staff observe and assess them on a 
regular basis. However, clinical staff infrequently observe and 
directly assess the children and adolescents in their care. 
Consequently, in making treatment decisions, clinicians fail to 
consider important aspects of both the patients' clinical status 
and their level of functioning. This deficiency is exacerbated 
by the lack of a hospital policy dictating when psychological 
evaluations are to be updated. 
Psychological evaluations should identify and address 
psychiatric issues when such issues are present. Program 1 
evaluations frequently fail to do so. For instance, although 
M.C.'s psychological evaluation on admission identified no 
psychiatric issues, he subsequently was psychiatrically diagnosed 
with Bipolar Disorder with Psychotic Features. Notwithstanding 
that psychiatric diagnosis, his psychological evaluation was not 
updated. Consequently, either M.C.'s psychiatric diagnosis was 
wrong or his psychological evaluation was significantly 
deficient. 
Similarly, as discussed in Section I, psychological 
evaluations should identify and address functional abilities. In 
this regard, uMental Retardation" and UBorderline Intellectual 
Functioning" are distinct categories of intellectual assessment 
that should trigger different treatment interventions. 
Metropolitan's psychological evaluations often do not recognize 
this distinction. For example, K.N. was admitted to Metropolitan 
with a diagnosis of uRule Out Mental Retardation," and shortly 
thereafter was assessed as having a full-scale IQ of 54 - well 
into the range of mental retardation. Nevertheless, without 
documented justification, his diagnosis was changed to 
uBorderline Intellectual Functioning." 
Psychological evaluations also must address relevant 
components of particular disorders, but Program l's evaluations 
frequently do not. For instance, O.N. was diagnosed with 
Autistic Disorder, but nowhere in his chart was it evident that 
his speech and language had been evaluated, notwithstanding that 
an understanding of an autistic patient's communication abilities 
is essential in shaping appropriate interventions. 
Questions generated in psychological evaluations should be 
answered, not left unresolved for extended periods of time. 
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Failure to address promptly questions fundamental to a correct 
psychological evaluation undercuts the evaluation's efficacy. 
Nevertheless, a Metropolitan psychologist informed us that it was 
not unusual for unresolved diagnoses (so-called "rule out 
diagnoses") to remain open for 10 to 12 months. For example, 
E.H. was admitted in April 1999 with "Rule Out Mild Mental 
Retardation." That unresolved diagnosis was in place when we 
toured the facility more than three years later. In fact, a 
number of patients went through their entire treatment regimen 
and were discharged with one or more unresolved diagnoses. This 
problem is exacerbated by nursing and unit staff's failure to 
monitor, document and report patients' symptoms as discussed 
above. 
The foregoing deficiencies signal that Program 1 treatment 
teams undervalue psychological evaluations. Evidence of this 
comes from various charts, such as S.N.'s and F.U.'s, that do not 
even contain a psychological evaluation. The evaluations 
apparently had been removed from the active charts in 
contravention of facility policy. Further evidence that the 
facility disregards the importance of psychological evaluations 
is its failure to use Spanish-language testing tools for patients 
whose primary language is Spanish. Metropolitan identified 11 
such patients at the time of our tour. 
These problems lead to inaccurate, incomplete, and 
unreliable evaluations, which in turn leave the appropriateness 
of the psychological interventions to chance. This is a 
substantial departure from generally accepted professional 
standards of care that subjects Program 1 patients to the risk of 
harm and actual harm, in the form of untreated psychological 
disorders and psychological disorders that are worsened through 
inappropriate treatment. 
B. Active Treatment 
Generally accepted professional standards of care call for 
evidence-based psychotherapeutic interventions, that is, 
interventions that are empirically supported as effective. 
Program 1 policy does not reflect such a standard. Instead, it 
unspecifically states that "[e]ach patient shall be provided with 
an individualized program of treatment activity which reflects 
the program's highest level of performance and the optimal level 
of patient participation." 
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In any event, activity logs indicate that a number of 
children and adolescents receive virtually no active treatment. 
That is, they have scant participation in individual and group 
therapy or in activities of leisure and recreation. 
Attendance records indicate that some children receive as 
little as one-half hour of individual therapy and 30 total hours 
of structured therapeutic activity, a month. One patient 
received no recorded therapeutic activities for a 12-day period, 
other than participation in 30-minute group meetings at which the 
patients' points for behavior, treatment and school participation 
are announced. Metropolitan staff could not identify any current 
active treatment for patient T.T.'s primary diagnosis of Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Further, although T.T. also carries a 
diagnosis of polysubstance abuse, she reportedly has attended a 
substance abuse group only once and apparently is receiving no 
other substance abuse interventions. Moreover, most patients we 
reviewed receive no family therapy, despite the fact that many 
have significant traumatic family histories. 
Further, as explained in Section I, above, there is little 
evidence of spontaneous, positive social interactions, especially 
interactions initiated by staff. There is also little evidence 
that the courtyards and free time are used constructively to 
enhance patients' lives. In summary, the amount of active 
treatment that Program 1 patients actually receive is alarmingly 
low. 
Separately, there are a number of concerns with the quality 
of individual and group therapy. To be effective, individual 
psychological therapy should be available to patients in their 
primary language. Moreover, Metropolitan is a provider of health 
and social services that receives federal financial assistance 
from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. As such, 
it is required to provide Limited English Proficient ("LEP") 
persons such language assistance as is necessary to afford them 
meaningful access to these services, free of charge. Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq.; 45 
C.F.R. § 80.3(b). See also Policy Guidance on the Prohibition 
Against National Origin Discrimination as It Affects Persons with 
Limited English Proficiency, 65 Fed. Reg. 52762 (Aug. 30, 
2000) ("Health and social service providers must take adequate 
steps to ensure that [LEP] persons receive the language 
assistance necessary to afford them meaningful access to their 
services, free of charge."); 28 C.F.R. § 42.405 (d) (1) ("Where a 
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significant number or proportion of the population eligible to be 
served or likely to be directly affected by a federally assisted 
program . . . needs service or information in a language other 
than English in order effectively to be informed of or to 
participate in the program, the recipient shall take reasonable 
steps, considering the scope of the program and the size and 
concentration of such population, to provide information in 
appropriate languages to such persons.") Notwithstanding these 
obligations, Metropolitan has a significant number of primarily 
Spanish-speaking patients, such as F.U., whose therapists do not 
speak Spanish. 
In any event, there is also little indication that the 
therapy sessions have an effective impact on individuals' 
outcomes. For example, inconsistent documentation indicates that 
J.U. received somewhere between 6 and 12 hours of individual 
therapy from February to May 2002. From late April to late May, 
she received five psychotropic PRNs and was placed in seclusion 
and/or restraints on 16 occasions. Similarly, T.T. received 
approximately 4~ hours of individual therapy from March to May 
2002. She received no family therapy despite her issues 
regarding family dysfunction and her family's active visitation. 
From early April to early May, she received 12 psychotropic PRNs 
and was placed in seclusion and/or restraints on 11 occasions. 
These examples reflect Metropolitan's failure to provide the 
necessary therapeutic interventions to treat appropriately and 
effectively the children and adolescents in its care. 
The group therapy provided at Metropolitan is inadequate. 
Only 9 of the 157 group therapy/activity protocols that we 
reviewed for Program 1 contained interventions or approaches that 
were empirically supported as effective. Groups are provided too 
infrequently and inconsistently. In particular, Metropolitan is 
not providing adequate substance abuse or medication groups --
critical groups for this population given that all of the 
patients are taking psychotropic medications and many have drug 
and alcohol issues. 
Further, the lack of clinical oversight of group therapy 
raises serious concerns. Generally accepted professional 
standards of care require that such oversight be provided to: 
(a) determine a patient's readiness to participate in a group; 
(b) identify the group(s) that will provide therapeutic value to 
the individual; and (c) follow the patient's progress in the 
group(s) and regularly re-assess the appropriateness of the 
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group(s) based on the patient's individualized needs. Program 
1's group therapy lacks any such clinical oversight, thereby 
exposing its patients to serious risk of harm. For example, many 
of the children and adolescents served by Program 1 have 
histories of being subjected to abuse. By placing these patients 
in groups in which subjects such as abuse are discussed prior to 
assessing their readiness to participate in such a group, 
Metropolitan is potentially re-traumatizing these children and 
adolescents. This is further exacerbated by making attendance at 
groups a requirement for earning points in the point system and 
ultimately for being considered for placement in a more 
integrated setting. 
The quality of milieu programs (which are programs 
applicable to all patients and are to help them learn adaptive 
coping skills, improve self-esteem, and develop positive skills) 
appears also to be inadequate, as evidenced by the number of 
patients, such as Ui.N., Bc.O., I.X., and D.C., who have opted to 
miss almost as much as a month of school, and the many patients 
who "refuse to participate" in group therapy, according to their 
charts. High rates of treatment refusal convey a message 
regarding the quality of the treatment and should trigger an 
urgent assessment of programming and/or the patient, but this 
does not occur at Program 1. Moreover, patients whose group 
therapy attendance qualifies them for desirable activities, such 
as weekly community outings, are sometimes told that they cannot 
participate in these activities because of staffing constraints, 
which diminishes whatever therapeutic effectiveness group 
programming might have. 
The efficacy of psychological treatments is further undercut 
by the use of excessive sedation for several Program 1 patients. 
During our tour, we frequently observed patients sleeping in day 
rooms during free time, sleeping in school classes, and sleeping 
during group activities. Many other patients were awake but 
showed signs of heavy sedation. Excessive sedation does not 
comport with generally accepted professional standards of care. 
Rather, it indicates inappropriate reliance on medication to 
manage patient behavior and restricts participation in treatment 
and educational programming. It also fosters a mentality that 
behavior cannot be internally and voluntarily controlled. 
Further, it prolongs patients' stay in a highly restrictive 
environment. 
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Independent of the quality of therapy, the documentation of 
individual and group therapy and group activities is 
fundamentally insufficient, stating neither the nature of the 
interventions employed nor the patients' responses. For example, 
documentation regarding I.X. is limited to general statements in 
the nursing notes, such as "has been ... attending group," and 
various lists of the groups in which I.X. has participated. 
Similarly, the notes for B.S. by the physician, social worker, 
and psychologist do not even mention group treatment, and the 
nurse's notes contain only general statements, such as "[p]atient 
participates in groups." Consequently, it is not possible to 
gauge accurately the efficacy of particular treatments or assess 
the patient's progress relative to those treatments. In 
addition, patients' records often indicated that individual 
therapy was provided when therapy progress notes did not. These 
discrepancies call into question the integrity of the 
documentation as well the actual provision of services. 
In any event, the dearth of effective active treatment 
interventions predictably contributes to poor patient progress in 
meeting treatment goals and discharge criteria. E.H. is 
illustrative. E.H. was admitted to the facility in April 1999. 
During our tour, personnel on his unit contemplated relaxing the 
standard discharge criteria, such that E.H. could be discharged 
if he maintained Level 3, the highest level of performance, for 
one month. Even this standard fails to recognize the 
ineffectiveness of E.H.'s treatments; in the more than three 
years that E.H. has resided at Metropolitan, this patient has 
achieved Level 3 one time. 
E.H. illustrates the predicament of many of Metropolitan's 
children and adolescents. The failure to reach benchmarks that 
Metropolitan has determined to be achievable for patients like 
him primarily reflects, not his personal failings, but rather the 
shortcomings of the treatments he receives; E.H. is not receiving 
treatments that will allow him to maintain Level 3 long enough to 
leave the facility. 
In summary, it is apparent that Program l's active treatment 
interventions are too infrequent, are of inadequate quality, and 
are insufficiently documented. These deficiencies result in 
unnecessarily extended hospital stays, and they likely exacerbate 
psychological symptoms and increase feelings of hopelessness and 
emotional distress. 
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C. Behavioral Interventions 
Behavioral intervention is a fundamental component of any 
appropriate treatment program for children and adolescents with 
emotional and behavioral disorders. Behavioral intervention 
occurs in milieu, or structural, context and on an individual 
level. In general terms, the objective of behavioral 
intervention is to facilitate other forms of treatment by 
controlling environmental conditions and shaping responses to 
environmental conditions. Shaping of responses occurs most 
typically through the consistent, comprehensible imposition of 
consequences that increase desirable behavior and decrease 
undesirable behavior. Virtually every aspect of Program 1's 
behavioral treatment programs is profoundly below generally 
accepted professional standards of care. 
1. Milieu Programs 
Generally accepted professional standards of care for 
behavioral programming call for the identification of specific, 
"operationally defined" "target" behaviors and the provision of 
consistent responses across settings to those behaviors. (In 
general terms, "operationally defined" means behaviors that are 
specified with particularity such that different observers can 
agree whether the behavior has occurred, and "target" behaviors 
means behaviors identified for treatment.) Behavioral 
programming that departs from these standards is virtually 
certain to fail and may exacerbate behavioral problems. 
Perhaps the most prominent aspect of Program 1's milieu 
programs is its Point and Level System, the deficiencies of which 
are discussed above, at Section I. Independent of the Point and 
Level System, target behaviors in Program 1 behavior programs 
were stated in vague terms. Many patients' behavior programs 
included one target behavior for the unit, addressed only in the 
unit, and a different target behavior for the school, addressed 
only in the school. Thus, contrary to generally accepted 
professional standards of care, Program 1 does not ensure that 
responses to targeted behaviors are consistent across 
environments. Further, in at least one unit, the treatment 
team's review of, and changes to, target behaviors were not 
documented. In this regard, there was no effective means of 
tracking patient progress relative to the targeted behavior. 
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These problems severely restrict any benefit of the milieu 
programs and serve to frustrate and confuse patients. 
2. Individual Behavioral Planning 
Generally speaking, individual behavioral assessment is the 
careful examination of patient behaviors and the settings and 
circumstances in which they occur for purposes of developing 
appropriate interventions for undesirable behaviors and 
reinforcing desirable behaviors. Under generally accepted 
professional standards of care, this assessment is done through a 
functional analysis or functional assessment, which determines 
the purpose of the behavior and helps identify appropriate 
replacement behaviors. · 
As an initial matter, it is not clear that psychologists are 
aware of relevant behavioral data, including episodes of 
seclusion and restraints, which is essential in developing 
appropriate behavior support. Facility chart "thinning" 
guidelines dictate that the most recent three months of clinical 
data must be kept in the active chart, but we reviewed active 
charts from which recent instances of seclusion and/or restraints 
had been removed. T.T. is an example. Data regarding 15 
episodes of seclusion or seclusion/restraints occurring in the 
three months just before our tour were "thinned" from T.T.'s 
active chart and placed in another chart intended to store dated 
information. Further, as indicated in Section II, Metropolitan 
does not have procedures in place to ensure that nursing and unit 
staff reliably monitor, document and report patients' symptoms 
and behaviors. 
Program 1 behavioral supports are prepared without an 
adequate analysis of undesirable behaviors. The individual 
behavior treatment plans for F.U., I.X., D.Q., and N.Q., were 
prepared without a functional analysis or assessment of the 
behaviors which the plans are to address. One unit psychologist 
acknowledged that he had received no training in conducting 
functional behavioral assessments and was not aware of any tools 
for performing such assessments. The psychologist on another 
unit stated that systematic tools for conducting functional 
assessments were not available in the hospital. 
The Program 1 individual behavior treatment plans are 
identified interchangeably as "special treatment plans" or 
"behavioral treatment plans." It appears that they are prepared 
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without adherence to specific criteria regarding methodologies or 
required components; the plans that we reviewed lack a common 
structure or approach. Their lack of functional analysis, of 
consistent, justifiable methodology, and of uniform components 
are shortcomings that significantly depart from generally 
accepted professional standards of care. 
Separately, the triggers for performing behavioral 
assessments are poorly conceived. Consequently, individual 
behavior treatment plans are developed too rarely. In this 
regard, generally accepted professional standards of care require 
a clearly defined behavioral response, such as a behavioral 
treatment plan, to repeated episodes of highly restrictive 
interventions. However, Metropolitan policy requires 
individualized behavioral treatment plans only after the use of 
one-to-one supervision for 72 hours, due to harmful, or 
potentially harmful, behaviors. 
Indeed, many patients are placed in seclusion and restraints 
repeatedly without triggering a behavioral assessment. Although 
T.T. was placed in seclusion and restraints 17 times over the 90-
day period reviewed, and was subjected to PRN psychotropic 
medications 13 times over the 85-day period reviewed, T.T. did 
not have an individual behavior treatment plan. An intervention, 
of sorts, had been in place, but that was limited to T.T. 
reporting hourly to the nursing staff and was terminated because 
T.T. reportedly was uncooperative. Similarly, O.I. had 19 
episodes of seclusion or restraints and 18 episodes of PRN 
medication in the period of slightly less than three months 
immediately preceding our Program 1 tour, but O.I. did not have 
an individual behavior treatment plan. Program 1 personnel 
indicated to us that, as a general matter, the decision to begin 
tracking individual behaviors was made informally. 
Further, when behavioral interventions were developed, in at 
least some cases they were prepared with inordinate delay. 
Ui.N.'s chart indicates that a functional analysis of U.N.'s 
behavior was conducted in July 2001, followed by behavior 
tracking in October 2001 and the development of a "Special 
Treatment Plan" dated May 7, 2002. This example highlights not 
only a significant delay in treatment, but also another serious, 
more fundamental problem, which is that the facility is 
lackadaisical in responding to children and adolescents who are 
in need of urgent care and for whom extended institutionalization 
itself causes harm, by compounding their psychiatric problems. 
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When developed, the behavioral interventions are deficient 
in nearly every significant respect. They: (a) frequently are 
not prepared based on a functional analysis of behaviors, as in 
the plans of I.X., D.Q., Bc.O. and N.Q.; (b) describe target 
behaviors too broadly for the behaviors to be identified and 
tracked consistently, as in the plans for Ui.N., I.X., D.Q. and 
N.Q.; (c) do not sufficiently prescribe which environmental and 
consequential factors should be altered, as in the plans for 
Ui.N., I.X., D.Q., Bc.O., F.N. and N.Q.; (d) are internally 
inconsistent, as in the plans for Ui.N. and I.X.; (e) lack a 
reliable method to insure integrity of implementation, as in the 
plans for Ui.N., I.X. and D.Q.; and (f) lack criteria for 
revision or termination, as in the plans for Ui.N., I.X., D.Q. 
and N.Q. 
Although Metropolitan has a Behavioral Treatment Review 
Committee charged with evaluating and approving behavioral 
treatments before they are implemented and with providing 
guidance to the psychologists preparing behavioral interventions, 
it is clear from the foregoing discussion that this committee is 
not functional. In fact, we could find no committee minutes for 
March and April 2002. The lack of quality control, guidance and 
leadership emanating from this committee conveys a message of 
indifference to the persons charged with providing adequate 
psychological care, indifference to the therapeutic importance of 
that care, and indifference to the children and adolescents who 
need but are not receiving adequate psychological care. That 
message of indifference contributes to the deficient 
psychological care at Program 1 and the resulting harm to its 
patients. 
D. Use of Seclusion, Restraints and "As-Needed" 
Medications 
Program l's use of seclusion, restraints and "as-needed" 
(also known as pro re nata or "PRN") medications substantially 
departs from generally accepted professional standards of care 
and exposes the children and adolescents there to excessive and 
unnecessary restrictive interventions. It is generally accepted 
professional practice that seclusion and restraints will only be 
used when a person is a danger to self or others and when all 
other less restrictive measures have been attempted but failed. 
It also is generally accepted professional practice that 
seclusion and restraints will not be used in the absence of 
treatment or as punishment and will be terminated as soon as the 
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person is no longer a danger to himself or others. Finally, 
according to generally accepted professional medication 
practices, PRN medications should be used for psychiatric 
purposes only as a short-term measure to relieve a patient in 
acute distress, not as means to escape mild, possibly healthy, 
discomfort or as a repeatedly deployed substitute for treatment 
of the patient's underlying condition. 
Metropolitan Program 1 staff use seclusion, restraints 
and/or PRN medications in the absence of adequate treatment 
and/or as punishment. Many episodes of seclusion, restraints 
and/or PRN medication use occur as a result of Program 1 patients 
exhibiting symptoms of their mental health disorders. Without 
the benefit of appropriate medication and therapeutic 
interventions, the children and adolescents are unable to control 
such symptoms. As a result of inadequate mental health 
treatment, children and adolescents are exposed to excessive use 
of seclusion, restraints, and/or PRN medications. 
Moreover, we found numerous incidents in which patients 
exhibited behaviors that initially were not a danger to 
themselves or others, but because nursing and unit staff 
exacerbated their behaviors, the patients were ultimately 
subjected to seclusion, restraints and/or PRN medications. 
Because many Program 1 staff are not skilled in de-escalating 
their patients' behaviors, and because the patients lack adequate 
behavior support plans, staff frequently engage in power 
struggles with the patients. The documentation that is intended 
to reflect the interventions that staff attempted to use before 
seclusion, restraints and/or PRN medications does not indicate 
that staff had attempted other, less restrictive interventions. 
Whenever a seclusion, restraint and/or PRN medication is 
used, it is generally accepted professional practice for the 
interdisciplinary team to reassess interventions and, as 
necessary, to modify the treatment plan to ensure that adequate 
proactive measures are identified and implemented. Frequent use 
of seclusion, restraints and/or PRN medications is an indicator 
that an individual's diagnosis is erroneous and/or that the 
treatment plan is inappropriate. Program 1 is failing to review 
patients' treatment plans after such episodes. There were 
numerous patient charts that, on one hand, identified frequent 
seclusion, restraint and/or PRN medication episodes but, on the 
other, contained no documentation that the team had reviewed the 
treatment plan or considered alternative interventions. For 
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example, J.U. was placed in seclusion and/or restraints on 19 
occasions between April 16 and June 17, 2002. O.I. was placed in 
seclusion and/or restraints on 20 occasions between April 4 and 
May 30, 2002. S.N. was placed in seclusion and/or restraints on 
18 occasions between April 2, 2002 and June 29, 2002. We found 
no evidence that any of these patients' treatment plans were 
reassessed or that other interventions were utilized before 
restraints. Moreover, staff frequently failed to document any 
information about the patients' status before, after or between 
episodes of seclusion, restraint and/or PRN medication use, 
making it difficult to improve the treatment plans. 
Although Program 1 has made efforts to address its high 
rates of seclusion and restraints, those rates remain excessive. 
According to Metropolitan's statistics, for the 85 days 
immediately preceding our tour, there were 359 episodes of 
seclusion, restraints, or seclusion and restraints. Metropolitan 
statistics indicate that the average Program 1 census during our 
tour was 96. Together, these figures yield 43.99 episodes per 
1,000 patient days, which is almost double the national aggregate 
data for adolescent psychiatric inpatient programs of 24.49 
episodes per 1,000 patient days. See Association of Maryland 
Hospitals & Health Systems' Quality Indicators Project (2000) at 
http://www.giproject.org/publicdata/psych/ (national comparative 
study) . 
Further, it appears that Metropolitan's statistics under-
report the actual amount of seclusion and restraints that is 
being used. A random check of "Seclusion/Restraint" forms (form 
MSH 1172) uncovered numerous instances of seclusion and 
restraints not included in the summary seclusion and restraints 
data that Metropolitan provided to us. Examples of seclusion and 
restraints not captured in this summary data include: 
(a) K.C. seclusion/restraints on 4/25/02, 18:05-
19:30; 
(b) K.S. seclusion/restraints on 4/28/02, 19:00-
20:30; 
(c) L.M. seclusion/restraints on 4/7/02, 14:20-
16:10; 
(d) P.B. seclusion/restraints on 4/13/02, 12:35-
13:30; 
(e) F.S. seclusion/restraints on 4/1/02, 15:15-
17:15; 
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(f) S.N. seclusion/restraints on 4/24/02, 15:15-
17:15; and 
(g) E.G. seclusion/restraints on 5/7/02, 9:05-
11:00. 
The excessive use of PRN medications is also of great 
concern. For the 85 days immediately preceding our tour, PRN 
medications were administered 392 times. Based on a census of 
96, this yields a rate of 48.04 episodes of PRN use per 1,000 
patient days, which is an excessive rate. 
There are numerous specific examples of excessive use of PRN 
psychotropic medications. U.C. received 20 PRN doses of Haldol 
between April 3 and June 16, 2002. Strikingly, 11 of these PRNs 
were administered by injection at U.C.'s request because "it was 
faster." Ub.N. received 22 psychotropic medication PRNs from 
April 6 to June 23, 2002, ten by injection. More than half of 
the PRNs were Haldol and Thorazine. Over approximately the same 
two month period, at least nine other individuals received 
between seven and 15 antipsychotic PRNs each. Many of these PRNs 
were for Haldol or Thorazine and/or were administered by 
injection. 
The documentation indicates that patients frequently request 
and receive PRN medications when they are feeling "anxious." The 
facility appears to permit the use of PRN medications as a 
substitute for sound therapeutic intervention, thereby 
contributing to patients' medication dependency and dysfunction. 
In our review of charts of patients requesting PRNs, there was 
little indication that patients were provided proactive, 
supportive interventions before or after the administration of 
these medications. It does not appear that staff use such 
opportunities to teach children and adolescents the coping skills 
necessary to live independently in the community. Moreover, as 
discussed in Section I above, the use of the older antipsychotic 
medications raises a host of other serious risks to these 
patients' health. 
IV. PHARMACY 
It is standard practice for pharmacists to review individual 
patient's medication regimens. Such a review should encompass 
all of the medications prescribed (not just psychiatric drugs and 
PRN medications) and should include documentation of any 
communication between the pharmacists and physicians regarding 
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concerns, potential medication interactions, and the need for 
laboratory testing. Pharmacists, by the nature of their 
education and licensure, are the facility's experts regarding 
medications and medication interactions and share responsibility 
with physicians regarding medication decisions. We found no 
evidence that Metropolitan pharmacists perform these crucial 
roles. This is particularly troubling given the outdated and 
unjustified combinations of medications that are prescribed for 
these children and adolescents. By not providing adequate 
pharmacy services, Metropolitan places Program 1 patients at risk 
for the misuse of medication, unnecessary side effects from 
medication, potential drug interactions, general health problems, 
and excessively long hospitalizations. 
V. GENERAL MEDICAL CARE 
There are numerous instances in which Metropolitan fails to 
provide necessary medical care to the children and adolescents in 
Program 1. A number of children, including U.C., E.Z., S.K., 
C.H., Ui.N. and T.T., waited one to two months for an evaluation 
after complaining of vision problems and an additional one to 
three months to receive their glasses. U.C. experienced 
nighttime incontinence and received 15 doses of Motrin over two 
months for headaches. Neither problem was evaluated. The 
results of an x-ray for E.Z. were not noted by his physician for 
over one month. Similarly, C.H.'s physician did not initial his 
x-ray for more than two months. 
VI. INFECTION CONTROL 
In an institutional setting such as Metropolitan, it is 
standard practice for infections and communicable diseases to be 
tracked and trended. When analysis of trends reveals potential 
problems, it is standard practice for corrective action plans to 
be developed and implemented. Metropolitan has two infection 
control nurses on staff, but they only monitor individual patient 
infections. Metropolitan completes no systemic tracking or 
trending of infections or communicable diseases in Program 1 or 
throughout the hospital. As a result, Metropolitan's patients 
are at increased risk for infections and/or communicable 
diseases. Because no tracking or trending information was 
available for our review, it was impossible to determine if such 
infections had occurred or diseases had been allowed to spread 
without the benefit of corrective action plans. 
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VII. DENTAL SERVICES 
Generally accepted professional standards of care require 
that dental care and treatment be provided in a timely manner. 
Program 1 patients, however, experience delays of several months 
in rece1v1ng needed dental care and treatment or do not receive 
treatment at all. This problem was noted in the April and May 
2002 minutes of Metropolitan's CNS/NC Committee, which stated 
that individuals were not seen by a dentist in a timely manner 
and the "backlog" of dental patients required attention. At the 
time of our tour, the dentist assigned to Program 1 was on 
extended leave and the dentist for Metropolitan's adult 
population, an additional 800 or so individuals, was covering the 
Program 1 caseload. This coverage is insufficient to ensure 
timely and appropriate dental care. Even when Program 1 patients 
do receive dental services, documentation of these services is 
grossly incomplete, often failing to indicate the individual's 
current dental status and leaving numerous sections of the 
evaluation blank. 
VIII. DIETARY 
Program 1's dietary services substantially depart from 
generally accepted professional standards of care and expose the 
children and adolescents there to significant risk of harm. The 
facility's dietician estimated that eighty percent of Program 1's 
patients are obese, an estimate consistent with our own 
observations and review of patient records. Many of the 
medications these children and adolescents receive exacerbate 
weight problems. These patients' obesity, which is very severe 
in several cases, places them at increased risk for physical 
health problems, such as high blood pressure, and other 
deleterious effects, such as decreased self-esteem, that worsen 
existing mental health problems. Notwithstanding these 
significant consequences, virtually every one of the several 
nutritional evaluations that we reviewed indicated that the 
facility was not pursuing dietary interventions because the 
patient "refused [a] weight reduction program" that consisted 
almost entirely of receiving a smaller portion of the same meals 
served to other patients. We found no evidence that the facility 
was actively promoting viable alternative interventions to 
address patients' severe weight problems. Our record review of 
Program 1's exercise group, for instance, indicated that the 
group rarely met. Whether or not these children and adolescents 
arrived at Metropolitan greatly overweight, the facility is not 
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implementing meaningful interventions to address their serious 
weight problems or related self-esteem issues. 
IX. PLACEMENT IN THE MOST INTEGRATED SETTING 
Generally accepted professional standards of care and 
federal law require that treatment teams, with the leadership of 
psychiatrists and the support of the hospital administration, 
actively pursue the timely discharge to the most integrated, 
appropriate setting that is consistent with patients' needs. In 
this regard, factors that contributed to previous unsuccessful 
placements should be identified and addressed. Program 1's 
discharge planning process fails to meet these standards of care. 
Consequently, the process results in unnecessarily extended 
hospitalizations, poor transitions, and a high likelihood of 
readmission, all of which result in harm to Program 1's children 
and adolescents. 
The excessive length of numerous patients' hospitalizations 
is alarming. As of the week of our visit, the average length of 
stay was reported to be 350 days, with 30 percent of the current 
patients having been at Program 1 more than one year and 14 
percent more than two years. Staff appear to take little 
responsibility for the discharge process, stating that 
excessively long stays are unavoidable. Despite the fact that 
some children and adolescents remain at Program 1 for years, 
Program 1 has not developed any mechanism to identify and review 
those patients having extremely lengthy hospitalizations. Given 
that there is no mechanism to identify patients who are stalled 
in their discharge implementation, senior administration seems to 
have no understanding that children and adolescents remaining 
institutionalized for years constitute a systemic crisis, nor do 
they demonstrate any influence over this process. 
Metropolitan's discharge criteria and the portions of 
treatment plans addressing discharge are also inappropriate and 
contribute to patients' lengthy hospitalizations. Plans fail to 
identify clearly the barriers to discharge to the most integrated 
setting, and the actions that staff and/or the patient needs to 
take to overcome these barriers. Plans also do not contain 
measurable action steps, persons responsible for discharge steps, 
and time frames for the completion of those steps. 
Further, discharge criteria in the majority of cases are 
identical. Most patients are required to maintain nearly 100 
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percent compliance with most aspects of Program 1 rules and to 
maintain discharge criteria for 90 days prior to the facility 
seeking a placement. Thus, even after the point at which an 
individual achieves discharge criteria, he or she is typically 
not discharged for many months. For instance, Ui.N.'s April 2002 
treatment plan stated that he had met discharge criteria, but his 
estimated discharge date read "three to six months." The fact 
that discharge plans routinely have broad estimated time frames 
for discharge rather than a specific date as the estimated date 
of discharge favors such easily extendable discharge dates. 
As a general matter, Metropolitan's approach to the 
discharge process is passive, as illustrated by the case of N.Q. 
This patient had met all of the facility's discharge criteria. 
Nevertheless, he remained there because his receiving program 
would not accept him without an updated audiological evaluation, 
and Metropolitan had not scheduled one. Moreover, discharge 
summaries for a number of patients included no appointments for 
follow-up care. Failure to ensure follow-up care places these 
children and adolescents at marked risk of re-hospitalization. 
Metropolitan's shortcomings regarding N.E. illustrate many 
of these problems. Despite the fact that she met discharge 
criteria for 90 days, that her family was willing to care for 
her, and that a court, at N.E.'s insistence, ordered her 
discharged, the treatment team was so entrenched in their view of 
discharge planning that they discharged her "against medical 
orders" to her family, because they wanted her sent, instead, to 
a group home. The discharge form indicated that N.E. was 
frustrated over the period of time she had waited to be 
discharged, stating "you guys won't do anything so I have to." 
Indeed, many aspects of Metropolitan's approach to discharge 
planning reflect an attitude that the children, and not the 
facility, bear responsibility for improving their health. 
In part, the problems with the discharge process are due to 
the diffusion of authority and responsibility for the provision 
of discharge services between the facility and California 
counties; the facility typically determines.when a patient is 
ready for discharge and recommends a setting for placement, but 
the resident's county of origin determines the actual placement 
setting. Also, social workers, who are required to organize the 
discharge process with little administrative support from 
Metropolitan, have a limited ability to influence many of the 
decisions regarding placement. Discharge planning, however, 
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cannot be disconnected from treatment and based solely upon 
funding and resource availability. One social worker expressly 
stated to us that these factors posed obstacles to discharge. 
Metropolitan must take necessary actions in the discharge process 
to treat its patients adequately and appropriately and to comply 
with federal law. 
X. SPECIAL EDUCATION 
Metropolitan's provision of special education substantially 
departs from generally accepted professional standards of care 
and from federal law in that it fails to provide children and 
adolescents adequate habilitation to prevent regression and to 
facilitate their ability to exercise their liberty interests. 
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). California is also 
failing to meet its more specific obligation to provide 
individualized educational programs that are reasonably 
calculated to enable the children and adolescents of Metropolitan 
to receive educational benefits. See Bd. of Educ. of the 
Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 
(1982) . 
Federal law conditions federal financing of State special 
education programs upon the State's provision of a free and 
appropriate public education ("FAPE"). Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et ~ 
(2002). In this regard, the IDEA requires educational agencies 
to develop an individualized education program ("IEP") for each 
child having a disability. The required elements of the IEP 
include, but are not limited to: (a) present levels of 
educational performance; (b) annual goals and short-term 
objectives; (c) specific educational services that are to be 
provided; and (d) statements of how progress toward annual goals 
are to be measured. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2002). The IDEA 
further requires such "related services" as are necessary to 
permit the child to benefit from instruction, including 
psychological services. Id. at§§ 1401(22), 1414(d) (2002). 
Thus, the IDEA requires "access to specialized instruction and 
related services which are individually designed to provide 
educational benefit to the handicapped child." Rowley, 458 U.S. 
at 201. 
Metropolitan does not provide "specialized instruction and 
related services which are individually designed," id., nor has 
it developed clear statements of how progress toward annual goals 
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are to be measured, ~ 20 u.s.c. § 1414(d) (2002). Its 
deficiencies in this regard cause harm to most of its Program 1 
patients, who are entitled to a free and appropriate education, 
but do not receive it. 
Inadequate direction is a common component of many of the 
problems in this area. School administration is not effective in 
supervising teachers, overseeing instruction, or ensuring that 
procedures, such as the recording of attendance, are 
appropriately followed. For example, the principal of the Allen 
Young School, which is the on-campus school serving Metropolitan 
patients under age 18, appeared largely unaware of what happened 
in his classrooms; he was unable to identify which students were 
doing well or even recall significant incidents of violence and 
suspensions that recently had occurred in the school. 
A. Individual Education Programs 
Metropolitan's IEPs substantially depart from generally 
accepted professional standards of care and do not comply with 
federal law. Based on our review of 15 plans, it is apparent 
that they are formulaic. Many plans vary by only a few words 
from student to student. Further, they reflect poor assessments 
of students' individual levels of educational performance. 
Metropolitan's assessments of unique educational needs are 
unreliable. They frequently are based on assessment tools that 
are greatly outdated and that do not evaluate students in their 
non-English native languages. Consequently, the IEPs do not 
correctly identify students' current levels of education 
performance. 
Further, although the IEPs do contain nominally "specific 
education services" to be provided to each student, the 
identified services are, in substance, largely generic among 
students. Specificity regarding the unique educational needs of 
the individual student is mostly absent. As a consequence of 
these deficiencies, the identified annual goals and short-term 
objectives of students often are not appropriate. For that 
matter, the IEPs generally do not contain individualized goals. 
For many of Program 1's students, behavioral supports are 
necessary "related services" that are not currently being 
provided. Without such services, students are unable to benefit 
from instruction. Given the population enrolled in the Allen 
Young School, it is troubling that only one of the IEPs reviewed 
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indicated a need for functional behavioral assessment. Even when 
assessments and behavioral plans are included in the IEPs, they 
are inadequate for many of the reasons discussed at Section III, 
above, including their lack of individualization, specificity or 
objective data. It is also of great concern that there appears 
to be no coordination between the behavior support plans at the 
school and those on the residential units. The children and 
adolescents are likely to be confused by disparate plans, thereby 
negating their intended therapeutic effect. 
Finally, although the IEPs should include appropriate, 
objective criteria for determining whether instructional 
objectives are being achieved, they do not. In this regard, two 
teachers acknowledged to us that they have no formal system for 
assessing progress, and most teachers indicated that they use 
informal, subjective estimates of students' progress. Thus, 
Metropolitan's IEPs neither comply with the IDEA nor have 
significant utility in identifying and providing for individuals' 
education needs. 
B. Instruction 
One of the most critical elements of the IEP is that it be 
reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 
benefits. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07. It is axiomatic that, 
for students to receive educational benefits, they must receive 
adequate instruction. Generally accepted professional standards 
regarding special education instruction call for teacher-directed 
lessons, provided in small, homogeneous groups, composed of 
frequent teacher questions and student answers, progressing in 
small increments, with abundant teacher feedback. Although we 
saw some elements of such instruction in three classes, no such 
instruction was evident in another five classes that we attended. 
Generally speaking, Metropolitan's classroom instruction is not 
effective in conveying the educational benefits to which its 
special education students are entitled. 
c. Literacy 
Metropolitan's records clearly show that some special 
education students lack basic reading and writing skills. These 
skills are the most fundamental educational benefit to which 
special education students are entitled. Although some IEPs 
contained literacy objectives, we found no evidence that 
literacy instruction was, in fact, provided. We saw no literacy 
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instruction during our tour, nor records of planning for 
fundamental literacy instruction. Teachers we interviewed 
indicated that they had adult readers assist students having 
reading difficulties, but they did not provide remedial reading 
instruction. One school staff person stated that the speech 
therapist provided remedial reading instruction, but the speech 
therapist told us that she was not teaching reading. 
Consequently, it appears that Metropolitan is not providing the 
most basic academic skills to the special education students who 
lack them. This is a substantial departure from generally 
accepted professional standards of care that is harmful to these 
students in that it deprives them of educational tools that are 
essential to function adequately in society. 
D. Least Restrictive Environment 
The IDEA requires that, 
[t]o the maximum extent possible, children with 
disabilities, including children in public or 
private institutions or other care facilities, are 
educated with children who are not disabled, and 
special classes, separate schooling, or other 
removal of children with disabilities from the 
regular educational environment occurs only when the 
nature or severity of the disability of a child is 
such that education in regular classes with the use 
of supplementary aids and services cannot be 
achieved satisfactorily. 
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5) (A). See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202 ("The 
Act requires participating States to educate handicapped children 
with nonhandicapped children whenever possible.") None of 
Metropolitan's children and adolescents participates in any off-
grounds schooling, with non-institutionalized children. 
Metropolitan does not meaningfully assess each child and 
adolescent to determine whether he or she, when provided adequate 
supervision and supports, is capable of participating in at least 
some regular school activities with non-disabled peers. Although 
many patients' disorders may preclude any participation in a 
regular educational environment, other patients, especially those 
approaching discharge, may be capable of at least some integrated 
education, with appropriate supports. Metropolitan's failure to 
assess continuously each of its child and adolescent patients to 
determine whether he or she requires separate schooling, and its 
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failure to provide access to a regular school environment for 
those patients who could participate, with reasonable supports, 
is in violation of the IDEA. 
XI. PROTECTION FROM HARM 
During the Metropolitan II exit interview, we outlined 
facility-wide issues relating to protection from harm and quality 
assurance, and we will address these facility-wide issues in 
connection with our findings regarding Metropolitan's adult 
units. Regarding Program 1, in particular, the foregoing 
discussion makes evident that Metropolitan fails to protect the 
children and adolescents it serves from harm. 
Further, as we pointed out in the presence of facility 
administrators who toured Program 1 units with us, the vents and 
window grills on several units contained holes large enough for 
patients to thread a sheet or other cloth through them, placing 
them at risk for suicide by hanging. In this regard, a number of 
the units had metal window frames with space between the frame 
and the ceiling which could be potential suicide hazards. 
Likewise, some of the vents in Program 1 were not covered. This 
presented a hazard in that patients could access wires and other 
potentially dangerous items. Several of the units contained 
other hazards, such as wires holding down seclusion beds that, if 
accessed by patients, could be used to hurt oneself or others. 
In addition, one of Unit 101's seclusion rooms did not have 
mirrors properly positioned, creating a blind spot and preventing 
staff from monitoring patients who have been placed in the room. 
Further, some of the seclusion room restraints were worn, placing 
patients who are restrained at risk of abrasions and skin 
breakdown. 
In at least one instance, Metropolitan did not take steps to 
ameliorate known risks. On January 23, 2002, patient I.X. 
attempted to commit suicide by tying a shoelace through openings 
on the under side of her bed and strangling herself. Less than 4 
months later, on May 17, 2002, she again attempted suicide using 
the same methodology. 
Further, frequent instances of same-sex sexual contact among 
patients were labeled by Metropolitan as "consensual" when it 
appeared that the facility was making insufficient effort to 
ensure that patients were not being coerced into sexual activity. 
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A staff member on Unit 107 estimated that there had been 10 such 
instances on the unit over the preceding year, but our search for 
documentation of these instances uncovered a record of only one. 
Separately, as to a patient who had made a documented claim that 
he had been raped, we found no evidence in the chart that a 
physician had examined him physically, and no responsive 
interventions were undertaken, according to the chart, apart from 
moving the involved boys to separate bedrooms. 
These examples and much of the foregoing discussion raise 
concerns regarding Metropolitan's ability to protect patients 
from harm and its incident management system, including the 
tracking and trending of unusual incidents, the quality of the 
investigations being completed, and the identification and 
implementation of corrective actions. As indicated above, we 
will elaborate on those concerns in our findings addressing 
Metropolitan's adult units. 
XII. FIRST AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS 
Prior to our tours of Metropolitan, the State indicated that 
it would refuse to allow Program 1 patients to speak with the 
Department of Justice or its expert consultants unless persons 
acting at the direction of the State were present. During our 
tours of Metropolitan, the State maintained this position, and 
State representatives participated in all of our discussions with 
patients. The State's effort to circumscribe our access to 
Metropolitan patients and to information regarding their care and 
well being is troubling. 
As the State is aware, the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California has ruled that CRIPA preempts 
a jurisdiction's invocation of procedural hurdles to ~restrict or 
deny the DOJ access to [a juvenile facility] , the juveniles held 
therein and their records." United States v. County of Los 
Angeles, 635 F. Supp. 588, 594 (C.D. Cal. 1986). More 
fundamentally, by denying its patients the right to speak 
confidentially to attorneys from, or expert consultants acting 
for, the Department of Justice, the State impermissibly has 
constrained its patients' constitutional rights to: (a) free 
speech, including the right to petition the government for 
redress of grievances; and (b) due process. See United States 
Constitution Amendments I, XIV; Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 
485 (1969) (stating that even state prisoners retain the freedom 
to petition for redress of grievances); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 
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F. Supp. 1209 1 1224 (E.D. La. 1976) 1 aff 1 d 1 622 F.2d 804 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (stating that children institutionalized for treatment 
enjoy the First Amendment right to free communication/ and the 
State may monitor such children 1 s communications only under 
"carefully circumscribed conditionS 1 11 when "necessary to prevent 
serious harm to the child11 ); In re Quarles 158 U.S. 532 1 535-36 
(1895) (discussing the rights of citizens to communicate with 
federal law enforcement officials regarding violations of federal 
law) . By imposing itself on communications between the federal 
government and its citizens 1 California wrongfully abridges these 
rights. 
Further 1 California 1 s position violates the protections that 
it itself affords to persons institutionalized in its mental 
health hospitals/ in its Code of Mental Health Patients 1 Rights. 
See Cal. Welf. & Instit. Code § 5325 (2002). Under California 
law/ all State mental health patients are entitled to certain 
rights/ that must be posted in English and Spanish throughout the 
institution/ and that include the right to engage in 
communications that are confidential. Id. The right to 
confidential communication provided by California law --
especially communication with one 1 s government regarding matters 
of important public interest/ such as conditions of care at a 
state institution -- is one of real substance/ the State 1 S 
encumbrance of which implicates the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution. In placing its own interests in 
limiting its exposure to a federal investigation of a State 
facility over the constitutional interests of the patients 
residing in that facility/ the State has further harmed those 
patients. 
XIII. MINIMUM REMEDIAL MEASURES 
To remedy the deficiencies discussed above and to protect 
the constitutional and federal statutory rights of the children 
and adolescents in Program 1 of Metropolitan/ California promptly 
should implement the minimum remedial measures set forth below. 
A. Psychiatric Services 
Metropolitan should provide psychiatric supports and 
services to provide adequate treatment for chronically and 
severely mentally ill and traumatized children and adolescents. 
More particularly/ Metropolitan should: 
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1. Ensure that each individual's psychiatric 
evaluation, diagnoses, and medications are 
justified in a generally accepted professional 
manner. 
2. Ensure that all physicians and clinicians can 
demonstrate competence in appropriate psychiatric 
evaluation and diagnosis. 
3. Develop standard psychiatric evaluation protocols 
for reliably reaching psychiatric diagnoses. 
4. Review and revise, as appropriate, psychiatric 
evaluations of all individuals currently residing 
in Program 1, providing clinically justifiable 
current diagnoses for each individual, and 
removing all diagnoses that cannot be clinically 
justified. Modify treatment and medication 
regimen, as appropriate. 
5. Develop and implement policies and procedures 
regarding the development of treatment plans 
consistent with generally accepted professional 
standards of care. 
6. Review and revise, as appropriate, each 
individual's treatment plan so that it is current, 
individualized, and consistent with generally 
accepted professional standards of care. 
7. Develop appropriate protocols that require the 
completion of cognitive and academic assessments 
of all Program 1 patients within 30 days of 
admission, unless valid testing has been completed 
within one year of admission. 
8. Develop and implement a plan of remediation in 
both treatment and educational plans for any 
identified cognitive and academic deficits of 
current Program 1 children and adolescents. 
9. Develop policies and protocols to ensure patients 
have genuine input into their treatment plans, 
including education regarding the purposes and 
side effects of medication. 
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Committee made various recommendations, including revision of 
the Managing Assaultive Behavior ("MAB") training curriculum, 
providing staff with additional education, and increasing the 
use of alternatives to seclusion and restraint. According to 
minutes provided to us, no other mention of this issue occurred 
until November 27, 2001, when almost identical strategies were 
identified. No subsequent discussion apparently occurred 
thereafter through March 26, 2002, the period that we reviewed; 
the minutes are silent regarding implementation of the 
previously identified strategies or recommendations, or their 
impact on resolving the identified issues. This apparent lack 
of follow-up is especially problematic, given the problems 
identified in Section VI, above, regarding Metropolitan's use of 
restraint and/or seclusion. 
C. Environmental Issues 
In a facility serving people at risk of harming themselves 
or others, the environment should be kept free of hazards. 
Metropolitan has failed to meet this generally accepted 
professional standard of care. As we pointed out in the 
presence of administrators who toured the adult units with us, 
the vents and window grills on several units contained holes 
large enough to thread a sheet or other cloth through, placing 
patients at risk for suicide by hanging. As on the children and 
adolescent units, some of the vents on the adult units were not 
covered, allowing patients to access wires and other potentially 
dangerous items. Several of the units contained other hazards, 
such as wires holding down seclusion beds that, if accessed by 
patients, could be used to hurt oneself or others. In one of 
the restraint rooms, we observed plaster on the floor that 
easily could have been swallowed by a patient. 
Examples of Metropolitan's breakdown in environmental 
protections include a January 17, 2001 incident in which W.T. 
was found standing on a heater vent with torn linen tied tightly 
around his neck and attached to a bar on the window. He jumped 
from the vent in an attempt to strangle himself. By the time 
staff arrived to assist, his face reportedly had turned a bluish 
hue. Despite the fact that this incident clearly identified 
that the bars on the windows are a potential suicide hazard, it 
does not appear that systemic action was taken to ameliorate the 
situation. On July 11, 2001, a peer notified staff that N.T. 
had attempted to hang herself in her bedroom with a bed sheet 
looped around her neck and fastened to a metal frame of a 
window. Again on July 15, 2001, a peer reported to staff that 
N.T. was attempting to hang herself. Staff found N.T. with a 
blanket tied around her neck and the other end tied to the bars 
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on the window. Less than three months later, on October 8, 
2001, N.T. was found with a bed sheet looped around her neck and 
fastened to a metal frame of a window. N.T. was then placed in 
seclusio~ and restraint. One day earlier, staff found K.S. in 
the bathroom with a blanket tied around his neck and the other 
end tied to the bars on the window. 
Based on both staff statements and our own observations, 
Metropolitan fails to maintain temperatures in some patient 
areas that do not pose a risk to health. For example, during 
the evenings, the SNF units were excessively warm. We observed 
that staff repositioning patients were sweating profusely. 
Commendably, staff had attempted to ameliorate the heat by 
pointing fans into patient rooms, but privacy curtains were 
blocking the airflow. Moreover, fans blowing on patients whose 
health is compromised, such as patients requiring skilled 
nursing care, places them at high risk for complications such as 
pneumonia. 
Lastly, areas throughout the facility, primarily the SNF 
units, had a strong smell of urine and excrement. This is a 
potential indication that patients had been sitting in their 
urine or feces for a long period of time, placing them at high 
risk for skin breakdown. We observed urine-soaked laundry on 
the floors of some patients' rooms and in uncovered bins in 
patient-inhabited areas, presenting an infection hazard. 
D. Use of Untrained Personnel in Patient Interventions 
Generally accepted professional standards of care for 
facilities such as Metropolitan dictate that program staff be 
responsible for patient treatment and care. Although there is 
nothing improper about utilizing such security personnel to 
handle episodic incidents of violence by residents, it is not 
appropriate to rely on security staff -- who lack mental health 
training -- to share material responsibility for patient 
treatment and care. 
It appears that treatment staff frequently rely on officers 
because staff cannot effectively address patients' behavioral 
needs. This practice highlights weaknesses in Metropolitan's 
therapeutic interventions and presents substantial risk of harm 
to patients. First, given that the officers are armed with 
pepper spray and batons, their presence on the units presents a 
safety risk if a patient were to gain control of these weapons. 
Second, the officers are not trained properly to address the 
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4. Ensure that psychologists communicate and 
interpret psychological assessment results to the 
treatment team, along with the implications of 
those results for diagnosis and treatment. 
5. Develop and implement policies and procedures, in 
accordance with generally accepted professional 
standards of care, regarding the necessary and 
sufficient components of a comprehensive 
psychological evaluation. 
6. Ensure that patients in need of individual, group 
and/or family therapy services receive such 
services in accordance with generally accepted 
professional standards, and that these services 
are provided in a patient's primary language. 
7. Document the provision of individual and group 
therapy services each time they occur, including 
clear descriptions of the problem being addressed, 
the focus of the session, the intervention 
provided by the therapist, and the patient's 
response to the intervention. 
8. Provide adequate clinical oversight to therapy 
groups to ensure that patients are assigned to 
groups that are appropriate to their individual 
needs, that groups are provided frequently and 
consistently, and that issues particularly 
relevant for this population, including the use of 
psychotropic medications and substance abuse, are 
addressed in group therapy. 
9. Ensure that all group leaders are competent 
regarding selection and implementation of 
appropriate approaches and interventions to 
address group therapy objectives, are competent in 
monitoring patient responses to group therapy, and 
are supervised by clinical staff. 
10. Ensure the consistent implementation of 
reinforcement and behavior programs. 
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11. Ensure that patients are not denied, because of 
excess sedation, the full benefit of behavioral 
treatment and educational interventions. 
12. Ensure that all psychologists can demonstrate 
competence in the development and implementation 
of milieu behavioral programs that are consistent 
with generally accepted professional standards of 
care, including the monitoring of patient progress 
in such programs and program revision as 
monitoring warrants. 
13. Ensure that all responsible program staff 
demonstrate competence in implementing individual 
behavioral programs. 
14. Ensure that, before they work with patients, all 
psychologists have successfully completed 
competency-based training, in accordance with 
generally accepted professional standards of care, 
in conducting a functional analysis of behavior, 
preparing individualized behavior interventions 
and positive behavior support plans, designing 
methods of monitoring the program intervention and 
the effectiveness of the intervention, providing 
staff training regarding program implementation, 
and, as appropriate, revising or terminating the 
program. 
15. Specify and utilize, in accordance with generally 
accepted professional standards of care, triggers 
for instituting individualized behavior treatment 
plans. 
16. Continue to reduce the use of seclusion, 
restraints and psychotropic PRN medications. 
17. Ensure the accuracy of seclusion, restraints, and 
psychotropic PRN medications data. 
18. Revise and implement policies and procedures to 
prohibit the use of seclusion, restraints and/or 
psychotropic PRN medications as an alternative to 
adequate treatment and/or as punishment. Include 
requirements for staff to utilize and document the 
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10. Increase the frequency of treatment team meetings 
and discharge plan reviews from every 90 days to a 
minimum of every 30 days, and more frequently, as 
appropriate. 
11. Ensure that all psychotropic medications are 
appropriate for Program 1's population, are 
specifically matched to current, clinically 
justified diagnoses, are prescribed in therapeutic 
amounts, are monitored for efficacy against 
clearly-identified target variables and time 
frames, are modified based on clinical rationales, 
and are properly documented. 
12. Develop and implement protocols and procedures 
consistent with generally accepted professional 
standards of care regarding the use of 
psychotropic medications to treat symptoms other 
than psychosis, including that this practice be 
clearly documented with a specific plan for 
minimizing the dosage and the duration of the 
medication. 
13. Develop and implement protocols and procedures 
consistent with generally accepted professional 
standards of care regarding off-label medication 
usage, including the establishment of an 
institutional review board to supervise this 
practice, the development of research protocols, 
and policies to obtain appropriate informed 
consent from minors and/or guardians. 
14. Develop and implement protocols and procedures to 
ensure that each patient's treatment plan includes 
a plan to monitor, document, report and properly 
address potential side effects of prescribed 
medications. 
15. Develop and implement formal tools to be used 
program-wide for each person at risk of 
experiencing medication side effects in accordance 
with generally accepted professional standards. 
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16. Make appropriate attempts to use newer 
psychotropic medications with fewer, less serious 
side effects, rather than older psychotropic 
medications. 
17. Use a milieu structure for Program 1 that is 
consistent with generally accepted professional 
standards of care. Ensure that it is applied to 
patients in a consistent, comprehensible and 
therapeutic manner, and ensure that staff 
implementing milieu programs first have 
successfully completed competency-based training 
in implementing such programs. 
18. Remedy those aspects of Program 1's physical 
environment that inhibit appropriate psychiatric 
treatment, including, but not limited to, the 
violation of individual's privacy, the lack of 
individualization, and the lack of appropriate 
recreational facilities. 
B. Nursing 
Metropolitan should provide nursing services to the children 
and adolescents it serves that are consistent with generally 
accepted professional standards of care. Such services should 
result in Program 1's patients receiving individualized services, 
supports and therapeutic interventions. At a minimum, 
Metropolitan should: 
1. Develop and implement a treatment planning policy 
that ensures that each patient's treatment plan 
identifies the Axis I diagnoses and the related 
symptoms to be monitored by nursing and other unit 
staff and the frequency by which staff need to 
monitor such symptoms. This policy should include 
requirements for staff to monitor, document and 
report such symptoms and for treatment teams to 
analyze the information collected and to modify, 
as appropriate, treatment plans based upon this 
data. 
2. Develop and implement a policy consistent with 
generally accepted professional standards of care 
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regarding psychotropic medication side effects 
monitoring. 
3. Ensure that, before they work directly with 
patients, all nursing and other unit staff have 
successfully completed competency-based training 
in mental health diagnoses, related symptoms, 
psychotropic medications, and the identification 
of side effects of psychotropic medications. 
4. Ensure that, before they work directly with 
patients, all nursing and other unit staff have 
successfully completed competency-based training 
in the provision of a therapeutic milieu on the 
units. 
5. Ensure that, before they work directly with 
patients, all nursing and other unit staff have 
successfully completed competency-based training 
in proactive, positive interventions to prevent 
and de-escalate crises. 
C. Psychology 
Metropolitan should provide psychological supports and 
services adequate to treat the emotional and behavioral disorders 
experienced by Program 1 children and adolescents according to 
generally accepted professional standards of care. More 
particularly, Metropolitan should: 
1. Where clinical information is insufficient, 
increase the use of direct clinical assessment of 
patients to provide a comprehensive clinical 
picture, and when additional clinical questions 
are raised, including so-called "Rule Out" and 
deferred diagnoses, implement appropriate clinical 
assessments to answer the questions promptly. 
2. Ensure that clinically relevant information 
remains readily accessible in the active chart. 
3. For patients whose primary language is not 
English, provide comprehensive psychological 
assessments in the patients' primary language. 
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use of proactive, positive, and less restrictive 
methods before using seclusion, restraints and/or 
psychotropic PRN medication. Ensure that staff 
demonstrate competence in the implementation of 
such policies. 
19. Revise and implement policies and procedures to 
require the review and modification, if necessary, 
of patients' treatment plans after any use of 
seclusion, restraints and/or psychotropic PRN 
medication. 
20. Develop and implement a policy consistent with 
generally accepted professional standards of care 
governing the use of psychotropic PRN medication 
for psychiatric purposes in child and adolescent 
patients and ensuring, in particular, that such 
medications are used on a limited basis and not 
as a substitute for adequate treatment of the 
underlying cause of the patient's distress. 
D. Pharmacy 
Metropolitan's Program 1 patients should receive pharmacy 
services consistent with generally accepted professional 
standards of care. Specifically, Metropolitan should: 
1. Develop and implement policies and procedures that 
require pharmacists to complete monthly reviews of 
patients' medication regimens, and, as 
appropriate, to make recommendations to the 
treatment team, including the prescribing 
physician, about possible medication changes. 
Such a review process should include medical and 
psychotropic drugs. 
2. Develop and implement policies and procedures that 
require pharmacists to track the use of 
psychotropic PRN medications, and, whenever 
appropriate, notify the prescribing physician of 
problematic trends. 
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E. General Medical Care 
Metropolitan should provide adequate preventative, routine, 
specialized and emergency medical services on a timely basis, in 
accordance with generally accepted professional standards of 
care. More particularly, Metropolitan should: 
1. Develop and implement protocols and procedures to 
ensure the timely provision of medical care, 
including but not limited to, evaluation of vision 
care, dental care, and x-ray services. 
2. Render appropriate medical treatment on a timely 
basis. 
3. Monitor patients' health status indicators in 
accordance with generally accepted professional 
standards of care, and, whenever appropriate, 
modify their treatment plans to address any 
problematic changes in health status indicators. 
F. Infection Control 
Metropolitan should implement adequate infection control 
procedures to prevent the spread of infections and/or 
communicable diseases. More specifically, Metropolitan should: 
1. Revise infection control policies and procedures 
to include the tracking and trending of infections 
and communicable diseases as well as the 
development and implementation of corrective 
action plans. 
2. Establish an effective infection control program 
that: (a) actively collects data with regard to 
infections and communicable diseases; (b) assesses 
these data for trends; (c) initiates inquiries 
regarding problematic trends; (d) identifies 
necessary corrective action; (e) monitors to 
ensure that appropriate remedies are achieved; and 
(f) integrates this information into 
Metropolitan's quality assurance review. 
G. Dental Services 
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Patients should be provided with routine and emergency 
dental care and treatment on a timely basis and in a manner 
consistent with generally accepted professional standards of 
care. More specifically, Metropolitan should: 
1. Retain an adequate number of adequately qualified 
dentists to provide timely and appropriate dental 
care and treatment to Metropolitan patients. 
2. Develop protocols and procedures that require the 
comprehensive and timely provision of dental 
services and the documentation of such services. 
H. Dietary 
Metropolitan Program 1 patients should receive adequate 
dietary services, particularly patients who experience weight-
related problems. Specifically, Metropolitan should: 
1. Modify treatment planning policies and procedures 
to require that the treatment plans of children 
and adolescents who experience weight problems 
and/or related health concerns include adequate 
strategies and methodologies to address the 
identified problems and that such strategies and 
methodologies are implemented in a timely manner. 
2. Ensure that treatment team members demonstrate 
competence in the dietary and nutritional issues 
affecting children and adolescents and the 
development and implementation of strategies and 
methodologies to address such issues. 
3. Increase the availability of individualized and 
group exercise and recreational options for the 
children and adolescents in Program 1. 
I. Placement in the Most Integrated Setting 
Metropolitan should pursue actively the appropriate 
discharge of patients and ensure that they are in the most 
integrated, appropriate setting that is consistent with patients' 
needs. More particularly, Metropolitan should: 
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1. Ensure that discharge planning begins at the time 
of admission and that all patients have realistic 
and individualized discharge criteria. Ensure 
that each patient has a professionally developed 
discharge plan, including measurable action steps, 
persons responsible and time frames for 
completion. 
2. Ensure that patients who have met discharge 
criteria are discharged expeditiously and with 
appropriate supports. 
3. Develop and implement a policy and protocol that 
identifies patients with lengths of stay exceeding 
six months. Establish a regular review forum, 
including senior administration, to review these 
patients, their treatment plans, and obstacles to 
successful discharge to the most integrated, 
appropriate setting. Create an individual action 
plan for each individual being reviewed. 
4. Consolidate responsibility for discharge planning 
with the authority to provide the supports and 
services that discharge planning indicates are 
necessary. 
5. Ensure that all Program 1 staff, including senior 
administration, provide care and treatment to 
mitigate the dangers of long-term 
institutionalization for the children and 
adolescents in their care. 
6. Provide transition and follow-up supports and 
services consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. 
J. Special Education 
Metropolitan should ensure that all of its child and 
adolescent patients who qualify for special education receive 
individualized educational programs that are reasonably 
calculated to enable these patients to receive educational 
benefits. More particularly, Metropolitan should: 
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1. Ensure that all Individualized Education Programs 
are developed and implemented consistent with the 
requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Act, 20 U.S. C. §§ 1400 et seq. (2002) ("IDEA") . 
2. Ensure that special education students receive 
instruction appropriate to their needs and 
learning abilities, consistent with generally 
accepted professional standards of care. 
3. Provide appropriate literacy instruction for 
students with significant deficits in reading 
and/or writing. 
4. Provide appropriate supplemental education for 
students whose individualized education programs 
at the facility have not been reasonably 
calculated to enable them to receive educational 
benefits. 
5. Continuously assess each student's capacity to 
participate, with appropriate supports and 
services, in a regular, non-institutional, 
education environment, and provide access to a 
regular education environment for those students 
who can participate in one with appropriate 
supports and services. 
6. Ensure that all students receive their education 
in the least restrictive setting pursuant to the 
requirements of the IDEA. 
K. Protection from Harm 
Metropolitan should provide its patients with a safe and 
humane environment and protect them from harm. At a minimum, 
Metropolitan should: 
1. Conduct a thorough review of the units within 
Program 1 to identify potential safety hazards, 
and develop and implement a plan to remedy any 
identified issues. 
2. Thoroughly review and, as appropriate, revise 
hospital policy, and Program 1 practice, regarding 
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sexual contact between patients. Establish clear 
guidelines regarding staff responses to reports of 
sexual contact and monitor staff responses to 
incidents. Comprehensively document therapeutic 
interventions in patient charts in response to 
instances of sexual contact. 
3. Develop and implement a comprehensive quality 
assurance plan consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care/ including but not 
limited to an effective incident management 
system. 
L. First Amendment/ Access to Courts and Due Process 
The State should permit Metropolitan Program 1 patients to 
exercise their constitutional rights of: (a) free speech 1 and/ 
in particular/ the right to petition the government for redress 
of grievances without State monitoring; and (b) due process. 
More particularly/ the State should: 
1. Permit patients to speak with representatives of 
the federal government outside the presence of 
persons acting for the State. 
2. Permit patients to engage in confidential 
communications. 
***** 
The collaborative approach that the parties have taken thus 
far has been productive. We hope to continue working with the 
State in this fashion to resolve our significant concerns 
regarding the care and services provided at this facility. 
We will forward our expert consultants/ reports under 
separate cover. Although their reports are their work - and do 
not necessarily represent the official conclusions of the 
Department of Justice - their observations/ analyses and 
recommendations provide further elaboration of the relevant 
concerns/ and offer practical assistance in addressing them. We 
hope that you will give this information careful consideration 
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and that it will assist in facilitating a dialogue swiftly 
addressing areas requiring attention. 
In the unexpected event that the parties are unable to reach 
a resolution regarding our concerns, we are obligated to advise 
you that the Attorney General may initiate a lawsuit pursuant to 
CRIPA, to correct deficiencies or to otherwise protect the rights 
of Metropolitan's patients, 49 days after the receipt of this 
letter. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a) (1). Accordingly, we will soon 
contact State officials to discuss in more detail the measures 
that the State must take to address the deficiencies identified 
herein. 
cc: The Honorable Bill Lockyer 
Attorney General 
State of California 
Stephen W. Mayberg, Ph.D. 
Director 
Sincerely, 
Ralph F. Boyd, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
California Department of Mental Health 
Mr. William G. Silva 
Executive Director 
Metropolitan State Hospital 
Debra W. Yang, Esq. 
United States Attorney 
Central District of California 
The Honorable Roderick R. Paige 
Secretary 
United States Department of Education 
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~Mental Health 
Benjamin 0. Tayloe, Jr. 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division 
Special Litigation Section 
PHB Mailroom 5034 
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW 
Washington DC, 20530 
1600 9th Street, Sacramento, CA 95814 
(916) 654-2413 
July 24, 2003 
RE: Response to the United States Department of Justice Findings Letter regarding 
Metropolitan State Hospital's Program 1 (Children and Adolescents) pursuant 
to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 
Dear Mr. Tayloe: 
The California Department of Mental Health and Metropolitan State Hospital (hereafter 
referred to as the Department) have carefully considered the findings letter dated May 13, 
2003 and the expert consultant reports that we received subsequently. 
The Department looks forward to a dialogue addressing areas that the United States 
Department of Justice (USDOJ) identifies as requiring attention. In this regard, the 
Department is firmly committed to enhancing the services it provides. Subsequent to 
USDOJ's onsite visit, Metropolitan State Hospital (MSH) has continued to enhance its 
program and previously had undertaken enhancements to the treatment approach that 
emphasizes recovery through individualized treatment, empowerment and self-
determination. The Department believes that the enactment of this treatment approach and 
other enhancements, which we can discuss in detail in upcoming conferences with USDOJ, 
will demonstrate the Department's continued compliance with CRIP~~ 
Please be advised, however, that the Department's willingness to engage in a dialogue 
with USDOJ does not mean that the Department agrees with all of the findings and 
conclusions in the May 13, 2003, letter. For instance, the following are examples of 
instances where the Department believes USDOJ may have overlooked information which 
was provided and/or may have come to conclusions which are contrary to that of the 
Department: 
1. On page 26 of the findings letter, USDOJ, citing the Maryland Quality Indicator 
Project, states that MSH's episodes of seclusion, restraints, or seclusion and restraints are 
double the national aggregate data for adolescent psychiatric inpatient programs. However, 
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the Maryland Quality Indicator Project is a performance measurement system approved by 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations as ORYX vendors. 
Participants in the project are primarily for-profit, private, acute medical hospitals and some 
psychiatric facilities. It does not appear that any state hospitals participated in the project. 
Comparing MSH's restraint rates to such facilities cannot be said, therefore, to be an 
accurate comparison. 
Further, the USDOJ findings letter only mentions how MSH's rates of restraint 
episodes compare in the Maryland system. It does not indicate how MSH compares to 
other Maryland measures, such as restraint hours. MSH's own benchmarking, through the 
National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors Research Institute's ORYX 
program, comprised of over 200 public or public-contract mental health facilities in 48 US 
states and territories, indicates that MSH's restraint hour rates for adolescents are close to 
the national rates. 
2. On pages 26-27 of the findings letter, USDOJ alleges that numerous instances of 
seclusion and restraints were not included in the summary seclusion and restraints data 
that MSH provided to USOOJ. 
After a review of the seclusion and restraints database in MSH's Standards 
Compliance Office, please note that, in fact, information regarding all of the cited cases 
were contained within the seclusion and restraints database. The only difference noted was 
a date change specified in (d) below. It is not clear why USDOJ came to the conclusion of 
underreporting since all of the cases cited in the findings letter were reported and 
documented at the time of the incident. 1 
1 (a) K.C. seclusion/restraints on 4/25/02, 18:05-19:30 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123699) 
(b) K.S. seclusion/restraints on 4/28/02, 19:00-20:30 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123700) 
(c) L.M. s.eclusion/restraints on 4n/02, 14:20-16:10 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123571) 
(d) P.B..-seclusion/restraints on 4/13/02, 12:35-13:30 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123620. NOTE: Our database indicates that the correct date is 4/12/02 
NOT 4/13/02 as specified in the DOJ letter) 
(e) F.S. seclusion/restraints on 4/1/02, 15:15-17:15 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123539) 
(f) S.N. seclusion/restraints on 4/24/02, 15:15-17:15 (MSH restraint and seclusion datab~e in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123639) 
(g) E. G. seclusion/restraints on 5/7/02, 9:05-11 :00 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards ~ompliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123775) 
(h) K.C. seclusion/restraints on 4/25/02, 18:05-19:30 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123699) 
(i) K.S. seclusion/restraints on 4/28/02, 19:00-20:30 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123700) 
{j) L.M. seclusion/restraints on 4n/02, 14:20-16:10 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123571) 
(k) P.B. seclusion/restraints on 4/13/02, 12:35-13:30 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123620. NOTE: Our database indicates that the correct date is 4/12/02 
NOT 4/13/02 as specified in the DOJ letter) 
(I) F.S. seclusion/restraints on 4/1/02, 15:15-17:15 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123539) 
(m) S.N. seclusion/restraints on 4/24/02, 15:15-17:15 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards Compliance 
indicates this data as being present in record 123639) 
(n) E.G. seclusion/restraints on 517/02, 9:05-11:00 (MSH restraint and seclusion database in Standards 
r-~.....,nli·:u·,ro inrlir::>IP~ !hi~ rl:::~lrl C'JS beina Dresen! in record 123775) 
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3. On pages 28-29 of the findings Jetter, the USDOJ alleges that MSH completes no 
systemic tracking or trending of infections or communicable diseases in Program 1 or 
throughout the hospital. As a result, MSH's patients are at increased risk for infection 
and/or commu_nicable diseases. This allegation is without merit. 
It is standard practice at MSH for infections and communicable diseases to be tracked 
and trended. When analysis of trends reveals potential problems, it is standard practice for 
corrective action plans to be developed and implemented. MSH has two infection control 
nurses on staff, and they monitor individual patient infections. 
In response to USDOJ's original document request the Department provided all of the 
Infection Control Committee minutes from May 1, 2001 to the present. The minutes of the 
Infection Control Committee indicate that incidences of infections and communicable 
diseases are tracked and trended. The minutes specifically contain a section £;mtitled 
Infection Surveillance Report (nosocomial rate); Infection Line List for the month; Hepatitis 
C Report; Monthly Comparison of Infection -Whole House and Employee Infection Report. 
4. On pages 36 and 48 of the findings letter, the USDOJ expresses "concern" that 
same-sex sexual contact among patients were labeled "consensual" and not investigated 
properly. 
In response to USDOJ's original document request, the Department provided a copy of 
MSH 's Administrative Manual. Within that manual, Policy number 3305, which deals with 
rape or sexual assault, provides that all sexual assault victims, whether male or female 
receive immediate medical attention and evaluation as soon as staff become aware of such 
activity. The Department has learned, however, that on occasion, a patient may not 
immediately report the contact. Or, a patient may report the contact days or weeks after the 
reported assault has occurred. This delay may make it very difficult to gather physical 
evidence to confirm the report. In any event, MSH completes an intensive investigation 
after S(Jch incidents are reported in compliance with the Administrative Manual. The 
Department and MSH do have procedures in place to investigate these allegations. 
5. The Department also disagrees with USDOJ's findings and conclusions set forth in 
the First Amendment/Due Process section of the findings letter. 
-
First, USDOJ alleges that the State refused to "allow Program I patients to speak with 
the Department of Justice or its expert consultants unless persons acting at the direction of 
the State were present" 
In fact, USDOJ did conduct individual patient interviews at the request of the patients 
and was able to gain insight and information regarding patient care at MSH. These patients 
also consented to the presence of State representatives at the interviews. 
Second, USDOJ alleges "State representatives participated in all of our discussions 
with patients." To clarify, MSH patients consented to the presence of State representatives 
at the individual interviews. However, at no time did State representatives participate in any 
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of the discussions with the patients. The patient interviews were conducted between 
USDOJ and MSH patients and State representatives were present to observe. 
Third, USDOJ claims that the "State's effort to circumscribe our access to Metropolitan 
patients and to information regarding their care and well being is troubling." After producing 
nearly two hundred thousand document~. including over 200 patient charts, USDOJ's claim 
that the State tried to circumscribe access and information to MSH and its patients is 
overstated. The State allowed unrestricted access to the hospital, its records, and 
permitted USDOJ to interview all persons as requested. In fact, USDOJ interviewed all the 
patients that requested to speak to them. 
The Department respectfully disagrees with, USDOJ's interpretation of legal authorities 
in support of its findings that the Department has violated GRIP A and other federal and 
state laws. While we are willing to discuss with you either in person or by written 
communication our legal arguments, we do not believe that this Jetter is the time or place to 
set forth that lengthy and detailed analysis. Suffice to say, we are hopeful that we can 
resolve with you the significant issues raised without resort to the federal courts who will be 
the ultimate arbiters of any alleged violations of law. 
As previously indicated, rather than responding to every detail in the comprehensive 
findings letter at this time, the Department proposes that the parties commence the informal 
conference process that is contemplated by U.S. C. section 1997b(a)(2)(A) and (B). 
The Department is committed to working with USDOJ to address the concerns that it 
has raised. However, as the above indicates, there is much to be discussed and the 
Department is not in agreement with everything in the findings letter. Moreover, the 
Department would appreciate further discussion and clarification from USDOJ on any 
remedial measures it may recommend. At your convenience, please call Evon Dixon-
Montgomery at (916) 654-2453 to schedule a time convenient to all parties to further 
discuss this matter. The Department looks forward to working with the USDOJ to continue 
its mis~ion to serve the patients at Metropolitan State Hospital. 
cc: Evon Dixon-Montgomery 
Kyungah Suk 
Respectfully, 
fl::o~:;o,~ 
Deputy Director 
Long Term Care Services 
SECTION 8 
Report on Metropolitan 
State Hospital, 
February 19, 2004 
Report on Department of 
Mental Health Response, 
April 8, 2004 

The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger 
Governor of California 
State Capitol Building 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
February 19, 2004 
Re: Metropolitan State Hospital, Norwalk, California 
Dear Governor Schwarzenegger: 
On March 21, 2002, we notified then Governor Davis that we 
were investigating conditions at Metropolitan State Hospital 
("Metropolitan"), pursuant to the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 u.s.c. § 1997. 
During the weeks of June 24 and July 8, 2002, we visited the 
facility. Our first tour, "Metropolitan I," focused on the care 
and treatment provided to the facility's child and adolescent 
patients, all of whom are in Metropolitan's Program I. Our 
second tour, "Metropolitan II," addressed the care and treatment 
provided to the facility's adult patients. At exit interviews 
conducted at the end of each facility visit, we verbally conveyed 
our preliminary findings to counsel and facility officials. 
Consistent with the requirements of CRIPA, we wrote to Governor 
Davis on May 13, 2003, to apprise him of our findings regarding 
the child and adolescent patients. We are writing now to 
transmit our findings regarding the care and treatment of the 
facility's adult patients. 
As we noted in our previous letter, we appreciate the 
cooperation and assistance provided to us by the administrators 
and staff of Metropolitan. We hope to continue to work with the 
State of California and officials at Metropolitan in a 
cooperative manner. 
We conducted our investigation by reviewing medical and 
other records relating to the care and treatment of approximately 
150 of Metropolitan's adult patients; interviewing administrators 
and staff; speaking with patients; and conducting on-site surveys 
of the facility. We were assisted in our investigation by expert 
consultants in the fields of psychiatry, psychology, psychiatric 
nursing, and incident management and quality assurance. 
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As of the time of our July 2002 visit, Metropolitan had a 
census of approximately 825 patients, ranging in age from 11 to 
more than 80, roughly 725 of whom were adults. Metropolitan's 
adult patients are placed in one of five treatment programs, 
based on a mix of factors, primarily: (a) the nature of their 
admission (civil or forensic); (b) their gender; (c) the severity 
of their illness, (d) their assessed ability to participate in 
psychological and social rehabilitation ("psychosocial 
rehabilitation"); (e) their need for skilled nursing care; and 
(f) their language and cultural needs. Each of these treatment 
programs, identified as Programs II through VI, operates semi-
independently, with its own director, nurse coordinator, and 
senior psychiatrist. 
Residents of state-operated facilities have a right to live 
in reasonable safety and to receive adequate health care, along 
with habilitation to ensure their safety and freedom from 
unreasonable restraint, prevent regression, and facilitate their 
ability to exercise their liberty interests. See Youngberg v. 
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Similar protections are accorded by 
federal law. See, ~~ Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395hh, and implementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. Parts 
482-483 (Medicaid and Medicare Program Provisions) . The State 
also is obliged to provide services in the most integrated 
setting appropriate to individuals' needs. Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 u.s.c. § 12132 et 
seq.; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (d); see Olmstead v. L.C., 527 u.s. 581 
(1999). 
As was the case with Metropolitan's Program I, which serves 
the facility's child and adolescent patients, it was apparent 
that many Metropolitan staff are highly dedicated individuals who 
are genuinely concerned for the well-being of the persons in 
their care. In particular, certain staff display admirable 
dedication to the patients whom they serve, and undertake 
significant, largely self-initiated, efforts to provide effective 
rehabilitation to their patients. Further, again as is true of 
Program I, Metropolitan's adult programs are demonstrably 
proficient in many procedural aspects of care. Nevertheless, it 
is also the case that significant and wide-ranging deficiencies 
exist in Metropolitan's provision of care to its adult patients, 
and that the First Amendment rights of its patients are being 
violated. Our findings, facts that support them, and the minimum 
remedial steps that we believe are necessary to correct 
deficiencies are set forth below. 
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I. INTEGRATED TREATMENT PLANNING 
The planning of treatments and interventions ("treatment 
planning") for Metropolitan's adult patients substantially 
departs from generally accepted professional standards of care. 
Generally accepted professional standards of care instruct that 
treatment plans should integrate the individual assessments, 
evaluations, and diagnoses of the patient performed by all 
disciplines involved in the patient's treatment; be 
individualized; and identify and build on the patient's 
strengths, interests, preferences, and goals, to optimize the 
patient's recovery and ability to sustain herself in the most 
integrated, appropriate setting. 
As a threshold matter, Metropolitan's treatment planning 
format does not recognize that adequate treatment planning is 
dependent upon a logical sequence: first and foremost, the 
formulation of an accurate diagnosis; subsequently, the 
utilization of the diagnosis to identify the fundamental problems 
that are caused by the diagnosed illness; the development of 
specific, measurable goals that are designed to ameliorate 
problems and promote functional independence; the interventions 
that will guide staff as they work toward those goals; and, 
finally, ongoing assessment and, as warranted, revision of the 
plan. 
Almost uniformly, the document entitled "Treatment Plan" in 
Metropolitan charts bears no resemblance to a comprehensive, 
integrated plan for the provision of treatment addressing 
individual patient needs. It is often redundant, burdensome, and 
confusing for staff to follow. Although there was some slight 
variation in the structure of the plans between units, in no 
instance, among approximately 150 charts reviewed, did we see an 
individualized plan of treatment. 
Diagnoses listed on the plan often differ from diagnoses 
listed in the physician documentation section of the patient's 
chart. Similarly, identified problems often differ with other 
components in the plan, and the patient's medication plan often 
is not integrated into the overall treatment plan. 
The primary reason for hospitalization is not identified and 
addressed carefully, and documentation of the need for continued 
hospitalization is not individualized or valid. Short- and long-
term goals are typically generic, overly broad, not attainable, 
do not account for the patient's level of functioning, likes, 
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preferences and goals, and do not include measurable outcomes 
regarding objectives such as developing a skill, altering a 
behavior or experiencing a reduction in symptoms. Further, 
information about the anticipated length of stay is not linked to 
achievable outcomes. 
Treatment interventions are determined and implemented 
arbitrarily and indiscriminately. Further, treatment plans do 
not identify in rational, operationally defined terms the 
symptoms or problems to be monitored or the frequency with which 
such monitoring and reporting should occur. Consequently, 
symptoms and problems are not reliably monitored or reported. In 
this regard, Metropolitan does not regularly collect or analyze 
information regarding patient progress relative to target 
symptoms and problems, or utilize such information in the 
reassessment and revision of treatment plans. In fact, based on 
our review, it is rare for the facility to modify treatment plans 
because of a patient's lack of progress under an existing plan. 
This is fundamentally at odds with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. 
Numerous examples illustrate these problems. Diagnoses 
listed in the treatment plans differed from those listed in 
psychiatric assessments in the cases of S.B., 1 N.Cj., and T.E. 
Further, S.B. had an April 2002 treatment plan indicating "no 
progress" with a problem that was listed as closed in October 
2001 on his master treatment plan. Another problem identified at 
S.B.'s admission was not identified in the treatment plan until 
almost two years after admission. Further, the treatment plan 
indicated "no change" in the patient's goals, although numerous 
changes, in fact, had been documented elsewhere. 
Similarly, N.Cj.'s treatment plan includes problems that are 
listed as "discontinued" or "revised" on another form dated the 
same date. In fact, as to each of the listed problems, three 
successive treatment plans stated, "Goals not achieved, goals not 
changed, interventions not changed." T.E.'s short-term goal for 
anger management deficit was not revised as of October 2002, 
although her chart indicates that she accomplished this goal in 
early 2001. 
Medication compliance was listed as an intervention and/or a 
criteria for discharge for T.E. and F.I. even though this is not 
1 In this letter, to protect patients' privacy, we identify 
patients by initials other than their own. We will separately 
transmit to the State a schedule cross-referencing the initials 
with patient names. 
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identified as a problem for either of these patients. In 
contrast, medication compliance is not listed as a problem for 
U.C., a patient who was noncompliant with her medication when she 
committed an assault with a deadly weapon. C.Hb. was prescribed 
medications for anxiety and depression, but there is no mention 
of either problem as targets in his treatment plan. 
!.C.'s psychiatrist started him on Risperdol (a psychotropic 
medication) and stated, in the treatment plan, "patient will be 
involved in different unit teaching activities." The treatment 
groups to which this patient was assigned appear to have little 
purpose beyond occupying his time. In this regard, the 
psychiatrist's clinical description of this patient makes no 
references to impulse control problems nor impairments in social 
problem solving skills. In fact, the master interdisciplinary 
treatment plan of the hospital from which this patient was 
transferred states that, even when he was acutely delusional, 
"Mr. [C.'s] strength is social competence." Nevertheless, many 
of the groups to which this patient was assigned were to teach 
"impulse control" and "socially approved problem solving 
techniques." Further, although this patient has little previous 
institutional history, his treatment plan emphasizes socializing 
him to the role of a psychiatric hospital resident (attending 
groups), rather than reinforcing the patient's own stated desire 
to "get back to work." Thus, the harm to patients from 
Metropolitan's treatment planning practices goes beyond a failure 
to provide care. It includes fostering the institutionalization 
of its patients. This is a gross deviation from generally 
accepted professional standards of care. 
N.D. is an 18-year-old patient who was transferred from a 
juvenile facility with assaultive and self-injurious behavior, 
and a history of brutal sexual abuse and neglect apparently 
beginning at age two. Apart from medications, which a 
neurologist identified as being at toxic levels at one point, the 
chart provides no evidence that N.D. is receiving any treatment 
on her unit, which constitutes a substantial departure from 
generally accepted professional standards of care. Further, 
N.D.'s chart describes her as a nonpsychotic individual of at 
least average intelligence. Notwithstanding that N.D. has the 
cognitive ability to engage in such a discussion, we could not 
locate anything in N.D.'s chart indicating that any staff member 
had ever talked with her about her personal goals and objectives 
for a life outside of an institution. It appears that developing 
such goals, or even the skills needed to achieve such goals, is 
not part of her treatment plan. In fact, her chart does not 
articulate any long-term goals. Such failures are inconsistent 
with federal regulations that require the development of adequate 
treatment plans. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.61(c). 
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Treatment plans are not tailored to the needs of patient 
subpopulations, such as patients with cognitive impairments, 
persistent dangerous behaviors, and substance abuse, and patients 
who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity ("NGRI"). 
Metropolitan assigns generic interventions to these patients 
rather than developing targeted interventions geared toward their 
particular needs. 
Like the treatment plans in Program I, treatment plans in 
the adult units are completed and reviewed after unacceptably 
long delays. The infrequency of treatment team meetings leads to 
delayed treatment, poor interdisciplinary communication, 
inability to modify treatment in a timely manner, and 
unnecessarily prolonged hospitalization. 
Adequate treatment planning also requires that patients have 
genuine input into and understand their treatment plans and their 
implementation. Metropolitan's documentation reflects that the 
patients do not meaningfully participate in their treatment. For 
instance, during the treatment team meetings that we observed for 
C.D., S.G., and P.P., team members talked about the patients in 
the third person in front of them, frequently interrupted the 
patients, failed to discuss the patients' goals in front of them, 
and/or ignored the patients' legitimate concerns. During one of 
these meetings, staff's response to S.G.'s inquiry regarding his 
placement options was, "I wish I were a fortune teller" and "Your 
mom has to find a place." Similarly, S.G.'s psychiatrist 
entirely ignored S.G.'s repeated statement that he needed his 
medication changed. Our expert consultant subsequently confirmed 
that changes in S.G.'s medication regimen were clinically 
warranted. 
Further, Metropolitan's treatment teams often are 
uncoordinated, disorganized, and unstable. Also, while some 
teams carry comparatively light loads, others have many more than 
24 patients. More fundamentally, Metropolitan's treatment teams 
often appear to lack a common understanding of the patients' 
symptoms or problems that should drive treatment interventions. 
Treating psychiatrists do not verify that psychiatric and other 
interventions, particularly behavioral treatments, do not 
conflict. Also, many of the treatment team meetings that we 
observed concluded without an agreement among the team members on 
the modifications that had been or should be made to the 
treatment plan or any dialogue indicating a common understanding 
of, or response to, the patient's status. 
Metropolitan also has no mechanism to address patients' risk 
factors. The current procedure, whereby staff check a box on the 
admission risk assessment form to indicate if a patient is 
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suicidal, homicidal, an elopement risk, or a fire-setter, is not 
performed consistently. More importantly, these risk factors are 
not then tracked by treatment teams or integrated into the 
treatment plans. 
For instance, "fire-setter" or "homicidal" are identified in 
admission risk assessments for T.C., S.B., o.u., and Z.F., but 
these risks are neither addressed in the treatment plans nor 
tracked by the treatment teams. Z.F.'s admission risk assessment 
fails to identify suicidal behavior as a risk factor, although 
this patient had jumped off of a building approximately two years 
earlier. T.Eb.'s preliminary psychiatric evaluation does not 
contain a formalized risk assessment, despite his long history of 
psychotic illness, substance abuse, proclivity to assault others, 
and attempted elopement. Similarly, K.P.'s preliminary 
psychiatric evaluation lists no risk factors, notwithstanding his 
admission as a danger to others and his prior elopement from 
Metropolitan during a previous hospitalization. Further, there 
is no reference to the admission risk factors in the discharge 
notes. In general, Metropolitan lacks an adequate procedure to 
identify or track patterns of high-risk behavior or to establish 
thresholds to ensure early and timely intervention to reduce 
ongoing risk. 
In summary, Metropolitan's treatment planning for its adult 
patients substantially departs from generally accepted 
professional standards of care. These deficiencies subject 
patients to treatment that: (a) prolongs their psychiatric 
distress; (b) needlessly worsens or prolongs their difficulties 
with problem solving, memory, or attention, thereby exacerbating 
their disability; (c) unnecessarily exposes those with substance 
abuse problems to additional drug dependency; (d) needlessly 
extends their institutionalization; (e) exposes them to an 
increased risk of relapse after discharge; and (f) contributes to 
an overall lower quality of life. 
II. ASSESSMENTS 
Adequate assessment of a mental health patient for treatment 
planning purposes requires input from various disciplines, under 
the active direction and guidance of the treating psychiatrist, 
who is responsible for assuring that relevant patient information 
is obtained and considered. At Metropolitan, as at many mental 
health facilities, assessments typically are reflected in: (a) 
psychiatric assessments and diagnoses; (b) psychological 
assessments; (c) rehabilitation assessments; and (d) social 
history evaluations. 
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A. Psychiatric Assessments and Diagnoses 
In many respects, psychiatric assessments are the main 
vehicle establishing the patient's diagnoses, establishing safe 
and effective treatment, and providing direction for treatment 
planning. Yet, it appears that Metropolitan psychiatrists 
routinely diagnose their adult patients as having psychiatric 
disorders without clinical justification. As a result, patients' 
actual illnesses are not being properly treated, patients are 
exposed to potentially toxic treatments for conditions from which 
they do not suffer, patients are not provided appropriate 
psychiatric rehabilitation, and patients' options for discharge 
are seriously limited. 
In the majority of cases that we reviewed, the information 
gathered during the assessment process does not justify the 
patient's diagnoses. For instance, F.I. was diagnosed with 
schizoaffective disorder, although nothing in her history, her 
mental status examination, or her psychiatric progress note dated 
the week after admission indicated that she had any psychotic 
symptoms. Similarly, N.Cj.'s chart contained no support for his 
diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. Apart from his reported 
illiteracy, his diagnosis of mental retardation was also 
unsupported. 
Metropolitan psychiatrists diagnosed K.Sf. with, and 
prescribed two antidepressants for, a mood disorder, even though 
his records consistently indicated no evidence of a mood disorder 
of any kind. However, this patient does suffer from Huntington's 
Chorea, a degenerative neurological disease causing ever 
increasing dementia and severe abnormal movements. Although his 
chart identifies numerous occurrences of falls, poor balance, 
clumsy movement and poor gait, recorded by different staff within 
days of an ostensibly detailed psychiatric evaluation of his 
abnormal involuntary movements, that evaluation inexplicably 
identified no abnormal movements whatsoever. In numerous other 
cases, including D.I., L.E., I.Q., N.E., and S.G., the 
information gathered by facility psychiatrists during the 
assessment process did not justify the patients' diagnoses. 
Separately, many of Metropolitan's adult patients receive 
tentative and unspecific diagnoses (often referred to as "rule 
out" ("R/0") or "not otherwise specified" ("NOS") diagnoses), 
without being further assessed, at least as evidenced in their 
charts, to finalize these open diagnoses. For instance, U.E. has 
had a diagnosis of "psychotic disorder, NOS" since his admission 
to Metropolitan in 1997. His treating psychiatrist stated that 
no diagnostic work-up was performed to resolve this diagnosis 
because "that is the diagnosis [U.E.] came in with," an assertion 
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at odds with a psychiatrist's duty to attempt to identify the 
nature of his patient's illness. 
Erroneous and untimely psychiatric evaluations and diagnoses 
can lead to the wrong mix of treatments and interventions, 
thereby causing harm through ineffective, potentially deleterious 
treatment, and the withholding of appropriate interventions. It 
is clear that Metropolitan's practices are irreconcilable with 
generally accepted professional standards of care in this area, 
and that its patients experience harm and a significant risk of 
harm as a result. 
B. Psychological Assessments and Evaluations 
Like the other forms of patient assessments and evaluations 
at Metropolitan, psychological assessments and evaluations, with 
few exceptions, are inaccurate, incomplete, and uninformative. 
These poor assessments and evaluations contribute directly to bad 
treatment choices that, in turn, expose patients to actual or 
potential harm. In the context of patients' needs for 
psychological supports and adequate life skills, this harm takes 
the form of prolonged and/or exacerbated behavioral disorders and 
functional disabilities that, in turn, needlessly prolong 
patients' confinement in a highly restrictive environment and 
block their successful re-entry into the community. 
Metropolitan's policies generally provide that psychological 
assessments {which involve formal testing) and psychological 
evaluations {which do not involve formal testing) are to be 
performed when "clinically indicated." Yet, we found numerous 
instances where assessments and evaluations were warranted but 
not performed. Examples include M.H. and N.T. 
In fact, generally accepted professional standards of care 
for facilities such as Metropolitan dictate that, before a 
patient's treatment plan is developed, facility psychologists 
provide a thorough psychological assessment of the patient to 
assist the treating psychiatrist in reaching an accurate 
diagnosis and provide an accurate evaluation of the patient's 
psychological needs. As indicated above, this does not happen at 
Metropolitan. Moreover, as needed, additional psychological 
assessments should be performed early in the patient's 
hospitalization to assist with any psychiatric disorders that may 
need further study, such as "Rule Out," deferred, and "NOS" 
diagnoses. However, this rarely occurs at Metropolitan. As 
noted above, it is common for patients there to carry open, or 
unresolved, diagnoses for several years, which is a gross 
deviation from generally accepted professional standards of care 
that also contributes to ineffective, even harmful, treatments. 
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Further, based on our review of numerous patient charts, the 
psychological assessments and evaluations that were performed 
were generally strikingly poor, and more likely to lead to bad or 
ineffective interventions than good ones. The psychological 
assessment of N.Cj., for example, contains glaring weaknesses 
that render it of little use. The total analysis of this 
patient's intelligence is, "[p]atient said he never went to 
school and doesn't read or write." Regarding the patient's 
"strengths and coping style," the analysis is blank. Although it 
states that the patient has a history of assaultive behaviors and 
property destruction at the hospital, it provides no analysis of 
the antecedents, circumstances, causes, or consequences of this 
behavior, notwithstanding that these are the core elements of 
behavioral analysis. Thus, it provides none of the information 
essential to understand and correctly address his behavioral 
disorders. Similarly, the May 2, 2002 psychological assessment 
of N.E. advances numerous factual inaccuracies, various 
unintelligible statements, and a psychiatric diagnosis contrary 
to that used by the rest of the treatment team, with no apparent 
justification or explanation. 
A December 3, 2001 psychology assessment of K.Q. concludes, 
without support, that this patient's schizophrenia is not the 
cause of his dementia because his cognitive deficits "appear to 
exceed those associated with schizophrenia," notwithstanding that 
the opposite is likely true. Further, the assessment recommends 
that K.Q. undergo neurological testing, because the last such 
testing ostensibly had occurred 15 years earlier. In fact, 
K.Q.'s chart makes clear that he had undergone a thorough 
neurological exam at Metropolitan the previous month. 
A subsequent, October 10, 2002 "Functional Evaluation of 
Behavior" for K.Q., performed by two other Metropolitan 
psychologists, also is significantly flawed. Its analysis of 
"reenforcers," or factors that support various behaviors, lists 
items that K.Q. reportedly enjoys but provides no analysis as to 
how they affect his behaviors. Similarly, the summary and 
conclusion of the report list various factors that might 
contribute to the patient's negative behaviors but provide no 
analysis as to how or whether any of them actually have any 
relationship with those behaviors. Notwithstanding its stated 
purpose as a "functional evaluation" of this patient's behavior, 
the report is devoid of any evaluation or other support for its 
conclusion regarding this patient's behavioral disorders. 
Further, many Metropolitan patients suffer from acquired 
brain damage or primary neurological diseases, resulting, for 
instance, from motor vehicle accidents or strokes that affect 
cognitive function in a manner not typical of primary psychiatric 
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disorders. Nevertheless, Metropolitan lacks staff possessing an 
expertise in neuropsychology. Consequently, these patients 
receive inadequate or no assessments of their injuries, their 
treatment teams do not understand the nature of their cognitive 
deficits, and they receive misguided, ineffective treatments and 
interventions. 
M.C., for instance, is an 80-year-old patient who has a 
history of stroke and possible bipolar disorder. It was apparent 
from our interview of two psychologists who have worked with M.C. 
over several years that they do not know whether he had 
experienced one or multiple strokes, where in the brain the 
stroke(s) had occurred, or what the likely relationship is 
between the stroke(s) and this patient's cognitive and behavioral 
problems, one of which is "aggression." Although M.C.'s 
aggression strongly appears to be the result of behavioral 
disinhibition (often thought of as loss of "impulse control"), 
which is a phenomenon occurring in many victims of significant 
brain injury, the hospital's intervention is classes in anger 
management and coping skills - highly inappropriate treatments 
where brain injury produces, first, aggression resulting from 
behavioral disinhibition, rather than "anger," and, second, 
cognitive impairments that interfere with skill acquisition. 
Similarly, T.Q. suffered a traumatic brain injury from a 
motorcycle accident, and experiences significant short-term 
memory problems, difficulty concentrating, and explosive, 
unpredictable outbursts that are described as impulsive motor 
outbursts with little association to his actual emotional state. 
Notwithstanding that it is fundamental, in such cases, to perform 
a neuropsychological examination to determine the nature of the 
patient's memory deficits and to assist in identifying 
alternative learning methods to address severe cognitive 
deficits, the facility has not performed such an examination. 
Further, although he cannot remember, has difficulty 
concentrating, and has outbursts that probably are not caused by 
his temper, the facility has placed him in anger management 
classes. 
c. Rehabilitation Assessments 
Effective psychiatric rehabilitation derives from accurate 
and complete rehabilitation assessments. Rehabilitation 
assessments should identify the patient's life skills, cognitive 
abilities, and distinct strengths, weaknesses, likes, and 
dislikes. This information is fundamental to developing adequate 
treatment. Generally speaking, Metropolitan's rehabilitation 
assessments substantially depart from generally accepted 
professional standards of care. 
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A few of the rehabilitation assessments at Metropolitan 
provide good descriptions of patients' interests and skills. 
Typically, however, assessments fail to address patients' 
rehabilitation needs. In fact, the assessments indicate that 
many of Metropolitan's rehabilitation therapists lack even a 
basic understanding of psychiatric illnesses. Consequently, the 
assessments generally do not provide information that is 
necessary in developing appropriate rehabilitation goals and 
interventions. 
The February 22, 2002 rehabilitation assessment for K.P., 
for example, states that "[t]he patient has fair to poor 
treatment potential at this time due to the patient's attitude 
and lack of motivation to attend and participate in his treatment 
groups and also his response to his treatment plan." The 
assessment's focus on this patient's "attitude" and "lack of 
motivation" is troubling. This patient's record clearly 
identifies activities that he voluntarily undertakes, such as 
reading a certain genre of novels, but these are not identified 
in the assessment as potential bases for rehabilitation 
activities. Rather than serving as a basis for appropriate 
treatment, K.P.'s rehabilitation assessment saddles him with a 
negative prognosis for recovery. 
Major portions of S.G.'s rehabilitation assessments of 
February 7, 2002, and August 20, 2002, are incoherent. Further, 
the sections that are understandable reflect no knowledge of 
appropriate rehabilitation objectives. Finally, more than half 
of the August assessment, including its most incoherent portions, 
is identical to the February assessment. 
D. Social History Evaluations 
The social history evaluation should reliably inform the 
psychiatrist and other treatment team members regarding such 
fundamental factors as the circumstances surrounding the onset of 
the patient's illness, the history of the illness, and relevant 
family information, because these factors are often essential to 
forming an accurate diagnosis and developing adequate treatments 
and interventions. Additionally, an adequate social history 
evaluation permits treatment teams to learn from previously 
attempted interventions and to plan effectively for the patient's 
discharge. 
Some Metropolitan social history evaluations were thorough 
and complete. However, most contained significant factual 
omissions, apparent errors, or unresolved internal 
inconsistencies. Consequently, patients' social history 
evaluations were generally unreliable and often fostered 
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inadequate interventions around psychiatric needs, behavioral 
problems, and important life skill deficits. This is 
irreconcilable with generally accepted professional standards of 
care. 
For instance, the latest social history evaluation of U.C. 
states that "patient does not have a history of arrest prior to 
the instant case." Yet, it separately indicates that the patient 
had been arrested and convicted numerous times, including 
separate instances of "battery on a peace officer," "assault with 
a deadly weapon with great bodily harm," and "assault on a peace 
officer." The evaluation also indicates that the patient's 
mother had been mentally ill and had committed suicide when the 
patient was a child. Then, with no attempt to reconcile the 
previous observation, it suggests that the mother was last known 
to be living in a nursing home. Although patient histories 
inevitably will involve incomplete and sometimes inconsistent 
facts, the evaluator's failure to recognize and attempt to 
resolve facts having important treatment implications - such as 
whether the patient has a history of assaults and a mother who 
committed suicide - compromises diagnoses and treatment 
decisions, and exposes patients to harm and a significant risk of 
harm. 
The social history evaluation of N.D. contains similar 
obvious gaps and significant, unaddressed inconsistencies. 
Although the patient was 18-years-old as of the most recent 
social evaluation history, it irreconcilably states that "patient 
has had a long and serious history of dangerous behavior since 
age 18." Nowhere does this report detail the dangerous 
behaviors, discuss possible precipitants, or otherwise set forth 
information shedding light on this problem. 
E. Court Assessments 
A number of Metropolitan's adult patients are committed due 
to a not guilty by reason of insanity status ("NGRI"). 
Metropolitan prepares court reports assessing these patients, the 
content and quality of which are instrumental in shaping the 
court's decision whether to release the patient to a lower level 
of care. The format and content of the court reports, however, 
fail to provide the court adequate and accurate information and, 
consequently, contribute to needlessly maintaining patients in a 
highly restrictive setting when they qualify for a less 
restrictive environment. 
For instance, Metropolitan's court reports regarding M.C. 
did not recommend him for the conditional release program 
("CONREP") although his chart indicates that he consistently met 
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CONREP 1 S criteria - "person would not pose a substantial danger 
of physical harm to others if released into the community" -
since February 1999. 
Similarly/ all of U.T. 1 S records and court reports indicate 
his cooperativeness/ compliance/ and participation/ but he failed 
to meet CONREP 1 S criteria for release due to his reported lack of 
understanding of his illness and ability to cope with anger. 
Yet/ U.T. 1 S treatment plan did not focus on either of these two 
issues. These patients are exposed to unnecessarily restrictive 
treatment so long as the court 1 S decisions are based on 
incomplete and inaccurate analyses of the patients/ condition/ 
and the facility fails to provide treatments focused on the 
reasons for its patients/ hospitalization. 
III. DISCHARGE PLANNING AND PLACEMENT IN THE MOST INTEGRATED 
SETTING 
Within the limitations of court-imposed confinement/ 
federal law/ as interpreted through generally accepted 
professional standards of care/ requires that treatment teams/ 
with the leadership of psychiatrists and the support of the 
hospital administration/ actively pursue the timely discharge of 
patients to the most integrated/ appropriate setting that is 
consistent with patients/ needs. Olmstead v. L.C. 1 527 U.S. 581 
{1999). From the time of admission/ the factors that likely 
will foster viable discharge for a particular patient should be 
identified expressly/ through professional assessments/ and 
should drive treatment interventions. 
The discharge planning process for Metropolitan~s adult 
patients falls well short of these standards of care. 
Consequently/ patients are subjected to unnecessarily extended 
hospitalizations/ poor transitions/ and a high likelihood of 
readmission/ all of which result in harm. 
Metropolitan 1 S various policies indicate that planning for a 
patient 1 S discharge is an interdisciplinary effort that starts 
the day the patient arrives. However/ in practice/ 
Metropolitan 1 S discharge planning is done by the social worker 
alone/ near the end of the anticipated Metropolitan tenure/ and 
typically is limited to finding a residential facility that will 
take the patient and arranging for a clinical appointment after 
discharge. In a few instances/ individual staff make exceptional 
efforts to overcome largely bureaucratic discharge issues/ but 
such individual efforts are not sufficient to offset the 
facility 1 s more systemic shortcomings. 
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Based on our extensive chart review, treatment team 
discussion of discharge is generally limited to the type of 
setting to which the patient is likely to go. Apart from obvious 
factors, such as the absence of psychiatric symptoms, assaultive 
behaviors, and fundamental deficits in the activities of daily 
living, criteria for discharge are rarely considered or 
integrated in treatment planning. For instance, the causes of 
previously failed discharges or particular reasons for the 
patient's admission to a psychiatric institution are seldom 
considered and addressed. Also, the patient's strengths, 
preferences, and personal goals play virtually no meaningful role 
in discharge planning. 
Preparation for discharge while in the hospital appears to 
be almost nonexistent. In no instance could we determine that a 
treatment team actually had prepared a patient to transition to, 
or succeed in, a new setting. In fact, the provision of 
transition supports almost never was discussed in the numerous 
patient records that we extensively reviewed. Further, 
rehabilitation goals are couched - and functional recovery is 
evaluated - on the basis of patients' ability to engage in group 
therapy and leisure activities, not on expressed and demonstrated 
skills in work, school, or independent living. Finally, the 
patient plays virtually no significant role in the discharge 
process. 
Examples of these deficiencies can be found in many patient 
charts. K.C.'s discharge plan, for instance, is limited to a 
boilerplate discussion of housing issues. E.B.'s plan consists 
of a facility placement to an Institute for Mental Disease 
(typically a locked facility, oriented towards maintenance, with 
less oversight of patients than Metropolitan provides) "until she 
is able to get her self-destructive behavior under control and is 
less resistive to treatment . . . The patient will be assisted 
to get independently [sic] living skills training for herself. 
It is also hoped that the patient will enroll herself into 
vocational rehabilitation for continued schooling alternative 
[sic] . n 
In many respects, this patient's discharge plan underscores 
a failure within Metropolitan to accept responsibility for 
helping patients to recover and to gain behavioral control. The 
plan instead makes this a treatment goal for the next provider, 
while Metropolitan is to address "living skills." 
The discharge plan for D.D. is simply a list of generic 
criteria (~, "for 90 days will comply with meds, attend 70% of 
groups, comply with [activities of daily living], and free of 
[danger to self, danger to others] and AWOL attempts.") The plan 
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could apply to virtually every adult Metropolitan patient with 
any history of dangerousness; it is not individualized and says 
nothing about meaningful activity following discharge. 
N.T.'s discharge plan is limited to placement in a less 
restrictive environment. The paucity of care reflected in this 
plan is particularly glaring; this patient was readmitted to 
Metropolitan after only nine weeks of living in the community 
following her previous discharge, and although her treatment team 
should have focused in discharge planning on identifying and 
addressing the causes of her previously failed placement, it did 
not do so. The discharge plans for C.Hb. and N.D. similarly are 
essentially nonexistent. 
Metropolitan's failure to provide adequate, individualized 
discharge planning, that is integrated in treatment decisions, 
significantly deviates from generally accepted professional 
standards of care and contributes to unnecessarily prolonged 
hospitalization and to inappropriate, unsuccessful placements in 
other settings. As a consequence, patients are harmed or exposed 
to the risk of harm by the effects of prolonged 
institutionalization and by being denied a reasonable opportunity 
to live successfully in the most integrated, appropriate setting. 
IV. SPECIFIC TREATMENT SERVICES 
The provision of effective interventions for patients in 
care settings such as Metropolitan requires the integrated 
participation of various treatment services, the exact 
configuration of which is dictated by the individual patient's 
needs. As noted at Section I, above, Metropolitan's ability to 
provide integrated treatment is deficient. Further, many of 
these services, standing alone, substantially depart from 
generally accepted professional standards of care. 
A. Psychiatry Services 
Metropolitan's psychiatric supports and services grossly 
deviate from generally accepted professional standards of care, 
exposing patients to harm and a significant risk of harm. 
Generally speaking, Metropolitan's psychiatrists fail to direct 
their treatment teams adequately, which is an essential 
requirement of a mental health facility. More specifically, as 
discussed herein, they fail to exercise adequate and appropriate 
medical management and monitor appropriately medication side 
effects. Also, as discussed in more detail, at Sections I and 
II, above, and at Section IV.B.2., below, these psychiatrists 
fail to plan adequate and appropriate treatments, fail to 
integrate properly psychiatric, behavioral, and other services, 
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and fail to provide clinically justified assessments and 
diagnoses of psychiatric disorders. The resultant harm to the 
patients takes many forms, among them, inadequate and 
counterproductive treatment, serious physiological and other side 
effects from inappropriate and unnecessary medications, and 
excessively long hospitalizations. 
1. Medication Management 
It is a basic tenet of generally accepted professional 
standards of care that the use of psychotropic medication always 
should be justified by the clinical needs of a patient. 
Metropolitan fails to ensure that its adult population is 
afforded appropriate pharmacological treatment. 
In this regard, vulnerable patients are routinely prescribed 
inappropriate or unsafe medications without justification. 
Patients, for instance, who have documented diagnoses of alcohol 
and/or other substance abuse frequently receive high doses of 
benzodiazepines, psychotropic drugs which are professionally 
well-known to have a high potential for addiction. T.E., a 
patient with severe and persistent alcoholism for almost 30 
years, was prescribed Lorazepam, a benzodiazepine used for 
anxiety disorders. When interviewed, the treating psychiatrist 
was unable to state the side effects of this medication. It is 
widely known by professionals that the regular administration of 
Lorazepam is habit-forming and that Lorazepam is detrimental for 
patients, such as T.E., with a history of severe alcohol abuse. 
Similarly, benzodiazepines and anticholinergic agents carry 
a professionally well-known potential side effect of exacerbating 
cognitive decline. Nevertheless, numerous patients who suffer 
from memory or other cognitive deficits routinely receive these 
medications at Metropolitan. Similarly, Metropolitan's diabetic 
patients, obese patients, and patients with hyperlipidemia (the 
presence of excess fats or lipids in the blood) are prescribed 
medications professionally well-known to aggravate these 
conditions. Based upon documentation and interviews, it does not 
appear that these medications are justified or that the 
psychiatrists have considered safer and equally effective 
medications for these patient populations. 
In this regard, numerous Metropolitan patients, such as L.I. 
and U.H., have received older, so-called "typical" antipsychotic 
medications, such as haldol decanoate and lithium, for several 
years, without either improvement in their condition or 
documentation in their chart indicating that other, more commonly 
used "atypical" antipsychotic medications were considered or 
attempted. As a group, atypical antipsychotic medications are 
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generally regarded as equally effective as conventional 
antipsychotics, while having a lower propensity to produce 
movement disorders, such as drug-induced Parkinsonism (muscular 
rigidity, tremors, restricted speech, and gait disturbance), 
dystonia (uncontrollable muscle spasms), and tardive dyskinesia 
("TD") (involuntary, aimless movements of the tongue, face, 
mouth, jaw, or other body parts). Further, atypicals are 
generally considered to have a lower risk of producing cognitive 
dysfunction and akathisia (restlessness, subjective distress and 
agitation), than conventional medications, and, in some 
instances, may have therapeutic effects on TD. Accordingly, as a 
general matter, atypicals are the first choice among 
antipsychotic medications, and it is a gross deviation from 
generally accepted professional standards of care, absent 
individual considerations, to initiate a patient on conventional 
antipsychotic medications. 
Further, the use of multiple medications to address the same 
condition ("polypharmacy"), while possibly appropriate in some 
circumstances, always should be clinically justified. In many 
cases, including those of T.E., F.I., and S.G., Metropolitan's 
use of polypharmacy is unjustified. Unjustified polypharmacy can 
potentially harm patients by exposing them to, among others 
risks, unnecessary medication, harmful side effects, and harmful 
drug-to-drug interactions. 
Independent of the fact that patients frequently are 
medicated based upon clinically unjustified diagnoses, we note 
that Metropolitan's medication guidelines do not meet generally 
accepted professional standards of care. See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 482.25(b). Significant protocols for medication usage and 
management of side effects are outdated and incomplete. We would 
also flag for the State's consideration that generally accepted 
professional standards of care dictate that facilities such as 
Metropolitan use appropriate procedures to ensure patients are 
afforded safe and effective pharmacological treatment, including 
mechanisms to: (a} monitor practitioners' adherence to drug 
medication guidelines ("drug utilization evaluation" or "DUE"); 
(b) report and analyze adverse drug reactions ("ADR"); and 
(c) report, analyze, and document actual and potential variances 
in medication use ("medication variance reporting" or "MVR"). 
See Id. Metropolitan fails to meet these standards of care. 
Adding to this lack of protections, the functions of the two 
committees that are to provide oversight of medication use at 
Metropolitan - the Pharmacy & Therapeutics Committee ("P&T") and 
the Therapeutics Review Committee("TRC") - are poorly 
coordinated, overlapping, and disconnected. As a result, neither 
committee performs the critical, comprehensive review of 
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medication practices that is essential at a facility such as 
Metropolitan to assure adequate and safe treatment. 
2. Side Effect Monitoring 
Metropolitan fails to assess or monitor adequately side 
effects of medications and in particular the side effect TD. TD 
is associated with prolonged treatment with conventional 
antipsychotic medications. Metropolitan's psychiatrists are not 
adequately tracking patients' signs and symptoms of TD, nor are 
they adhering to appropriate precautions. In fact, without 
justification, these psychiatrists prescribe medications that are 
professionally known to be the main causes of TD to patients with 
a diagnosis and history of TD. This practice is a substantial 
departure from generally accepted professional standards of 
care. Relatedly, the hospital's internal pharmacological 
consultant agreed that certain medications, in particular 
anticholinergic agents, are over-prescribed at Metropolitan and 
that their use risks aggravating patients' TD. 
Moreover, Metropolitan's psychiatrists often appear to be 
confused as to which medications are associated with particular 
side effects. For example, N.S.'s psychiatrist told us that 
"Cogentin protects from TD," when this medication actually is 
professionally well-known to be detrimental for patients with TD, 
because it masks TD symptoms. When asked if Clozapine has any 
effects on the cardiovascular system, S.E.'s psychiatrist 
responded "[i]t is missing my mind [sic]." Cardiovascular 
effects are, in fact, the most common side effect of treatment 
with Clozapine. Moreover, Metropolitan's psychiatrists appear to 
confuse their role in monitoring side effects. One psychiatrist 
stated that he had sought a neurology consultation to rule out 
TD, although the detection of TD is generally accepted among 
professionals to be a core psychiatric competency. 
B. Psychology Services 
Metropolitan's provision of psychological services to its 
adult patients is fundamentally at odds with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. As discussed at Section II, 
above, assessments and evaluations that should shape 
psychological and other supports and services frequently are 
incomplete, inaccurate, and outdated and, consequently, are 
unreliable in identifying important elements of the patient's 
condition and shaping adequate interventions. Interventions 
often do not address assessed needs regarding functional skills 
and maladaptive behaviors, and those interventions actually 
addressing such needs typically are poorly conceived, excessively 
generic, and untherapeutic. The stated goals of psychological 
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interventions, which should serve to measure patient progress, 
are frequently inappropriate and unmeasurable. Further, the 
implementation of interventions is inconsistent and essentially 
unmonitored. For these reasons, interventions are not revised to 
account for patient progress or lack thereof. These deficiencies 
are irreconcilable with generally accepted professional standards 
of care and expose patients to harm and to risk of harm. 
1. Psychosocial/Rehabilitative Interventions 
The purpose of psychosocial and rehabilitative interventions 
is to improve a patient's ability to engage in more independent 
life functions, so that he can better manage the consequences of 
psychiatric distress and avoid decompensation in more integrated 
settings. To be effective, these interventions should address 
the patient's needs and should build on the patient's existing 
strengths. Further, according to generally accepted professional 
standards of care, they should occur at regular, frequent 
intervals. Nevertheless, it appears from our extensive chart 
review that, at Metropolitan, rehabilitative and psychosocial 
interventions are largely driven by what is available on a 
particular unit, not what is appropriate for a given patient, and 
occur on an irregular and infrequent basis. Metropolitan's off-
unit Stepping Stones and Psychosocial Rehabilitation programs 
were exceptions to this, but they are unavailable to the bulk of 
the facility's population. 
On the units themselves, patients most typically are 
assigned to groups depending upon what is available and what 
staff feel the patient can tolerate, regardless of need or 
indication. In this regard, many patients have a critical need 
for specialized treatment for problems such as substance abuse, a 
recognized psychiatric disorder, in addition to their underlying 
mental illness. The failure to provide specialized treatment for 
these dually diagnosed patients is a substantial departure from 
generally accepted professional standards of care. Nevertheless, 
Metropolitan often fails to identify and assess dually diagnosed 
patients. For instance, F.I. was not diagnosed with substance 
abuse although her psychiatric assessment included information 
that she has a history of this problem. Similarly, N.T.'s 
psychiatric assessment indicated an extensive history of 
substance abuse, with sobriety for the past four years. The 
psychiatrist, however, did not identify her substance abuse 
history. 
Even when identified and assessed, treatment plans do not 
address the needs of these patients. Substance abuse groups, for 
instance, were not scheduled for some patients in serious need of 
such interventions while relatively stable patients with remote 
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histories but no recent substance abuse were scheduled for this. 
For example, C.Nj., a 27-year-old man whose parents were both 
substance abusers and who himself has a long history of 
polysubstance dependence, had no interventions addressing this 
problem in his treatment plan, and there were no substance abuse 
groups on his schedule. I.Q. was not assigned to a substance 
abuse group in spite of the fact that his Axis I diagnosis is 
alcohol-induced persisting dementia. 
Metropolitan patients are expected to attend the groups on 
their schedule, and, for the majority of patients, group 
attendance is the short-term, and often, long-term treatment 
goal. However, without a specific goal, or intended outcome, for 
a particular treatment, it is not possible to determine whether 
the treatment's objective is achieved. Further, patients' 
responses to treatment were virtually never recorded in treatment 
plans, social work evaluations, or rehabilitation assessments. 
Thus, with respect to on-unit rehabilitation, which is all the 
rehabilitation that the majority of Metropolitan patients 
receive, it is clear that psychiatric rehabilitation activities 
serve little purpose other than to fill the day and structure the 
unit's operations. This is an extraordinary failure of care. 
In addition, on-unit rehabilitation groups are not reliably 
offered as scheduled. We sampled 23 patients, from different 
units, at a mid-morning or mid-afternoon time point other than 
mealtime. Of these patients, only two clearly could be 
determined to be engaged in an activity. Very few groups 
occurred as scheduled, representing a very small proportion of 
patients on each unit. Patients spend strikingly little time in 
a treatment or rehabilitation program. 
2. Behavioral Supports 
Generally accepted professional standards of care dictate 
that patients receive appropriate behavioral interventions when: 
(a) their behaviors place them or others at risk of harm or 
otherwise significantly limit their ability to function in a 
noninstitutional setting; and (b) these behaviors are driven by 
factors that are susceptible to effective behavioral 
interventions. A determination whether behavioral supports are 
clinically warranted begins with an assessment of the challenging 
behavior and why it occurs. 
For instance, to the extent that a patient's behaviors are 
purely the result of delusions or hallucinations, behavioral 
interventions are less likely to be appropriate. Often, however, 
challenging behaviors are driven by factors as simple as a need 
for attention or an aversion to a noisy environment, factors 
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readily susceptible to effective behavioral interventions. In 
any case, without an adequate assessment of why challenging 
behaviors occur, it is not possible to determine whether 
behavioral interventions are necessary and appropriate and, if 
so, the form those interventions should take. 
By contrast, Metropolitan's approach is to provide 
behavioral supports, in the form of a "Special Treatment Plan," 
for patients experiencing high rates of seclusion, restraint, or 
one-to-one supervision. However, those patients who are not 
disruptive but nevertheless have significant behavioral needs -
such as extreme withdrawal, isolation, anxiety, and avoidance 
behaviors - rarely, if ever, receive behavioral supports. 
Further, our expert consultants identified numerous patients who, 
given their high rates of seclusion, restraint, or one-to-one 
supervision, warranted behavioral supports, even according to 
Metropolitan's practice, but nevertheless did not receive them. 
More particularly, a sizable number of patients suffer from 
chronic illnesses that are resistant to traditional treatment, 
such as schizoaffective disorder and polysubstance abuse (~, 
L.I.), persistent disruptive or maladaptive behaviors (~, 
N.D.), cognitive impairments with deficits in self-care (~, 
T.P.), lack of motivation to participate in treatment or be 
discharged to a lower level of care (~, T.Eb.), and severe and 
persistent self-abuse (~, F.I.) and aggression (~, N.Cj.; 
D.I.), that clearly clinically warranted the development of 
behavioral plans which, in fact, were not developed. 
K.P.'s chart indicates that he has been at Metropolitan for 
most of the past 12 years, is extremely violent at times and does 
not have a Special Treatment Plan, apparently because the 
previous plan was ineffective and therefore discontinued. N.T. 
has made several suicide attempts and repeatedly has engaged in 
self-injurious behavior, but she does not have a Special 
Treatment Plan to help her to address these behaviors. According 
to her chart, D.N.H. has a history of yelling and screaming, 
hitting other patients and staff, and self-abusive behaviors. 
She also may have mental retardation. Her chart indicates that 
she does not have a Special Treatment Plan, and it does not 
identify any other interventions to assist her in addressing 
these behaviors. Metropolitan clearly is not identifying and 
providing adequate behavioral supports for a large number of its 
patients having significant behavioral needs, and this is wholly 
inconsistent with generally accepted professional standards of 
care. 
Even when behavioral plans are developed, they typically are 
poorly coordinated with other interventions and, on their face, 
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are inadequate. Analyses of behaviors are inadequate, individual 
psychotherapy is not goal-directed or individualized, and the 
plans are too simplistic to make a difference in patients who 
have persistent and severe mental illness. Documentation 
indicates that psychiatrists are not aware of their patients' 
behavioral plans, nor is there any integration of these plans and 
the patients' pharmacological treatment. N.Cb.'s Special 
Treatment Plan highlights this lack of integration. It 
systematically withdraws his access to treatment groups which he 
enjoys and which presumably are intended to help him, independent 
of his behavioral control problems. 
Patients in need of this treatment are not only denied 
adequate treatment and, consequently, exposed to prolonged 
hospitalization, but also exposed to potentially serious risks of 
physical harm. In 2001, D.S. swallowed batteries, screws, 
packets of mustard, and paper, resulting in surgery in December 
2001 to remove these objects. So long as D.S. is denied adequate 
and effective treatment, he is at continued risk of this 
behavior. Similarly, so long as D.D., who has a history of 
aggression, does not receive effective, integrated treatment, 
both he and his fellow patients are at continued risk of 
assaultive behavior, and he likely will be subject to ongoing 
restraint and seclusion as a result of this behavior. K.Ej. is 
at continued risk of self-abusive behaviors so long as she does 
not receive a behavioral therapy program. 
C. Nursing and Unit-Based Services 
Metropolitan's adult unit nursing services are 
irreconcilable with generally accepted professional standards of 
care and treatment. Nursing and other unit staff fail to 
adequately: (a) monitor, document, and report patients' 
symptoms; (b) document the administration of medications; (c) 
provide a therapeutic environment; and (d) participate in the 
treatment team process. These deficiencies expose patients to 
harm and a significant risk of harm. 
Many nursing and unit staff appear to lack adequate support, 
training, and supervision. Metropolitan leadership does not 
encourage these staff to communicate with other team members to 
anticipate and minimize problems. Consequently, nursing and unit 
staff respond to patient needs in a largely reactive way, often 
subjecting Metropolitan's patients to excessive and inappropriate 
uses of medication, seclusion and restraints, inadequate and 
ineffective therapeutic interventions, and needlessly long 
hospitalization. 
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1. Monitoring, Documenting, and Reporting Symptoms 
As indicated in Section I, above, for the treatment team to 
evaluate the adequacy of implemented interventions, staff must 
monitor, document, and report patients' symptoms. For 
psychiatrists to prescribe medications and psychologists and 
therapists to properly oversee therapeutic interventions, they 
must rely upon nursing and other unit staff to document and 
report symptomology. 
As noted at Section I, above, Metropolitan treatment plans 
do not adequately define the criteria or target variables by 
which treatments and interventions are to be assessed, nor do the 
plans identify how and when these factors should be monitored. 
Consequently, nursing and unit staff do not monitor patients' 
problems and symptoms adequately, and treatment teams lack 
significant information regarding the efficacy of interventions. 
Further, we found no formal documentation system or 
objective exchange of substantive information between staff 
during shift changes or at other relevant times. Without a 
reliable system of recording and tracking patients' progress 
relative to identified goals and problems, chart entries 
regarding a patient's status have little value. Metropolitan's 
lack of substantive documentation and information regarding 
patient progress hinders the provision of adequate treatment, 
needlessly exposing patients to potentially ineffective 
interventions and prolonging their institutionalization. 
2. Medication Administration 
Generally accepted professional standards of care require 
that staff properly complete the Medication Administration 
Records ("MARs"). MARs list the current medications, dosages, 
routes, and times that medications are to be administered. 
Generally accepted professional standards of care also dictate 
that staff sign the MARs at the time the medication is 
administered. Completing the MARS properly is fundamental to 
maintaining patient safety and reducing the likelihood of 
medication errors and adverse drug effects. If staff members 
fail to document the medications they are administering, it may 
result in patients not receiving medications or receiving 
medications multiple times. Further, generally accepted 
professional standards of care require that all "controlled" 
substances be signed out on the control log and that there be an 
accurate count at all times of such medications. 
During our tours, we observed a number of instances in which 
staff failed to sign the MARs for medications that reportedly had 
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been administered. In addition, controlled medications were 
administered without staff signing the control log. Staff's 
failure to properly sign the MARs or the control log should be 
considered a medication error and documented as such, and follow-
up should occur to reduce the likelihood that such errors will 
continue to occur. However, Metropolitan fails to follow such 
procedures. 
Moreover, generally accepted professional standards of care 
dictate that staff who administer medication know: (a) what the 
medication is for; (b) its expected results and their timing; and 
(c) the symptoms of the disorder that it is targeting. 
Metropolitan's nurses generally are unfamiliar with the purposes 
of the medication they administer and unable to identify the 
expected results or their timing. Also, a number of nurses we 
interviewed were unable to identify the symptoms associated with 
the disorder for which a particular medication was prescribed. 
If nurses do not understand patients' disorders or the purposes 
of the medications that they are administering, they lack 
information fundamental to their responsibilities to assess and 
report their patients' progress. This shortcoming is a 
substantial departure from generally accepted professional 
standards of care, and places residents at risk of harm from 
ineffective or inappropriate treatment interventions. 
Finally, while not necessarily rising to the level of a 
violation of federal law, we flag for the State's consideration 
that staff administering medications were not observed to 
properly educate patients about their medications, the expected 
effects or the expected side effects. These failures are not 
consistent with generally accepted professional standards of 
care. 
3. Provision of Therapeutic Activity 
At Metropolitan, nursing and unit staff generally do not 
appear to understand their roles in the therapeutic process, nor 
do they appear to be familiar with basic therapeutic tools or 
treatment modalities. In this regard, we observed a number of 
skilled nursing facility ("SNF") unit patients in their beds 
during the day time with the privacy curtains pulled around them 
and their doors closed. It appeared that they had not had 
contact with anyone for hours. From our observations, 
Metropolitan was not providing any stimulation or therapeutic 
activities for these individuals. This complete lack of 
interaction for patients such as these, with cognitive and memory 
deficits, causes harm in that it exacerbates their symptoms. 
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Even more critically, some patients, such as E.D. and K.E., 
are bed-bound. We saw no indication that Metropolitan staff 
assisted them to get out of bed on a daily basis. Generally 
accepted professional standards of care require that patients be 
assisted out of bed on a daily basis, unless there is a medically 
justified and documented reason to maintain the person in a "bed 
bound" status. We did not find such justification for either of 
these patients. Among other concerns, prolonged periods in a 
supine position places patients at serious risk of skin 
breakdown. This failure is at odds with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. 
D. Pharmacy 
It is generally accepted professional practice for 
pharmacists to review individual patients' medication regimens on 
a regular, at least quarterly, basis. Such a review should 
encompass all of the medications prescribed (not just psychiatric 
drugs and "as-needed" {also known as "pro re nata" or "PRN") 
medications) and should include documentation of any 
communication between the pharmacists and physicians regarding 
concerns, potential medication interactions, and the need for 
laboratory testing. Metropolitan pharmacists review patients' 
medication regimens, for example, when new medication orders are 
issued or lab results are returned. However, they are not 
systematically reviewing patients' medication regimens. 
Moreover, when pharmacists' review of medications does identify 
problems, adequate follow-up does not occur to ensure that 
physicians have reviewed the pharmacists' recommendations and 
taken appropriate action. Numerous Pharmacy Intervention forms 
we reviewed identified problems and actions that needed to be 
taken, such as the completion of laboratory work. However, we 
were unable to confirm from the documentation provided that such 
actions actually were taken in a timely manner. This is a 
significant deviation from generally accepted professional 
standards of care. These failures are particularly troubling, 
given the unjustified and outdated combinations of medications 
that often are prescribed for Metropolitan's patients. 
E. General Medical Services 
Generally accepted professional standards of care dictate 
that patients be provided adequate and timely preventative, 
routine, specialized, and emergency medical services. 
Metropolitan's provision of general medical care, however, 
deviates substantially from these standards. Metropolitan has 
not adequately defined the primary care physicians' 
responsibilities, nor the triggers for initial assessments, 
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ongoing care, and re-assessments. It has not established 
protocols governing physician-nurse communication, or mechanisms 
integrating patients' mental health and medical care. 
Because staff fail to monitor, document, and report 
patients' symptoms, treatment teams lack objective data to 
determine whether treatments addressing patients' general medical 
issues should be modified. Many patients receive unspecific or 
vague diagnoses that contribute to inadequate, inappropriate, or 
no medical treatment. For instance, diagnoses such as "Other 
Convulsions," given to K.D., K.Eb., M.C., E.D., K.E., Ep.G., and 
U.O., and "Paralysis, Unspecified," given to M.C. and X.F., are 
not adequate to guide treatment. Further, Metropolitan lacks a 
means to obtain medical records consistently from hospitals 
providing treatment to Metropolitan patients. 
Separately, Metropolitan's after-hours medical coverage 
places patients at serious risk of harm in the case of a 
psychiatric emergency. It is a generally accepted professional 
standard of care in an in-patient facility such as Metropolitan 
that at least one psychiatrist be on-site at all times or, at a 
m1n1mum, be available by telephone and able to come to the 
facility as needed. At Metropolitan, after-hours medical 
coverage (typically from 5 p.m. - 8 a.m.) is provided by primary 
care physicians without any psychiatry support. Moreover, 
according to the chairman of psychiatry and six staff 
psychiatrists, these physicians have not been formally 
"privileged" in psychiatry. Rather, "they basically learn on the 
job." Physicians who are not "privileged" in psychiatry have not 
received critical training in psychiatry or in dealing with 
psychiatric emergencies, including the assessment of 
dangerousness, suicidality, or behavioral disorders that may 
require restrictive interventions. Such a practice assumes that 
psychiatric emergencies do not occur after-hours, is a gross 
deviation from generally accepted professional standards of care, 
and places patients at great risk of harm. 
There are numerous instances in which Metropolitan has 
failed to provide necessary medical care to its patients. For 
example, T.N. inserted a metal object into her abdomen. The 
object was never removed, causing an abscess on her abdomen and 
severe abdominal pain. E.E., an ambulatory patient, fell in 
April, 2001, while at Metropolitan, fracturing his right femur. 
The community hospital determined that he was "not a candidate" 
for repair of his femur. That hospital also detected a mass in 
his left lung but failed to perform a biopsy. As of May, 2002, 
Metropolitan had never questioned the community hospital's 
determinations or ordered a biopsy. Further, since this injury, 
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E.E. has been permanently bed-bound, has experienced multiple 
bouts of pneumonia, has been placed on a feeding tube and has had 
numerous pressure sores, ranging in severity from Stage II (which 
involve a partial loss of skin layer that presents clinically as 
an abrasion, blister, or shallow crater) to Stage IV (meaning 
soft tissue is exposed to the bone, the most severe 
classification of pressure ulcers) . 
F. Infection Control 
Generally accepted professional standards of care require 
that infections and communicable diseases be tracked and trended 
in an institutional setting such as Metropolitan. When analysis 
of trends reveals potential problems, it is standard practice for 
corrective action plans to be developed and implemented. 
After we stated in our May 13, 2003 letter that Metropolitan 
does not systemically track or trend infections or communicable 
diseases, the State referred us to infection control committee 
minutes indicating that Metropolitan does track infections and 
communicable diseases. However, neither in our interview of one 
of the facility's two infection control nurses nor in any 
documentation that we reviewed, including the infection control 
committee minutes, were we able to detect that the. facility takes 
appropriate interventions to minimize the risk of infections. 
For instance, we saw no evidence that the facility monitors 
living units for infectious contaminants and takes measures to 
eliminate or prevent such contaminants, although generally 
accepted professional standards of care dictate that this be 
performed as part of a standard infection control program. In 
fact, the infection control nurse told us that infections are 
addressed on an individual basis (although, here again, we saw no 
documentation in the numerous charts that we reviewed indicating 
that nurses had provided treatment or education to an individual 
patient to resolve an infection and prevent its reoccurrence) . 
In this regard, as noted in Section VII, below, we saw urine-
soaked laundry on the floors of patients' bedrooms and in 
uncovered bins in patient-inhabited areas. The obvious presence 
of such potential infection sources in living units is at odds 
with adequate infection controls and places patients at risk of 
harm from infection. We further note that it also did not appear 
that the facility's quality assurance system amalgamated and 
assessed its infection control data. 
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G. Dental Services 
At Metropolitan, dental care substantially departs from 
generally accepted professional standards. Consequently, 
patients experience harm and are at risk of harm. 
Many Metropolitan patients' dental health deteriorates 
because of long delays in, or the complete absence of, dental 
treatment. These deficiencies appear to be caused by, among 
other factors, Metropolitan's failure to: (a) take patients to 
dental appointments; (b) identify and address the causes for 
patient refusals to participate in dental appointments; and 
(c) follow-up on recommendations made by the dentist. Patients 
whose dental care appears to have been compromised because of 
these factors include Tu.Q., E.H., K.N., Q.C., Kb.N., F.E., 
Kp.E., Mz.H., Dm.D., O.U., X. F., X.X., M.C., C.Hb., T.N., U.O., 
K. B . , C . W. , K. Ep . , and I . Q . 
Generally accepted professional standards of care also 
dictate that appropriate efforts be made to restore patients' 
natural teeth before resorting to the irreversible extraction of 
teeth. However, several Metropolitan patients, including K.P., 
M. C. , B. M. , S . N. , u. H. , Tu. Q. , N. G. , and E. H. , have had teeth 
extracted without adequate clinical justification to support such 
decisions. 
Further, to avoid medical complications, it is essential 
that the dentist take account of diseases, medications, and 
physical disabilities that have a major impact on dental health. 
Individuals with diabetes, for example, may be at increased risk 
for developing mouth infections. They may also take longer to 
heal from dental procedures, increasing their risk of infection. 
Individuals with certain cardiovascular conditions, such as 
mitral valve prolapse, need to receive certain antibiotics prior 
to undergoing dental procedures to prevent an infection of the 
lining of the heart, which can be life-threatening. However, 
Metropolitan often fails to document significant health 
information in its patients' dental records that would indicate 
that its dentists have accounted for such important factors in 
providing treatment. In addition, it is a generally accepted 
professional standard of care that dentists document their 
findings and their plan of care. Metropolitan rarely maintains 
adequate documentation in these areas. As a result, patients are 
at risk of receiving inadequate treatment and/or treatment that 
jeopardizes their physical health. 
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H. Physical and Occupational Therapy 
Generally accepted professional standards of care provide 
that patients who require physical therapy ("PT") or occupational 
therapy ("OT") to regain, maintain, or improve functioning 
receive such services in a timely manner in accordance with an 
individualized plan of care. This plan of care should be 
integrated into the patient's overall treatment plan. In 
addition to the direct services provided by the physical and/or 
occupational therapists, PT and OT programs should be 
incorporated into patients' daily activities, whenever 
appropriate. 
As with other treatment plan goals and objectives, it is a 
generally accepted professional standard of care that PT and OT 
goals and objectives be measurable, observable, and functional. 
Although many of Metropolitan's OT goals appear to meet this 
criteria, many of its PT goals do not, making it impossible to 
determine if patients have met their goals or if the goals are 
appropriate to meet their needs. Moreover, generally accepted 
professional standards of care require that physical and 
occupational therapists provide staff with clear, individualized 
guidelines regarding positioning and transferring patients who 
cannot complete these activities independently. This is 
essential to both patient and staff safety. Metropolitan has no 
such guidelines. These deficiencies depart largely from 
generally accepted professional standards of care. 
Other impediments to patients receiving adequate PT and OT 
services are Metropolitan's failures to take them to scheduled 
appointments, provide adequate staffing, or address appropriately 
patients' refusals to participate in PT and/or OT sessions. 
Numerous appointments for numerous patients are cancelled due to 
a lack of transportation, patient refusals, or patients or staff 
being "unavailable" at the time of the appointments. Examples of 
patients who experienced these issues include B.N., N.Q., S.Q., 
Ef .H., D.B., Cj .D., E.H., and O.K. 
Staff on certain units stated that they require patients to 
use wheelchairs because they are afraid that walkers and canes 
could be used as weapons. However, we found no evidence that 
Metropolitan had completed assessments to determine whether 
individual patients could use canes and walkers safely on their 
units, or if the patients could be placed on another unit where 
such adaptive equipment could be used safely. Other patients, 
such as S.M., are blind and could utilize walking canes to 
increase their level of independent mobility, but Metropolitan 
has not provided them with the equipment or the requisite 
- 31 -
training. Rather than promoting patients' independence, 
Metropolitan's practices are fostering their functional decline. 
Wheelchairs need to be fitted properly for the individuals 
using them. A number of patients, such as M.C. are in 
wheelchairs that do not fit them and, consequently, provide 
inadequate postural support and body alignment that can result in 
injury or medical complications. For instance, patients 
diagnosed with Huntington's Chorea are at risk of contracting 
respiratory diseases. When placed in a wheelchair providing 
incorrect postural support, their risk may be significantly 
increased. We observed one such patient, S.U., seated in a 
wheelchair with his posture collapsed, making it more difficult 
for him to breathe. 
I. Dietary Services 
Metropolitan's dietary services substantially depart from 
generally accepted professional standards of care, which require 
that patients' weight and other dietary issues be addressed 
comprehensively by their treatment teams. Medical conditions 
such as hypertension or Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
("COPD") can be exacerbated by obesity, and many of the 
medications that Metropolitan frequently uses, such as Depakote, 
Thorazine, and Haldol can cause significant weight gain. 
Further, the charts of several Metropolitan adult patients 
prescribed such medications, such as E.E., Mz.H., Q.C., N.K., and 
F.E., indicate that these patients are at risk of significant 
health problems because of their weight. However, most of the 
treatment plans that we reviewed for patients appearing to have 
significant weight problems did not address their weight. 
Further, the treating psychiatrist and the treatment teams did 
not appear to consider a patient's weight when determining which 
psychotropic medications to prescribe. 
Generally accepted professional standards of care dictate 
that individuals at risk of aspirating be evaluated adequately 
and have mealtime protocols developed by their treatment team 
that include specific instructions for staff on topics such as 
the texture of the food, the patient's position during and 
immediately after meals, and the level of supervision staff need 
to provide. These protocols also should address other activities 
involving swallowing, such as tooth brushing, dental 
appointments, and medication administration. Finally, staff 
responsible for implementing these protocols must be able to do 
so correctly. Metropolitan's services in this regard 
substantially depart from generally accepted professional 
standards of care. 
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It appears that a number of Metropolitan patients with 
aspiration problems, such as X.F., B.M., E.E., Q.C., E.T., 
D.N.H., N.K., H.S., Kv.Q., M.C., C.K., S.U., E.D., and T.T., lack 
these protections. In some cases, evaluations had been completed 
which clearly identified serious problems, but Metropolitan had 
failed to follow-up on the resulting recommendations. It appears 
that no specific, individualized mealtime protocols are available 
for staff who are assisting patients to eat, and we saw no 
mechanism enabling staff to identify those patients who are at 
high risk for aspiration. Nor was there any indication that such 
patients are adequately monitored. We also found no 
individualized written instructions regarding other activities 
involving swallowing for patients at risk for aspiration. 
Consequently, it appears that Metropolitan's patients with 
aspiration problems are at risk of harm. 
In addition, at the time of our visit, there were six 
patients on the SNF units who were fed by tubes. Generally 
accepted professional standards of care for such individuals 
require that efforts be made to address the underlying causes of 
the person's inability to eat by mouth so that these feeding 
tubes, which, among other concerns, pose infection risks, can be 
removed. However, we found no evidence these activities were 
occurring at Metropolitan. As a result, these patients are at 
risk of long-term, unjustified use of feeding tubes. 
V. DOCUMENTATION OF PATIENT PROGRESS 
As noted in Section II.A, above, Metropolitan's 
psychiatrists do not chart their patients' progress with 
sufficient frequency. Further, the substance of the 
psychiatrists' progress notes at Metropolitan grossly departs 
from generally accepted professional standards of care. 
Psychiatrists often fail to: (a) document significant 
developments in their patient's condition; (b)describe target 
symptoms; (c) identify a patient's response to treatments; (d) 
document rationales for changes in pharmacological treatment; (e) 
identify medication side effects; (f) assess the use of PRN 
medications; (g) explain changes in diagnoses; (h) explain the 
rationale for polypharmacy; and (i) assess the patient's 
competence on an ongoing basis. These deficiencies directly 
impede adequate assessment of patients' progress and evolving 
needs during hospitalization and indirectly lead to ineffective 
and even harmful treatment. 
In fact, the progress notes of Metropolitan's psychiatrists 
often suggest unfamiliarity with patients' status. For instance, 
on numerous occasions F.I.'s psychiatrist wrote that she was 
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stable, without noting that she had been in seclusion and/or 
restraints that same month for being assaultive or self-abusive. 
Similarly, in August 2002, N.Cj. reportedly swallowed batteries 
and was referred to a medical consultant. The psychiatrist's 
subsequent progress notes ignore this event and report nothing 
about the status of the medical follow-up. The 2001 monthly 
progress notes for K.E. contain no justification for the 
patient's medication regimen, fail to mention a number of his 
medications, and include no discussion of his frequent use of 
"as-needed" {also known as pro re nata or "PRN"} medication or 
his response to treatment. 
VI. RESTRAINTS, SECLUSION AND "AS-NEEDED" MEDICATIONS 
Metropolitan's use of seclusion, restraints, and "as-needed" 
medications for its adult patients substantially departs from 
generally accepted professional standards of care and exposes 
those patients to excessive and unnecessarily restrictive 
interventions. Generally accepted professional standards of care 
dictate that seclusion and restraints: {a} will be used only 
when persons pose an immediate safety threat to themselves or 
others and after a hierarchy of less restrictive measures has 
been considered and/or exhausted; (b) will not be used in the 
absence of, or as an alternative to, active treatment, as 
punishment, or for the convenience of staff; {c) will not be used 
as a behavioral intervention, and {d) will be terminated as soon 
as the person is no longer a danger to himself or others. 
Generally accepted professional standards also instruct that PRN 
psychotropic medications should be used only as a short-term 
measure to relieve a patient in acute distress, not as means to 
escape mild, possibly healthy, discomfort or as a repeatedly 
deployed substitute for treatment. 
Metropolitan uses seclusion, restraints, and PRN medications 
for its adult patients in the absence of adequate treatment and, 
in some instances, as punishment. Many instances of seclusion, 
restraints, or PRN medication result from adult patients 
exhibiting symptoms of their mental health disorders. Without 
the benefit of appropriate medication and therapeutic 
interventions, patients lack the means to control such symptoms. 
Thus, inadequate mental health treatment exposes patients to 
excessive use of seclusion, restraints, or PRN medications. 
Moreover, we found numerous incidents in which patients exhibited 
behaviors that initially were not a danger to themselves or 
others, but which escalated with staff involvement into dangerous 
situations. We also found that documentation often did not show 
that staff first attempted less restrictive interventions before 
using seclusion, restraints, or PRN medications. 
- 34 -
When seclusion, restraints or PRN medications are frequently 
used, it is generally accepted professional practice for the 
treatment team to reassess interventions and, as necessary, 
modify the treatment plan to ensure that adequate measures are 
identified and implemented. Frequent use of seclusion, 
restraints and/or PRN medications is an indicator that an 
individual's diagnosis is erroneous and/or that the treatment 
plan is inappropriate. Metropolitan fails to review routinely 
its adult patients' treatment plans after such episodes. 
Numerous patient charts identify frequent episodes of 
seclusion, restraint, or PRN medication without related 
documentation indicating that the team adequately assessed the 
patient, developed and/or reviewed the treatment plan, or 
considered alternative interventions. For example, D.I. was in 
walking restraints 24-hours-a-day for almost the entire month of 
March 2002, and was in restraints another 41 times between April 
7 and November 11, 2002. T.N. was placed in wrist and ankle 
walking restraints continuously April 27 through 29, 2002, and 
again from April 30 through May 9, 2002. U.H. was placed in 
seclusion and/or restraints on 25 occasions between February 8 
and November 13, 2002, with restraint episodes lasting between 30 
minutes and 23 hours. D.D. was kept in walking restraints 24-
hours-a-day April 1 through May 3, 2002, and again May 9 through 
12, 2002. For over six months between January and July 2002, 
C.X. was kept in walking restraints during waking hours and 
placed in a locked seclusion room to sleep. It appears that no 
mechanism was in place to alert treatment teams to these 
incidents of seclusion and restraint, and that treatment teams 
did not meet routinely to review and modify, as appropriate, the 
treatment interventions of these patients. We also could not 
locate documentation indicating that other, less restrictive 
alternatives had been attempted prior to restraining or secluding 
patients. 
Further, Metropolitan fails to comply with generally 
accepted professional standards of care that require physicians 
or other licensed medical practitioners to conduct face-to-face 
assessments of patients placed in seclusion or restraints within 
one hour of the initiation of the seclusion and/or restraints. 
D.I.'s chart indicates that he was placed in seclusion and/or 
restraints at least five times in October 2001 without a signed 
physician's order denoting a face-to-face assessment within the 
required time frame, and on February 2, 2002, he was kept in 
seclusion and/or restraints for more than 11 continuous hours 
without a timely assessment by a physician. L.T. was placed in 
physical restraints seven times between November 10 and December 
29, 2001, without a physician's assessment, including one episode 
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that lasted 24 hours. U.Cs. was placed in seclusion and 
restraints at least 14 times between February 25 and September 8, 
2001, without evidence in his chart of any face-to-face 
assessments. 
According to generally accepted professional standards of 
care, bed side rails constitute physical restraints. Patients, 
particularly those experiencing significant cognitive 
difficulties, can become entangled in side rails when attempting 
to exit beds, and can be severely injured or killed, as a result. 
Where side rails are used, they must be part of a patient's 
treatment plan that reflects that they are the least restrictive 
.intervention then available and that alternative interventions 
are being explored to obviate their need. During our tours of 
the SNF units during the day, evening, and night shifts, most 
patients had their side rails up when they were in bed. None of 
the treatment plans reviewed for these patients documented that 
they were the least restrictive intervention. Moreover, there 
was no indication that Metropolitan had attempted to reduce the 
use of side rails and/or identify other, less dangerous 
alternatives. This places patients at risk of harm. Likewise, 
vest and soft wrist restraints should not be used without proper 
assessments that justify the need for them, and without treatment 
plans that include interventions designed to eliminate or 
minimize their use. Metropolitan is regularly using vest and 
soft wrist restraints with patients on the SNF units without 
proper justification and/or treatment planning. 
Separately, as indicated in Section IV.A, above, 
Metropolitan has no parameters governing the use of PRN 
medication. Because Metropolitan's psychiatrists frequently fail 
to review critically the use of PRN medications and patients' 
reactions to them, they are unable to refine patients' diagnoses 
and adjust routinely administered medications. Without adequate 
monitoring by psychiatrists of PRN medications, patients are at 
risk of being overly and/or improperly medicated. 
For example, psychiatrists' failure to review adequately the 
use of PRNs was evident in the chart of K.E., who was prescribed 
one PRN medication for insomnia and two PRN medications for 
agitation. This patient's psychiatric progress notes fail to 
justify the use of these medications, neglect even to mention one 
of them, do not describe the frequency of the PRN medication use, 
and do not provide the patient's response to these medications. 
This is particularly concerning because, during the period when 
this patient was prescribed a PRN medication for agitation, his 
chart reports that he was "weak" and "bed bound" and indicates 
that any agitation he may have had was limited to occasional 
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verbal outbursts in response to hands-on care. Similarly, during 
the treatment team meeting for S.G., a nurse reported that this 
patient had received eight PRN medications over the previous 
month and repeatedly had requested a change in his medication, 
but the psychiatrist did not critically review the use of S.G.'s 
PRN medications or his reactions to them. 
VII. PROTECTION FROM HARM 
We indicated in our May 13, 2003 letter that we would 
address protection from harm issues on a facility-wide basis in 
this letter. It is an essential component of generally accepted 
professional standards of care in congregate care facilities such 
as Metropolitan, to maintain an effective incident management 
system and a related quality assurance system to prevent harmful 
incidents and identify and correct deficiencies in care. 
However, Metropolitan's systems are themselves deficient and fail 
to protect its patients from avoidable harm. 
Metropolitan also fails to provide its patients a safe 
living environment. As was true of Program· I, Metropolitan's 
adult units contain environmental hazards, some of which pose 
risks of serious injury, illness, and death. The harm that 
Metropolitan's patients experience as a result of these 
deficiencies is multi-faceted, including physical and 
psychological abuse; physical injury; excessive and inappropriate 
use of physical and chemical restraints; inadequate, ineffective, 
and counterproductive treatment; and excessively long 
hospitalizations. 
A. Incident Management 
It is a generally accepted professional standard that, to 
ensure that patients are provided a reasonably safe environment, 
facilities such as Metropolitan maintain an effective incident 
management system, including mechanisms for: reporting; 
investigating thoroughly; tracking and trending; and identifying 
and monitoring implementation of appropriate corrective and 
preventative action. Metropolitan's incident management system 
is at odds with generally accepted professional standards of 
care and exposes its patients to actual and potential harm. 
Facility records indicate that, in Program I, which serves 
approximately 100 children and adolescents, for the period 
between May 1, 2001, and March 31, 2002, there were 131 patient-
against-patient assaults, 169 incidences of patients abusing 
themselves, and 74 accidental injuries. Between May 1, 2001, 
and April 30, 2002, there were 27 allegations of staff abuse. 
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In addition, based on an incomplete list provided by 
Metropolitan, between May 1, 2001, and April 30, 2002, there 
were six allegations of rape and an additional 28 instances of 
inappropriate sexual contact between children and adolescents. 
Of the 28 incidents of inappropriate sexual contact, an 
aggressor and/or victim was identified in 21 of them, indicating 
they were not consensual. During this same time period, 15 
suicide attempts and 23 elopements and/or attempted elopements 
occurred. 
Metropolitan's adult patients are also frequently exposed 
to harmful incidents. Between April 1, 2001, and March 31, 
2002, Metropolitan's adult patients were involved in 475 
patient-against-patient assaults, 310 incidences of patients 
abusing themselves, 304 accidental injuries, and 11 incidents of 
elopement or attempted elopement. In addition, between May 1, 
2001, and April 30, 2002, there were 42 allegations of patient 
abuse by staff. 
Many of these incidents left patients in need of medical 
treatment. Between April 1, 2001, and March 31, 2002, patients 
required first aid on 749 occasions, more extensive medical 
treatment on 114 occasions, and hospitalization on 61 occasions. 
Some individual examples illustrate the problem: 
On September 11, 2001, D.H. allegedly was hit in the face 
by another patient. D.H. was admitted to the hospital with a 
diagnoses of facial bruising and fracture of the nose and left 
eye socket. He was scheduled for plastic surgery. 
On January 10, 2002, although patients are not supposed to 
be in the employee cafeteria, F.I. gained access, broke a glass 
bottle on a bench, and swallowed some of the glass, leaving her 
with cuts in her mouth and small bits of glass in her lower 
intestine. 
On July 27, 2002, while on compound privileges with 13 
staff and 134 other patients, S.W. sustained a laceration to his 
face and neck that was 22 centimeters in length and one 
centimeter deep. The incident report indicates that 38 sutures 
were necessary to close the external wound and it was unknown 
how many sutures were necessary to close the internal damage. 
s.w. reported that he was attacked from behind. Two state-
issued razor blades made into a weapon were found in the grass 
near the unit's entrance. 
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1. Incident Reporting 
As the above examples indicate, Metropolitan's patients 
frequently are subjected to the most basic kinds of harm. 
Moreover, it appears that the frequency of these incidents is 
actually higher than what Metropolitan reports, because of 
multiple factors. As a threshold matter, Metropolitan's 
policies and procedures related to reporting and categorizing 
incidents are disjointed, uncoordinated and confusing. 
Consequently, there is a significant risk that incidents will 
not be reported or reported correctly. In this regard, the 
Hospital Police Department's {"HPD") Crime Statistics Report 
includes several incidents that were not reported or tracked by 
the facility on its list of "Special Incidents" {which involve 
significant harm, such as allegations of abuse, and actual or 
attempted elopement or suicide). Further, it appears that staff 
frequently do not formally report Special Incidents at 
Metropolitan or report them in writing days after they occur. 
This practice substantially departs from generally accepted 
professional standards of care, which require that staff who 
witness or first discover an incident submit a written report 
before the end of that person's shift. 
Incident reporting is further complicated for children and 
adolescents attending the school program. Metropolitan 
contracts with Los Angeles County Office of Education {"LACOE") 
for the provision of educational services to its children and 
adolescents. LACOE staff have different Special Incident 
reporting requirements than Metropolitan staff, and there does 
not appear to be a formal cooperative agreement between the two 
entities to ensure consistency in reporting. Although 
Metropolitan and LACOE have developed informal methods for 
communicating about patients, it appears that some incidents 
that occur during the school day are not recorded by the program 
units. Without consistent reporting, Metropolitan is unable to 
protect its patients from harm adequately, to take appropriate 
and adequate preventative and corrective action, or to trend and 
track incidents comprehensively across programs. 
Moreover, generally accepted professional standards of care 
dictate that incidents be categorized consistently, so that they 
can be reliably aggregated and analyzed. However, 
Metropolitan's ability to do so is significantly compromised, 
because its policies do not define concepts as fundamental as 
neglect or exploitation, leaving it to individual staff to 
determine whether incidents involve such harm. This lack of 
clarity creates a significant risk that instances of neglect and 
exploitation will never be reported, investigated, and 
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addressed, which is irreconcilable with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. 
2. Incident Investigations 
Metropolitan's investigations vary widely in quality and, 
in many respects, substantially depart from generally accepted 
professional standards of care. Metropolitan's investigations 
often lack the necessary components of a valid investigation. 
For instance, investigations often do not appear to reconcile 
evidence appropriately, calling into question the 
investigations' conclusions. Consequently, more often than not, 
allegations of abuse are unsubstantiated. Also, the 
investigations almost never address programmatic issues that are 
necessary to identify the underlying causes of incidents. 
Consequently, adequate corrective action cannot be taken and 
Metropolitan's patients are needlessly exposed to risk of harm. 
It appears that many of the program level staff, HPD staff, and 
Senior Special Investigators ("SSis") who share responsibility 
for conducting investigations have not been trained adequately 
to conduct investigations in a mental health setting. Finally, 
some investigations are performed by staff who appear to have 
conflicts of interest. Although SSis are available to conduct 
independent investigations, it appears that often cases of 
alleged abuse are investigated by unit staff, including 
supervisors. 
We saw numerous investigations reflecting these problems. 
Two are illustrative. On January 7, 2002, L.A. alleged that a 
staff person raped her. Without conducting or documenting a 
thorough investigation, L.A.'s treatment team concluded that the 
allegation was not credible and added a problem of "false 
accusations" to L.A.'s problem list. Facility records do not 
indicate that this allegation was referred to an SSI for further 
investigation. 
Another incident, reported on April 18, 2002, arose from 
staff's denial of D.O.'s request for a shower or soap to clean 
herself after being incontinent. It escalated to staff placing 
D.O. in restraints and seclusion. D.O. alleged that, while 
restraining her, a staff person intentionally hurt her. 
Notwithstanding the circumstances preceding the seclusion and 
restraint, the ensuing investigation did not address whether 
staff appropriately implemented programmatic requirements or 
whether changes in staff's approach should be considered. 
Further, the investigating staff concluded that the allegation 
was not substantiated but did not reconcile relevant evidence 
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nor interview all witnesses. Finally, although the incident 
involved alleged abuse, it apparently was not referred to an SSI 
for further investigation. 
3. Incident Tracking and Trending 
Generally accepted professional standards of care also 
require facilities such as Metropolitan to track and trend 
incident data to address problematic trends. Metropolitan's 
under reporting of incidents obviously compromises its ability 
to trend and track incidents adequately. Further, 
Metropolitan's incident tracking and trending system, itself, is 
at odds with generally accepted professional standards of care. 
For example, Metropolitan's incident trending reports do not 
track important types of incidents, such as allegations of 
patient abuse by staff, neglect, rape, or other inappropriate 
sexual incidents. Furthermore, although the summary reports 
provide some information regarding patterns or trends, there are 
a number of other potential trends and patterns that are not 
included but that are fundamental to identifying potential 
problems and formulating solutions, such as which patients most 
often are victims or aggressors. 
Even when Metropolitan identifies problematic trends, we 
could not identify evidence that adequate or appropriate 
remedies ensue. For example, in response to high numbers of 
patient assaults resulting in staff injuries, Metropolitan 
initiated use of an additional type of restraint, a containment 
blanket. However, Metropolitan did not, so far as we could 
determine, consider and address the cause of the high numbers of 
assaults. Likewise, Metropolitan's Special Incident Reports 
Summaries for the period between April 1, 2001, and March 31, 
2002, identify early evenings, nights, weekends, and holidays as 
peak times for the occurrence of incidents. However, 
Metropolitan does not appear to have investigated this trend or 
identified strategies to address it. Metropolitan's failure to 
take appropriate and timely action to address such trends and 
patterns places its patients at ongoing risk of harm. 
B. Quality Improvement 
Throughout this letter and our May 13, 2003 correspondence, 
we enumerate various failures at Metropolitan to provide 
adequate care and treatment for its patients. With few 
exceptions, Metropolitan has failed to identify these problems 
independently, or formulate and implement remedies to address 
them. Consequently, actual and potential sources of harm to 
Metropolitan's patients are going unaddressed. 
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Although at the time of our tours, Metropolitan had begun 
to engage in some quality improvement activities, these efforts 
generally were disjointed and inadequate. Specifically, each of 
Metropolitan's six programs collects data on different aspects 
of the protections, treatments, services, and supports they 
provide, making system-wide analysis virtually impossible on all 
but a few issues. Moreover, most of the data Metropolitan 
collects relates to process, not outcomes being achieved by 
patients or the adequacy of the protections, treatments, 
supports, and services being provided. For example, 
Metropolitan collects data about the number of restraint and/or 
seclusion episodes, but does not collect data about whether the 
use of such procedures was clinically necessary and justified. 
Some programs collect data on the number of group therapy and/or 
educational sessions scheduled and attended, but do not collect 
data about the outcomes achieved by patients as a result of 
attendance at these sessions as compared with their 
individualized therapy and educational goals. Similarly, one 
program (Program IV) collects data on the number of missed 
medical appointments. These numbers show that patients 
frequently miss medical appointments due to patient refusal. 
However, it does not appear that the program analyzes the 
efforts treatment teams are taking to minimize these refusals 
and/or the adequacy of these efforts. 
Moreover, Metropolitan does not adequately or appropriately 
use the data that it does collect. Each program prepares and 
submits a Performance Improvement report on a quarterly or, 
occasionally, monthly basis. Although these reports include 
various and sometimes extensive data, Metropolitan often fails 
to analyze the data to identify problematic trends or areas in 
need of improvement. It also often fails to conduct the further 
analyses necessary to determine which policies, procedures, and 
practices are working, which are not, and to recommend and 
implement actions designed to correct deficiencies and/or 
improve performance. Even when data indicates improvement or 
positive trends, it does not appear that Metropolitan analyzes 
such trends to determine which policies, procedures, and 
practices might be replicated throughout a program, or facility-
wide. 
We found numerous examples of quality assurance breakdowns 
indicating weaknesses in Metropolitan's ability to identify or 
correct causes of actual or potential harm to patients. For 
instance, the July 24, 2001 Interdepartmental Performance 
Improvement Committee minutes indicate that the Committee 
identified problems regarding the use of seclusion and 
restraint. A number of strategies were identified, and the 
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Committee made various recommendations, including revision of 
the Managing Assaultive Behavior ("MAB") training curriculum, 
providing staff with additional education, and increasing the 
use of alternatives to seclusion and restraint. According to 
minutes provided to us, no other mention of this issue occurred 
until November 27, 2001, when almost identical strategies were 
identified. No subsequent discussion apparently occurred 
thereafter through March 26, 2002, the period that we reviewed; 
the minutes are silent regarding implementation of the 
previously identified strategies or recommendations, or their 
impact on resolving the identified issues. This apparent lack 
of follow-up is especially problematic, given the problems 
identified in Section VI, above, regarding Metropolitan's use of 
restraint and/or seclusion. 
C. Environmental Issues 
In a facility serving people at risk of harming themselves 
or others, the environment should be kept free of hazards. 
Metropolitan has failed to meet this generally accepted 
professional standard of care. As we pointed out in the 
presence of administrators who toured the adult units with us, 
the vents and window grills on several units contained holes 
large enough to thread a sheet or other cloth through, placing 
patients at risk for suicide by hanging. As on the children and 
adolescent units, some of the vents on the adult units were not 
covered, allowing patients to access wires and other potentially 
dangerous items. Several of the units contained other hazards, 
such as wires holding down seclusion beds that, if accessed by 
patients, could be used to hurt oneself or others. In one of 
the restraint rooms, we observed plaster on the floor that 
easily could have been swallowed by a patient. 
Examples of Metropolitan's breakdown in environmental 
protections include a January 17, 2001 incident in which W.T. 
was found standing on a heater vent with torn linen tied tightly 
around his neck and attached to a bar on the window. He jumped 
from the vent in an attempt to strangle himself. By the time 
staff arrived to assist, his face reportedly had turned a bluish 
hue. Despite the fact that this incident clearly identified 
that the bars on the windows are a potential suicide hazard, it 
does not appear that systemic action was taken to ameliorate the 
situation. On July 11, 2001, a peer notified staff that N.T. 
had attempted to hang herself in her bedroom with a bed sheet 
looped around her neck and fastened to a metal frame of a 
window. Again on July 15, 2001, a peer reported to staff that 
N.T. was attempting to hang herself. Staff found N.T. with a 
blanket tied around her neck and the other end tied to the bars 
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on the window. Less than three months later, on October 8, 
2001, N.T. was found with a bed sheet looped around her neck and 
fastened to a metal frame of a window. N.T. was then placed in 
seclusion and restraint. One day earlier, staff found K.S. in 
the bathroom with a blanket tied around his neck and the other 
end tied to the bars on the window. 
Based on both staff statements and our own observations, 
Metropolitan fails to maintain temperatures in some patient 
areas that do not pose a risk to health. For example, during 
the evenings, the SNF units were excessively warm. We observed 
that staff repositioning patients were sweating profusely. 
Commendably, staff had attempted to ameliorate the heat by 
pointing fans into patient rooms, but privacy curtains were 
blocking the airflow. Moreover, fans blowing on patients whose 
health is compromised, such as patients requiring skilled 
nursing care, places them at high risk for complications such as 
pneumonia. 
Lastly, areas throughout the facility, primarily the SNF 
units, had a strong smell of urine and excrement. This is a 
potential indication that patients had been sitting in their 
urine or feces for a long period of time, placing them at high 
risk for skin breakdown. We observed urine-soaked laundry on 
the floors of some patients' rooms and in uncovered bins in 
patient-inhabited areas, presenting an infection hazard. 
D. Use of Untrained Personnel in Patient Interventions 
Generally accepted professional standards of care for 
facilities such as Metropolitan dictate that program staff be 
responsible for patient treatment and care. Although there is 
nothing improper about utilizing such security personnel to 
handle episodic incidents of violence by residents, it is not 
appropriate to rely on security staff -- who lack mental health 
training -- to share material responsibility for patient 
treatment and care. 
It appears that treatment staff frequently rely on officers 
because staff cannot effectively address patients' behavioral 
needs. This practice highlights weaknesses in Metropolitan's 
therapeutic interventions and presents substantial risk of harm 
to patients. First, given that the officers are armed with 
pepper spray and batons, their presence on the units presents a 
safety risk if a patient were to gain control of these weapons. 
Second, the officers are not trained properly to address the 
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programmatic needs of patients and, as a result, are more likely 
to resort to force, placing patients at increased risk of 
restraint or physical injury. 
VIII. FIRST AMENDMENT AND DUE PROCESS 
As set forth in our letter of May 13, 2003, the State 
indicated prior to our tours of Metropolitan that it would 
refuse to allow patients to speak with the Department of Justice 
or its expert consultants unless persons acting at the direction 
of the State were present, and State representatives did, in 
fact, attend all of our discussions with patients. The 
abridgements of patients' First Amendment and due process rights 
identified in our earlier letter apply with equal force to 
Metropolitan's adult patients. 
IX. MINIMUM REMEDIAL MEASURES 
To remedy the deficiencies discussed above and to protect 
the constitutional and federal statutory rights of the patients 
at Metropolitan, California promptly should implement the 
minimum remedial measures set forth below. 
A. Integrated Treatment Planning 
Metropolitan should provide its patients with integrated 
treatment planning consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. More particularly, Metropolitan 
should: 
1. Develop and implement policies and procedures 
regarding the development of treatment plans 
consistent with generally accepted professional 
standards of care, as set forth in Section I, 
above. 
2. Use these policies and procedures to review and 
revise, as appropriate, each patient's treatment 
plan to ensure that it is current, 
individualized, strengths-based, outcome-driven, 
and emanates from an integration of the 
individual disciplines' assessments of patients. 
3. Revise treatment plans as appropriate, based on 
significant developments in patients' conditions, 
including patients' progress, or lack thereof, as 
determined by the scheduled monitoring of 
identified criteria or target variables. 
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4. Ensure that treating psychiatrists verify, in a 
documented manner, that psychiatric and 
behavioral treatments are properly integrated. 
5. Require all clinical staff to complete 
successfully competency-based training on the 
development and implementation of 
interdisciplinary treatment plans. 
6. Ensure that each treatment team has a stable core 
of members, includes other members as needed, and 
maintains case loads that are not excessive. 
B. Assessments 
Metropolitan should ensure that its patients receive 
accurate, complete, and timely assessments, consistent with 
generally accepted professional standards of care, and that 
these assessments drive treatment interventions. More 
particularly, as to the following areas, Metropolitan should: 
1. Psychiatric Assessments and Diagnoses 
a. Develop diagnostic practices, guided by 
current, generally accepted professional 
criteria, for reliably reaching the most 
accurate psychiatric diagnoses. Develop a 
clinical formulation of each patient that: 
(1) integrates relevant elements of the 
patient's history, mental status 
examination, and response to current 
and past medications and other 
interventions; and 
(2) is used to prepare the patient's 
treatment plan. 
b. Review and revise, as appropriate, 
psychiatric assessments of all patients, 
providing clinically justifiable current 
diagnoses for each patient, and removing all 
diagnoses that cannot be clinically 
justified. Modify treatment and medication 
regimens, as appropriate, considering 
factors such as the patient's response to 
treatment, significant developments in the 
patient's condition, and changing patient 
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needs. Ensure that each patient's 
psychiatric assessments, diagnoses, and 
medications are collectively justified in a 
generally accepted professional manner. 
c. Ensure that treating psychiatrists utilize 
behavioral data in refining their diagnosis 
and enhancing their understanding of the 
targeted behavior, especially when 
previously provided treatments have failed 
to achieve desired outcomes. 
2. Psychological Assessments and Evaluations 
Ensure that: 
a. psychologists provide appropriate 
psychological assessments, as clinically 
indicated. 
b. before the treatment plan is developed, 
psychologists provide a psychological 
assessment of the patient that will: 
(1) address the nature of patient 
impairments to assist the psychiatrist 
in reaching a clear diagnosis; and 
(2) provide an accurate evaluation of the 
patient's psychological functioning to 
inform the treatment planning process. 
c. additional psychological assessments are 
performed to assist with any psychiatric 
disorders that may need further work up. 
d. the purpose of the assessment is clearly 
identified. 
e. psychological assessments are performed by 
professionals having a demonstrated 
competency in the methodology required to 
address the purpose of the assessment. 
f. psychological assessments include an 
accurate, complete, and up-to-date summary 
of the patient's clinical history and 
response to previous treatment. 
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g. where applicable, psychological assessments 
adhere to generally accepted professional 
standards for behavioral assessments. If 
behavioral intervention is indicated, 
further assessment must be conducted by a 
professional having demonstrated competency 
in applied behavior analysis and must be 
consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of applied behavioral 
analysis. 
h. psychological assessments contain 
conclusions which specifically address the 
purpose of the assessment, and a summary of 
the empirical basis for all conclusions, and 
any remaining unanswered questions. 
3. Rehabilitation Assessments 
Ensure that each patient's rehabilitation assessments: 
a. are accurate, complete, and coherent as to 
the patient's functional abilities; 
b. identify the patient's life skills prior"to, 
and over the course of, the mental illness 
or disorder; 
c. identify the patient's observed and, 
separately, expressed interests, activities, 
and functional strengths and weaknesses; and 
d. provide specific strategies to engage the 
patient in appropriate activities that the 
patient views as personally meaningful and 
productive. 
4. Social History Evaluations 
Ensure that each patient's social history evaluation: 
a. is, to the extent reasonably possible, 
accurate, current, complete, and coherent; 
b. expressly identifies factual inconsistencies 
among sources, resolves or attempts to 
resolve inconsistencies, and explains the 
rationale for the resolution offered; and 
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c. reliably informs the patient's treatment 
team about the patient's relevant social 
factors. 
5. Court Assessments 
a. Develop and implement policies and 
procedures to ensure an interdisciplinary 
approach to the development of court 
submissions for patients adjudicated NGRI 
based on accurate information, 
individualized risk assessments, and 
evaluations of readiness for community 
outpatient treatment. 
b. As appropriate, review and revise all court 
assessments and reports for NGRI patients so 
that they are individualized, accurate, and 
consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. 
C. Discharge Planning and Placement in the Most 
Integrated Setting 
Within the limitations of court-imposed confinement, the 
State should pursue actively the appropriate discharge of 
patients and ensure that they are provided services in the most 
integrated, appropriate setting that is consistent with 
patients' needs. More particularly, Metropolitan should: 
1. Identify at admission and address in treatment 
planning the criteria that likely will foster 
viable discharge for a particular patient, 
including but not limited to: 
a. the individual patient's symptoms of mental 
illness or psychiatric distress; 
b. any other barriers preventing that specific 
patient in transitioning to a more 
integrated environment, especially 
difficulties raised in previously 
unsuccessful placements; and 
c. the patient's strengths, preferences, and 
personal goals. 
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2. Include in treatment interventions the 
development of skills necessary to live in the 
setting in which the patient will be placed, and 
otherwise prepare the patient for her new living 
environment. 
3. Ensure that the patient is an active participant 
in the placement process. 
4. Provide the patient adequate assistance in 
transitioning to the new setting. 
5. Develop and implement a quality 
assurance/improvement system to oversee the 
discharge process and aftercare services. This 
system should ensure that professional judgments 
about the most integrated setting appropriate to 
meet each patient's needs are implemented and 
that appropriate aftercare services are provided 
that meet the needs of the patient in the 
community. 
D. Specific Treatment Services 
1. Psychiatry Services 
Metropolitan should provide adequate psychiatric supports 
and services for the treatment of the severely and persistently 
mentally ill population of adults that it serves in accordance 
with generally accepted professional standards of care. More 
particularly, Metropolitan should: 
a. Develop and implement policies and 
procedures requiring physicians to document 
their analyses of the benefits and risks of 
chosen treatment interventions. 
b. Ensure that all physicians and clinicians 
can demonstrate competence, consistent with 
generally accepted professional standards, 
in appropriate psychiatric evaluation and 
diagnosis, medication management, treatment 
team functioning, and the integration of 
behavioral and pharmacological treatments. 
c. Ensure that all psychotropic medications 
are: 
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(1) specifically matched to current, 
clinically justified diagnoses; 
(2) prescribed in therapeutic amounts; 
(3) tailored to each patient's individual 
symptoms; 
(4) monitored for efficacy against clearly-
identified target variables and time 
frames; 
(5) modified based on clinical rationales; 
and 
(6) properly documented. 
d. Review the medication treatment for all 
patients prescribed continuous 
anticholinergic treatment for more than two 
months. Review the medication treatment for 
all elderly patients and patients with 
cognitive impairments who are prescribed 
continuous anticholinergic treatment 
regardless of duration of treatment. 
e. Review the medication treatment for all 
patients prescribed benzodiazepines as a 
scheduled modality for more than two months. 
Review the medication treatment for all 
patients prescribed benzodiazepines with 
diagnoses of substance abuse and cognitive 
impairments regardless of duration of 
treatment. 
f. Develop and implement policies and 
procedures to monitor, document, report, and 
properly address potential side effects of 
prescribed medications to reflect generally 
accepted professional standards of care. 
Review treatment of all patients with a 
diagnosis of tardive dyskinesia in 
accordance with this updated policy. 
g. Make appropriate attempts to use those newer 
psychotropic medications having fewer, less 
serious side effects, rather than those 
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older psychotropic medications having more 
serious side effects. 
h. Develop and implement a comprehensive system 
to report all actual and potential variances 
in medication use to ensure that all 
potential and actual errors are captured. 
i. Develop and implement written guidelines and 
procedures consistent with generally 
accepted professional standards of care 
regarding medication practices, including 
the use and monitoring of PRN medications. 
j. Develop and implement a system for the 
timely identification, reporting, and 
monitoring of adverse drug reactions. 
2. Psychology Services 
Metropolitan should provide psychological supports and 
services adequate to treat the functional and behavioral needs 
of its adult patients according to generally accepted 
professional standards of care. More particularly, Metropolitan 
should: 
a. Ensure that psychologists provide evidence-
based psychological interventions across a 
range of modalities, as the assessed needs 
of the patient dictate. 
b. Provide active psychosocial rehabilitation, 
consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care, that: 
(1) is derived from the assessed, 
individualized needs of the patient to 
engage in more independent life 
functions; 
(2) addresses those needs in a manner 
building on the patient's strengths, 
preferences, and interests; 
(3) includes a focus on the patient's 
vulnerabilities to mental illness, 
substance abuse and readmission due to 
relapse; 
- 52 -
(4) takes place regularly and as scheduled; 
and 
(5) is documented in the patient's 
treatment plan. 
c. Develop and implement policies to ensure 
that patients who require treatment for 
substance abuse are appropriately 
identified, assessed, treated, and monitored 
in accordance with generally accepted 
professional standards. 
d. Ensure that behavioral interventions are 
based on appropriate, positive behavioral 
supports, not the use of aversive 
contingencies. 
e. Ensure that psychologists treating 
Metropolitan's adult patients have a 
demonstrated competence, consistent with 
generally accepted professional standards, 
in the use of functional assessments and 
positive behavioral supports. 
f. Ensure that psychologists integrate their 
therapies with other treatment modalities, 
including drug therapy. 
g. Ensure that psychosocial, rehabilitative, 
and behavioral interventions are monitored 
appropriately against rational, 
operationally defined, target variables and 
revised as appropriate in light of 
significant developments and the patient's 
progress, or the lack thereof. 
3. Nursing and Unit-Based Services 
Metropolitan should provide nursing and unit-based services 
to its patients consistent with generally accepted professional 
standards of care. Such services should result in 
Metropolitan's patients receiving individualized services, 
supports, and therapeutic interventions, consistent with their 
treatment plans. At a minimum, Metropolitan should: 
a. Ensure that, before they work directly with 
patients, all nursing and unit-based staff 
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have successfully completed competency-based 
training regarding mental health diagnoses, 
related symptoms, psychotropic medications, 
identification of side effects of 
psychotropic medications, monitoring of 
symptoms and target variables, and 
documenting and reporting of the patient's 
status. 
b. Ensure that, prior to assuming their duties 
and on a regular basis thereafter, all staff 
responsible for the administration of 
medication have successfully completed 
competency-based training on the completion 
of the Medication Administration Records and 
the controlled medication log. 
c. Ensure that all failures to properly sign 
the Medication Administration Record or the 
controlled medication log are treated as 
medication errors, and that appropriate 
follow-up occurs to prevent recurrence of 
such errors. 
d. Ensure that staff responsible for medication 
administration regularly ask patients about 
side effects they may be experiencing. 
e. Ensure that each patient's treatment plan 
identifies: 
(1) the diagnoses, treatments, and 
interventions that nursing and other 
staff are to implement; 
(2) the related symptoms and target 
variables to be monitored by nursing 
and other unit staff; and 
(3) the frequency by which staff need to 
monitor such symptoms. 
f. Ensure that staff monitor, document, and 
report the status of symptoms and target 
variables in a manner enabling treatment 
teams to assess the patient's status and to 
modify, as appropriate, the treatment plan. 
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g. Ensure that only patients with clinically 
justified reasons remain in a "bed-bound" 
status. For patients who have been 
unjustifiably maintained in this status, 
develop and implement methodical plans to 
reduce their time spent in bed, paying 
particular care to plan for and monitor 
these patients due to the risks associated 
with their long-term, bed-bound status. 
h. Ensure that nursing and other staff 
providing direct support to patients are 
knowledgeable about their patients and 
participate meaningfully in the treatment 
team process. 
4. Pharmacy 
Metropolitan's patients should receive pharmacy services 
consistent with generally accepted professional standards of 
care. More particularly, Metropolitan should: 
a. Develop and implement policies and 
procedures that: 
(1) require pharmacists to complete 
regular, appropriate reviews of 
patients' entire medication regimens, 
track the use of psychotropic PRN 
medications, and, as warranted, make 
recommendations to the treatment team 
about possible drug-to-drug 
interactions, side effects, medication 
changes, and needs for testing; and 
(2) require that physicians consider 
pharmacists' recommendations, clearly 
document their responses and actions 
taken, and for any recommendations not 
followed, provide an adequate clinical 
justification. 
5. General Medical Care 
Metropolitan should provide adequate preventative, routine, 
specialized, and emergency medical services on a timely basis, 
in accordance with generally accepted professional standards of 
care. More particularly, Metropolitan should: 
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a. Develop and implement policies and 
procedures that clearly define 
Metropolitan's primary care physicians' 
scope of service and ensure the timely 
provision of initial assessments, ongoing 
care and re-assessments, physician-nurse 
communication, and the integration of 
patients' mental health and medical care. 
b. Ensure that each patient's treatment plan 
identifies general medical diagnoses, the 
treatments to be employed, the related 
symptoms to be monitored by nursing and 
other unit staff, and the frequency by which 
staff need to monitor such symptoms. 
c. Revise the system of after-hours coverage by 
primary care physicians to institute formal 
psychiatric training and provide psychiatric 
backup support after hours. 
6. Infection Control 
Metropolitan should implement adequate infection control 
procedures to prevent the spread of infections or communicable 
diseases. More specifically, Metropolitan should: 
a. Revise infection control policies and 
procedures to include analysis of aggregated 
data and development and implementation of 
corrective action plans. 
b. Establish an effective infection control 
program that: 
(1) actively collects data with regard to 
infections and communicable diseases; 
(2) assesses these data for trends; 
(3) initiates inquiries regarding 
problematic trends; 
(4) identifies necessary corrective action; 
(5) monitors to ensure that appropriate 
remedies are achieved; and 
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(6) integrates this information into 
Metropolitan's quality assurance 
review. 
c. Develop proper procedures to remove dirty 
linens and clothing from the living units in 
a timely and safe manner. 
7. Dental Services 
Metropolitan should provide its patients with routine and 
emergency dental care and treatment on a timely basis, 
consistent with generally accepted professional standards of 
care. More particularly, Metropolitan should: 
a. Retain an adequate number of qualified 
dentists to provide timely and appropriate 
dental care and treatment to Metropolitan 
patients. 
b. Develop protocols and procedures that 
require: 
(1) the timely prov~s~on of documented 
dental services; and 
(2) preventative and restorative care be 
used whenever possible and tooth 
extractions be used as a treatment of 
last resort, which, when used, will be 
justified in a manner subject to 
clinical review. 
c. Ensure that dentists demonstrate, in a 
documented fashion, an accurate 
understanding of their patients' health 
conditions and medications that bear on 
dental care, as well as an accurate 
understanding of their current dental status 
and complaints. 
d. Ensure that transportation and staffing 
issues do not preclude residents from 
attending dental appointments. 
e. Ensure that treatment teams review, assess, 
and develop strategies to overcome patient 
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refusals to participate in dental 
appointments. 
f. Ensure that dentists consistently document 
their findings, a description of the 
treatment they have provided, and their plan 
of care. 
8. Physical and Occupational Therapy Services 
Metropolitan should provide its patients with physical and 
occupational therapy consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. More particularly, Metropolitan 
should: 
a. Develop and implement policies related to 
the provision of physical and occupational 
therapy that address, at a minimum: 
(1) the assessment process; 
(2) the development of plans of care; 
(3) the provision of direct services by 
therapists; 
(4) the oversight by therapists of 
individualized programs; 
(5) program implementation by nursing and 
unit staff; and 
(6) training for staff with related 
responsibilities. 
b. Ensure that patients are provided with 
timely and adequate PT and OT services and 
that transportation and staffing issues do 
not preclude residents from attending PT and 
OT appointments. 
c. Ensure that treatment teams review, assess, 
and develop strategies to overcome patient 
refusals to participate in PT and OT 
sessions. 
d. Ensure that each person who requires 
adaptive equipment is provided with 
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equipment that meets their individualized 
needs and promotes their independence. 
Provide patients with training and support 
to use such equipment. 
e. Provide competency-based training to nursing 
and other unit staff on the use and care of 
adaptive equipment, transferring, and 
positioning, as well as the need to promote 
patients' independence. 
9. Dietary Services 
Metropolitan should ensure that its patients, particularly 
those experiencing weight-related problems, receive adequate 
dietary services, consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. More particularly, Metropolitan 
should: 
a. Modify treatment planning policies and 
procedures to require that the treatment 
plans of patients who experience weight 
problems or related health concerns include 
adequate strategies and methodologies to 
address the identified problems and that 
such strategies and methodologies are 
implemented in a timely manner, monitored 
appropriately, and revised, as warranted. 
b. Increase the availability of individualized 
and group exercise and recreational options 
for its adult patients. 
c. Develop and implement policies and 
procedures to address the needs of patients 
who are at risk for aspiration, including 
but not limited to, patient assessments, and 
the development and implementation of 
protocols for mealtimes and other activities 
involving swallowing. Ensure that staff 
with responsibilities for these processes 
have successfully completed commensurate 
competency-based training. 
d. Develop and implement policies requiring the 
treatment of the underlying causes for tube 
feeding placement, and ongoing assessment of 
the individuals for whom these treatment 
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options are utilized to determine the 
feasibility of returning them to oral intake 
status. 
E. Documentation of Patient Progress 
Metropolitan should ensure that patient records accurately 
reflect patient progress, consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. More particularly, Metropolitan 
should: 
1. Develop and implement policies and procedures 
setting forth clear expectations regarding the 
content and timeliness of progress notes, 
transfer notes, and discharge notes. 
2. Ensure that such records include meaningful, 
accurate assessments of a patient's progress 
relating to the treatment plan and treatment 
goals. 
F. Restraint, Seclusion, and "As-Needed" Medications 
Metropolitan should ensure that seclusion, restraints and 
PRN psychotropic medications are used in accordance with 
generally accepted professional standards of care. More 
particularly, Metropolitan should: 
1. Ensure that restraints and seclusion: 
a. are used in a reliably documented manner and 
only when persons pose an immediate safety 
threat to themselves or others and after a 
hierarchy of less restrictive measures has 
been considered and/or exhausted; 
b. will not be used in the absence of, or as an 
alternative to, active treatment, as 
punishment, or for the convenience of staff; 
c. will not be used as part of a behavioral 
intervention. as indicated in (a), above; 
and 
d. will be terminated as soon as the person is 
no longer an imminent danger to himself or 
others. 
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2. Ensure that PRN psychotropic medications are used 
only as a short-term measure to relieve a patient 
in acute distress, not as means to escape mild, 
possibly healthy, discomfort or.as a repeatedly 
deployed substitute for treatment. 
3. Reduce its use of seclusion, restraints, and 
psychotropic PRN medications. 
4. Revise, as appropriate, and implement policies 
and procedures consistent with these generally 
accepted professional standards of care. 
5. Ensure that staff successfully complete 
competency-based training regarding 
implementation of such policies and the use of 
less restrictive interventions. 
6. Revise, as appropriate, and implement policies 
and procedures to require the review and 
modification, if appropriate, of patients' 
treatment plans after use of seclusion or 
restraints. 
7. Comply with 42 C.F.R. § 483.360(f) as to 
assessments by a physician or licensed medical 
professional of any resident placed in seclusion 
or restraints. 
8. Develop and implement a systemic plan to reduce 
the use of side rails as restraints in a 
systematic and gradual way to ensure the 
residents' safety. Ensure that residents' 
individualized treatment plans address the use of 
side rails for those who need them, including 
identification of the medical symptoms that 
warrant the use of side rails, plans to address 
the underlying causes of the medical symptoms, 
and strategies to reduce the use of side rails. 
9. Develop and implement a policy consistent with 
generally accepted professional standards of care 
governing the use of psychotropic PRN medication 
for psychiatric purposes and requiring that: 
a. such medications are used on a limited basis 
and not as a substitute for adequate 
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treatment of the underlying cause of the 
patient's distress; 
b. the patient's physician assess the patient 
within 24 hours of the administration of PRN 
medication; and 
c. in a clinically justifiable manner, the 
patient's treatment team, including the 
psychiatrist, timely review the use of such 
medications, determine whether to modify the 
patient's treatment plan, and implement the 
revised plan, as appropriate. 
G. Protection from Harm 
Metropolitan should provide its patients with a safe and 
humane environment and protect them from harm. At a minimum, 
Metropolitan should: 
1. Review, revise, as appropriate, and implement an 
incident management system that comports with 
generally accepted professional standards of 
care. At a minimum, Metropolitan should: 
a. review, revise, as appropriate, and 
implement comprehensive, consistent incident 
management policies and procedures that 
provide clear guidance regarding reporting 
requirements and the categorization of 
incidents; 
b. require all staff to complete successfully 
competency-based training in the revised 
reporting requirements; 
c. review, revise, as appropriate, and 
implement unified policies and procedures 
addressing the investigation of serious 
incidents, including requirements that such 
investigations be comprehensive, include 
consideration of staff's adherence to 
programmatic requirements, and be performed 
by independent investigators; 
d. require all staff involved in conducting 
investigations to complete successfully 
competency-based training on technical and 
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programmatic investigation methodologies and 
documentation requirements necessary in 
mental health service settings; 
e. monitor the performance of staff charged 
with investigative responsibilities and 
provide technical assistance and training 
whenever necessary to ensure the thorough, 
competent, and timely completion of 
investigations of serious incidents; 
f. develop and implement a reliable system to 
identify the need for, and monitor the 
implementation of, appropriate corrective 
and preventative actions addressing problems 
identified as a result of investigations; 
and 
g. review, revise, as appropriate, and 
implement policies and procedures related to 
the tracking and trending of incident data, 
to ensure that appropriate corrective 
actions are identified and implemented in 
response to problematic trends. 
2. Develop and implement a comprehensive quality 
improvement system consistent with generally 
accepted professional standards of care. At a 
minimum, such a system should: 
a. collect information related to the adequacy 
of the provision of the protections, 
treatments, services, and supports provided 
by Metropolitan, as well as the outcomes 
being achieved by patients; 
b. analyze the information collected in order 
to identify strengths and weaknesses within 
the current system; and 
c. identify and monitor implementation of 
corrective and preventative actions to 
address identified issues and ensure 
resolution of underlying problems. 
3. Conduct a thorough review of all units to 
identify any potential environmental safety 
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hazards, and develop and implement a plan to 
remedy any identified issues. 
a. Ensure that all areas of the hospital that 
are occupied or utilized by patients have 
adequate temperature control at all times. 
b. Review, revise as appropriate, and implement 
procedures and practices so that incontinent 
patients are assisted to change in a timely 
manner. 
c. Develop clear guidelines stating the 
circumstances under which it is appropriate 
to utilize staff who are not trained to 
provide mental health services in addressing 
incidents involving patients. Ensure that 
persons who are likely to intervene in 
patient incidents are properly trained to 
work with patients with mental health 
concerns. 
H. First Amendment and Due Process 
The State should permit Metropolitan patients to exercise 
their constitutional rights of: (a} free speech, and, in 
particular, the right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances without State monitoring; and (b) due process. More 
particularly, the State should: 
1. Permit patients to speak with representatives of 
the federal government outside the presence of 
persons acting for the State. 
2. Permit patients to engage in confidential 
communications. 
***** 
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The collaborative approach that the parties have taken thus 
far has been productive. We hope to continue working with the 
State in this fashion to resolve our significant concerns 
regarding the care and services provided at this facility. 
We will forward our expert consultants' reports under 
separate cover. Although their reports are their work - and do 
not necessarily represent the official conclusions of the 
Department of Justice - their observations, analyses, and 
recommendations provide further elaboration of the relevant 
concerns, and offer practical technical assistance in addressing 
them. We hope that you will give this information careful 
consideration and that it will assist in facilitating a dialogue 
swiftly addressing areas requiring attention. 
In the unexpected event that the parties are unable to 
reach a resolution regarding our concerns, we are obligated to 
advise you that the Attorney General may initiate a lawsuit 
pursuant to CRIPA, to correct deficiencies or to otherwise 
protect the rights of Metropolitan's patients, 49 days after the 
receipt of this letter. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a) (1). Accordingly, 
we will soon contact State officials to discuss in more detail 
the measures that the State must take to address the 
deficiencies identified herein. 
Sincerely, 
R. Alexander Acosta 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: The Honorable Bill Lockyer 
Attorney General 
State of California 
Stephen W. Mayberg, Ph.D. 
Director 
California Department of Mental Health 
Mr. William G. Silva 
Executive Director 
Metropolitan State Hospital 
Debra W. Yang, Esq. 
United States Attorney 
Central District of California 
~ ,., ..... ,. o •••••••• , •• 
~Mental Health 
Benjamin 0. Tayloe, Jr. 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division 
Special Litigation Section 
PHB Mailroom 5034 · 
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW 
Washington DC, 20530 
1600 ?th Street, S;~er;~mentn, CA ')5lll.t 
(')[(,) tiS.t-l.t U 
April 8, 2004 
RE: Response to the United States Department of Justice Findings Letter regarding 
Metropolitan State Hospital ("Metropolitan II" Adult Patients) pursuant 
~to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 
Dear Mr. Tayloe: 
The California Department of Mental Health and Metropolitan State Hospital (hereafter 
referred to as the Department) have carefully considered the findings letter dated February 
19, 2004 and the expert consultant reports that the Department received subsequently. 
The Department looks forward to a dialogue addressing areas that the United States 
Department of Justice (USDOJ) identifies as requiring attention. In this regard, the 
Department is firmly committed to enhancing the services it provides. Subsequent to 
USOOJ's onsite visit, Metropolitan State Hospital has continued to enhance its program 
and previously had undertaken enhancements to the treatment approach that 
emphasizes recovery through individualized treatment, empowerment and self-
determination. The Department believes that the enactment of this treatment approach 
and other enhancements demonstrates the Department's continued compliance with 
CRIPA. 
.. 
Please be advised, however, that the Department's willingness to engage in a 
dialogue with USDOJ does not mean that the Department is in complete agreement with 
all of the findings and conclusions in the February 19, 2004, letter. The findings letter 
makes sweeping generalizations that are not borne out by fact or attested to in the 
USDOJ's Experts' reports. For instance, the following is an example where the 
Department believes USDOJ may have overlooked information that was provided and/or 
may have come to conclusions that are contrary to that of the Department. The findings 
letter states on page 43: 
Benjamrn 0 Tayloe. Jr 
April 8. 2004 
Page 2 
.. areas throughout the facility, primarily the SNF units. 
had a strong smell of urine and excrement. This is a potential 
indication that patients had been sitting in their urine or feces 
for a long period of time. placing them at high risk for skin 
breakdown. We observed urine-soaked laundry on the floors 
of some patients' rooms and in uncovered bins in patient-
inhabited areas. presenting an infection hazard." 
It is clear from the information provided by the USDOJ experts that the above 
referenced conclusion is far removed from what was observed by the USDOJ experts. 
First. none of the experts note a smell "throughout the facility". Second, the smell of urine 
and excrement was only noted in the SNF unit during the times when the patients' 
clothes/bed linens were being changed. Third, there was no evidence at all that any 
patients were ever sitting in their urine or feces for a long period of time. Fourth, there 
was no evidence thaCanyone in the SNF unit had skin breakdown due to this cause. 
These purported findings and conclusions go beyond the facts and data and are 
infl~mmatory statements. 
Another example relates to discharge planning. The findings letter states on page 15: 
"Preparation for discharge while in the hospital appears to 
be almost nonexistent. In no instance could we determine 
that a treatment team actually had prepared a patient to 
transition to, or succeed in, a new setting. In fact. the 
provision of transition supports almost never was discussed 
in the numerous patient records that we extensively 
reviewed." 
This statement is simply not true. The Department has an extensive system of 
preparing patients for discharge that is dependent on the reason for their admission to the 
hospitaL For example, the Department has mock courts and individualized training for 
patients who are admitted under Section 1370 of the California Penal Code (incompetent to 
stand trial) that prepares patients for discharge. For those patients that are to be 
discharged to Community Release Programs (see Section 1600 et s~q. of the California 
Penal Code) the Department has treatment plans that specify what the individuals need to 
do to be discharged, including the development of a Relapse Prevention Plan." The 
Department invites the patient. family and conservators to participate and collaborate with 
the treatment team in developing the discharge plan. Often. there is representation from the 
County of residence of the patient. as well. While our documentation may not always reflect 
everything that is done by the Department to prepare an patient to transition to an~ succeed 
in another setting, it is a gross overstatement to say that discharge planning is almost 
nonexistent 
f?enjamin 0. Tayloe. Jr. 
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In addition, again the Department respectfully disagrees with. USDOJ's interpretation 
of legal authorities in support of its findings that the Department has violated CRIPA and 
other federal and state laws. Also as the Department has indicated with regard to the May 
13, 2003 findings letter, the Department is seeking clarification on a number of remedial 
measures especially those remedial measures that refer to "professional standards" without 
specifying what are the standard~. 
As previously indicated, rather than responding to every detail in the comprehensive 
findings letter at this time, the Department proposes that the parties commence the informal 
conference process that is contemplated by U.S.C. section 1997b(a)(2)(A) and (8). The 
Department stands ready to commence this process as soon as possible. 
The Department is committed to working with USDOJ to address the concerns that it 
has raised. However, as the above indicates, there is much to be discussed and the 
Department is not in agreement with everything in the findings letter. At your convenience, 
please call Evon Dixon-Montgomery, Senior Staff Counsel, at (916) 654-2453 to schedule a 
time convenient to all parties to further discuss this matter. The Department looks forward 
to working with the USDOJ to continue its mission to serve the patients at Metropolitan 
State Hospital. 
cc: Evon Dixon-Montgomery 
J:<yungah Suk 
Respectfully. 
;~·. / 
DRIGUEZ iJY 
p ty rector 
Long Term Care Services 
SECTION 9 
Report on Department of 
Justice/Department of Mental 
Health Correspondence 
Regarding Access, 
March 19, 2004, 
January 24,2005 
SiC:EJ!BOT:BG:DH!sjr 
OJ 168-11-44 
Via F!Oiiail! apd U.S. Mail 
Evon Dixon-Montgomery, Esq. 
Senior Staff Counsel 
Office of Legal Servic9s 
Civil Right'! Division 
Splciol UtitDIIctJ Src1kln • J>HB 
m P~Aw~~~~. .v.w. 
Woshiitt~Dot. DC 10SJO 
March 19, 2004 
California Department of Mental Health 
1600 9t11 Street, Room 153 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Re: Napa State Hosoital 
Dear Ms. Dixon-Montgomery: 
On January 6, 2004, Assistant Attorney General Acosta 
notified Governor Schwarzenegger that the United Stat~s 
Bepartment of Justice had commenced an investigation of Napa 
State Hospital (~Napa"), in Napa, California. Since then, after 
you identified yourself to the Department as the State's point of 
contact in this matter, Department attorneys have communicaLed 
with you on a weekly ba5iB throughout January and February to 
ascertain the State's position. In those communications, both 
written and verbal, we conveyed to you the Department's intention 
of touring Napa during the period of Ma~ch 29 through 
April 2, 2004. 
In respon~e, you indicated that the matter had been 
forwarded to Governor Schwarzenegger's office for determination, 
and that you were awaiting instructions as to the State's 
posi·tion. We appreciate that there may be factors beyond your 
personal control. Nevertheless, the State's delay in responding 
to the notice of our investigation of Napa is of increasing 
concern. I am obliged to inform you that our investigation is 
proceeding, whether or not the State elects to cooperate 
actively. Certainly, however, it is to·the State's;benefit to 
cooperate, as cooperation enhances the prospects of an amicable 
resolution of the investigation, as well as facilitates the· 
process of ensuring that the con~titutional and federal statutory 
rights of individuals in the State's custody are upheld. 
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We hope that the State .shortly will demonstrate, in a 
tangible manner, it3 intent to work cooperatively with the 
Department in this matter. 
anetta Y. Cutlar 
Chief 
Special Litigation Section 
• ,,'IOLD 
<>CHWARZENEGGER 
GOVERNOR 
S.J<IMBERL Y BELSHE 
SE.CRETARY 
Agency 
Departments & 
Boards: 
Aging 
Alcohol and 
Drug Programs 
Child Support 
Services 
Community Services 
and Development 
Developmental 
-:vices 
Emergency Medical 
Services Authority 
Health Services 
Health and 
Human Services 
Data Center 
Managed Risk 
Medical Insurance 
Mental Health 
Rehabilitation 
Social Services 
Statewide Health 
Planning and 
Development 
State of California 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY 
March 26, 2004 
R. Alexander Acosta, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Civil Rights Division 
US Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
Re: Napa State Hospital, Napa, California 
Dear Mr. Acosta: 
The State of California is in receipt of the letter dated January 6, 2004, regarding the 
intention of the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) to investigate the 
conditions of care and treatment of patients at Napa State Hospital (NSH) pursuant 
to authority under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997. Governor Schwarzenegger has referred this matter to my attention. While 
we understand that the USDOJ has not reached any conclusions about the subject 
matter of the investigation, we take your concerns seriously and intend to cooperate 
fully .. We, too, are concerned with the two recent patient suicides at this hospital. 
A similar investigation of conditions of care and treatment of patients at the 
Metropolitan State Hospital (MSH) in Norwalk, California, was commenced in March 
2002. The State received a findings letter regarding the child and adolescent 
program at MSH in May 2003. In August, the State, in responding to the findings 
letter, requested and is in the process of reaching clarification with regard to the 
standards referred to in the findings letter. As you are aware, the State just recently 
received the findings letter for the adult programs at"MSH, and we are reviewing it 
along with the individual experts' reports. 
The State has been very responsive to the verbal concerns expressed by the USDOJ 
experts and has initiated a comprehensive systems change program in its inpatient 
psychiatric hospitals. For example, the systems change involves·(a) embracing the 
rehabilitation model of psychiatric services, with a strong emphasis on personal 
recovery, (b) involvement of patients in every facet of their care, as well as 
representation in committees and groups that develop policies, procedures and 
processes used at the hospitals, (c) person-centered treatment planning process 
based on principles of rehabilitation and recovery, with full patient participation, (d) 
use of psychosocial rehabilitation malls to maximize the delivery of enrichment, 
treatment and rehabilitation services, (e) increasing use of evidence-based and 
manualized treatments, (f) culturally informed services, (g) a strong focus on 
recovery-based outcomes, and (h) transition planning to the community or through 
CONREP to the community. 
The State began these initiatives at the MSH in 2002, and has started a similar process 
at two other hospitals, one of which is NSH. As the USDOJ attorneys and expert 
consultants know, such a broad and state-of-the-art systems change takes, at a 
minimum, three to five years. Indeed, it takes about three years to produce a 
sustainable cultural change from the traditional model of mental health care to 
psychosocial rehabilitation and .recovery. In California, the State is systematically 
building the foundation for this change to occur in all the State's mental health facilities 
and the State is developing self-monitoring systems to document the progress. 
Given the State's total commitment to this process and its implications for addressing 
quality of care issues and concerns at MSH as well as NSH, the State is concerned that 
an USDOJ investigation of NSH at this time could result in the reallocation of scarce 
state staff and fiscal resources that is not in the best interests of either the patients or the 
State. The State takes seriously the imperative for change, recognizes the changes that 
need to be made, and has initiated the change process. Giyen the current fiscal 
situation of California, the State respectfully suggests that it focus its scarce resources 
on improvements in its mental health service delivery system rather than on another 
USDOJ on-site visit that will take the State no further than where it is going today. 
The State respectfully requests that the USDOJ complete its investigation of MSH, reach 
an agreement with the State on necessary remedial measures, and monitor the 
hospital's compliance with the remedial measures. At the same time, the State will 
stipulate that it will implement similar measures at the other state hospitals without direct 
involvement of the USDOJ, but will provide the USDOJ with the same data set that is 
negotiated for MSH. This will enable the USDOJ to monitor the change process at NSH 
without subjecting the State of California to the additional expenditure of fiscal and 
human capital that can be more fruitfully used for enhancing patient care. 
In view of the many changes implemented since the USDOJ began its investigation at 
MSH in 2002, we would like to meet with you to more fully discuss the nature of the 
USDOJ concerns, the actions taken and planned in our hospitals, and alternative 
approaches to a full investigation at this time at NSH. My office is available at your 
convenience to discuss our next steps. I can be reached at (916) 654-3454. 
Sincerely, 
KIMBERLY BELSHE 
Secretary 
KB/rh 
c: Marybel Batjer, Cabinet Secretary, Office of Governor Schwarzenegger 
Peter Siggins, Legal Affairs Secretary, Office of Governor Schwarzenegger 
Stephen W. Mayberg, Ph.D., Director, Department of Mental Health 
SYC:EJ:BOT:MS:JC: 
MEL:SSL:BG:KK:ch 
OJ 168-11~44 
DJ l68·12C-44 
OJ 168-12C-63 
Kimberly Belahe 
Secretary 
State of California 
Health and Human Services 
1600 Ninth Street 
:Room 450 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Agency 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division 
$pfcklf Lillfllliort Ser•19!1· fHB 
159 J'e)l~ Avmllf, II IV 
1f~C'O'\ IX: JOJJO 
May 12, 2004 
• 1' i 1 . 1 Re: Metropo 1tan State »oep ta, and Napa State Hosn1t~ 
Dear Secretary B~lshe: 
Thank you for your letter of March 26, 2004, to Assistant 
Attorney General Acosta, which has been forwarded to my 
attention. We are gratified by the Stat~'~ representations that. 
it intend~ to cooperate fully with our investigation into 
conditions of care and treatment at Napa State Hospital (!''Napa•) 
and that, in reaponsa to our investigation of Metropolitan State 
Hospital (•Metropolitanw) the State is undertaking significant 
reforms at Metropolitan, Napa, and one other, unidentified, 
mental health care facility, 
As you are aware, the Department recently has commenced an 
investigation of Patton State Hospital (•Patton~}. in San 
Bernardino, California. We presume t~~t the State's proposals as 
to our Napa investigation wouldJllsO apply to our investigation 
of Patton. In any event, the Department cannot agree to.suspend 
its investigations based on assurances that the State will 
implement remedial measures at Napa, and elsewhere, that are 
similar to those negotiated for Metropolitan and that~the State 
will provide the Department with documentation of its efforts. 
However, we recognize that the State does not have unlimited 
resources and that an investigation can have an impact, if 
temporary, on a facility's operations. In this regard, it 
certainly is our preference to work with the state to avoid 
needless expense and disruption. 
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We understand that the State and its consultants have 
reviewed conditions of care and treatment at Napa, Patton, and 
its other mental health care facilities in light of our 
Metropolitan investigation. If the State has determined that the 
conditions at Napa and Patton are substantially &imilar to those 
that we found at Metropolitan (in which case the State should 
consider undertaking at Napa and Patton the remedial measures set 
forth in the Department's findings letters regarding 
Metropolitan), there may be a basis for limiting the scope, and 
.corresponding impact, of the investigatory tours of those 
'facilities. Although the Department could not confine its 
oversight of an agreement to a review of data provided by the 
State, the Department is certainly willing to discuss options for 
tangibly limiting any disruption associated with such oversight. 
In any event, the Department notified the State of the Napa 
investigation on January 6, 2004. If the State is interested in 
proceeding with the approach outlined above, we would request 
tha·t it inform us promptly, by contacting me at (202) 514-0195, 
In the alternative, we will proceed with our investigations of 
Napa and Patton and will be in contact to coordinate tours of 
those facilities. Independent of the foregoing, we would~ 
pleased to meet with the State to commence negotiations regarding 
a resolution of our Metropolitan invest~gation and to learn in 
more detail what steps the State is undertaking in respdnae to 
that investigation. 
hanetta Y. C~tlar 
Chief 
Special Litigation Section 
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June 10, 2004 
R. Alexand~r Acosta, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Civil Rights Division 
US Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
Re: Patton State Hospital, San Bernardino, California 
Dear Mr. Acosta: 
The State of California is in receipt of the letter dated April 9, 2004, regarding 
the intention of the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) to 
investigate the conditions of care and treatment of patients at Patton State 
Hospital (PSH) pursuant to authority under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. Governor Schwarzenegger has 
referred this matter to my attention. While we understand that the USDOJ 
has not reached any conclusions about the subject matter of the 
investigation, we intend to cooperate fully. 
As you know, a similar investigation of conditions of care and treatment of 
patients at the Metropolitan State Hospital (MSH) in Norwalk, California was 
commenced in March 2002. The State received a findings letter regarding 
the child and adolescent program in May 2003. In August 2003, the State, in 
responding to the findings Jetter, requested and is in the process of reaching 
clarification with regard to the standards referred to in the findiRgs letter. On 
February 19,2004, the State received- a similar findings letter for the adult 
programs at MSH. The State responded to this findings Jetter on April 8, 
2004, again requesting the beginning of the informal conference process. 
The State of California also received a letter dated January 6, 2004 regarding 
the intent of the USDOJ to initiate an investigation at Napa State Hospital 
(NSH). I responded to this letter in March suggesting an alternative 
approach at both NSH and our other state hospitals that allows the hospitals 
to focus their scarce resources on improvements in their services rather than 
on another USDOJ on-site visit. We recommend the same approach in 
response to your letter regarding PSH. 
The State has been very responsive to the verbal concerns expressed by the 
USDOJ experts and has initiated a comprehensive systems change program 
in its inpatient psychiatric hospitals. For example, the system changes 
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involve (a) embracing the rehabilitation model of psychiatric services, with a 
strong emphasis on personal recovery; (b) including patients in every facet of 
their care, as well as representation in committees and groups that develop 
policies, procedures and processes used at the hospitals; (c) supporting 
person-centered treatment planning process based on principles of 
rehabilitation and recovery, with full patient participation; (d) using 
psychosocial rehabilitation malls to maximize the delivery of enrichment, 
treatment and rehabilitatiof1 services; (e) increasing use of evidence-based 
andmanualized treatments; (f) providing culturally informed services; (g) 
focusing on recovery-based outcomes; and, (h) transition planning to the 
community or through CONREP to the community. 
The State began these initiatives at the MSH in 2002, and started a similar 
process attx;>th·NSH and PSH, and will begin at Atascadero State Hospital in 
the next month. As the USDOJ attorneys and expert consultants know, such 
a broad and state-of-the-art systems change takes, at a minimum, three to 
fwe years. Indeed, it takes about three years to produce a sustainable 
cultural change from the traditional model of mental health care to 
psychosocial rehabilitation and recovery. In California, the State is 
systematically building the foundation for this change to occur in all the 
State's mental health facilities and the State is developing self-monitoring 
systems to document the process. 
Given the State's total commitment to this process and its implications for 
addressing quality of care issues and concerns at MSH, NSH and PSH; the 
State remains concerned that a USDOJ investigation of two additional 
hospitals at this time could result in the reallocation of scarce state staff and 
fiscal resources that is not in the best interests of either the patients or the 
State. The State takes seriously the imperative for change, reeognizes the 
changes that need to be made, and has initiated the change process .. Given 
the current fiscal situation of California, the State respectfully suggests again 
that it focus its scarce resources on improvements in its mental health 
services delivery system rather than additional USDOJ on-site visits that 
could delay the very improvements that USDOJ seeks. : 
. 
The State respectfully requests that the USDOJ complete its investigation of 
MSH, reach an agreement with the State on necessary remedial measures, 
and monitor the hospital's compliance with the remedial measures. At the 
same time, the State will stipulate that it will implement similar measures at 
the other state hospitals without direct involvement of the USDOJ, but will 
provide the USDOJ with the same data set that is negotiated for MSH. This 
will enable the USDOJ to monitor the change process 
R. Alexander Acosta, Esq. 
June 10, 2004 
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at NSH and PSH without subjecting the State of California to the additionaJ 
expenditure of fiscal and human capital that can be more fruitfully used for 
enhancing· patient care. 
In view of the many changes implemented since the USDOJ began its 
investigation at MSH in 2002, we would like to meet with you to more fully 
discuss the nature of the USDOJ concerns, the actions taken and planned in 
our hospitals, and alternative approaches to a full investigation at this time at 
PSH. My office is available at your convenience to discuss our next steps. I 
can be reached at (916) 654-3454. 
Sincerely, 
~~7~ 
KIMBERLY BELSHE 
Secretary 
KBIJRIEC/mcv 
c: Marybel Batjer, Cabinet Secretary, Office of Governor 
Schwarzenegger 
Peter Siggins, Legal Affairs Secretary, Office of Governor 
· Schwatzenegger · 
vStephen W. Mayberg, Director, Department of Mental Health 
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Kimberly Belshe 
Secretary 
State of California 
Health and Human Services Agency 
Room 460 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
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u.;s. uepartJDtnt or Jusnce 
Civil Rights Division 
Sprciat llllr«iM &aiM · FHI 
950 l'tiiiiSJ/VtmiD Avoaw, N. W. 
WQI~ OC 20JJO. 
August 2'7, 2004 
Re: Patton State Hospital, ~etropolitan State Hospital, 
and Napa Stnte Hospital 
Dear Secretary Belshe: 
Thank you for your letter of June 10, 2004, to Assistant 
Attorney General Acosta regarding the Department's investigation 
of Patton State Hospital, which was forwarded to my attention. 
We apologize for not acknowledging your June 10 letter sooner; a 
mail processing error delayed our receipt and review. In any 
event, we are pleased to read that the State remains committed to 
this process and has, as a result of the Department's 
investigation of Met£opolitan State Hospital, initiated 
compr~hensive reforms at its other inpatient psychiatric 
hospitals. 
Likewise, we are encouraged to hear that the State is 
willing to stipulate that all remedial measures agreed upon in 
connection with resolution of the Metropolitan investigation will 
also be implemented at Patton and Napa State Hospital$. However, 
as discussed in our previous correspondence of May 12, 2004, 
regarding Napa, although we are willing to discuss options for 
limiting any disruption associated with investigatory tours, the 
Department is unable to limit oversight of any subsequent 
agreement resolving its investigations of Patton and Napa to a 
review of data provided by the State. 
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As you probably are aware, there have been informal 
discussions between our offices for the past several months 
regarding alternative approaches to achieving the goals reflected 
in the Stat~'s proposal. Our hope is that these discussions will 
lead to a mutually satisfactory vehicle for reaching the 
important goal that the State and the Department share, ensuring 
that the patients in these -facilities receive the care and 
protections that they are entitled to under the U.S. Constitution 
and federal law. In this regard, we would welcome a meeting with 
your staff to take this process forward. I will ask Benjamin 
Tayloe, the trial attorney assigned to all three investigations, 
to contact your staff to discuss next steps and to arrange a 
meeting. In the meantime, I may be reached at (202) 514-0195 if 
you have any questions or concerns. 
Sincerely, 
hanetta Y. Cutlar 
Chief 
Special Litigation Section 
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October 4, 2004 
Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief 
Special Litigation Section 
Civil Rights Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington DC, 20530 
. Re: Metropolitan, Napa, and Patton State Hospitals, California 
Dear Ms. Cutlar: 
Thank you for your letters of May 12, 2004, and August 27, 2004 inviting the State 
California to commence negotiations regarding a resolution of the United States 
Department of Justice's (USDOJ) investigation of Metropolitan State Hospital and : 
exploration of procedures for USDOJ's investigations at Napa and Patton State 
. Hospitals. We appreciate the USDOJ's willingness to work with the State to . 
· minimize disruption of operations of our state hospitals and expense to the State. 
This is to formally inform you that the State of California accepts your offer of 
negotiation and that the Department of Mental Health will participate in these 
discussions as the representative for the State. Please have your staff contact Jot 
Rodriguez, Deputy Director of the Long Term Care Services Division, at (916) 654 
241.3 to arrange a meeting. My office is also available to provide any assistance Y' 
may require. I can be reached at (916) .654-3454 .. 
Sincerely, 
KIMBERLY BELSHE 
Secretary 
c: 
KB/rh 
Marybel Batjer, Cabinet Secretary, Office of Governor Schwarzenegger 
Peter Siggins, Legal Affairs Secretary, Office of Governor Schwarzenegg1 
Stephen W. Mayberg, Ph.D., Director Department of Mental Health 
1600 Ninth Street · Room 460 . Sacramento, CA 95814 • Telephone (916) 654-3454 • Fax (916) 654-3343 
Internet Address: www .chhs.ca.gov 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division 
---------------------------------------------------------------------·--------
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Via Telecopy & U.S. Mail 
Evon Dixon-Montgomery, Esq. 
Senior Staff Counsel 
Office of Legal Services 
SptdallJiigmiOII Seaton· PHS 
950 Pmnsylvonia Avtnllt, N. W. 
Washingum, DC 20530 
January 24, 2005 
California Department of Mental Health 
1600 9~ Street, Room 153 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Re Investigations of Californ.ia State Hospitals 
Dear Ms. Dixon-Montgomery: 
I write to confirm the substance of our recent teleDhone 
conversations. 
As discussed, we look forward to meeting with State 
officials the week of March 28, 2005, in Sacramento. As we 
understand it, the meeting's principal purpose is to negotia·:e an 
agreement addressing the issues raised in our letters of May 13, 
2003, and February 19, 2004, regarding our investigation of 
Metropolitan State Hospital. In that regard, on December 1, 
2004, we provided the State with a proposed plan of remediat~on, 
which-we hope addresses the State's request for elaboration 
iega~ding our findings. Also, we expect to provide the St.3te 
shortly with a propo$ed settlement agreement to ensure tha·: 
agreed remedial measures are successfully implemented. 
Regarding our investigations of Napa State Hospital ("Napa") 
and Patton State Hospital ("Patton"), you have told me that:· the 
State will not give the Department of Justice access to these 
facilities until early 2006. We regret the State's position, 
particularly because we notified the State of our investigati~n 
of Napa in January 2004 and of Patton in April 2004. To ac~dr:ss 
the State's conc_erns, reflected in Secretary Belshe's letters of 
March 26 and June 10, 2004, that tours of these facilities could 
be costly and disruptive, we indicated in our responsive 
correspondence of May 12 and August 27, 2004, that we were 
prepared to take steps to limit any disruption associated with 
the invest~gatory tours. In fact, we subsequently proposed, in 
- 2 -
our telephone discussions, conducting comparatively brief v.lsits 
to Napa ~nd Patton. We are disappointed that our proposal does 
not satisfy the State's cbncerns and objectives. In any evt!nt, 
as I have indicated, the Department is proceeding with its 
investigation of these facilities. In the meantime, if the State 
wishes to revisit its decision, please let us know. 
( 
SECTION 10 
Report on Napa State 
Hospital, June 27, 2005 
Report on Health & Human 
Services Agency Response, 
August 8, 2005, 
Report on Department of 
Justice Response, August 17, 
2005 
US. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Divi&ion 
June 27, 2005 
The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger 
Governor of ~alifornia 
State Capitol Building 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Re: Napa State Hospital, Nap§. California 
Dear Governor Schwarzeneggerr 
On January 6, 2004, we notified then-Governor Gray Davia of 
our intent to investigate conditions at Napa State Hospital 
(•Napaw), in Napa, California, pursuant to the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA~), 42 U.S.C. i 1997. I 
write now to provide the statutorily required findings of that 
investigation, the bases for those findings, and the minimum 
re~dial measures that we believe are warranted to correct 
deficiencies contributing to conditions that violate the federal 
rights of individuals residing in this facility. 
Ae a threshold matter, we note that State officials have 
declined to cooperate with this investigation. In particular, 
they repeatedly have refused to allow the Department access to 
the facility, most recently stating that access will not be 
provided before sometime in 2006. The State's conduct is unusual 
in this regard. Most government officials cooperate with CRIPA 
investigations because they recognize that protecting the rights 
of institutionalized citizens warrants a thorough and impartial 
review. Indeed, the State cooperated with the Department 
regarding a.previoua CRIPA investigation of Napa that was 
resolved via a consent decree in 1990. 1 The State aiso 
cooperated with our investigation of Metropolitan State Hospital 
in June and July 2002 (•Metropolitan'). Since then, however, the 
State has declined our requests for access to Napa and to 
1 Consent Decree, United States v. California, No. C90-
264l, (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 1990). 
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the State's other mental health care facilities that we are 
investigating, Patton State Hospital and Atascadero State 
Hospital.a 
As we understand it, the State's position is that permitting 
the Department access to Napa, and its other facilities, before 
sometime next year would excessively divert limited resources at 
a time when the State is undertaking significant reforms. We 
attempted to address the State's concerns by offering to conduct 
a etreanUined tour of Napa, and we reminded the State that we 
were committed to providing technical assistance during the tour 
and to working in a transparent manner. If the State had agreed 
to our proposed investigation procedures, State officials would 
have had an early opportunity to work directly with our experts 
and staff. They also would have had an opportunity to address 
any identified problems on a voluntary basis at an early stage of 
this investigation. Regrettably, the State has maintained its 
opposition to permitting the Department access. 
As we repeatedly advised State officials, however, our 
investigations proceed regardless of whether officials choose to 
cooperate. Indeed, when CRIPA was enacted, lawmakers considered 
the possibi~ity that local official~ might not assist a federal 
investigation. Such non-cooperation is a factor that may be 
• •t:J-.J 
.. -considered adversely when drawing conclusions about a facility ..... ~ --· ·--
~ H.R. CONF. REP. 96-897, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.A.A.N. 832, 836. We now dra~ such an adverse conclusion. 
The State's non-cooperation is only one factor that we have 
considered in preparing our statutorily-required findings and 
recommendations. We have also considered information from 
several recent on-site surveys conducted by the Centers for 
Medicaid and Medicare Services (•CMS•) and by the State's 
Department of Health Services ("DHS*), and conducted interviews 
with professionals, advocates, family members of patients, and 
patients themselves. In doing eo, we found evidence of 
significAnt ·and wide-ranging deficiencies in Napa's provision of 
care to its patients. 
Tragically illustrative of the widespread and systemic 
deficiencies that currently exist at Napa is the case of p~tient 
2 In May ~005, the State did permit Department staff to 
interview certain Patton patients and has agreed to provide us 
With requested portions of charts from patients who authorized us 
to obtain such records. 
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Q.R., 3 who committed suicide by hanging in December 2004. 
Several months before hie suicide, Q.R. attempted suicide (also 
by hanging), ~hich staff told hie family was an attention-getting 
behavior 1 and not a realistic threat. This patient's family was 
in frequent contact with his counselor at Napa, and conveyed to 
the counselor ita concern that the patient's escalating episodes 
of violence were uncharacteristic and needed to he treated. on 
the day of Q.R. 1 e death, a family member who had just spoken with 
Q.R. phoned the nurses' station on his ward to warn that Q.R. was 
despondent, crying, and in need of attention. Despite this 
specific warning and the patient's history of suicide attempt, 
staff failed to act. Less than an hour later, Q.R. was 
discovered by a peer, hanging by a sheet in his room. Because 
the Stat~ denied us access to the facility to investigate these 
allegations, we have no reason not to conclude that the 
contentions are accurate, and that Napa's failure to intervene 
appropriately was a cause of this young man's death. 
The preceding incident is emblematic of the systemic 
deficiencies at Napa. We have received overwhelming information 
that, following the dismissal of the consent decree in 1995, 
significant problems recurred at Napa. including: failure to 
protect patients from harm from assaults and suicide; 
inappropriate use of seclusion, restraint and PRN (~pro re nataN 
or ftas-needed-) psychotropic medications; and inadequate medical, 
nursing and psychiatric care. In addition, we have received 
information evidencing deficient treatment planning, programming, 
and nutritional management; unsanitary conditions; and failure to 
place patients in the moat integrated setting as required by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 At~-
(•ADA"), and the President's New Freedom Initiative, which 
prioritizes community-based alternatives for individuals with 
disabilities. See Exec. Order No. 13217, §§ l(a)-(c), 66 Fed. 
Reg._331S5 (June 18, 2001). our findings, the facts that support 
them, and the minimum remedial steps that we believe are 
necessary to correct deficiencies are set forth below. 
I. ~CKGROUNP 
Napa has been in operation since November 1975. It is 
situated on a 138-acre campus and houses almost 1,100 adult 
patients. These individuals are classified as ~low to moderate 
risk• and are civilly commdtted or committed through criminal 
proceedings. In our previous investigation of Napa, we 
3 We use pseudo-initials to refer to individual patients, 
in order to protect their privacy. 
- 4 -
identified deficiencies in the facility's protections from harm, 
use of restraints, and provision of medical care, among other 
areas. These concerns ~ere addressed in a consent decree that 
was dismissed in 1995 based on the Department's assessment that 
Napa, at that time, was in substantial compliance with the 
decre~a requirements. 
II. FINDINGS 
A. P&Of'ECTION FROM HARM 
Napa is constitutionally required to provide patients 
reasonable protection from harm and freedom from bodily 
restraint. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 u.s. 307, 315-16 (1982). 
Information from multiple, credible sources leads us to conclude 
that Napa fails to protect patients from harm and abuse. We have 
determined that the harm suffered by Napa's patients is multi-
faceted, including physical injury by assault; death by suicide 
due to inadequate suicide precautions; excessive and 
inappropriate use of physical and chemical restraints and 
seclusion; inadequate, ineffective, and counterproductive 
treatment; and exposure to unnecessary environmental hazards. 
A major factor in Napa's failure to protect patients from 
harm is inadequate supervision. As DHS has reported, ~[e)ven 
though clients in the facility can be extremely unpredictable and 
violent, they are left unsupervised for long periods of ti~.· 
Family members of patients and advocates who frequently visit 
Napa confirm that patients are left unattended, without staff 
observation or interaction. A number of incidents occurred when 
medically required one-to-one staffing was cancelled, apparently 
not due to clinical decisions, but rather staff shortages. 
Moreover, as a nurse at Napa reported, ~there are not enough 
people on hand to subdue [out-of-control patients] .... so an 
alarm is set off or the hospital police are called. But it takes 
at least five minutes, sometimes 10 or more to get there, and a 
lot can happen during that time.• 
1. Patient-on-Patient Aasaults 
Napa patients suffer from repeated acts of aggression by 
peers, resulting in serious injuries, and in one case, a 
homicide. In egregious departures from accepted standards, staff 
often fail to intervene and/or fail to report the incidents. 
Staff likewise do not attempt to prevent repeated assaults by 
addressing the underlying behavior of the aggressors. 
- 5 -
Many instances of inappropriate aggression in a psychiatric 
hospital such as Napa result from patients exhibiting symptoms of 
their mental health disorders. Without the benefit of 
appropriate medication and therapeutic interventions, patients 
often lack the means to control such symptoms. Thus, inadequate 
mental health treatment exposes individuals to excessive levels 
of violence. Examples of failures to prevent known aggressors 
from repeated acts of serious aggression include: 
• On May 3, 2002, a patient was atrangled to death by hie 
roommate. The roommate had previously been convicted of 
several violent crimes and had a history of attacking peers, 
including two attacks on sleeping patients. Reportedly, 
there are no bedrooms set aside to house separately patients 
who demo~strate the .potential to harm others. 
• Between January and June 2003, one patient assaulted other 
patients at least 20 times, including at least 17 incidents 
in which he punched or kicked other patients in the head or 
face. Staff were afraid of this patient and failed to 
intervene to protect other patients. 
• In June 2002, a patient with a history of aggressive 
behavior attacked another patient in the TV room, punching 
him and stabbing him in the neck with a portable radio 
antenna. Staff failed to report the assault to the 
licensing authorities. 
• On November 18, 2002, a patient who was ordered to be under 
constant observation by staff assaulted another patient. He 
previously had assaulted two patients on October 3, 2002, 
and one patien~ on September 18, 2002. In addition, an 
assessment dated September 3, 2002, indicated that he had 
•numerous recent assaults on peers." 
• Two patients known to be •extremely assaultive" were placed 
in a bedroom together where they were not supervised for 
aignificant periods of time. on August 8, 2001, one patient 
attacked the other, punching him in the nose. The following 
day, that patient retaliated by choking his roommate until 
he passed out. 
Patient advocates and patients themselves tell us that staff 
often fail to intervene with violent patients because the staff 
are afraid. Last fall, Napa's Clinical Admdnistrator confirmed 
to CMS surveyors that "staff become fearful of patients who have 
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been assaultive." Examples of staff failing to intervene 
include: 
• On November 11, 2003, one patient stabbed another in th~ 
face and back with an 11-inch ftehank" made from an antenna. 
Four daY.s earlier, the victim had told staff that he feared 
that he would be attacked. The State's regulatory agency 
concluded that Napa had failed to investigate the source or 
nature of the threat identified by the victim, and it 
imposed a treble fine on the facility for its failure to 
protect the victim. 
• On September 20, 2002, a 38-year-old woman suffered ~great 
bodily injuryN when she was beaten by three male patients. 
According to the woman, the other patients •kicked the shit 
out of me.• Staff did not intervene, nor did staff report 
to Napa authorities the significant bruises and injuries to· 
this client. 4 
2. Inadequate Suicide Precautions 
Several Napa patients have committed suicide in recent 
years, often using the same method to do so: 
• On March 20, 2005, Napa patient M.E. committed suicide by 
hanging himself in a locked bathroom. 
• Napa patient Q.R. committed suicide by hanging in December 
2004. Several months earlier, he had attempted suicide by 
hanging1 notwithstanding his history, Napa staff faile~ to 
intervene or adequately supervise Q. R. when a family member 
called the nurses station on his unit the day of his death 
and informed staff that Q.R. was despondent and crying and 
in need of attention. 
• On July 21, 2003, a man hanged himself from a door using a 
radio cord, on the same ward where another patient committed 
suicide only a month earlier. 
' The failure to report or investigate a serious incident 
is not uncommon at ~pa, and is a substantial departure from 
accepted standards of care. Numerous sources described incidents 
to us, incl~ding this assault, inappropriate sexual contact 
between residents or staff and residents, and illegal drug use, 
which were not reported to and/or not investigated by Napa 
authorities. 
- 7 -
• On June 3, 2003, a patient who had previously been reported 
as suicidal hanged himself using a bed sheet. 
• On September 4, 2001, a patient committed suicide by hanging 
with a bed sheet in his ward. 
• On July 16, 1999, a man known to be suicidal hanged himself 
with bedsheets tied to a light fixture. 
In February 2005 1 CMS cited Napa for failing to complete the 
suicide assessment of a patient for more than six months after 
his admission. CMS found that Napa did not provide translation 
services to complete the suicide assessment of this patient, who 
could not communicate in English. 
The State's own surveyors previously cited Napa for failing 
to identify and address current symptoms of yet ~other patient 
with a documented history of suicide attempts. In July 2004, DHS 
imposed a treble fine on Napa for failing to assess and treat a 
patient whose suicide attempt was reported to staff by a peer and 
whose records contained numerous observations documenting his 
depression during that time, including: ftverbalized feelings of 
depression;" the patient stating that his ftepirit wae broken;" 
and the patient requesting medication for depression and 
agitation. Notwithstanding this significant evidence of a mental 
health treatment need, the facility's nursing staff did not 
assess or evaluate the patient, and the treatment team did not 
amend his treatment interventions to address this need* I would 
note that DHS imposes treble fines only when the violation is a 
repeat violation within a short time frame. Napa has been warned 
repeatedly of deficiencies in its suicide prevention practices, 
but has failed to remedy them. 
3 • Harmful Contraband 
Napa also fails to protect patients from harmful contraband. 
The State's own Department of Health Services has determined that 
policies requiring investigation of all contraband are not 
followed. Numerous credible allegations corroborate our finding 
that Napa fails to control traffic in harmful contraband, 
including illegal narcotics. We have determined that patients 
have access to illegal drugs, including marijuana and cocaine, 
while residing at Napa. Patients allege, moreover, that staff 
provide illegal drugs to patients in return for cash or sex. 
Evidence that patients are obtaining access to contraband 
includes: 
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• Three different Napa patients overdosed on amphetamines 
and/or eocaine in fall 2004, including one patient who died 
of the overdose. Three other patients obtained and used 
heroin during this time period. 
• In September 2004, a Napa physician testified under oath 
that Napa's staff brings drugs into the facility in exchange 
for cash. 5 
• An independent psychologist who recently examined a Napa 
patient and all of his medical records told us that the 
client,· L.A., tested positive for marijuana and other street 
drugs six months after his admission to Napa. 
• In late 2002, the State's own surveyors documented numerous 
indications of drug use by Napa residents that were neither 
inv~stigated by the facility nor addressed by the residents' 
treatment teams. A Napa police staff member told the state 
surveyors, "[W]e don't have the resources to stop the drugs 
[coming into the facility]." 
• As described in the discussion above regarding patient-on-
patient assaults, the patient who strangled his roommate to 
death on May 2, 2002, waa a heavy drug user who had tested 
positive for cocaine, amphetamines, and barbiturates in the 
five months prior to the incident, even though he had been 
confined to Napa for t~o years. 
• One patient tested positive for marijuana, cocaine, and 
alcohol while at Napa in 2001 and 2002, and was seen 
injecting another patient with a needle on September 5, 
2002. 
4. seclusion, Restraints and PRN Medications 
Generally accepted professional standards of care dictate 
that seclusion a~d restr~ints: (a} will ~ used only when 
pereons pose a safety threat to themselves or others and after a 
hierarchy of lese restrictive measures has been considered and/or 
exhausted; (b) will not be used in the absence of, or as an 
alternative to, active treatment, as punishment, or for the 
convenience of staff; (c) will not be used as a behavioral · 
intervention, and (d) will be terminated once the pereon is no 
longer a danger to himself or others. see Youngberg, 457 u.s. at 
5 This testimony was submitted during a conditional 
release hearing for patient L.A. 
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324 ("[The State] may not restrain patients except when and to 
the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure 
such safety to provide needed training.H) Generally accepted 
professional standards also instruct that PRN psychotropic 
medications should be used only as a short-term measure to 
relieve a patient in acute distress, not as means to escape mild, 
possibly healthy, discomfort or as a repeatedly deployed 
substitute for treatment. 
Misuse of seclusion and restraint was a significant area of 
concern during our first CRIPA investigation of Napa. In 
addition to overuse and misuse of physical restraints and 
seclusion, our earlier investigation found an exorbitant number 
of PRN (pro re nata or "as needed•) medication orders, suggesting 
that they were used for the convenience of staff to sedate and 
.control patients. Substantial evidence shows that misuse of 
seclusion and restraint is a significant area of concern again. 
Statistics published on the DMH web site show the duration of 
restraint episodes at Napa to be substantially higher chan the 
system's average in 2004. The average duration of restraint 
episodes at Napa during each quarter of 2004 was more than double 
those at Metropolitan State Hospital (where we also found 
unconstitutional use of seclusion and restraint) during this same 
time.' Data comparing administration of emergency psychiatric 
medication' in the State's four public psychiatric hospitals also 
shows that Napa's rate was nearly twice that at Metropolitan.• 
' February 19, 2004 CRIPA Findings Letter Regarding 
Conditions at Metropolitan State Hoepital. We currently are 
negotiating to reach a resolution of the Metropolitan 
investigation. Of the State's four psychiatric hospitals, the 
residents at Metropolitan and Napa are the most similar, and 
include both eivilly-commdtted and forensic patients. Patton and 
Atascadero State Hospitals admit only forensic patients. 
7 We refer to this published data on emergency 
medications as an indicator of PRN usage. Although not every 
administration of a PRN medication ie an emergency ~ee, and vice 
versa, in most cases, the two sets of data overlap. The data 
generally support the claims of Napa patients and families that 
Napa overuses PRN medications. Because the State denied us 
timely access to the facility and patient records to conduct our 
investigation, we have little choice but to conclude that the 
allegations are true. 
• Inexplicably, of the four hospitals' statistics, only 
Napa,s are expressly limited to use of •intramuscular 
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Thia is a concern because we found the high levels of seclusion, 
restraint and PRN medications at Metropolitan to be evidence of a 
failure to follow generally accepted professional practices. 
Specifically, frequent resort to seclusion, restraint and PRN 
medication is an indicator that a patient's diagnosis ia 
erroneous and/or that the treatment plan is inappropriate and 
should be re-evaluated. 
In September 2004, and again in February 2005, Napa was 
cited by CMS for continuing deficiencies in the use of seclusion 
and restraints. In both surveys, OMS found that Napa failed to 
justify the use of restraints; failed to ensure physicians• 
orders and face-to-face assessments in application of reatrainte; 
and failed to limit use of restraints and seclusion to documented 
emergencies. When interviewed by CMS surveyors regarding 
examples of inappropriate restraint, Napa's Clinical Director 
stated, "[m)aybe our system is not working." Examples of 
inappropriate uses of seclusion or restraint include: 
• A patient identified in a February 2005 CMS survey waa 
secluded for 30 hours, during which time staff's recorded 
observations included: "appears sleeping," "eating," 
"drinking," "eyes open staring in space," and "not 
responding." These behaviors do not reflect violence 
requiring·seclusion, and there was no evidence that the 
patient was released during these times to see if she could 
control her behavior without being secluded. On a second 
occaeion, the same patient was secluded for 36 hours, with 
the following release criteria; "when client is able to 
make eye contact to staff with relaxed muscle tone." During 
this second episode of seclusion, the patient was observed 
as 11 not responding to staff," and ~covering self with 
blanket, mute," behaviors not indicative of violence 
requiring seclusion. 
~ The February 2005 CMS survey also identified a patient who 
was admitted while under restraint and continued in 
restraints for more than 46 hours. Documentation shows that 
restraint was continued based on past behaviors; current 
behaviors noted in the documentation clearly d±d not justify 
restraint, including "demanding, whining," "eating dinner,• 
"staring at wall," and "eyes closed." · 
injections.• It appears that Napa's actual use of emergency 
medications, including any delivered via methods other than 
intramuscular injection, is higher. 
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• Another patient identified in the February 2005 CMS survey 
was "walking wrist to waist restrained 11 for 50 hours based 
on a physician order stating, •• [w] alking wrist to waist 
restraints when out of his own room. No release criteria 
other than being release criteria [sic) in his own room." 
The Medical Director, when questioned by CMS ~hether thie 
use of restraints was justified based on an immediate threat 
of violence, stated,. PI think it is less r~strictive to 
allow the patient out in the mdlieu in these restraints, 
rather than having to stay in hie room.N 
• Another patient was restrained on 20 occasions between 
August 2M and September 21, 2004, for a total of 920.4 
hours, or 75% of her hospital time during this period. One 
episode was for 369 consecutive hours. 
• Another patient, who had Down syndrome and whose primary 
language was not English, was observed by CMS surveyors in 
three-point restraints on September 20, 2004. Records 
showed he had been restrained in three or five-point 
restraints since admission three days earlier. None of the 
information in his charts suggested any justification for 
use of restraints. 
• PRNs are used inappropriately, and as a substitute for 
sufficient staff supervision and therapeutic interventions. 
For example, a patient who pushed away a peer in self 
defense when the peer assaulted her was given a PRN for her 
o~ •aggression.• Generally accepted practices and federal 
regulations, 42 C.F.R. § 482.13, prohibit use of restraints 
(including medications) unless the person poses an immediate 
safety threat to themselves or others and aft~r a hierarchy 
of less restrictive measures has been considered and/or 
exhausted. 
Previous CMS surveys confirm that Napa • s misuse of 
restraints and seclusion is a serious and long-standing problem; 
• on February 2, 2001, a patient died while in th~ee-point 
prone restraints in a seclusion room. The patient was 
restrained on his stomach and choked to death while eating. 
The patient's chart reflects that he was at increased risk 
of positional asphyxia because he suf;fered from 
hypertension, obesity, and Huntington's disease. 
Inexplicably, this patient was served.a meal in this 
position and was monitored only by an audio/video monitor 
that showed the back of hie head. 
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• In three of three records reviewed by CMS in August 2001, 
restraints were used without having been approved in the 
patients 1 plans of care. A supervisor interviewed by CMS 
wasunaware of accepted professional standards requiring 
that patients subject to restraint have plans of care 
expressly addressing the restraints used, including 
assessments addressing the need for restraints, appropriate 
interventions based on those assessments, evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the interventions, and re-intervention as 
warranted. 
Multiple independent sources have alleged that staff at Napa 
goad patients into behaviors that are then punished with 
restraint or secluaion. More particularly, staff frequently 
provoke patients into verbal confrontations to justify pl~cing 
the patients in seclusion. If a patient resists being placed in 
seclusion, the patient is then restrained. Because the State has 
denied us access to the facility to investigate these 
allegations, we are compelled to conclude that they are accurate. 
5. Failure to Control EnVironmental Hazards 
In a facility serving people at risk of harming themBelvea 
or others, the environment should be kept tree of hazards. Napa 
has failed to meet this generally accepted profession~l standard 
of care. 
Examples of Napa's breakdown in environmental protections 
include the prevalence of appurtenances and other fixtures upon 
which patients tie off to commit suicide; jagged and broken wall 
tiles; and highly unsanitary bathroom areas. CMS, in fact, has 
determined that staff takes no action, or completely ineffective 
action, to prevent patients from soiling common areas with human 
waste. Exposure to others 1 wastes is a health hazard. 
B. MEDICAL .. NJJRSING, AND PSYCHIATRIC CARE 
1. Peficiencies in Preventative. Routine. and 
Emergency Medical, Nursing. Dental, And 
Psychiatric Ca#ft 
The State is required to provide adequate medical care to 
patients, including·adequate nursing care. Youngberg, 457 U.S. 
at 315, 322. We find that Napa does not provide adequate medical 
and nursing care to patients. Regulatory agency surveys from 
2001 to as recently ae February 2005 indicate persistent 
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deficiencies in medical and nursing care: nursing care is not 
provided to all patients who need it; registered nurses do not 
consistently supervise and evaluate the nursing care of each 
patient; the nursing staff does not consistently develop a 
nursing care plan for each patient; staff fail to ensure the 
proper implementation of patients' care plansi care plana are 
inadequate and outdated; dental care is inadequate; documentation 
and reporting of treatment and symptoms is inadequate; and 
·medications are not consistently administered properly. In 
addition, medical care -- including psychiatric assessments is 
not consistently timely, responsive, or accurate. 
Lapses in medical and nursing care can, and ha~e had, fatal 
consequences for Napa patients. In February 2005, patient B.X. 
complained of breathing problems. Although he used a nebulizer 
for a history of breathing problems, his complaints were not 
addressed by staff~ He died sitting in his room and was 
discovered by a peer. Because the State has denied us access to 
the facility and its records in our investigation, we conclude 
that staff's inattention to this patient's serious medical 
complaint was a cause of his death. 
The following additional examples illustrate many systemic 
medical, nursing, and psychiatric service deficiencies and 
demonstrate Napa's substantial departure from generally accepted 
professional standard of care in these critical areas; 
• In May 2005, a patient who suffered a seizure while in the 
cafeteria choked to'death. !nan inpatient hospital 
setting, it is difficult to imagine why there was no staff 
person with sufficient training available to avert a death 
by choking. 
• In March 2005, a patient waited more than 48 hours for an x-
ray and treatment for a broken arm. 
• In November 2004, the State's own surveyors cited Napa for 
deficient nursing care involving a client with a history of 
suicide attempts. After being notified of the client's 
expressed plan to harm himself, nursing failed "to assess, 
develop a nursing care plan, or even document the incident. 
Five days later, the client attempted suicide. 
• A court-appointed psychologist testified that a forensic 
patient recommended by Napa 1 s staff for conditional release 
had been given the wrong psychiatric diagnosis and no 
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treatment for psychiatric conditione directly affecting his 
suitability for release. 
• In 2003, a patient was forced to wait at least seven months 
for surgical repair of his broken hip. 
• In November 2002, staff failed to observe whether or not 
patients take their medications, even when care plana 
required observation. The State 1 e own surveyors reported 
that, on November 19, 2002, two individuals walked away 
after they had received their medication without staff 
members observing whether they had taken the medication, 
including one individual who had admitted to selling hie 
medications to other patients. Staff members observed by 
DHS on November 20, 2002, failed to crush and dissolve 
medication for certain patients, as had been ordered by the 
physician to ensure that patients were taking their 
medications. 
• According to DHS observations in November 2002, staff failed 
to record the administration of medication in a timely 
manner, resulting in the potential for medication error due 
to the lack of communication of medication administration to 
other medication~adminietering nurses on the unit. 
• On August 5, 2002, a patient attempted to commit suicide by 
taking an overdose of approximately 3000 milligrams of 
medication, when he was prescribed no more. than 
310 milligrams of medication per day. 
• Based on its November 2002 revie~ of records, the State's 
own surveyors reported that several patients failed to 
receive critical dental treatment, despite poor dental 
health, including patients who had cavities, had lost 
several teeth prior to admission, or who were likely 
candidates for extractions. 
• A review by the State's own surveyors of a sample of patient 
records dated July through October 2002, indicated that many 
patients had been prescribed numerous psychotropic 
medications that ha~e adverse interactions, yet there was no 
follow-up to review or record these adverse effects. 
• Napa recorda dated September 30, 2002, indicated that one 
patient was prescribed multiple psychoactive medications and 
doses ot medication above the recommended maximum doses 
without any apparent justification. Ee received 2700 mg a 
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day of an anticonvulsant while the maximum recommended dose 
is 1800 mg a day; 700 mg a day of another anticonvulsant 
while the recommended maximum dose is 500 mg; 20 mg a day of 
an antipsychotic compared to the usual dosage range of 10 mg 
a day; and 10 mg a day of another antipsychotic with a 
maximum effective dose of 4-6 rng a day. In addition, the 
patient received daily doses of an anti-depressant, an anti-
anxiety and anticonvulsant medication, and another 
anticonvulsant. These medications have numerous adverse 
effects and cumulative drug interactions, including 
agitation, insomnia, nervousness, hostility, dizziness, 
objectionable behaviors, movement disorders, anxiety, gait 
disturbances, lack of coordination, irritability, 
restlessness, and slurred speech. Records for this patient 
demonstrated the presence of seizures, falls, hostility, 
aggression, agitation, insomnia, restlessness, and 
unpredictable and objectionable behaviors. There was no 
evidence of a system for recording symptoms in a way that 
would allow the treatment team to differentiate between the 
patient's symptoms of mental illness and symptoms of adverse 
effecte of medication. 
• On the skilled nursing facility unit, staff have refused to 
assist patients to the restroom, forcing patients to spend 
up to 12 hours in soiled diapers. Staff have taken up to 
two hours to respond to patients' call lights, and bathed 
patients as infrequently as once every two to four weeks. 
Observers reported •a strong stench of urine and feces on 
the unit.• 
2. Deficiencies in Pxovisipn of occupational and 
Physical Therapy and Di~tary Sunports and Services 
The care provided at Napa to patients whose needs include 
occupational or physical therapy departs substantially from 
generally accepted professional standards. Napa also 
consistently fails to provide adequate nutritional services, a 
substantial departure from professionally accepted standards that 
may cause serious health problems. For example: 
• In a February 2005 survey, CMS identified two patients ~ho 
required equipment such as portable oxygen and/or 
wheelchairs to attend programming; staff neither encouraged 
nor assisted the patients to use this equipment to attend 
programming but, instead, left th~ patients in bed in their 
rooms. 
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• In November 2002, at least six patients' records were 
missing observation data and information relevant to 
necessary dietary supports and services. 
• In October 2002, CMS observed Napa staff incorrectly 
administer gastrosomy tube feedings for five of six 
patients, and observed a patient with a care plan that 
included swallowing precautions being fed by staff that waa 
not trained and not familiar with the patient's plan. 
The failure to provide physical, occupational, and· 
nutritional supports and services to Napa patients may result in 
a loss of.mobility and independence, and can also lead to 
preventable medical complications. 
C. PSYCROLQGY AND TRBA'l'MBNT PLANNING 
The State must also provide persons committed to psychiatric 
hospitals for an indefinite term with mental health treatment 
that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released. 
Qregon AdVOcacy Ctr. v. M1nk, 322 F.3d 1101, 1121 (9~ Cir. 2003) 
(citing Qblinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 779 (9~ Cir. 1980); 
Sham v. weston, 233 P.Jd 1166, 1172 (9t.:ll Cir. 2000) (same). 
Multiple independent sources. including regulatory agencies, 
independent professionals, patients, and patient advocates, 
inform us that Napa fails to provide adequate treatment planning, 
and in particular, fails to plan adequately to &ddrees patients• 
assaultive and self-abusive behaviors. In addition to the many 
examples of Napa's failure to addreaa assaultive and suicidal 
behavior, discussed at §§ II.A.l and 2, above, example~ of 
failures to.treat include: 
• Napa failed to provide a current psychiatric assessment for 
··patient M.E. since someti~ before February 2004; this 
patient committed suicide on March 20, 2005. CMS identified 
additional patients without timely psychiatric evaluations, 
including one who had not been evaluated more than six 
months after admission, and another who had no psychiatric 
evaluation for more than two years. 
• Napa failed to intervene to address escalating violence by 
patient Q.R., including an assault on a peer that caused 
injury requiring stitches, despite pleas from Q.R. 1 s family 
members to hie treatment team. 
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• Recent CMS surveys confirm that Napa fails to provide 
structured therapies baaed on patients' treatment needs; 
fails to develop and document interventions based on 
patients• presenting needs; and fails to develop 
interventions to be provided by a physician. 
• Staff do not encourage patients to attend their few 
scheduled treatment groups, and staft actions often disrupt 
those groups. One patient was left asleep in her bed at the 
time of her scheduled treatment group with no staff 
encouraging her to partici~te. 
• Napa fails to provide adequate interpretative services to 
enable non-English-speaking patients to understand their 
treatment. One Vietnamese patient was observed to mumble 
and sing throughout his ward's community meeting, during 
which he was frequently •shushed" by the interpreter. When 
interviewed following the meeting, the patient stated he did 
not understand what had occurred. A second Vietnamese 
patient was not evaluated for suicide risk for more than six 
months because no interpreter was available. 
• A court-appointed psychologist testified that Napa staff 
failed to address a patient's history of violent assault and 
inappropriate relationships with women, including Napa etaff 
members. Notwithstanding this failure to treat, Napa's 
doctors recommended that this forensic patient be 
conditionally releaaed to the community, which the court-
appointed expert deacribed as a complete lapse in 
professional judgment. 
• Th& State's regulatory agency reviewed patient records in 
late 2002 and concluded that Napa fails to assess and plan 
interventions for thoee patients with a history of 
assaultive behavior until after those patients have 
assaulted someone at the facility. 
D. DISCHARGE PLANNING AND PLA~ IN THE MOST lNTEGRATRP 
SETIING 
Napa fails to comply with the requirement of the ADA and its 
implementing regulations that patients be placed in the most 
integrated, appropriate setting consistent with the patient's 
needs and the te~ of any court-ordered confinement. See 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, which states: 
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no qualified individual with a disability shall, by 
reason of such disability1 be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the 
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 
~also ADA implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) ('A 
public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities 
· in the moat integrated setting appropriate to the needs of 
qualified individuals with disabilities#}; Olmstead v. ~, 
527 U.S. 591 (1999); President George W. Bush's New Freedom 
Initiative, ~community-Based Alternatives for Individuals with 
Disabilities,• Exec. Order No. 13217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33155 
(June 18, 2001) (the President emphasized that unjustified 
isolation or segregation of qualified individuals with 
disabilities in institutions is a form of prohibited 
discrimination, that the United States is committed to community-
baaed alternatives for individuals with disabilities, and that 
the United States seeks to ensure that America's community-based 
programs effectively foster independence and participation in the 
community for Americans with disabilities). 
We have received credible allegations that patients ~ho seek 
to be discharged into community place~nt~ are retaliated against 
by Napa staff. According to a patient's family member, a patient 
~as placed on psychotropic medication in late 2002 in retaliation 
for writing letters to the court requesting a discharge hearing. 
The prescribing doctor reportedly told him that he would not stop 
giving him the medication until he stopped writing the letters. 
Another patient alleged that abe was retaliated against for 
hiring an attorney to seek her release. She alleged that she 
received excessive dosages of medication and was awa~ened every 
30 minutes at night to deprive her of sleep, until she stopped 
seeking her release. Two other sources stated that patients were 
given large doses of psychotropic drugs before any court 
appearance to inhibit their release from Napa. In addition, in 
November 2001, a staff member alleged that when patients were 
ready for discharge, supervisors instructed the medical staff to 
alter notations in patients' records to indicate that patients 
were not ready to be discharged. • 
Napa also fails to provide sufficient substance abuse 
programs to meet patient needs, even though these are a 
prerequisite to participation in tbe "conditional release" 
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program.' A patient's failure to complete the program leads Napa 
to file a petition for an extension of time of commitment. 
Finally, multiple credible sources state that patients receive 
little or no treatment or interventions to prepare them for 
discharge; discharge planning for patients is essentially "do it 
yourself. 11 
III. MINIMUM REMEDIAL MEASURES 
Because the State has denied.ue timely accees to Napa, we 
are not able to provide remedial measures with the eame 
specificity as we provided in our letters dated May·21, 2003 and 
February 19, 2004, regarding Metropolitan State Hospital. 
However, because the deficiencies at Napa generally mirror the 
deficiencies at Metropolitan, the specific remedies outlined in 
the letters regarding Metropolitan are illustrative of those that 
should be implemented at Napa. To remedy the deficiencies 
discussed above and to protect the constitutional and federal 
statutory rights of the patients at Napa, the State should, at a 
minimum, promptly implement the remedial measures set forth 
below. 
A. Prot~ction from Harm 
1. To remedy deficiencies that result in excessive patient-on-
patient assaults, patient suicides, and trafficking in 
contraband, including illegal street drugs, the State must: 
a. Enaure that Napa provide its patients with adequate, 
integrated treatment planning consistent with generally 
accepted professional standards of care. In 
particular, Napa should: 
(l) Develop and implement policies and procedures 
regarding the development of treatment plans 
consistent with generally accepted standards of 
care. 
(2) Revise treatment plans as appropriate, based on 
significant developments in patients•.conditions, 
including patients' progress, or lack thereof, aa 
determined by the scheduled monitoring of 
identified criteria or target variables. 
9 In California, conditional release is similar to parole 
for forensic patients. 
•• C.CJ 
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b. Ensure Napa provides its patients with accurate, 
complete, and timely assessments, consistent with 
generally accepted professional ~tandards of care; 
these assessments should drive treatment interventions. 
c. Ensure that Napa reviews, revises, as appropriate, and 
implements comprehensive, consistent incident 
management policies and procedures consistent with 
generally accepted professional standards. At a 
minimum, revised policies and procedures shall provide 
clear guidance regarding reporting requirements and the 
categorization of incidents, and address investigation 
of all serious incidents. 
d. Ensure that Napa develope and implements a 
comprehensive quality improvement system consistent 
with generally accepted professional standards of care. 
2. To remedy deficiencies that result in excessive and 
inappropriate use of seclusion, restraint and PRN 
medications, the State must: 
a. Eneure that seclusion, restraints, and PRN psychotropic 
medications are used at Napa in accordance with 
generally accepted professional standards of care. 
b. Ensure that restraints, seclusion, and PRN medications 
are used in a reliably-documented manner and only when 
persons pose an immediate safety threat to themselves 
or others, after a hierarchy of leas restrictive 
measures has been considered and/or exhausted, and are 
terminated once the person is no longer an imminent 
danger to himself or others. 
c. Ensure that seclusion, restraints and PRN medications 
are not used in the absence of, or as an alternative 
to, active treatment, aa punishment, or for the 
convenience of staff. 
d. Ensure that the patient's treatment team, in a 
clinically-justifiable manner, timely reviews the.uee 
of such interventions, and determines whether to modify 
the patient's treatment plan, and implements the 
revised plan, as appropriate. 
3. To remedy deficiencies that result in an unsafe physical 
environment, the State must: 
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a. Ensure that Napa provides ita patients with a safe and 
humane environment and protect them.from harm. At a 
minimum, Napa shall conduct a thorough review of all 
units to identify any potential environmental safety 
hazards and develop and implement a plan to remedy any 
identified issuea. 
B. Medical, Nursing. Dental and P~chiatric Ca~ 
1. Napa should provide adequate preventative, routine, 
specialized, and emergency medical services on a timely 
basis, in accordance with generally accepted professional 
standards of care. 
2. Napa should provide nursing and unit-based services to ita 
patients consistent with generally accepted professional 
standards of care. such services should regult in Napa's 
patients receiving individuali~ed services, supports, and 
therapeutic interventions, consistent with their treatment 
plans. 
3. Napa should provide adequate psychiatric supports and 
services for the treatment of the severely and persistently 
mentally ill population of adults that it serves in 
accordance with generally accepted professional standards of 
care. At a minimum, the State must ensure that: 
a. Napa develops diagnostic practices, guided by current, 
generally accepted professional criteria, for reliably 
reaching the most accurate psychiatric diagnoses for 
each patient. 
b. Napa reviews and revises, as appropriate, psychiatric 
aaaesaments of all patients, providing clinically 
justifiable current diagnoses for each patient; 
modifies treatment and medication regimens, as 
appropriate, considering factors such as the patient's 
response to treatment, significant developments in the 
patient's condition, and changing patient needs; and 
ensures that each patient's psychiatric aseea&manta, 
diagnoses, and medications are collectively justified 
in a generally accept~d professional manner. · 
c. Napa's patients receive pharmacy services consistent 
with generally accepted professional standards of care. 
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4. Napa should provide its patients with routine and emergency 
dental care and treatment on a timely basis, consistent with 
generally accepted professional standards of care. 
5. Napa should implement adequate infection control procedures 
to prevent the spread of infections or communicable 
diseases. 
'6. Napa should provide its patients with physical and 
occupational therapy consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. 
7. Napa should ensure that its patients receive adequate 
dietary services, consistent with generally accepted 
professional standards of care. 
c. Psychology and Treatment Planning 
l. Napa should provide psychological supports and services 
adequate to treat the functional and behavioral needs of its 
adult patients according to generally accepted professional 
standards of care. 
. 
D. Discharge Planning and Placement in the Most Integrated 
Setting 
1. Within the limitations of court-imposed confinement, the 
State should pursue actively the appropriate discharge of 
patients and ensure that they are provided services in the 
most integrated, appropriate setting that is consistent with 
patients' needs. 
I invite the State to discuss with us the remedial 
recommendations, with the goal of remedying the identified 
deficiencies without resort to litigation. In the event that we 
are unable to reach a resolution regarding our concerns, the 
Attorney General is empowered to institute a lawsuit pursuant to 
CRIPA to correct deficiencies of the kind identified in this 
letter, 49 days after appropriate offieials have been notified of 
them. 42 U.S.C. S 1997b(a) (l). · 
We would prefer, however, to resolve thia matter by working 
cooperatively with you. We have every confidence that we will be 
able to do so in this case. The lawyers assigned to this matter 
will contact your attorneys to discuss this matter in further 
detail. If you have any questions regarding this letter, please 
r.c::::..) 
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call Shanetta Y. CUtlar, Chief of the Civil Rights Division's 
Sp~cial Litigation Section, at (202) 514-0195. 
Sincerely, 
Bradley J. Schlozman 
Acting Assistant Attorney General 
cc: The Honorable Bill Lockyer 
Attorney General 
State of California 
Stephen W. Mayberg, Ph.D. 
Director 
California Department of Mental Health 
Mr. Dav& Graziani 
Executive Director 
Napa State Hospital 
Kevin V. Ryan, Esq. 
United States Attorney 
~orthern District of California 
TOTAL P.24 
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State of California 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY 
August 8, 2005 
Bradley J. Schlozman 
Acting Assistant Attorney General 
U:S. Department of Justice 
Civil Rights Division 
Special Litigation Section 
PHB Mailroom 5034 
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW 
Washington DC, 20530 
RE: Response to the United States Department of Justice Findings Letter 
regarding Napa State Hospital pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized 
Persons Act "CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 
Dear Mr. Schlozman: 
The California Health and Human Services Agency, the California Department of 
Mental Health, and Napa State Hospital (hereafter referred to collectively as the 
Department) have reviewed the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) 
findings letter dated June 27, 2005. We believe that your findings result in part from 
a misunderstanding between the Department and the USDOJ about the intention of 
the Department to facilitate an inspection of the Napa facility. We would like to 
assure you of our intention to collaborate with the USDOJ to provide the level of 
services we agree is necessary, as well as clarify our position regarding facility 
access and propose further cooperative meetings in order to reach an accord. 
Not only is the Department firmly committed to cooperating with the USDOJ Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) investigations and to enhancing the 
services at the state hospitals, we have demonstrated this intent by our response to 
the investigation of Metropolitan State Hospital (Metropolitan). In the Metropolitan 
investigation, the USDOJ itself has noted our cooperation, and the Department has 
welcomed a dialogue addressing areas that the USDOJ identifies as requiring 
enhancement. Subsequent to the Metropolitan findings, the Department has not.only 
begun introducing enhancements at Metropolitan, even without a finalized 
agreement, but we have also begun introducing additional enhancements in the 
operations of the other three operating state hospitals (Napa, Patton, and 
Atascadero). As we have stated numerous times, we are committed to the best 
interest of the patients, the community, and the hospitals. 
It was never our intent to prevent the USDOJ from inspecting the Napa facility. 
Unfortunately, the fact that many different investigations were going on or being 
announced at the same time complicated communication on this matter. Our 
statement, made late in 2004 and again in June 2005, that we did not believe access 
to the Napa facility would be possible before 2006, was not meant to be 
unreasonable or untimely. Indeed, we believe the timing problems are apparent from 
the overlapping communications: 
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• In March 2002, the USDOJ announced the Metropolitan investigation and 
issued findings in the children and adolescent programs in May 2003 and in 
the adult program investigation in February 2004. The Department 
immediately began cooperating with the USDOJ to make enhancements and 
has worked steadily on those enhancements. 
• In January 2004, the USDOJ announced the Napa investigation to the 
Department, in April2004 the Patton investigation was announced, and in 
February 2005 the Atascadero investigation was announced. 
• In March 2004, I requested additional time prior to having an on-site 
inspection of Napa in order to complete and implement the enhancements 
being made in the wake of the Metropolitan investigation. In June 2004, 1 
requested the Department be allowed to complete its response to the first 
investigations (at Metropolitan) prior to allocating its scarce resources to more 
investigations. In August 2004, USDOJ offered to discuss options to limit 
disruptions by "investigatory tours." In October 2004, I accepted USDOJ's 
offer to negotiate all of the investigations announced. 
• In December 2004 and February 2005, the USDOJ presented a remediation 
plan and a proposed court order concerning Metropolitan. In March 2005, 
USDOJ and the Department met for a conference to discuss the 
enhancements to the Metropolitan program and the potential of incorporating 
those enhancements at all other state hospital (Napa, Patton, and 
Atascadero) programs. 
• In May 2005, the attorney handling this matter for the Department passed 
away unexpectedly. 
The Department understood that the process was moving forward at a pace dictated 
by the USDOJ's investigation and that both the Department and USDOJ had similar 
perspectives about the importance of the enhancements that were being put in place 
at Napa. By the time we received your Napa report, the time period we suggested 
for the inspection was less than five months away. 
Some of the extenuating circumstances that made it difficult to allow access sooner 
were the October-November 2005 JCAHO accreditation committee inspection that 
comes every three years to accredit the hospitals, the staff shortages created by the 
trainings underway to institute the enhancements, the September 2005 opening of a 
new state hospital, our first new hospital in over 50 years, and the volume of work 
associated with the USDOJ inspections (at Metropolitan, staff produced a total of 
259,911 copies for the USDOJ, eighty-three 12" X 11" X 16" boxes of documents, 
and tens of thousands of worker hours were consumed during the inspection and 
producing the documents). 
Due to these issues, we requested to work together and schedule an inspection in 
2006 that would not disrupt the facility or pose nearly impossible work schedules for 
staff, and would allow you to note the enhancements we had informed you we were 
making. We believed this was in both parties', as well as our patients', best interest. 
I. 
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At this point, we also continue to seek a reasonable schedule for the access at 
Atascadero and Patton. In the Department's July 18, 2005 phone conference with 
Benjamin Tayloe of your office, he suggested that August and September of 2005 
are the only viable dates for those inspections. We are willing to provide access on 
those dates for an abbreviated tour if no more reasonable times can be found, 
although we are still facing the same timing issues we mentioned earlier. 
Additionally, in response to the specific issues raised in your letter, we would like to 
first assure you that the Department has already begun instituting enhancements to 
the treatment approach that emphasizes recovery through individualized treatment, 
empowerment, and self-determination, as the USDOJ agrees is the right direction. 
However, we must be clear that the Department's willingness to engage in a dialogue 
and enhance programs does not mean that the Department agrees with all of the 
findings and conclusions in the June 27, 2005 letter. While we consider all of the 
issues addressed in your findings letter to be important ones, we note that the 
enhancements the Department has already made are not acknowledged in your 
assessment. For instance, in the last 6 months, Napa State Hospital has made 
significant improvement in the area of seclusion and restraint, reducing the number 
of seclusion and restraint hours for all patients on the acute units by 93% and 
hospital wide by 89%. This has meant that although patients at the hospital spent 
over 8100 hours in seclusion in September 2004, that time was reduced to 897.1 
hours by May 2005. There are also several factual errors that we can address at 
further length in the meetings currently being scheduled. 
The Department is committed to working with USDOJ to address the concerns that 
has been raised. As we discussed, the untimely death of our lead attorney on this 
case has seriously hampered our continuity. Cynthia Rodriguez, Chief Counsel of 
the Department, will be following up with you to schedule a time convenient for all 
parties to further discuss this matter. The Department has already scheduled a 
meeting on August 9, 2005 to further discuss a remediation plan for Metropolitan 
State Hospital. We are negotiating a meeting for later in August to discuss the global 
issues that your investigations have raised and possible resolutions. We have 
proposed and are considering several resolutions, and the Department looks forward 
to working with the USDOJ to resolve this matter and continue with the Department's 
mission to serve the patients at Napa State Hospital. 
Sincerely, 
KIMBERLY BELSHE 
Secretary 
1600 Ninth Street · Room 460 · Sacramento, CA 95814 · Telephone (916) 654-3454 · Fax (916) 654-3343 
DOJ/CRD/SPL 
SYC:JP:BOT:LS:MRB: 
SSL:BG:RC:KAK:kf 
DJ 168-ii-44 . 
BY FACSIMILE AND FIRST CLASS MAIL 
Ms. s. Kimberly Belshe 
secretary 
· Health and Human Serv-ices Agency 
State of California 
1600 Ninth Street 
Room 460 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
202 514 4883 
U.S. Department of Justke 
Civil Rights Division 
Sptcial litigation Section - PHB 
· 950 PerwylWl11ia Avenue, N. W. 
WashingtOn, DC 20530 
August 17, 2005 
Re: Napa State Hospital:· Napa, California 
. Dear Secretary Belshe: 
Tharik you for your letter. of August 8,.2005 to Bradley J. 
P.02 
Schlozman setting forth·the response of the California Health and 
·Human Services ~gency,·the California Department of Mental Health 
·. ("DMH"} I and Napa. State Hospital {collectiVely r the "State") to 
our June 27, 200.5 findings .letter regarding Napa State Hospital~ 
Your letter was directed to me, and I apologize for any delay in 
our response. 
We appreci~f~ your leadership and are pleased that the 
parties appear to be moving towards a resolution of this matter 
.as well as our:investig~tions of Metropolitan, Patton, and 
. ·Atascadero State Hospitals. We believe that working in a 
collaborative fashion serves the· interests of ·the State, the· 
United States ·oepartment of Justice, and, most importantly, the 
, patients at California's state hospitals. To that end, our 
office h~s been in regular contact with Cynthia Rodriguez, Chief 
Counsel for.DMH, and will continue to be available to discuss 
this matter with her. 
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Again, we appreciate the State's willingness to be an active 
and cooperative partner in addressing conditions ·at its state 
hospital~. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to 
contact~me at 202-514-0195. 
anetta Y. Cutlar 
Chief 
Special Litigation Section 
